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i 
ABSTRACT 
The corporate political activity field has focused on the study of political 
capabilities that allow firms to influence governments and regulators.  Building on 
previous studies, this thesis examines a set of capabilities that allow host firms to adapt 
to rather than influence political environments.  Specifically, this set of adaptive 
political capabilities can be used by firms to confront host country political contexts in 
emerging economies that share two characteristics: authoritarian regimes and weak 
institutions.  The findings of this thesis show that host firms can develop and use 
adaptive political capabilities rather than political capabilities to start and sustain their 
operations in this type of political contexts.  This entails attuning firm processes, 
structures, and practices to local norms and political behaviors, rather than attempting to 
shape the host country political environment in its own likeness.  Our results suggest 
host firms can develop adaptive political capabilities to enhance their strategic 
repertoire when starting or sustaining operations in emerging economies with such 
characteristics.  Our contribution is that by using mixed methods, we provide and test 
several exploratory propositions that support the conceptualization of a framework to 
guide the development of adaptive political capabilities by host firms and we make 
explicit a taxonomy of corporate adaptive political strategies that can enable firms to 
envision how they can adapt to host political contexts. 
Keywords:  
non-market strategy, resource-based view, dynamic capabilities, political capabilities, 
corporate political activities, political strategies, internationalization, food industry 
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 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Prologue 
Within strategic management, dynamic capabilities research is a rapidly 
expanding area of theory that has emerged from the resource-based view to explain the 
competitive advantage of firms (Blyer and Coff, 2003; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 
1997; Zott, 2003).  Dynamic capabilities refer to the ability of firms to integrate, build, 
and reconfigure resources to create or sustain competitive advantage in rapidly changing 
environments (Teece et al., 1997).  Empirical research on dynamic capabilities has 
focused on the study of specific firm capabilities suggesting that there is not an all-
purpose dynamic capability that can provide firms with competitive advantage in all 
contexts (Ethiraj et al., 2005).  Among some of the specific capabilities that have been 
studied are: project management capabilities, client-specific capabilities (Ethiraj et al., 
2005), pricing capabilities (Dutta, Zbaracki, and Bergen, 2003), and product 
development capabilities (Salvato, 2009).  Whilst these and many other capabilities 
have focused on how firms can create or sustain competitive advantage in the market 
environment (Barney, 1991; Baron, 1995; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Wernerfelt, 1984), 
more recently the non-market environment has received increasing attention by the 
study of capabilities that address this context (Doh, Lawton, and Rajwani, 2012).  
Among some of the most studied capabilities within the non-market environment are: 
“political capabilities” that enable firms to assess policy risk and manage the policy 
making process (Holburn and Zelner, 2010) and “lobbying capabilities” that enable 
firms to influence the political environment (Lawton and Rajwani, 2011; Lawton, 
Rajwani, and Doh, 2013).
1
 
The study of political capabilities is of particular interest to the corporate 
political context in the non-market environment (Baysinger, 1984; Hillman, Keim, and 
Schuler, 2004).  Within the corporate political context, governments have long been 
                                                 
1
 Despite political capabilities and lobbying capabilities have been both used to refer to capabilities that 
aim to manage or influence the political environment, we found that political capabilities have been more 
commonly used and even thought of as encapsulating lobbying capabilities.  In other words, lobbying 
capabilities have been conceptualized as a subset of political capabilities.  Consequently, we will refer to 
political capabilities throughout our inquiry. 
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viewed as sources of uncertainty for firms since they exert control over critical 
resources that shape firms’ competitive environments, especially when firms enter new 
markets (Boddewyn, 1988; Jacobson, Lenway, and Ring, 1993; Hillman and Hitt, 
1999).  Over time, the political context has become increasingly relevant for firms as 
their competitive landscape has changed to progressively involve more challenges 
arising from political affairs, many of them related to growing internationalization 
efforts (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Hitt, Keats, and DeMarie, 1998; Lawton, McGuire, and 
Rajwani, 2013).  Through their political capabilities, firms have traditionally used 
corporate political activities, in an attempt to shape government policy in ways 
favorable to their shareholders (Baysinger, 1984; Hillman et al., 2004). 
Despite the growing number of studies about political capabilities, there is still a 
call for “research into firm resources and capabilities that aid political activities” 
(Hillman et al., 2004: 851) since “resources and capabilities are one of the three 
dominant research areas that need further exploration in CPA” (Lawton et al., 2013: 
13).  Our criticism to current resources and capabilities studies in CPA, is that they have 
focused on the study of capabilities that can only enable firms to influence political 
environments, not paying attention to other capabilities that can enable firms to respond 
differently to political affairs.  The underlying assumption of the many studies of 
political capabilities is that influencing political affairs is the only strategic response for 
firms to all political contexts.   
However, the acceleration of firms’ internationalization processes has 
confronted firms with different political contexts (i.e. different degrees of institutional 
and regulatory interference), which condition and impact firms’ activities (Brouthers, 
Brouthers, and Werner, 2008).  We argue that the particular characteristics of these 
different political contexts have set a challenge for firms to develop diverse capabilities 
that can enable them with a repertoire of strategic responses to be more competitive in a 
variety of political contexts.  Therefore, the competitiveness of firms’ international 
operations should not only rely on their development of political capabilities to 
influence governments in all host markets.  Firms also deal with host markets where 
influencing governments through information exchange or political contributions are 
not the only or most adequate responses.  Therefore, our study will aim to meet these 
 3 
shortfalls by addressing the development of a set of capabilities by firms that will 
enable them to deal with host political contexts having particular characteristics where 
influencing political affairs through political capabilities is not the only or most 
adequate strategic response.  We found that through the development of this different 
set of capabilities, firms can adapt to political challenges by using their experience and 
knowledge to integrate, build, and reconfigure their resources to create or sustain their 
competitive advantage. 
1.2 Research rationale 
Our interest in the study of a set of capabilities that enables firms to adapt to 
political contexts stemmed from the acceleration of firms’ internationalization 
processes, especially in Latin America (Brenes and Carneiro, 2013; Casanova, 2009).  
Specifically, studies have shown how political uncertainties in emerging markets have 
significantly affected the operations of international firms (Henisz and Zelner, 2010).  
Simultaneously, through a series of exploratory interviews we observed top executives 
claimed that emerging markets have become strategic markets for their firms which they 
cannot simply decide to exit in the face of high political uncertainty.  Furthermore, 
many described these host markets as sharing the characteristics of having authoritarian 
regimes and weak institutions.  As these top executives argued that rather than 
attempting to influence these emerging markets’ governments, their firms needed to 
deal with and adapt to their political challenges to sustain their international operations, 
we identified this challenge as not being extensively investigated in the corporate 
political activity field.  However, we found this research problem resonates with 
Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani’s (2013) claim that “an up-and-coming challenge for 
corporate political activity (CPA) scholars is to understand non-market activity in 
emerging economies” (p. 14). 
To address this problem we reviewed the existing literature domains of 
internationalization, uncertainty, the resource-based view (RBV), dynamic capabilities, 
and corporate political activity.  Our review indicated that while the corporate political 
activity field has concentrated on the study of how firms influence political contexts, 
little research has directed towards the study of other different strategic responses firms 
use to deal with their political contexts.  We found that firms can deal with high 
 4 
political uncertainty contexts in host markets characterized by authoritarian regimes and 
weak institutions through flexible responses (i.e. by modifying firms’ organizational 
structures and processes to comply with the law) which allow them to adapt to political 
challenges.  We argue these flexible responses can be enabled by firms’ adaptive 
political capabilities (later on defined in section 1.3).  Therefore, the challenge of our 
research focused on further exploring the question of “how” and “why” does a firm 
develop adaptive political capabilities to confront high political uncertainty contexts in 
emerging economies during its internationalization processes.  We believe that the 
better the knowledge gained regarding the way firms deal with their political contexts, 
the more enhanced will be our understanding of how firms can manage to operate in 
politically challenging markets. 
1.3 Definition of adaptive political capabilities 
The term “adaptive political capabilities” is derived from the term “adaptive 
capabilities” that has been used to address the market environment and less so the non-
market environment.  In the market environment, adaptive capabilities have been 
defined as the ability of a firm to enable product adaption to market demands.  For 
example, Cavusgil and others (1993) referred to adaptive capabilities as the ability of a 
firm to adapt its product upon and after market entry and to adapt its promotion 
approach, packaging/labeling or product positioning.  While, Oktemgil and Greenley 
(1997) referred to adaptive capabilities as the ability of a firm to respond to product-
market opportunities, conduct marketing activities for responding to these opportunities, 
and speedily responding to pursue these opportunities.  More recently, Lu and others 
(2010) defined adaptive capabilities as the ability of a firm to coordinate, recombine, 
and allocate resources to meet the different requirements of foreign markets.  They 
operationalized adaptive capabilities by measuring a firm’s ability to meet the 
requirements of foreign customer demands in terms of product and service 
specifications, ability to tailor products/services according to foreign customer requests, 
and ability to respond quickly to the demand for a product price change from a foreign 
customer.   
While “adaptive capabilities” are used by firms to address the market 
environment, we find from our data that “adaptive political capabilities” are used by 
 5 
firms to address the non-market environment through non-market strategy to start and 
sustain their international operations in the high political contexts of some emerging 
markets.  
Therefore, building on the work in market strategy by Cavusgil and others 
(1993), Oktemgil and Greenley (1997), and Lu and others (2010); and on the work in 
the strategic management field by Zollo and Winter (2002), Gibson and Birkinshaw 
(2004), and March (1991) (discussed in more detail in Chapter 3), we view adaptive 
political capabilities as a specific set of capabilities that can allow the adaption of a firm 
to host political contexts to start and sustain its operations despite high political 
uncertainty.  Consequently, we define adaptive political capabilities as: 
A firm’s ability to collectively, systematically, and simultaneously accumulate 
experience and articulate and codify knowledge from political uncertainties 
confronted in host markets, to enable through a learned pattern the 
reconfiguration of resources and processes to adapt to political uncertainties.
2
 
1.4 Setting 
Most non-market strategy research has tended to concentrate on multinationals 
operating in richly institutionalized markets such as the United States (McGuire, 
Lindeque, and Suder, 2012).  In contrast, our research is set in highly uncertain political 
contexts characterized by authoritarian regimes and weak institutions.  These contexts 
have become strategic markets for firms which they cannot simply decide to exit in the 
face of political uncertainty.  They are mainly found in emerging economies throughout 
the world such as those in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.   
Among these various emergent regions around the world, we selected Latin 
America to set the scene for our research.  This region has been categorized as the 
second most important emergent region in the world after Southeast Asia, with an 
aggregated gross domestic product (GDP) roughly that of China’s and three times larger 
than India’s (World Bank, 2008).  More important, Latin America has presented 
interesting political changes during the last 50 years.  It has become polarized insofar as 
                                                 
2
 More details of the conceptualization of adaptive political capabilities can be found in Chapter 3. 
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some countries are clearly democratic whereas others have long-lived populist and 
dictatorial practices (Brenes and Carneiro, 2013).  The region has also been 
characterized by a weak institutional context where the “rules of the game” are 
frequently changed arbitrarily by governments.  According to Transparency 
International (2009), Latin American countries have among the lowest levels of trust in 
the judiciary, and many countries lack effective enforcement of the rule of law.  
Additionally, firms in Latin America have had to cope over decades with guerrilla, war, 
infrastructure limitations, and corruption.  These conditions have forced firms in this 
region to learn how to operate in a highly volatile environment with hostile 
characteristics.  Therefore, given the environmental conditions that firms have regularly 
faced in Latin America, it is interesting to examine how firms in that region cope with 
political uncertainty.  Paradoxically, although much can be learned from Latin America, 
we found scarce research had addressed this region.  From 1963–2009, only 206 articles 
in 17 academic management journals were found to discuss Latin America (Nicholls-
Nixon et al., 2011).  Moreover, Latin American researchers publish little (Pérez-Batres, 
Pisani, and Doh, 2010). 
Within Latin America, we selected Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua as the 
host political contexts to conduct our research, since these countries have suffered the 
highest political uncertainty in the region over the last decade (IHS Global Insight, 
2012) and have been characterized by authoritarian regimes and weak institutions 
(Vassolo, De Castro, and Gomez-Mejia, 2011).  Although Cuba and Haiti have also 
been categorized with the highest political uncertainty in Latin America, we excluded 
them from our research due to their limited international commercial relations and FDI. 
That said, our research focused on firms from the processed food industry since 
this industry was impacted by extreme political uncertainties in the three countries of 
our study during our research timeframe (1999 to 2011).  According to our data, the 
processed food industry faced the imposition of quotas and safeguards, delays in 
required registrations, logistic obstacles, policy changes, and price controls stemming 
from political decisions.  Additionally, we found no empirical study investigating 
capabilities in the processed food industry within the strategic management arena.  (Our 
research setting is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2). 
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1.5 Importance of this research 
Our research interest was chosen based on the paucity of studies that examine 
the resource based-view in relation to corporate politics (Getz, 2002; Hillman et al., 
2004).  In particular, it was surprising to have found that among these studies most 
describe ways in which firms can influence political environments using information 
exchange, political networking or political contributions (Aplin and Hegarty, 1980; 
Baysinger, 1984; Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Bonardi, Hillman, and Keim, 2005; 
Hillman, 2003; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004), but few scholars examine 
political behaviors to manage political environments such as firms’ adaption of their 
structures and processes to comply with the law.  The growing internationalization of 
firms has confronted them with the challenge of sustaining operations in emerging 
economies with authoritarian regimes and weak institutions in their need to find markets 
where their participation and sales can grow.  Given that this is an inescapable reality 
for many firms and a pending assignment for academic research, we believe it is 
important for corporate political activity research to develop further understanding 
about “how” and “why” firms decide to adapt instead of influencing political issues in 
their host markets.  This broader understanding can extend our knowledge about the 
strategic repertoire available to firms to deal with the non-market environment, 
specifically the corporate political contexts of their diverse host markets.  It will also 
allow a better understanding of the foundations and themes that play a role in the 
development of adaptive political capabilities and their interactions to create 
competitive benefits.   
1.6 Research contributions 
The contributions to knowledge of this thesis are set within the strategic 
management field, specifically dynamic capabilities research emerging from the 
resource based-view theory, and the corporate political activity field.  The first of our 
theoretical contributions is the conceptualization of adaptive political capabilities as a 
set of capabilities that can allow firms to adapt to high political uncertainty contexts in 
host markets.  Political capabilities have been amply discussed as capabilities that 
enable firms to influence their political environment (Holburn and Zelner, 2010; 
Lawton and Rajwani, 2011).  However, by for example adapting their structures and 
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processes to comply with the law, many firms are being able to manage their political 
contexts.  Therefore, our central contribution lies in the conceptualization of a set of 
capabilities that enable firms to adapt to their uncertain political environments.   
Our second contribution is achieved through our first study - a case study.  Its 
empirical findings allowed us to contribute to reactive corporate political activity 
research within the corporate political activity field, by suggesting a taxonomy of 
corporate adaptive political strategies that explains what strategies firms can use to 
adapt to political contexts. 
Our third contribution to knowledge is broadening our understanding of how and 
why adaptive political capabilities develop by uncovering their foundations and the 
resources involved in their development process.  We suggest, test, and discuss several 
exploratory propositions that support a framework to guide their development by firms 
to sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts. 
Additionally to these theoretical contributions, our research also produced two 
contextual contributions related to the setting where it was conducted and a modest 
methodological contribution.  We do not anticipate these contextual and methodological 
contributions in this introduction but leave them to be discovered in Chapter 9: 
Conclusion, in section 9.1.: Contributions to knowledge. 
1.7 Methodology 
Our inquiry followed a hybrid or mixed methods and sequential contributions 
(qualitative to quantitative) research design that involved first the collection of 
qualitative data that was analyzed qualitatively during study 1, and subsequently the 
collection of quantitative data that was analyzed quantitatively during study 2 (Morgan, 
2014; Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2009).  Our research integrated a qualitative 
method as the core method, and a follow-up supplementary quantitative method to 
contribute additional strengths to enhance the effectiveness of the core method (Morgan, 
2014).  The goal of this sequential contributions design was to use the different 
strengths of different methods for different purposes with one method contributing to 
the other in a pre-planned fashion.  This research design had the objective of first 
understanding an unexplored phenomenon through qualitative methods, and secondly, 
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understanding the broader applicability of small-sample qualitative findings through 
quantitative methods (Huff, 2009).  The qualitative method used as the core method was 
the case study method and the follow-up supplementary quantitative method was a 
survey.  Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2012) have described this type of 
research design as compensatory since it combines qualitative and quantitative studies 
to make up for the weaknesses of the other. 
Despite an increasing number of published empirical articles using hybrid or 
mixed methods, our research design was not the result of a methodological fad but a 
question of methodological fit (Edmondson and McManus, 2007).  To achieve 
methodological fit, the research questions, design, and contribution of any inquiry in 
any field should be influenced by the stage of development of the current literature at 
the time of the inquiry.  The state of prior research on dynamic capabilities within the 
resource-based view and corporate political activity research was found to be at an 
intermediate theoretical developmental stage at the time of our inquiry.  This state 
signifies that these streams of research generally present provisional explanations of 
phenomena, often introducing a new construct and proposing relationships between it 
and established constructs.  In some cases, research questions even allow the 
development of testable propositions.  This intermediate state of prior research on 
dynamic capabilities and corporate political activity, offered the possibility of a new 
study to simultaneously allow openness to new or unexplored insights from qualitative 
data and to test several propositions (Edmondson and McManus, 2007).  Consequently, 
the research design of our inquiry addressed an unexplored phenomenon through 
qualitative data to develop several exploratory propositions that were subsequently 
tested through a quantitative approach.  The value of our design lies in that, despite the 
overall intermediate state of prior research, many of the studies on specific dynamic 
capabilities conclude by drawing findings or propositions from a single case such as 
Salvato (2009) and Ethiraj and others (2005), while our research design aimed to further 
address through a second study the extent of generalizability of our exploratory 
propositions - at least within their specific context.  In this sense, we believe mixed 
methods allowed us to advance from one stage to another in the development of 
knowledge about our phenomenon of interest. 
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1.8 Structure of thesis 
This thesis is structured chronologically and systematically in nine chapters.  
Chapter 1: Introduction, Chapter 2: Setting the Scene, Chapter 3: Theoretical 
Positioning, Chapter 4: Methodology, Chapter 5: Results of Study 1 Case Study, 
Chapter 6: Discussion of Study 1 Case Study, Chapter 7: Results of Study 2 Survey, 
Chapter 8: Discussion of Study 2 Survey, and Chapter 9: Conclusion. 
Chapter 2: Setting the Scene, explains that our research interest focuses on 
political contexts that are highly uncertain and characterized by authoritarian regimes 
and weak institutions.  We exposit in which region and economies we found these 
political contexts and explicate what industry we chose for the purpose of our research. 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Positioning, discusses through a systematic review 
(Tranfield, Denyer, and Smart, 2003) the literature domains of internationalization, 
uncertainty, the resource-based view (RBV), dynamic capabilities, and corporate 
political activity (CPA), which shed light on our phenomenon of interest. 
Chapter 4: Methodology, explains the research problem that we investigated, the 
research questions we used to address such problem, and the research design and 
approach we followed throughout our inquiry.  Our research design involved two 
sequential field studies. Therefore, this methodology chapter is divided into two main 
sections: study one case study and study two survey.  
Chapter 5: Results of Study 1 Case Study, presents our empirical findings about 
“how” and “why” a Latin American processed food firm developed adaptive political 
capabilities to confront high political uncertainty contexts in the emerging economies of 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua (1999–2011).  Our analysis uncovers the 
foundations and themes that played a role in the development of adaptive political 
capabilities and their interactions to create competitive benefits.   
Chapter 6: Discussion of Study 1 Case Study, discusses how the empirical 
findings in chapter 5 relate to the theoretical foundations examined previously in 
chapter 3.  We develop a taxonomy of corporate adaptive political strategies that makes 
explicit the flexible responses that were used by the firm through its adaptive political 
capabilities to adapt to the political contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.  We 
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also suggest some exploratory propositions that support the conceptualization of a 
framework to guide the development of adaptive political capabilities by firms.   
Chapter 7: Results of Study 2 Survey, presents the results of a survey that was 
administered to other processed food firms that had operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua between 1999-2011.  The objective of this study was to test the 
generalizability of the exploratory propositions resulting from our first study.   
Chapter 8: Discussion of Study 2 Survey, discusses the relation between the 
empirical findings of our survey and the generalizability of the exploratory propositions 
resulting from our first study. 
Chapter 9: Conclusion, explains the contributions to knowledge of our inquiry 
and their implications for practice.  We also explicate the generalizability of our results 
and the limitations of our research.  We conclude by highlighting future research 
avenues. 
1.9 Concluding remarks 
Adaptive political capabilities allow firms to adapt to the political contexts they 
encounter in their host markets during their internationalization processes.  However, 
the strategic management and corporate political activity fields have dedicated scarce 
efforts to understanding how and why firms develop these capabilities to adapt to 
instead of influencing some of their host political contexts.  Therefore, the main 
objective of our research is to examine “how” and “why” a firm developed adaptive 
political capabilities to sustain its operations in host political markets and to explore to 
what extent the findings of this case study are generalizable. 
In the next chapter we start the presentation of our research by explaining the 
setting of the scene where it was conducted. 
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2 SETTING THE SCENE 
This chapter sets the scene for our research.  We explain that our research 
interest focuses on political contexts that are highly uncertain and characterized by 
authoritarian regimes and weak institutions.  We exposit in which region and economies 
we found these political contexts and explicate what industry we chose for the purpose 
of our research. 
 
2.1 Political contexts, authoritarian regimes, and weak institutions 
Firms have traditionally based their internationalization strategies on different 
antecedents and moderators that have frequently excluded the analysis of the political 
contexts of their host markets (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Henisz and Zelner, 2010; 
Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Kobrin et al., 1980; Ring, Lenway, and Govekar, 1990).  
Paradoxically, since 1969 the political context was identified by Fayerweather (1969), 
Boddewyn (1988), and Hillman and Hitt (1999) as an important factor in 
internationalization strategies, whilst firms underestimated its potential impact on 
foreign operations.   
Particularly, recent political uncertainties in emerging economies have proven to 
dramatically affect firms with operations in these markets and have consequently 
increased firms’ awareness of political contexts.  Moreover, many of the markets where 
these recent political uncertainties have developed have been characterized by diverse 
firms as their natural, most profitable or largest strategic markets; obligating firms to 
assess and confront these markets’ political uncertainties.  As a CEO who participated 
in our investigation claimed: 
We have experienced the effects of political events which have threatened the 
sustainability of our operations in natural markets such as Venezuela and 
Ecuador.  In the face of these events, we cannot just simply decide to exit these 
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traditional markets; instead we are forced to come up with strategies to 
maintain our operations through difficult times. [I001]
3
 
Furthermore, firms have described the markets where these political uncertainties 
have developed as sharing the characteristics of having authoritarian regimes and weak 
institutions.  As two VPs involved in our research highlighted: 
We need to study these markets with caution because they have various 
characteristics in common: authoritarian polarization and fast changing 
policies which affect businesses. [I003] 
The institutional frameworks of these types of countries are not very solid and 
the firm needs to find ways to protect it-self as much as possible. [I004] 
In these markets firms sense that trying to exert influence over their 
governments or negotiating the “rules of the game” is not a very good strategy.  They 
find that the lack of strong institutions and the orientations of these governments are 
conditions which they must somehow deal with rather than try to change.  As a CEO 
explained: 
Consciously we decided that we should avoid lobbying because of several 
reasons. One aspect we discussed at that time was that lobbying in these 
contexts would take us to scenes where we would be asked to incur in acts of 
corruption.  Another aspect was that lobbying could make us “more visible” and 
visibility would increase our chances of suffering hostile measures of different 
nature. [I001] 
If this is the scene that firms are confronting in many of their strategic markets, 
then further research in strategic management and corporate political activity should 
address themes that can improve firms’ competitive positions in political contexts of 
high uncertainty characterized by authoritarian regimes and weak institutions.   
                                                 
3
 This code indicates the interviewee that is quoted.  A list of the code references of interviewees can be 
found in Appendix 2. 
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Therefore, to start our inquiry we ask: what are authoritarian regimes and weak 
institutions? 
Authoritarian regimes permit competitive elections, yet manipulate the process 
to ensure their political survival.  As a result they become “hybrid regimes” (Karl, 
1995), which combine democratic procedures with autocratic practices.  This type of 
regimes has emerged as the most widespread political system in the world at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century (Howard and Roessler, 2006).  A growing body of 
literature has recognized the prevalence of hybrid regimes, with scholars using new 
descriptive labels, such as “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way, 2002), 
“electoral authoritarianism” (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002), and “semi-
authoritarianism” (Ottaway, 2003), to conceptualize and study them.  Not only are these 
regimes viewed as neither completely authoritarian nor democratic, they are most likely 
not “in transition” from one to the other (Carothers, 2002).  Rather, they constitute a 
“gray zone” (Carothers, 2002: 9) or a “foggy zone” (Schedler, 2002: 37).   
Regarding weak institutions, according to Meyer and others (2009) these are 
institutions that fail to ensure effective markets or even undermine markets (as in the 
case of corrupt business practices).  Conversely, strong institutions are those that 
support the voluntary exchange underpinning an effective market mechanism.  Where 
institutions are strong in developed economies, their role, though critical, may be almost 
invisible.  In contrast, when markets malfunction, as in some emerging economies, the 
absence of market-supporting institutions is conspicuous (MacMillan, 2007). 
2.2 “Polar types” of political contexts 
After defining authoritarian regimes and weak institutions, in our study of 
political contexts we found there are two different “polar types” (Pettigrew, 1992) that 
can be distinguished.  A first type of political context is that characterized by relatively 
lower uncertainty.  This political context is commonly found in democratic countries 
with strong institutions that follow a market openness approach.  In a lower political 
uncertainty context, legal regulations are clear and systematically enforced opportunities 
may be provided by a stable business environment and legal protection for property and 
proprietary know-how (Brouthers et al., 2008).  In this type of context, political 
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uncertainty is generated by events such as the terrorist attacks in 9/11 in the United 
States or the European airlines industry deregulation in 1987.  When events like these 
occur, firms traditionally react through lobbying because the political context sets an 
adequate institutional scene for lobbying to be an effective strategy (Lawton and 
Rajwani, 2011).  Differently, a second type of political context is that characterized by 
relatively higher uncertainty.  This higher political uncertainty context is commonly 
found in countries with authoritarian regimes and weak institutions.  Through our 
research, we question if in higher political uncertainty contexts lobbying can be as an 
effective strategy to confront political uncertainties as in lower political uncertainty 
contexts. 
From a global perspective, the United States and the United Kingdom are 
representative examples of the first type of lower political uncertainty contexts which 
are mainly found in democratic countries with strong institutions which follow a market 
openness approach.  While, Afghanistan and Venezuela are representative examples of 
higher political uncertainty contexts, which are mainly found in countries with 
authoritarian regimes and weak institutions.  Below, Figure 1 shows in a continuum the 
various “polar type” political contexts and their characteristics. 
Figure 1: “Polar types” of political contexts from a global perspective 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Characteristics:
• Democratic countries 
• Follow a market openness 
approach 
• Stronger institutions
Characteristics:
• Authoritarian regimes
• Weaker institutions
United States
United Kingdom
Afghanistan
Venezuela
Lower political uncertainty contexts Higher political uncertainty contexts
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2.3 Emerging economies 
High political uncertainty is typically found in countries characterized by 
authoritarian regimes and weak institutions.  Thus, this specific political context was 
chosen as the ideal scenario to the set the scene for our research in order to explore our 
phenomenon (Pettigrew, 1992).  Consequently, we will refer from now onwards and 
throughout our research to this type of contexts as high political uncertainty contexts, 
for the practicality of using a specific term, instead of otherwise, fully describing its 
characteristics when being referred to.   
These contexts are mainly found in emerging economies throughout the world 
such as those in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.  Emerging economies in 
general are characterized by weak institutional environments and fast changing 
regulatory and policy frameworks.  In these countries, governments (and government 
policies) are critical sources of uncertainty for firms because of their ability to exert 
control over critical resources which shape a firm’s competitive advantage (Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999; Shaffer, 1995).  The term “emerging markets” (used interchangeably with 
emerging economies) was first coined by World Bank economist Antoine W. van 
Agtmael in 1981 in reference to nations undergoing rapid economic growth and 
industrialization (van Agtmael, 2007).  In the Emerging Economy Report of 2008, the 
Center for Knowledge Societies defined emerging economies as those regions of the 
world which are experiencing rapid informalization under conditions of limited or 
partial industrialization.   
We found the 2010 list of emerging economies published by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to be by far the most extensive among all the lists created, by 
including a total of 150 countries.  It encompasses countries such as China, India, and 
Russia, who could potentially become the three largest economies in the world, poorer 
nations such as Haiti, and war-torn countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq.
4
  Other lists 
                                                 
4
 We are aware of the variation that exists among countries in listings of emerging economies such as the 
IMF 2010 listing.  Among the countries in this listing, we can find newly industrialized countries that 
have more advanced economies than those in the developing world, but not yet with the full signs of a 
developed country, such as China, Mexico, and India.  Countries with an inconsistent record of 
development such as Laos and countries with long-term civil war or large-scale breakdown of the rule of 
law or non-development-oriented dictatorships such as Afghanistan, Haiti, and Iraq. 
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of emergent economies are published by the FTSE Group, MSCI Barra, the Economist, 
and Standard and Poors.  Within these emerging economies, there are certainly 
countries with authoritarian regimes and that have weak institutions - which set the high 
political uncertainty context of interest to our research. 
Table 1: The IMF’s 2010 list of countries characterized as “emerging economies” 
Initials Countries 
A  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan   
B  Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi 
C Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Croatia 
D Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic 
E Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia 
F Fiji 
G Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana 
H Haiti, Honduras, Hungary 
I Indonesia, India, Iran, Iraq 
J Jamaica, Jordan 
K Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan 
L Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania 
M Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar 
N Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria 
O Oman  
P Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland 
Q Qatar  
R Romania, Russia, Rwanda 
S Saudi Arabia, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria 
T Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu 
U Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan 
V Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam 
Y Yemen  
Z Zambia, Zimbabwe 
  
Source: International Monetary Fund (2010) 
2.4 High political uncertainty contexts in the emergent region of Latin 
America 
Among the different countries which were characterized as emerging economies 
by the IMF (2010), those located in Latin America caught our attention due to the fact 
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that this region is the second most important emergent region in the world after 
Southeast Asia, with an aggregated gross domestic product (GDP) roughly that of 
China’s and three times larger than India’s (World Bank, 2008).  More important, this 
region has presented interesting political changes during the last 50 years.  It has 
become polarized insofar as some countries are clearly democratic whereas others have 
long-lived populist and dictatorial practices (Brenes and Carneiro, 2013).  The region 
has also been characterized by a weak institutional context where the “rules of the 
game” are frequently changed arbitrarily by governments.  According to Transparency 
International (2009), Latin American countries have among the lowest levels of trust in 
the judiciary, and many countries lack effective enforcement of the rule of law.  
Additionally, firms in Latin America have had to cope over decades with guerrilla, war, 
infrastructure limitations, and corruption.  These conditions have forced Latin American 
firms to learn how to operate in a highly volatile environment with hostile 
characteristics.  Therefore, given the environmental conditions that firms have regularly 
faced in Latin America, it is interesting to examine how firms in that region cope with 
political uncertainty.  Paradoxically, although much can be learned from Latin America, 
we found scarce research had addressed this region.  From 1963–2009, only 206 articles 
in 17 academic management journals were found to discuss Latin America (Nicholls-
Nixon et al., 2011).   
Consequently, we chose Latin America to set the scene for our research due to: 
 its economic importance as an emergent region  
 its characterization as a politically polarized region  
 and the lack of research addressing this region  
Another important common factor across Latin America is the strong influence 
of the United States.  This influence was formalized at the beginning of the 19
th
 century 
by the Monroe Doctrine, which signalled to European nations that any further 
colonization in the Americas would be seen as an act of aggression resulting in 
American intervention.  Frequent U.S. military interventions and involvement with 
right-wing governments evolved into a love/hate relationship with the United Stated that 
still exists today.  Left-wing governments as those in countries such as Venezuela, 
Cuba, and Nicaragua have exploited over the years feelings of hatred towards the 
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United States to justify their authoritarian behavior as a fight against “the Yankee 
imperialism” (Vassolo et al., 2011).  According to the Latinobarómetro Poll (2010), 
which tracks changes in attitudes in 18 Latin American countries (excluding Cuba and 
Haiti), support for democracy declined in half of the countries between 1996 and 2010, 
although the majority of Latin Americans still believe democracy is preferable to any 
other form of government.  Similarly, Vassolo and others (2011) found that although 
most countries in Latin America are following the market openness and trade 
liberalization approach, there is a strong threat of the installation of authoritarian 
regimes.   
Through a detailed examination of Latin American countries, we identified that 
in recent years, the evolution of Latin America has split countries between those 
pushing for market openness and institutions (Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil) and those 
having authoritarian regimes and suffering weak institutions (Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua).  These two groups of Latin American countries can be related to the “polar 
types” of political contexts that we previously described from a global perspective (see 
Figure 2). 
Figure 2: “Polar types” of political contexts in Latin America 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Characteristics:
• Democratic countries 
• Follow a market openness 
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• Weaker institutions
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We found that particularly the political changes that have taken place in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua from 1999 to 2011 have generated high political 
uncertainty in these emerging economies while countries like Chile, Costa Rica, and 
Brazil have increased their political stability and strengthened their institutional 
contexts.  Consequently, we selected 1999 to 2011 to set the timeframe for our research.  
Below, Figure 3 contrasts the evolution from 1999 to 2011 of the political uncertainty 
ratings of Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil.   
Figure 3: Evolution of political uncertainty ratings from 1999-2011 of Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil 
 
Source: IHS Global Insight (2012) 
These political uncertainty ratings are published by IHS Global Insight and are 
calculated upon the following criteria: 
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Table 2: Evaluation criteria of IHS Global Insight for political uncertainty ratings 
Criteria Description 
Institutional 
permanence 
An assessment of how mature and well established the political system is. It is 
also an assessment of how far political opposition operates within the system or 
attempts to undermine it from outside. A country with high institutional 
permanence would unquestionably survive the death or removal from power of 
the current leadership. A mature political system will conventionally have a 
clearly established relationship between the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government. 
Representativeness How well the population and organized interests can make their voices heard in 
the political system. Provided representation is handled fairly and effectively, it 
will ensure greater stability and better designed policies. 
Internal political 
consensus 
Whether the country is driven by major social and political divides, and how far 
these are exploited by nationalist or extremist leaders. Serious divisions will 
frequently spill over into violence and major political instability. 
External political 
consensus 
The degree to which the country is seen as a menace to, or is menaced by, third 
countries. Poor external political consensus is generally a cause for longer term, 
but intense risk. Strongly antagonistic foreign states may well sponsor 
destabilizing domestic opposition movements. 
 
Source: IHS Global Insight (2012) 
According to these factors, one would expect a country with the following 
political uncertainty ratings to match the next characteristics: 
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Table 3: Characteristics of political uncertainty ratings by IHS Global Insight 
Risk 
Rating 
Characteristics 
1 This country will have a strong, well-developed and effective democracy. Broad political and 
public consensus should ensure a very high level of political stability. Changes of government 
will be infrequent and any transitions should involve minimal disruption. In the event of a 
change of government, broad policy continuity is assured. 
2 This country will also have a mature political system, which is probably a democracy. Political 
and commercial institutions will be strong, and political parties will largely be free to operate 
as they please. More extreme opposition will generally be contained within the political 
system in the form of pressure groups or in isolated regions. Any changes of government are 
likely to take place through constitutional means. The political system will be secure enough to 
withstand occasional internal unrest. The business environment should remain largely 
unaffected by the political system. 
3 This country will have a less mature democratic system or a stable authoritarian system. Major 
tests are likely to lie ahead, but there will be general stability in the medium term. There will 
also be little orchestrated political violence. However, political stability cannot be guaranteed 
in the longer term because political and state institutions lack authority or are evolving. 
Political transition is likely to be destabilising and liable to result in major policy changes. 
Uncertainty in the political system will tend to make business time-consuming for investors 
and they will need to be aware of substantial longer-term risks to their investments. 
4 This country will have a repressive and/or highly unstable political regime. It is likely to face 
considerable opposition, which will often be violent. Individuals can expect little protection 
from the constitution or state. Any election results are likely to be dubious and the contests 
surrounded by violence and repression. Government changes are likely to be traumatic and 
unconstitutional. Political, economic, and legal institutions will be highly vulnerable and may 
periodically cease to function effectively. The state may have to rely on international 
peacekeepers to operate at all. Business can only continue with the active support and 
assistance of the state. 
5 This country may be in the grip of a civil or international war. Alternatively, the country is 
facing a major insurgency and law and order has broken down. The political situation will 
have effectively destroyed the business environment. 
 
 Source: IHS Global Insight (2012) 
Below, Table 4 shows the political uncertainty ratings by IHS Global Insight for 
all Latin American countries during March 2012.  These ratings indicate that in Latin 
America, Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil are the biggest emerging economies among the 
20 countries with the lowest political uncertainty ratings while Ecuador, Nicaragua, and 
Venezuela are among the five countries (along with Cuba and Haiti) with the highest 
political uncertainty ratings. 
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Table 4: Political uncertainty ratings for Latin American countries (March, 2012) 
Country 
Political Uncertainty 
Ratings 
US Virgin Islands 1.25 
Aruba 1.50 
Bahamas 1.50 
Barbados 1.50 
Cayman Islands 1.50 
Anguilla 1.75 
Bermuda 1.75 
Chile 1.75 
St. Kitts and Nevis 1.75 
St. Lucia 1.75 
Antigua and Barbuda 2.00 
Belize 2.00 
Costa Rica 2.00 
Martinique 2.00 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2.00 
Uruguay 2.00 
Dominica 2.25 
French Guiana 2.25 
Brazil 2.50 
Netherlands Antilles 2.50 
Panama 2.50 
Puerto Rico 2.50 
Trinidad and Tobago 2.50 
Colombia 2.75 
Grenada 2.75 
Mexico 2.75 
Argentina 3.00 
Dominican Republic 3.00 
El Salvador 3.00 
Jamaica 3.00 
Bolivia 3.50 
Guatemala 3.50 
Guyana 3.50 
Honduras 3.50 
Paraguay 3.50 
Peru 3.50 
Suriname 3.50 
Ecuador 3.75 
Nicaragua 3.75 
Cuba 4.00 
Venezuela 4.00 
Haiti 4.50 
Source: IHS Global Insight (March, 2012) 
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Clearly, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua have increased their political 
uncertainty ratings from 1999 to 2011 from a score of 3 to 4.  This increase along with 
their current governments shows how gradually over the last decade these emerging 
economies have become politically uncertain contexts with authoritarian regimes and 
weak institutions.  During 2013, Brenes and Carneiro claimed these three countries tend 
to show economic protectionism and political populism.  While on the other hand, other 
countries in the same region like Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil have either sustained or 
decreased their political uncertainty ratings, showing stability or even an improvement 
in their political contexts during the same timeframe.  Consequently, within Latin 
America we chose Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua to set the contextual scene for 
our research because these countries evidently have suffered high political uncertainty 
that has intensified over the last decade and have been characterized by authoritarian 
regimes and weak institutions.  Each of these countries has the high political uncertainty 
context that is of interest to set the scene for our research.  Although Cuba and Haiti 
have also been categorized among the highest political uncertainty countries in Latin 
America, we excluded them from our research due to their limited international 
commercial relations and FDI. 
2.5 The food industry 
As Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua were chosen to set the scene for our 
research, we reviewed what industries in these countries had been the most affected by 
the political uncertainty they experienced from 1999 to 2011 (see Table 5).   
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Table 5: Most affected industries by the political contexts in Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua from 1999-2011 
5
 
Venezuela Ecuador Nicaragua 
Petroleum industry Automotive industry Food industry 
Construction industry Garments industry Tourism industry 
Food industry Food industry  
  Pharmaceutical industry   
 
 Source: Elaborated by author 
We found that the food industry was one of the most affected industries by 
political uncertainties in all three countries between 1999 and 2011.  Data from our 
inquiry showed firms in this industry faced the imposition of quotas and safeguards, 
delays in required registrations, logistic obstacles, policy changes, and price controls 
stemming from political decisions.   
Within the food industry, we decided to concentrate our inquiry on processed 
food firms that produce high value added products such as: fruit or nut snacks, candies, 
chocolates, cookies, cold-meat cuts, canned vegetables, roasted coffee, sugar, juices, 
refreshment drinks, cereals, bread, ice cream, other dairy products, ready to cook 
dinners, and other products (FAO, 1999; World Bank, 2011).  Brenes, Montoya and 
Ciravegna (2013) defined high value added processed food firms as those that have 
managed to climb the value ladder, so that they do not focus solely on basic agricultural 
production, but also on additional activities such as washing, cleaning, processing, 
packaging, and distribution.  These activities increase the final value of the product by 
enhancing some of its intrinsic features, such as nutritional value and transportability 
(Austin, 1992; FAO, 1999; World Bank, 2011).  On the other hand, low value added 
products mainly refer to basic agricultural products or fresh food that has not been 
processed such as: bananas, pineapples, mangos, melons, avocados, corns, beans, rice, 
among others (FAO, 1999; World Bank, 2011).  Our focus on processed food firms that 
                                                 
5
 These industries were identified by: Felipe Benites, Director of the Venezuelan Observatory of Property; 
Adriana Gutierrez, Director of Proexport Ecuador; and Nelly Soto, General Manager of ADIPRONIC 
(Association of distributors of mass consumption products in Nicaragua) in 2011. 
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produce high value added products responds to our aim of supporting the 
internationalization efforts of these firms since recent trends show there is a rapid 
increase of opportunities for high value added food products relative to basic 
agricultural products (FLO, 2007).  Moreover, most governments in Latin American 
countries have been trying for long to promote added value food products because of 
their market potential (Da Silva et al., 2009). 
Additionally, we found that up to 2011 no empirical research in the management 
field regarding capabilities had included the processed food industry.  Below in Table 6, 
we synthesize the capabilities and industries that have been studied up to 2011 using the 
work of Ambrosini, Bowman, and Collier (2009) and our own further research. 
Table 6: Researched capabilities and industries  
Industry Capability 
Automobile and computer Integration ability (Iansiti and Clark, 1994). 
Banking 
Acquirers who codify integration processes to increase return on 
assets (Zollo, 1998). 
Designer home furnishings Product development capability (Salvato, 2009). 
Entertainment (movies) New organizational forms (Lampel and Shamsie, 2003). 
High tech Product innovation (Danneels, 2002). 
Machinery Pricing capabilitiy (Duttta et al., 2003) 
Manufacturing Strategy formation (Slater, Olson, and Hult, 2006), 
Medical 
Acquisitions process (Karim and Mitchell, 2000), organizational 
structures reconfiguration (Karim, 2006) 
Petroleum 
R&D (Helfat, 1997), managerial capabilities (Adner and Helfat, 
2003). 
Pharmaceutical 
Architectural competence or ability to integrate knowledge from 
external resources (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). 
Professional baseball franchises Resource divestment (Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007). 
Software  
Project management capabilities and client-specific capabilities 
(Ethiraj et al., 2005) 
Various industries 
Absorptive capacity (Zahra and George, 2002), knowledge 
articulation and codification to explain high success rates of joint 
ventures (Kale, 1999), marketing capabilities (Morgan, Vorhies, 
and Mason, 2009) 
Source: Elaborated by author based on data extracted from referenced authors 
Consequently, we chose the processed food industry to set the scene of our 
research due to its classification as one of the most affected industries by the high 
political uncertainty contexts during 1999–2011 in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
and the absence of empirical research on capabilities in that industry.  Moreover, from a 
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philanthropic perspective, if the food industry is an industry in which nutrition and food 
security are political issues of world interest (FAO, 2012), we wanted to conduct 
research that in particular enables processed food firms to improve their competitive 
positions in the high political uncertainty contexts of emerging economies to contribute 
to the assurance of worldwide processed food distribution and availability. 
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3 THEORETICAL POSITIONING 
In this chapter, through a systematic review we discuss the literature domains of 
internationalization, uncertainty, the resource-based view (RBV) - dynamic capabilities, 
and corporate political activity (CPA) which shed light on our phenomenon of interest.  
We explain in detail how these literature streams inform our inquiry while we highlight 
a series of uncovered gaps in research.  These gaps subsequently inspire the research 
questions that guide our investigation and which are presented in section 4.2. of the 
following methodology chapter.  It is important to note, that the specific methodology 
we followed to conduct this systematic literature review followed guidelines provided by 
Tranfield, Denyer, and Smart (2003) and is described in Appendix 1. 
 
3.1 Internationalization processes and political uncertainty assessment  
Exploring internationalization and uncertainty literatures, we found firms have 
confronted multiple types of uncertainty during their internationalization processes.  
Nonetheless, political uncertainty was one of the main types of uncertainties that firms 
stated to have confronted since the initial stage of their foreign operations 
(Fayerweather, 1969; Mascarenhas, 1982; Miller, 1992; Milliken, 1987).  Furthermore, 
government policy was found to affect the competitive position of firms and their 
performance (Shaffer, 1995).  However, despite these findings, firms have traditionally 
based their internationalization strategies on different antecedents and moderators that 
have frequently excluded the analysis of the political environment (Delios and Henisz, 
2003; Henisz and Zelner, 2010; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Kobrin et al., 1980; Ring et 
al., 1990).  Paradoxically, the recent political uncertainties in emerging regions have 
proven to dramatically affect firms with operations in these markets, and have 
consequently, increased firms’ awareness about political environments and their 
potential impact.   
The issue we identified in current research is that although firms are increasing 
their awareness about the necessity of assessing the political environment, there is an 
absence of satisfactory political uncertainty assessment tools to help firms understand 
the degree of their real exposure (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Kobrin, 1982).  
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According to Kobrin (1982), to assess political uncertainty, be this materialized through 
expropriation or policy changes, the most pertinent challenges affecting a firm stem not 
from the general country environment (the macro level), but from specific policies and 
actions that have differential effects across industries, firms, and projects (the micro 
level).  Consequently, discussions about the political environment of a country are no 
longer that useful since contingencies arise from the interaction of political factors 
affecting directly the strategy and structure of firms or their projects.  Moreover, prior 
research showed that those political assessment tools which consider the effect of 
political uncertainty within a country (the macro level) rather than its effect on a firm 
(the micro level), entitle the danger of possibly leading firms to significantly different 
responses (Erol, 1985).  
Research indicated that to assess political uncertainty, firms have mainly 
evaluated reports from their banks and from multiple organizations which produce risk 
indexes (Kobrin, 1979).  Some firms have even decided to contract external political 
assessment organizations (Baker and Hashmi, 1988).  All of these have provided macro 
level assessments that precisely fail to identify industry or firm-specific micro-political 
contingencies.  Kobrin (1981) claimed that the best political assessment tool is not 
provided by banks, indexes or tailored made reports, it can only be developed within the 
firm through its own understanding of the nature of the political uncertainties it 
confronts and their relationship to firm characteristics and political events.  Building on 
the work of Kobrin (1979, 1981), we acknowledge the challenge lies in that firms have 
not realized that they have the most valuable information to assess the political 
uncertainties they confront.  Firms still consider that the sophistication of the 
methodologies of some political risk indexes or reports assures them a complete 
political assessment while they only provide a country or macro level assessment - 
lacking the most important micro level assessment.   
For a firm to develop its own political assessment tool, Kobrin (1981) indicated 
that one of the barriers is an improved understanding of the relationship between the 
political environment and firm contingencies due to the insufficiency of historical data.  
With the exception of expropriation, impacts of political uncertainty on firms have 
rarely been documented.  Building on the work of Kobrin (1981), we suggest that 
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perhaps the most important step most international firms can take in improving the 
quality of their political assessment is to build a political assessment tool through which 
they review past history and firm experience to facilitate their future judgments.  Such a 
strategic examination can help to determine the actual contingencies that have been 
faced and the environmental conditions that have produced them.  This management 
review process should be conducted across countries and within the same country 
across time since comparability facilitates the improvement of the assessment process 
itself (Kobrin, 1981).  It allows the comparison of assessments with outcomes, it 
facilitates organizational learning through the compilation of a body of experience, and 
it provides an increased understanding of the relationship between the environment and 
the firm (Kobrin, 1981).   
For the construction and use of this type of political assessment tool, past, 
present, and future political uncertainties must be analyzed (Kobrin, 1981).  Through 
our systematic review we found various levels of analysis of political uncertainties that 
were proposed by multiple authors.  We suggest that during the construction and use of 
a political assessment tool, a firm should integrally analyze these different levels for its 
political uncertainties to achieve a better understanding of the uncertainties it has 
already confronted or will confront.  Table 7 shows our suggested levels of analysis for 
the understanding of political uncertainties.  
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Table 7: Levels of analysis for political uncertainties 
Political Uncertainty  
The possibility of occurrence of changes in the cash flows resulting from political events (Kobrin, 1979; 
Henisz and Zelner, 2010). 
Levels of Analysis Description 
Concept related 
Expropriation Uncertainty 
Expropriation uncertainty refers to the possibility of 
a host government seizing foreign owned assets; 
affecting ownership structures (Kobrin, 1980, 1981, 
1984; Henisz and Zelner, 2010). 
Policy Uncertainty 
Policy uncertainty refers to the possibility of a 
government discriminatorily changing the laws, 
regulations or contracts governing an investment, or 
failing to enforce them, in a way that reduces an 
investor’s financial return; affecting organizational 
operations (Kobrin, 1981; Henisz and Zelner, 2010). 
Effect related 
Macro  Country level political uncertainty (Kobrin, 1981).   
Micro 
Industry, organization, and project specific levels 
political uncertainty (Kobrin, 1981).   
Chronologically 
related 
Ex ante 
Uncertainty about the political conditions that can be 
established or negotiated to enter a market (Delios 
and Henisz, 2003). 
Ex post 
Uncertainty about the possibility of having the terms 
of investment altered by the host country government 
in an obsolescing, bargaining scenario (Delios and 
Henisz, 2003). 
Typology related 
State uncertainty 
Not understanding how components of the political 
environment might change (Milliken, 1987). 
Effect uncertainty 
The inability to predict what the nature of the impact 
of a future state of the political environment or 
political change would be on the organization 
(Milliken, 1987). 
Response uncertainty 
Lack of knowledge of response options and/or an 
inability to predict the likely consequence of a 
response choice (Milliken, 1987). 
 
 Source: Elaborated by author based on data extracted from referenced authors 
3.2 Firms’ strategic responses to political uncertainties 
After firms assess political uncertainties (through any methodology) they make 
decisions regarding how these will be managed.  To deal with political uncertainties we 
found firms can decide to follow different strategic responses enabled by different 
capabilities (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Miller, 1992; Oliver 
and Holzinger, 2008).  Firms can avoid political uncertainty by not entering or even 
exiting a politically uncertain market.  They can also decide to use lobbying to control 
political uncertainty, or they can cooperate through multilateral agreements with 
competitors to form alliances or associations to achieve a shared political objective.  
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Firms can also imitate the political behavior of their competitors, or they can decide to 
use flexible responses through which they can adapt to substantial, uncertain, and fast-
occurring political changes (Miller, 1992).   
Control and cooperative responses to political uncertainty involve firms’ 
attempts to influence or shape governments in favorable ways towards their own 
particular interests.  These attempts constitute what Baysinger defined in 1984 as a 
firm’s corporate political activity (CPA).  However, Meznar and Nigh (1995), Hillman 
and Hitt (1999), and Blumentritt (2003), later clarified that a firm’s corporate political 
activity can be either proactive or reactive.  Proactive corporate political activity aims to 
exert influence or shape government policy by the participation of the firm in 
government affairs through control or cooperative responses.  While, reactive corporate 
political activity aims to allow the firm to respond to government actions but does not 
involve its participation in government affairs.  Rather, reactive corporate political 
activity is achieved by the firm, through flexible responses that allow its adaption to 
political changes. 
Control or cooperative responses, that are enabled by a firm’s proactive 
corporate political activity, have been referred to as “political buffering” (Blumentritt, 
2003; Meznar and Nigh, 1995), “public policy shaping responses” (Wiedenbaum, 
1980), and “bargaining behavior” (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994).  Examples are, 
informing government decision makers about the impact of possible legislation, 
working alone or in trade associations to make campaign contributions, lobbying, or 
otherwise influencing governments (Hillman et al., 2004).  On the other hand, flexible 
responses that are enabled by a firm’s reactive corporate political activity, have been 
described as “political bridging” (Blumentritt, 2003; Meznar and Nigh, 1995), “passive 
reaction responses”, “positive anticipation responses” (Wiedenbaum, 1980), and “non-
bargaining behavior” (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994).  An example is monitoring the 
development of legislation for a firm to be able to comply with its guidelines (Hillman 
et al., 2004). 
Overall, many scholars (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hitt et 
al., 1998; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008) have described proactive and reactive corporate 
political activity (involving control, cooperative, or flexible responses) as essential for 
 34 
firms in their competitive landscape, while avoidance or imitation responses towards 
the political environment, have been considered as poor ways of handling government 
relations (Boddewyn, 1993; Keim, 1981).   
We found corporate political activity (CPA) scholars have mainly focused their 
research efforts on proactive corporate political activity that enables control or 
cooperative responses that aim to influence the political environment (Hillman and Hitt, 
1999; Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton et al., 2013; Shaffer, 1995).  Hillman and Hitt 
(1999) argued that their interest on proactive corporate political activity was explained 
by the fact that a firm that followed a reactive stance towards corporate political activity 
could be sure that other interest groups were proactively working to shape government 
policies in a direction that benefited their own interests - which could or not coincide 
with those of the firm.  Similarly, Oliver and Holzinger (2008) argued that firms that 
used corporate political strategies were more likely to strengthen their competitive 
advantage than firms that were passive or politically inactive.   
3.3 Taxonomy of corporate political strategies for proactive corporate 
political activity 
A significant contribution to proactive corporate political activity research has 
been Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) taxonomy of corporate political strategies.  This 
taxonomy makes explicit the choices available to firms to influence government affairs.  
When compared to the wealth of research on “generic” strategies for the market 
environment (Miles and Snow, 1978; Porter, 1980) there are few similar efforts for 
political strategies that address the non-market environment. 
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) taxonomy of corporate political strategies followed 
traditional strategic management literature that claims “strategies” are more long term 
and involve a substantial amount of resources and commitment.  While “tactics” are 
short term activities designed to fine tune strategy, and they involve a smaller 
commitment of resources.  This taxonomy presents three theoretically distinct 
strategies, each comprising of a variety of tactics.  The tactics describe the control or 
cooperative responses that a firm can use to influence the political environment (see 
Table 8).   
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Table 8: Taxonomy of corporate political strategies 
Strategy Tactics Characteristics 
Information strategy  Lobbying Targets political decision 
makers by providing 
information 
 Commissioning research projects 
and reporting research results 
 Testifying as expert witnesses 
 Supplying position papers or 
technical reports 
 
Financial incentive strategy  Contributions to politicians or party Targets political decision 
makers by providing 
financial incentives 
 Honoraria for speaking 
 Paid travel 
 Personal service (hiring people with 
political experience, relatives of 
political decision makers or having a 
firm member run for office) 
 
Constituency-building strategy  Grassroots mobilization of 
employees, suppliers, customers, 
etc. 
Targets political decision 
makers indirectly through 
constituent support 
 Advocacy advertising 
 Public relations 
 Press conferences 
 Political education programs 
   
Source: Hillman and Hitt (1999) 
Hillman and Hitt (1999) explained that through the information strategy, firms 
seek to affect public policy by providing policy makers specific information about 
preferences for policy or policy positions and may involve providing information on the 
costs and benefits of different issue outcomes (Aplin and Hegarty, 1980).  This strategy 
targets political decision makers by providing them information.  It includes tactics such 
as lobbying, commissioning research projects and providing their results, testifying as 
an expert witness in hearings or before other government bodies, and supplying decision 
makers with position papers or technical reports.  The second strategy in the taxonomy 
is the financial incentive strategy.  This strategy attempts to influence public policy by 
directly aligning the incentives of the policy makers with the interests of the principals 
through financial inducements.  The financial incentive strategy targets political 
decision makers by providing them financial incentives.  It includes tactics such as 
providing financial support through direct contributions to politicians or political 
parties, honoraria for speaking, paid travel expenses, and personal service (hiring people 
with political experience, relatives of political decision makers or having a firm member 
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run for office).  The last strategy is the constituency-building strategy.  This strategy 
attempts to influence public policy by gaining support of individual voters and citizens, 
who in turn, express their political preferences to political decision makers (Baysinger, 
Keim, and Zeithaml, 1985).  This strategy targets political decision makers indirectly by 
working through individual constituents and voters via public exposure/appeal and 
constituent contact.  It includes tactics such as grassroots mobilizations of employees, 
customers, suppliers, retirees, or other individuals linked to the firm; advocacy 
advertising, wherein a particular policy position is advertised to the public (Sethi, 
1982); public image or public relations advertising; press conferences on public policy 
issues; and economic or political education (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). 
To facilitate the understanding of this taxonomy, Hillman and Hitt (1999) 
explained that tactics are classified within one of the three corporate political strategies.  
However, the use of one political strategy or tactic within, does not, preclude the use of 
another strategy or tactic.  Therefore, a firm may use any combination of strategies (and 
tactics) in an attempt to shape its competitive environment by influencing government 
affairs.  Contrary to the case of proactive CPA research, we found reactive CPA 
research had not yet developed a similar taxonomy of strategies that included the tactics 
or flexible responses firms can use to enable their adaption to the political environment. 
3.4 Firms’ strategic responses to political uncertainties and capabilities 
Regardless of the type of corporate political activity a firm engages with, 
proactive or reactive, it needs to develop and use capabilities that enable the type of 
strategic responses that are intended by the firm towards the political environment.  
Following this line of thought, Baron’s (1995) seminal work claimed business strategy 
must be congruent with the capabilities of a firm.  Hillman and others (2004) also 
proposed a CPA research agenda that called for further research to focus on firm 
resources and capabilities that aid political activities.  Similarly, Lawton and others 
(2013) claimed resources and capabilities are one of the three dominant research areas 
that need further exploration in CPA. 
Through an exploration of the relation between capabilities and the strategic 
responses firms can have towards the political environment, we found that in the case of 
avoidance responses, firms must conduct a complete assessment of the political 
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uncertainties they are confronting, rather than using capabilities to manage the political 
environment.  Imitative responses involve scanning competitors’ behavior and may 
eventually require different capabilities - in accordance to which competitor’s behavior 
the firm decides to imitate.  Control or cooperative responses towards political 
uncertainty require “political capabilities” that enable firms to assess policy risk and 
manage the policy making process (Holburn and Zelner, 2010) or “lobbying 
capabilities” that enable firms to influence the political environment (Holburn and 
Vanden Bergh, 2002; Lawton and Rajwani, 2011).  However, in the case of flexible 
responses, these involve substantial organizational adaption to the political 
environment rather than efforts to influence government affairs.  We found that the 
development of a specific set of capabilities to enable this type of responses to political 
environments should be further explored in capabilities research (Aaker and 
Mascarenhas, 1984; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008).  Consequently, if flexible responses 
cannot be enabled by political capabilities that intend to influence the political 
environment, we question what set of capabilities can create adaption instead of 
influence towards political contexts. 
Previous research has indicated that allowing firms to create flexible responses is 
important, since as Mascarenhas (1982) claimed, sometimes firms face uncertain 
political contexts with specific characteristics where lobbying or influencing the 
environment are not response options, or at least not the best ones.  Some studies have 
even found that lobbying or a firms’ political embeddedness in host countries can have 
a declining or negative value for the firm (Sun, Mellahi, and Thun, 2010) or that 
building strong ties to political regimes does not necessarily enhance firm performance 
even if they are stable political regimes (Henisz and Delios, 2004).  What is missing in 
current research is that some political contexts may require, unlike traditional control 
and cooperative responses (which attempt to predict environmental contingencies), 
flexible responses that increase internal responsiveness (through for example structural 
reconfiguration), while leaving the predictability of external factors unchanged.  The 
difficulty lies in that firms typically have developed political capabilities to confront 
political uncertainty through control or cooperative responses, especially in developed 
countries, while they have not equally deliberately developed a specific set of 
capabilities that can enable them to confront particular political uncertainties through 
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flexible responses.  Therefore, the central contribution of our review suggests that the 
deliberate development and deployment of a specific set of capabilities that can allow 
adaption will enable firms with the ability to respond to particular political uncertainties 
through endogenous strategic and structural adaptation - when political capabilities do 
not enable the best responses. 
3.5 Capabilities that enable flexible responses 
In their research, Oliver and Holzinger (2008) explored the important relation 
between capabilities and strategies.  They studied the relation between reactive and 
proactive corporate political strategies and firm specific capabilities.  They claimed 
proactive corporate political strategies used “capabilities in appropriating and utilizing 
political social capital” and “institutional influence capabilities”.  Capabilities in 
appropriating and utilizing social capital refer to the ability to cultivate and utilize 
relations to government and/or indirect ties or networks to those who influence policy 
makers for purposes of protecting the organization’s interests.  Institutional influence 
capabilities refer to the ability to define or shape the norms, standards and beliefs of an 
industry or to reframe public perceptions about the social acceptability of one’s 
practices.  These capabilities relate to what other scholars have denominated as 
“political capabilities” and “lobbying capabilities”.  Political capabilities refer to the 
ability to assess policy risk and manage the policy making process (Holburn and Zelner, 
2010).  Lobbying capabilities refer to the ability to influence the political environment 
(Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2002; Lawton and Rajwani, 2011).  Overall, all of these 
capabilities intend to allow a firm to influence the political environment through control 
and cooperative responses. 
Likewise, Oliver and Holzinger (2008) claimed reactive corporate political 
strategies used “structural and process reconfiguration capabilities” and “scanning and 
predictive capabilities”.  Structural and process reconfiguration capabilities refer to the 
ability of aligning internal processes efficiently and effectively with public policy 
demands.  Scanning and predictive capabilities refer to the ability that gives firms early 
knowledge of impending or potential legislative or public policy changes, and the 
ability to respond appropriately before those changes are implemented.   
 39 
Although we agree with Oliver and Holzinger (2008) in that “structural and 
process reconfiguration capabilities” and “scanning and predictive capabilities” are 
necessary to allow firms to adapt to the political environment, we question if adaption 
to the political environment cannot be better explained by “adaptive political 
capabilities” that enable flexible responses. 
To elaborate our argument, we build on Baron’s (1995, 2001) conceptualization 
of the environment as having market and non-market components.  According to Baron 
(1995), the market environment includes those interactions between the firm and other 
parties which are intermediated by markets or private agreements.  Interactions in the 
market environment are typically voluntary and involve economic transactions, as when 
a firm designs and sells products to customers with specific demands.  The non-market 
environment includes those interactions which are intermediated by the public, 
stakeholders, government, the media, and public institutions.  These interactions may be 
voluntary, as when a firm decides to develop relations with policy decision makers, or 
involuntary, as when the government regulates an activity that impacts a firm.   
Similarly to this distinction between two components in the environment, Baron 
(1995) differentiated between market strategy that addressed the market environment 
and non-market strategy targeted to the non-market environment.  He explained market 
strategy is a concerted pattern of actions taken in the market environment to create value 
by improving economic performance, as when a firm decides to enter a foreign market 
or makes product pricing decisions.  Differently, non-market strategy is a concerted 
pattern of actions taken in the non-market environment to create value by improving 
overall performance, as in the case when a firm lobbies to impede the creation of 
legislation that increases tariff barriers.   
We build on Baron’s (1995) conceptualization of market and non-market 
environment and strategy, to explain that the term “adaptive capabilities” has been used 
to address the market environment through market strategy.  In this context, adaptive 
capabilities are the ability of a firm to enable product adaption to market demands.  For 
example, Cavusgil and others (1993) referred to adaptive capabilities as the ability of a 
firm to adapt its product upon and after market entry and to adapt its promotion 
approach, packaging/labeling or product positioning.  Oktemgil and Greenley (1997) 
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referred to adaptive capabilities as the ability of a firm to respond to product-market 
opportunities, conduct marketing activities for responding to these opportunities, and 
speedily responding to the pursuing of these opportunities.  More recently, Lu and 
others (2010) defined adaptive capabilities as the ability of a firm to coordinate, 
recombine, and allocate resources to meet the different requirements of foreign markets.  
They operationalized adaptive capabilities by measuring a firm’s ability to meet the 
requirements of foreign customer demands in terms of product and service 
specifications, ability to tailor products/services according to foreign customer requests, 
and ability to respond quickly to the demand for a product price change from a foreign 
customer.   
We argue that if adaptive capabilities are used to address the market 
environment through market strategy to explain firms’ ability to enable product 
adaption to market demands, we see value in using the term “adaptive political 
capabilities” to address the non-market environment through non-market strategy to 
explain firms’ adaption to political contexts.  
Therefore, building on the work in market strategy by Cavusgil and others 
(1993), Oktemgil and Greenley (1997), and Lu and others (2010); and on the work in 
the strategic management field by Zollo and Winter (2002), Gibson and Birkinshaw 
(2004), and March (1991) (discussed in section 3.6), we view adaptive political 
capabilities as a specific set of capabilities that can allow the adaption of a firm to host 
political contexts where this set of capabilities can improve a firm’s competitive 
position by allowing it to sustain its operations through high political uncertainty.  
Consequently, we define adaptive political capabilities as: 
A firm’s ability to collectively, systematically, and simultaneously accumulate 
experience and articulate and codify knowledge from political uncertainties 
confronted in foreign markets, to enable through a learned pattern the 
reconfiguration of resources and processes to adapt to political uncertainties. 
3.6 Adaptive political capabilities and their foundations 
To comprehend this definition, the nature of adaptive political capabilities, and 
to start their development process, firms must first understand what their foundations 
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are.  Through our review we identified experience and knowledge as the foundations of 
adaptive political capabilities.  We found that since 1998, Teece proposed that the 
ability to create, integrate, transfer, and use knowledge on an ongoing basis underpins a 
firm’s capabilities and competitive advantage.  Later, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) 
referred to the nature and evolution of capabilities in terms of knowledge.  Following, 
the work of other scholars focused on empirically investigating how capabilities are 
facilitated by experience and knowledge management (Cepeda and Vera, 2005; Gold, 
Malhotra, and Segars, 2001; Haas and Hansen, 2005; Sher and Lee, 2004).   
Within this stream of research, the development and evolution of dynamic 
capabilities is claimed to be based on the co-evolution of three learning mechanisms 
involving experience and knowledge.  These learning mechanisms are: (1) experience 
accumulation, (2) knowledge articulation, and (3) knowledge codification (see Figure 
4).  The ultimate objective of capabilities is reconfiguring resources and processes 
through these three learning mechanisms (Zollo and Winter, 2002).   
Figure 4: Learning mechanisms 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Experience accumulation refers to the most important learning mechanism by 
which processes have traditionally been thought to develop – following a “learning by 
doing” approach.  Throughout time, individuals gradually acquire experience that they 
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eventually accumulate.  Experience accumulation is related to the exploration of 
knowledge (Zollo and Winter, 2002).   
Knowledge articulation is the process through which experience and implicit 
knowledge is articulated by individuals through collective discussions, debriefing 
sessions, and outcomes evaluation processes.  By sharing individual experiences and 
comparing their opinions with those of their colleagues, firm members can achieve an 
improved level of understanding of the casual mechanisms intervening between the 
actions required to execute a certain task and the outcomes produced.  While potentially 
requiring significant efforts and commitment on the part of firm members, such 
articulation efforts can produce an improved understanding of the new and changing 
action-outcomes links, and therefore result in adaptive adjustments to the existing sets 
of processes or in enhanced recognition of the need for change (Zollo and Winter, 
2002).   
Knowledge codification involves an even higher level of cognitive effort when 
individuals codify their understandings of the outcome implications of internal 
processes in written tools, such as frameworks, manuals, spreadsheets, decision support 
systems, etc.  Knowledge codification is a step beyond knowledge articulation.  The 
process through which these tools are created and updated implies an effort to 
understand the casual links between the responses to be taken and the outcomes to be 
expected.  The individuals involved in this process will most likely reach a significantly 
higher degree of understanding of what makes a certain process succeed or fail.  
Knowledge codification is, therefore, a crucial element of capability development.  This 
exercise will facilitate the learning of individuals about casual relationships and a 
clearer definition of what works, what doesn’t work, and why (Zollo and Winter, 2002).  
It can facilitate the identification of opportunities or new proposals through a deliberate 
retrospective sense-making with respect to outcome implications of a given set of 
responses (Weick, 1979, 1995).  This process is related to knowledge exploitation and 
intends to be capable of producing “enabling” rather than “coercive” firms (Adler and 
Borys, 1996) by increasing their ability to re-use existing resources and processes in 
response to varying contexts.   
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For these three learning mechanisms to effectively work in the development of 
adaptive political capabilities, to enable adaption to political contexts, firms must 
simultaneously adapt and align (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004) by codifying knowledge 
from past experiences and using it in their confrontation of current political 
uncertainties (exploitation) while continuously accumulating experience (exploration) 
(March, 1991). 
3.7 The lifecycle of capabilities 
To approach the development process of adaptive political capabilities, we must 
also understand that the creation and development processes of all capabilities follow 
various evolution stages over time.  Helfat and Peteraf (2003) explained that all 
capabilities start with a founding stage when a group of individuals organizes around an 
objective requiring or centrally involving the creation of capabilities.  The founding 
stage has two general requirements: (1) an organized group or team, having some type 
of leadership and capable of joint action, and (2) a central objective, the achievement of 
which entails the creation of new capabilities.  The second stage in the lifecycle of 
capabilities is the development stage that begins after the team has organized itself 
around the objective of developing particular capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).  
During this stage, capabilities develop through search by the team of viable alternatives 
for capabilities’ development, combined with accumulation of experience over time.  In 
this context, an alternative is a way of attempting to accomplish the end result at which 
capabilities aim (Winter, 2000).  The development of capabilities entails learning by 
doing of individuals and of the team as a whole, problem-solving, and investment over 
time.  Moreover, the development of new capabilities involves trying out alternatives 
while searching for additional ones, as the team reflects on what it has learned (Winter, 
2000).  At some point, the development of capabilities ceases and these enter the 
maturity stage of their lifecycle (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).  The maturity stage entails 
capabilities’ maintenance.  This involves exercising the capabilities to refresh 
organizational memory.  Below, Figure 5 shows these different stages of the lifecycle of 
capabilities. 
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Figure 5: Stages of the lifecycle of capabilities 
 
Source: Helfat and Peteraf (2003) 
3.8 The use, reconfiguration, and acquisition of resources 
Through the development stage and deployment of all capabilities, firms develop 
responses that rely on the use, reconfiguration, and acquisition of resources to align 
firms with their changing environment and create or sustain competitive advantage 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  The RBV of the firm (Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984) 
examines precisely the link between the internal characteristics of the firm (its 
resources) and firm performance (Barney, 1991).  It describes the firm as a bundle of 
resources (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984) that can be 
categorized as physical capital, human capital, and organizational capital.  Physical 
capital resources include the physical technology used in a firm, a firm’s plant and 
equipment, its geographic location, and its access to raw materials.  Human capital 
resources include the training, experience, judgment, intelligence, relationships, and 
insight of individual managers and workers in the firm.  Organizational capital 
resources include a firm’s formal reporting structure, its formal and informal planning, 
controlling, and coordinating systems, as well as informal relations among groups 
within a firm and between a firm and those in its environment (Barney, 1991).   
It is those firm’s physical, human, and organizational resources that enable it to 
conceive and implement strategies and responses, that improve its efficiency and 
effectiveness by creating value and competitive benefits (Barney, 1991).  However, 
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Barney (1986), Castanias and Helfat (1991), and Wernerfelt (1989) made a distinction 
between resources by arguing that human capital resources constituted a firm’s sources 
of above normal returns, not physical capital resources.  Similarly, Bowman and 
Ambrosini (2000) claimed that the source of value of a firm is the combination and 
deployment of human capital with other resources. 
It is important to note, that research has recognized that the environment has an 
effect on the configuration of a firm’s resources (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Karim, 
2006; Mintzberg, 1979).  For example, Miller (1986) described that the configuration of 
the organizational structure of a firm is linked to its strategy and also to its environment.  
Miller and Shamsie (1996) also found that property-based resources are more valuable 
in stable environments while knowledge-based resources are more valuable in uncertain 
environments.  We suggest that since firms operate in diverse environments, an analysis 
of the effect of environmental contingencies on resource configurations allows us to 
better understand the “fit” between the firm and the environments in which it may 
operate.   
3.9 The development process of adaptive political capabilities 
We found research suggested the following key themes to guide the 
development process of adaptive political capabilities:  (1) managerial commitment, (2) 
knowledge management, and (3) learning mechanisms.   
Managerial commitment.  Existing research found that capability development is 
determined in first instance by managers’ reaction to change, their personal flexibility 
and resistance, their preparedness to influence or adapt, and their commitment to 
learning through learning investments (McLarney and Dastrala, 2001; Zollo and Winter, 
2002). Therefore, the managerial decision to deliberately invest in developing 
capabilities and furthermore, over time commitment to this decision, are vital conditions 
for their development and especially renewal.  What is known today is that if 
managerial commitment exists a firm can start to deliberately develop capabilities.  We 
suggest future research addressing the initiation of the development of capabilities can 
focus on assessing the impact of managerial commitment on capabilities’ development.  
Perhaps it can concentrate on the identification of particular aspects that can trigger or 
impede capabilities’ development.   
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Knowledge management.  To develop capabilities, prior research also suggested 
that a firm must count with or create a knowledge management function within its 
structure that enables the necessary learning processes that underpin capability 
development.  A knowledge management function focuses on providing solutions to 
firms regarding the creation, retention, transfer, and utilization of experience and 
knowledge to help them compete (Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Cepeda and Vera, 2005).  
This knowledge management function must facilitate the sense-making of individuals 
and count with adequate information systems that can support the management of 
knowledge (Easterby-Smith and Prieto, 2008).  A critical aspect that influences the 
impact of knowledge management in the capabilities development process is whether or 
not employees are willing to contribute to and use organizational knowledge (Tenkasi 
and Boland, 1996).  Furthermore, a common erroneous belief about knowledge 
management is that its role has been thought of as managing knowledge that is easily 
handled, and not knowledge that is harder to codify yet potentially more significant for 
the development of capabilities and competitive advantage.  For example, in the case of 
banks, knowledge management is believed to lead to the codification of the knowledge 
involved in daily operations, such as the opening of an account, rather than the 
codification and management of the knowledge involved in more challenging and 
competitive operations, such as acquiring other banks.  An interesting avenue to 
increase our understanding about the role of the knowledge management function 
within capabilities development, can address how this function should effectively 
interact with the rest of the firm to guide and sustain over time deliberate efforts aimed 
at the development of capabilities. 
Learning mechanisms.  Previous research indicated learning mechanisms 
constitute the firm’s systematic methods for reconfiguring resources and processes 
(Easterby-Smith and Prieto, 2008).  Firms learn systematic ways to shape their 
resources and processes by learning how to articulate and codify knowledge, while at 
the same time they facilitate the accumulation and absorption of experience.  Learning 
can be defined as knowledge creation, retention, and application (Vera and Crossan, 
2003).  Crossan, Lane, and White (1999) defined learning as a dynamic process of 
strategic renewal, involving creating new knowledge (exploration) and using existing 
knowledge (exploitation).  The degree of success of firms lies in their potential to 
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conduct both exploration and exploitation activities simultaneously (Levinthal and 
March, 1993; March, 1991).  Capabilities are effectively developed when a firm 
simultaneously explores and exploits its knowledge and competences (Easterby-Smith 
and Prieto, 2008).  This combination is reflected in the concept of ambidexterity 
introduced by Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004).  It involves two dimensions (adaptability 
and alignment) that give rise to capabilities.  Learning mechanisms mediate between 
knowledge management and the capabilities developed, and contribute to the evolution 
of both.  According to Zollo and Winter (2002), exploration and exploitation are both 
critical learning mechanisms.  Exploration is important because it involves moving 
outside the boundaries of current practice. Exploitation also has a role, provided there 
are sufficient conditions in place to ensure that the consequences of exploitative actions 
are fed back as a way of reviewing the processes that underpin them.  We suggest 
research addressing how firms can work on improving their ability to simultaneously 
explore and exploit knowledge can provide highly relevant insights to increment the 
effectiveness of the development of capabilities. 
After having identified the key themes that prior research suggested to guide the 
development of adaptive political capabilities, we question these theoretical findings by 
asking:  (1) Does a firm follow these themes to guide its adaption to host high political 
uncertainty contexts through the development of adaptive political capabilities? (2) How 
does a firm develop adaptive political capabilities?   
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4 METHODOLOGY  
The previous chapters explained the contextual setting of our research and the 
bodies of literature informing our phenomenon of interest.  This chapter explains the 
research problem that we investigated, the research questions we used to address such 
problem, and the research design and approach we followed throughout our inquiry.  
Our research design involved two sequential field studies. Therefore, this methodology 
chapter is divided into two main sections: study one case study and study two survey.   
 
4.1 Research problem 
Following Blaikie’s (2010) first step in the major choices of social inquiry, we 
started our investigation by identifying the research problem.  Our research problem 
stemmed from the accelerated internationalization processes that have confronted firms 
with different institutional frameworks which condition their activities and plans 
(Brouthers et al., 2008).  Specifically, recent political events showed that particularly 
the high political uncertainty contexts of emerging economies significantly affected 
firms’ operations (Henisz and Zelner, 2010).  Simultaneously, these markets had 
become strategic markets that firms could not simply decide to exit in the face of high 
political uncertainty.  Furthermore, they were categorized by firms as sharing the 
characteristics of having authoritarian regimes and weak institutions.  Consequently, as 
firms claimed that rather than attempting to influence these emerging markets’ 
governments, they needed to deal with and adapt to their political challenges to sustain 
their operations, we identified this challenge as a non-market strategy research problem 
in the corporate political activity field.  This research problem resonates with Lawton, 
McGuire and Rajwani’s (2013) claim that “an up-and-coming challenge for CPA 
scholars is to understand non-market activity in emerging economies” (p. 14).   
To address this research problem through our review of the existing literature 
domains of internationalization, uncertainty, the resource-based view (RBV), dynamic 
capabilities, and corporate political activity (CPA), we found that firms can confront 
high political uncertainty contexts through flexible responses that allow them to adapt to 
political challenges.  We argue these flexible responses can be enabled by firms’ 
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adaptive political capabilities.  Therefore, the challenge of our research focused on 
further exploring the questions of “how” and “why” does a firm develop adaptive 
political capabilities to confront high political uncertainty contexts in emerging 
economies during its internationalization processes.   
4.2 Research questions and design 
To address our research problem, we developed several research questions 
which inspired a research design involving two sequential field studies.  In our research 
design, we followed Bouchard’s (1976) suggestion of rather than choosing a method to 
guide our research inquiry, “asking the right question(s) and picking the most powerful 
method(s) for answering particular question(s)” (p. 402).   
In our inquiry, we addressed the following research questions: 
 How does a firm develop adaptive political capabilities to confront high 
political uncertainty contexts in emerging economies during its 
internationalization process (1999-2011)?  
 And, why does a firm develop adaptive political capabilities to deal with 
high political uncertainty contexts during its internationalization process 
(1999-2011)?  
* The timeframe from 1999-2011 was selected to position these research 
questions because it is important to set boundary conditions to better understand the 
development process of adaptive political capabilities and because it frames more than a 
decade of increasing high political uncertainty in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
(IHS Global Insight, 2012).  
To address these research questions, study 1 followed a case study approach that 
allowed us to better understand the unexplored phenomenon of adaptive political 
capabilities mainly through qualitative data as suggested by Barley (1990), Boucharad 
(1976), and Eisenhardt (1989).  As a result of this study, we extended the RBV theory 
and dynamic capabilities by contributing to our understanding of a specific set of 
capabilities (adaptive political capabilities) and their development, through the 
suggestion of several exploratory propositions that support a framework to guide the 
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development of these capabilities by firms.  And, we extended reactive corporate 
political activity research by suggesting a taxonomy of corporate adaptive political 
strategies that makes explicit the choices of flexible responses available to firms to 
adapt to host political contexts. 
After finalizing this first study, we presented its results to the CEO and the top 
executive team of the firm on the 16
th
 of January of 2013 and to the International 
Operations Directors of the firm on the 21
st
 of February of 2013.  Both audiences 
validated our results by stating to “view themselves and the firm”6 in our findings.  
After this validation, we decided to take a step further in our inquiry by conducting a 
second study through which we administered a survey to other firms in the processed 
food industry to test the generalizability of the exploratory propositions that resulted 
from our first study.   
Our inquiry followed a hybrid or mixed methods and sequential contributions 
(qualitative to quantitative) research design that involved first the collection of 
qualitative data that was analyzed qualitatively during study 1, and then, the subsequent 
collection of quantitative data that was analyzed quantitatively during study 2 (Morgan, 
2014; Saunders et al., 2009).  Both, the qualitative and quantitative data were collected 
in real organizations (Edmondson and McManus, 2007).  Our research integrated a 
qualitative method as the core method, and a follow-up supplementary quantitative 
method to contribute additional strengths to enhance the effectiveness of the core 
method (Morgan, 2014).  The goal of this sequential contributions design was to use the 
different strengths of different methods for different purposes with one method 
contributing to the other in a pre-planned fashion.  This research design had the 
objective of first understanding an unexplored phenomenon through qualitative methods 
and secondly, understanding the broader applicability of small-sample qualitative 
findings through quantitative methods (Huff, 2009).  The qualitative method used as the 
core method was the case study method and the follow-up supplementary quantitative 
method was a survey.  Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2012) have described this 
type of research design as compensatory since it combines qualitative and quantitative 
                                                 
6
 I001, I008, I003, I017 and I025.  These codes indicate the interviewees from whom this quote comes 
from.   
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studies to make up for the weaknesses of the other.  Typically, qualitative studies are 
seen as weak on generalization and quantitative studies are weak at explaining why the 
observed results have been obtained.   
This type of hybrid or mixed research design has been increasing in 
management studies (Bryman, 2009).  Hummerinta-Peltomäki and Nummela (2006) 
examined four journals in the international business field and found that 17% of all 
empirical articles derived from mixed methods research.  Cameron and Molina-Azorin 
(2009) also found that 15% of all empirical articles published in the Strategic 
Management Journal (SMJ) from 1997-2006 were based on a mixed methods approach.  
According to Molina-Azorin (2012), the empirical articles published by SMJ between 
1980-2006 that particularly follow a qualitative to quantitative developmental sequence, 
where the qualitative method is used to inform the quantitative method, are: Shrivastava 
(1987); Nutt (1987); Marcus (1988); Reid (1989); Walsh (1989); Reger and Huff 
(1993); Calori, Johnson, and Sarnin, (1994); Pisano (1994); Sharma and Vredenburg 
(1998); Kale, Dyer, and Singh (2002); Matusik (2002); Thomke and Kuemmerle 
(2002); Uzzi and Gillespie (2002); King and Zeithaml (2003); and McEvily and Marcus 
(2005). 
Despite an increasing number of published empirical articles using hybrid or 
mixed methods, our research design was not the result of a methodological fad but a 
question of methodological fit (Edmondson and McManus, 2007).  To achieve 
methodological fit, the research questions, design, and contribution of any inquiry in 
any field should be influenced by the stage of development of the current literature at 
the time of the inquiry.  The state of prior research on dynamic capabilities within the 
resource-based view and corporate political activity research was found to be at an 
intermediate theoretical developmental stage at the time of our inquiry.  This state 
signifies that these streams of research generally present provisional explanations of 
phenomena, often introducing a new construct and proposing relationships between it 
and established constructs.  In some cases, research questions even allow the 
development of testable propositions.  This intermediate state of prior research on 
dynamic capabilities and corporate political activity, offered the possibility of a new 
study to simultaneously allow openness to new or unexplored insights from qualitative 
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data and to test several propositions (Edmondson and McManus, 2007).  Consequently, 
the research design of our inquiry addressed an unexplored phenomenon through 
qualitative data to develop several exploratory propositions that were subsequently 
tested through a quantitative approach.  The value of our design lies in that, despite the 
overall intermediate state of prior research, many of the studies on specific capabilities 
conclude by drawing findings or exploratory propositions from a single case such as 
Salvato (2009) and Ethiraj and others (2005), while our research design aimed to further 
address through a second study the extent of generalizability of our exploratory 
propositions - at least within their specific context.  In this sense, we believe mixed 
methods allowed us to advance from one stage to another in the development of 
knowledge about our phenomenon of interest. 
4.3 Research approach 
Before describing our research methodology for each study, which involves the 
steps and techniques we used to generate and analyze data to explain our phenomenon 
of interest, we explain the research approach we adopted towards our inquiry.  Social 
inquiry design is concerned with both, the logics used to develop knowledge – which 
steps and techniques this involves, frequently referred to as research methodology – and 
the approach to research that involves philosophical assumptions (Blaikie, 2010). 
To uncover our research approach we start by addressing the incompatibility 
thesis (Howe, 1988).  This thesis posits that qualitative and quantitative methods cannot 
and should not be mixed.  Indeed, these two research approaches have resulted in two 
research cultures “one professing the superiority of deep, rich observational data and the 
other the virtues of hard, generalizable data” (Sieber, 1973, p. 1335).  We hope social 
scientists move beyond these qualitative versus quantitative research arguments to 
recognize mixed methods as another research design alternative.  The goal of mixed 
methods research is not to replace either of these approaches but rather to draw from the 
strengths and minimize the weaknesses of both in a single study (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  Taking a compatibilist position, allows researchers to create 
mixed methods research designs that offer the best chance of answering their research 
problem. 
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In our inquiry we decided to follow this compatibilist position that allowed us to 
employ a mixed methods research design under a pragmatist approach.  Tashakkori and 
Teddlie (1998) suggested that pragmatism can be employed as the philosophical 
underpinning for using mixed methods.  Similarly, Greene (2008) also identified 
pragmatism as the leading philosophical approach to mixed methods.  This view focuses 
on the problem to be researched and the consequences of the research (Brewer and 
Hunter, 1989, p. 74; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007, p. 26; Miller, 2006; Tashakkori 
and Teddlie, 1998, pp. 29-30). 
According to the philosopher John Dewey (1986) the key question that guides 
research under a pragmatist approach is what difference it would make to conduct a 
research one way rather than another.  Similarly, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) 
recommended a “contingency theory” approach to research design, which accepts that 
quantitative, qualitative, and mixed research are all superior under different 
circumstances and it is the researcher’s task to examine the specific contingencies and 
make the decision about which research approach should be used in a specific inquiry. 
From a pragmatist point of view, research is a form of action to meet goals which 
are framed in terms of a research problem or question(s).  For Dewey (1986), inquiry 
begins with a problematic situation that needs to be addressed through action.  The 
process of addressing a problem requires careful reflection on both the nature of the 
problem and the range of possible solutions.  Pragmatic inquiry centers on the question, 
what difference would it make to act one way rather than another?  This decision-
making process leads to action and consequences, which need to be evaluated in terms 
of how well they address the original problem.  Our inquiry followed this pragmatist 
approach since we started by identifying our research problem and then searched for the 
research design and methods that best addressed such problem. 
Pragmatism sidesteps the contentious issues of truth and reality, accepts, 
philosophically, that there are singular and multiple realities that are open to empirical 
inquiry and orients itself toward solving practical problems in the ‘‘real world’’ 
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007, pp. 20-28; Dewey, 1925; Rorty, 1999).  In that sense, 
mixed methods research uses quantitative methods to measure some aspects of the 
phenomenon in question and qualitative methods for others.  Ultimately, pragmatism 
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brushes aside the quantitative/qualitative divide and ends the paradigm war by 
suggesting that the most important question is whether the research has helped ‘‘to find 
out what [the researcher] want[s] to know’’ (Feilzer, 2010; Hanson, 2008: 109).  In 
other words, mixed-methods research is a research approach, where the research design 
is determined by what the researcher wants to find out rather than by any predetermined 
epistemological position. 
4.4 Study 1: Case study 
4.4.1 Research methodology 
Given that the development of adaptive political capabilities by firms to sustain 
their operations in high political uncertainty contexts had not been previously 
researched and the nature of the phenomena, we initiated our inquiry by employing the 
case study method, to understand the foundations and themes that guide the 
development process of these capabilities.  This in-depth case study research approach 
followed guidelines for case study research design provided by Yin (2009) and for the 
process of building theory from case studies provided by Eisenhardt (1989, 1991).  We 
also used visual analysis techniques suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), and 
suggestions on narrative analysis provided by Langley (1999) through which quotes 
from data are used to reflect participants’ reality.   
To answer our “how” and “why” research questions we adopted an inductive 
logic.  We started with the collection of data, followed by data analysis, and then 
derived generalizations (Blaikie, 2007).  Our aim was to understand the development 
process of adaptive political capabilities from a bottom up approach that initiated with 
data collection and finalized with the suggestion of a taxonomy of corporate adaptive 
political strategies and a framework to guide the development of adaptive political 
capabilities. 
4.4.1.1 A Latin American food firm 
We selected a firm within the Latin American processed food industry to be the 
focus of our in-depth study (Yin, 2009).  Salvato (2009) used a similar approach in his 
study of the evolution of the product development capability in “Alessi”, an Italian 
designer home furnishings firm.  Ethiraj and others (2005) also studied the case of a 
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single Indian firm in the software industry to understand client-specific and project 
management capabilities.  Our approach involved identifying and investigating the 
retrospective and longitudinal case of a “representative” (Yin, 2009) firm in the Latin 
American processed food industry that met the following criteria: (1) had a Latin 
American origin, (2) had managed to sustain operations for more than 10 years in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, and (3) had been categorized among the largest 
processed food firms in the Latin American region.  Since Latin American firms have 
traditionally confronted uncertainty (IHS Global Insight, 2012), we were interested in 
conducting our in-depth research in a Latin American origin processed food firm that 
had managed to sustain operations in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, which were 
the Latin American countries that we found to relate to the high political uncertainty 
contexts of our interest.  We defined that the processed food firm had to present 
sustained operations for at least 10 years in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua since 
this assured that it had confronted political challenges to which it could had probably 
adapted.  We also determined that the “size or amount of resources” of the processed 
food firm were key because they assured that the selected firm counted with sufficient 
resources to allow its adaption to political challenges rather than its immediate exit in 
the face of political uncertainty. 
We found a large and representative Latin America processed food firm that met 
these criteria and provided us with the required access to conduct our research.  We use 
the pseudonym of “Latam” to protect its identity and that of the interviewees’ who 
allowed us to explore and understand our phenomena of interest.  Table 9 shows some 
of the characteristics of Latam. 
Table 9: Characteristics of Latam 
Profit from international sales 2010 644 million USD  
Number of employees  29,000 employees  
International presence  71 countries  
  
Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
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Within this “representative” Latin American processed food firm, we 
investigated Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua as the three different contexts in which 
Latam had probably adapted to political challenges.  Our case was a longitudinal case 
that focused on the timeframe from 1999-2011 to understand capability development 
during the highest political uncertainty timeframe that these three countries and the firm 
had confronted in the last 50 years.  We explored our “how” and “why” questions inside 
Latam through its operations in these three contexts by concentrating on adaptive 
political capabilities as our phenomena of interest.  To understand how adaptive 
political capabilities were developed by Latam, we analyzed its strategic responses to 
political uncertainties in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.  Therefore, our units of 
analysis were first, the three different contexts (Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua) 
and secondly, Latam’s strategic responses to the political uncertainties it encountered in 
each context.  We described and analyzed Latam’s strategic responses in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua to find a total of 36 flexible responses and 0 control or 
cooperative responses had been adopted by the firm to start and sustain its operations in 
these markets.  To identify and describe each of the flexible responses, we triangulated 
multiple sources of data observing how Latam had responded to the various political 
uncertainties.  Since we were interested in understanding which had been Latam’s 
strategic responses to political uncertainties, the firm was our case (see Figure 6).  In 
other words, we followed a single-embedded case design that involved researching 
multiple units of analysis (first, the three contexts and secondly, Latam’s strategic 
responses in each context) within a single firm (Yin, 2009). 
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Figure 6: The case, phenomena of interest, and units of analysis 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
It is important to note, that our study focused on the legal strategic responses 
that Latam used to start and sustain its operations in Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua.  Our focus was determined by two main reasons.  Firstly, the selected firm’s 
policies explicitly prohibit any acts of corruption and state that any employee who 
incurs into an act of corruption will be immediately expelled.  Throughout our inquiry, 
we validated that this policy had become a shared value among the employees and 
found examples of situations were although an employee from Latam had been asked to 
incur into an act of corruption, he or she had not done so.  We found that in fact Latam 
had enforced this behaviour by designing ways to tackle these situations.  For example, 
in one host country a manager with a foreign nationality was requested to provide local 
authorities with a bribe in order to avoid their request of additional documentation as 
evidence of Latam’s compliance with a specific regulation.  Instead of providing these 
local authorities with a bribe, this manager informed his supervisor within Latam and 
the firm responded by asking other employees, who had the local nationality, to 
communicate with the local authorities to provide them with all of the additional 
documentation required to prove Latam’s compliance with the law.  Consequently, if 
our research interest included the study of the development of illegal strategic 
responses, the selected firm would not have been an appropriate case for our inquiry.  
Lastly, our inquiry intends to provide a “walking stick” (Hafsi and Howard, 2005) for 
firms that face the challenge of sustaining their operations in high political uncertainty 
Case Phenomena Units of analysis
Latam
Venezuela
Strategic Responses
Ecuador
Strategic Responses
Nicaragua 
Strategic Responses
Adaptive 
Political 
Capabilities
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markets through legal activities.  In this sense, despite worldwide increasing corruption 
indexes (Transparency International, 2012), our aim is to inform and promote legal 
corporate practices in the managerial world.  We intend to guide firms on their 
development of adaptive political capabilities that enhance their opportunities of legally 
sustaining international operations rather than increasing their risks through acts of 
corruption as means of adaption.  Therefore, we have excluded the study of corruption 
or illegal activities from our inquiry. 
4.4.1.2 The three foreign high political uncertainty contexts: Venezuela, Ecuador, 
and Nicaragua 
We analyzed “how” and “why” Latam had adapted to political challenges in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua because initially these contexts were identified as 
high political uncertainty contexts in Latin America (Vassolo et al., 2011; IHS Global 
Insight, 2012).  Secondly, because Latam also identified these three same contexts as 
strategic markets in which it had confronted it’s most challenging political uncertainties.  
Below, Table 10 shows a list of the 20 most important strategic markets for Latam 
following a descendent order starting with the country rated as having the highest 
political uncertainty context and ending with the country rated as having the lowest 
political uncertainty context.  To calculate these average ratings, we asked Latam’s 
CEO and its two Internationalization VPs to individually define which were the top 
strategic markets for Latam.  Then, we presented them with a list that aggregated all of 
the most strategic markets they had identified and we asked them to rate the degree of 
political uncertainty they perceived that Latam’s operations had confronted in each 
country between 1999-2011.  Participants were given a scale from 1-10 to guide their 
ratings in which 1 was low political uncertainty, 5 was medium political uncertainty, 
and 10 was high political uncertainty.  
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Table 10: Ratings of political uncertainty for Latam’s most strategic markets 
Market Average ratings 
Venezuela 10 
Ecuador 8,7 
Nicaragua 7 
Honduras 7 
Africa 6,3 
Russia 6 
Peru 5,7 
Guatemala 5,7 
El Salvador 5 
China 5 
Mexico 3,7 
Colombia 3,7 
Dominican Republic 3,3 
Spain 3,3 
USA 3 
Southeast Asian countries 3 
Brazil 3 
Panama 3 
Costa Rica 2 
Chile  2 
 
Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
As it is shown Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua were found to be the 
countries in which Latam had confronted the highest political uncertainty contexts.  
From top to bottom, Nicaragua occupied the third place followed by Honduras which 
both scored an average rating of 7.  Honduras was not included in the research because 
through conversations with the CEO and the Internationalization VPs, they emphasized 
that the lessons they had learnt on how to confront high political uncertainty contexts 
came from their experience in the first three countries. 
4.4.1.3 The location of Latam’s corporate office 
It is important to note that Latam has its corporate office located in the Latin 
American country of Colombia.  Colombia, as many other Latin American countries, 
follows a democratic regime and a market openness approach.  According to IHS 
Global Insight (2012), it has significantly improved its political stability during the last 
half decade (see Figure 7).  Political risks in Colombia are relatively low and despite the 
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persistence of civil conflict, the country has one of the most robust democracies in Latin 
America (IHS Global Insight, 2012). 
Figure 7: Evolution of political uncertainty ratings from 1999-2011 of Colombia vs. other Latin 
American countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IHS Global Insight (2012) 
Being the corporate office of Latam located in Colombia, it is important to 
understand this country’s political relations with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
and their implications for our research.  Colombia’s political relations with Ecuador and 
Venezuela have suffered frictions during the last decade due to their differing political 
stances towards their understandings of democracy and security.  However, Colombian 
President Juan Manuel Santos who was elected in 2010 has strongly improved relations 
with Ecuador and Venezuela.  Nonetheless, spill over effects from drug trafficking and 
the activities of illegal armed groups remain potential sources of friction in Colombia’s 
relations with these two neighbouring countries (IHS Global Insight, 2012).  With 
Nicaragua, Colombia faces a territorial dispute over San Andres, Providencia, Santa 
Catalina, and other territories, that has for decades affected their political relation.  
Since 1803, Spain declared these islands as Colombian territory.  Later, during the 24th 
of March of 1928, the Esguerra–Barcenas treaty was signed between Colombia and 
Nicaragua.  This treaty recognized that San Andres, Providencia, Santa Catalina, and 
other territories were Colombian.  The meridian 82 was determined as the limit between 
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both countries.  During 2001, Nicaragua declared the Esguerra – Barcenas as “null” and 
presented a lawsuit against Colombia in the International Court of Justice claiming as 
Nicaraguan the territories to the east of the 82 meridian.  During the 13th of December 
of 2007, the International Court of Justice recognized the sovereignty of Colombia over 
San Andres, Providencia, and Santa Catalina but it left open the consideration of border 
limits by the 82 meridian and the sovereignty of some small islands like Serranilla, 
Quitasueño, Serrana, Roncador, and Bajo Nuevos.  This territorial dispute between 
Colombia and Nicaragua continues to affect the political relation between the two 
countries.  Another notable challenge to the political relations between Colombia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua stems from their political stance towards the U.S.  
While Colombia has traditionally been recognized as an ally of the United States in the 
Latin American region, opposingly Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua have developed 
over the last decade an increasingly stronger discourse against “the Yankee 
imperialism” (Vassolo et al., 2011).   
These characteristics of the political relations of Colombia, as Latam’s location 
of its corporate office, with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua set the ideal scene for 
our research.  In chapter 2, Figure 3 showed the increasing evolution of the political 
uncertainty country ratings of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua (IHS Global Insight, 
2012).  Besides these political uncertainty country ratings, which evidence that the 
political contexts of these countries have become more uncertain during the last decade, 
it is also evident that the political relations between Colombia and these countries have 
had and still sustain difficult tension points.  Consequently, not only have the national 
political contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua been rated as increasingly 
uncertain but similarly the international political relations of these countries with 
Colombia have also placed a challenge for firms located in Colombia and having 
international operations in these three markets.  Unsurprisingly, Latam, rated 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua as the most challenging international markets in 
terms of their political contexts.  This demonstrates that not only have Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua been increasing their country level political uncertainty during 
the last decade (IHS Global Insight, 2012) but also have their international relations 
with Colombia not made it “easier” for firms with headquarters in Colombia to sustain 
their international operations in these three markets.  Consequently, both, the national 
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political contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua and their international political 
relations with Colombia, provide the ideal setting for us to explore how a firm with a 
Latin American origin that is based in a Latin American emerging economy manages to 
sustain its international operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts in other 
emerging economies – being those political contexts uncertain at the country level and 
in their international relations with the country of origin of the host firm. 
4.4.1.4 Data sources and collection 
Data gathering spanned over 8 months, from July of 2011 to February of 2012 
during which 58 company or office visits were carried out to conduct the interviews and 
3 company visits involved the revision of case study drafts by key informants to 
enhance validity.  Our collected data implied a mix of primary and secondary data.  
Specifically, our data came from interviews, documents, and archival data which were 
triangulated during the analysis stage to enhance validity and reliability through the use 
of multiple sources of information (Yin, 2009).  However, given the need to carefully 
trace political events, the uncertainties generated for Latam due to these events, the 
strategic responses of Latam and their outcomes, the main source of evidence came 
from interviews. 
4.4.1.4.1 Primary data: Interviews 
We interviewed 60 key informants who are identified in Appendix 2.  These 
included board members of Latam, the CEO, presidents of the business lines, managers 
located in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua and in charge of the operations in these 
countries, international business directors, logistic managers, marketing directors, 
coordinators of centralized services such as treasury, auditing, legal assessment, human 
resources, risk management, and IT.  Informants’ collaboration with Latam ranged from 
2 to 33 years with an average of 14 years, hence providing an extensive coverage of the 
focal 13 years period (1999–2011).  We also interviewed industry or trade experts such 
as an ex-CEO of a retail chain in Venezuela, the President of a trade association, and an 
ex-Ambassador of Colombia in Venezuela, to enhance construct validity.  Our 
interviews were face to face, in-depth, semi-structured interviews ranging from 30 to 
150 minutes.  These were conducted following Huber and Power’s (1985) and Miller, 
Cardinal, and Glick’s (1997) guidelines for increasing accuracy in retrospective 
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research by identifying multiple knowledgeable informants for our research interest, 
including informants from different perspectives, and using pre-tested questions and 
follow-up probes.  We asked informants about concrete events and motivated their 
responses by assuring confidentiality and explaining the usefulness of the research.  
Through the interview process we built our interviewee list by using the organizational 
chart and by continuously extending the number of participants by including those that 
were referred by others.  We finalized our interviews when saturation was achieved and 
when we simultaneously validated our interviewee list with 5 key informants to assure 
that the total population that had been exposed to decisions regarding operations in 
these three countries had been interviewed.  Our interviewees came from different areas 
and levels within Latam because all of them were called upon adapting to the various 
political challenges.  This allowed a broad perspective of Latam’s adaption process 
from its executive team to its operating level.  All interviews were conducted, recorded, 
transcribed, and analyzed in Spanish.  The final results and the quotes extracted from 
the interviews were translated to English.  All translations were validated by a third-
party.  
To conduct our interviews, we designed a presentation letter and an interview 
protocol which we previously tested during two pilot interviews with two CEOs of other 
different Latin American processed food firms.  In Appendix 3, we include the English 
version of the presentation letter and the interview protocol that we followed to conduct 
our interviews.  Throughout this appendix we point out the changes we made to their 
original versions according to the feedback we received during the pilot interviews.  
Comments starting with P1 explain the changes resulting from the first pilot interview 
and comments starting with P2 explain the changes resulting from the second pilot 
interview.  Appendix 4, presents the Spanish version of the presentation letter and 
interview protocol previously presented in Appendix 3. 
4.4.1.4.2 Secondary data: Documents and archival data 
Several hundred pages were available in documents about Latam and about the 
tools it developed to guide its operations in high political uncertainty contexts.  About 
Latam, we found of particular interest the various annual reports from 2004-2011 and 
the sales and employees reports from 1999-2011 which allowed us to longitudinally and 
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retrospectively reconstruct the evolution of sales and the number of employees in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.  We also used Latam’s organizational chart to 
validate that our interviewees made up the total population exposed to decision-making 
about these three markets from 1999-2011.   
Moreover, we found several tools that Latam developed to guide its distribution 
and production operations specifically in Venezuela.  These tools evidenced that Latam 
had started codifying part of the knowledge it had developed in order to improve its 
competitive position to confront future political uncertainties, particularly in Venezuela.  
Below, Table 11 shows a description of the documents we found. 
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Table 11: Documents 
Source Document Description 
Firm 
Annual Reports  
2004-2011 
These documents provided general information about 
Latam. 
Organizational  Structure 
Sales and employees 
report 1999-2011 
Distribution 
operations in 
Venezuela 
Strategic checklist Identified strategic topics, the people responsible for 
each topic and the actions that have, are or will be 
implemented regarding these strategic topics.   
 
The strategic topics included:  Property structure, 
protection of IT systems and information, protection of 
brands, relations with associations, communications, 
monitoring of legal affairs, corporate social 
responsibility initiatives, human resources, and 
expatriates. 
Operative checklist Identified by area all of the operative activities or 
reports that had to be up dated to assure that 
governmental inspections were passed.  The people 
responsible and the dates or periodicities of each report 
or activity were specified. 
 
It also included the requirements that the logistics 
operator had to meet and their periodicity. 
 
The areas responsible for the operative activities or 
reports were:  General management, administrative 
direction, accounting, taxing, treasury, human 
resources, regional sales, and logistics.  
Directory of legal advice 
services in Venezuela 
Provided a directory listed by topic or process that 
indicated which company or companies in Venezuela 
could provide specialized legal advice to Latam.  
Corporate support  Indicated who was responsible within Latam of what 
process and who supported this process within the 
corporate services centre.  It also included comments 
about how each process was being improved. 
Calendar for payment of 
taxes 
Detailed what taxes had to be payed, who within Latam 
was responsible, and the dates in which they had to be 
payed. 
Legal status of brands 
and sanitary registries  
Identified the brands directed to the Venezuelan market 
along with an explanation of their current legal status. 
 
Identified the products directed to the Venezuelan 
market along with the status of their sanitary registries. 
Protocol to manage 
governmental inspections 
Instructed employees within Latam on how to manage 
any type of governmental inspection that could take 
place at any distribution site in Venezuela. 
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Source Document Description 
Production 
operations in 
Venezuela 
Protocols System Instructed employees within the production operations 
on how to manage governmental inspections that could 
take place at the plant or distribution agencies in 
Venezuela. 
Training Guide Special 
Support Team for 
Protocols System  
Provided information required for the training of the 
employees that conformed the special support team for 
the protocols system.   
 
Its first section provided information about the 
regulatory system that allowed governmental 
inspections.  The second section provided instructions 
on how to respond to possible governmental 
inspections. 
Training Guide 
Employees in Agencies 
for Protocols System 
Provided information required for the training of the 
employees in the distribution agencies regarding 
governmental inspections. 
11 Topic Specific 
Protocols 
Instructed employees within production operations on 
how to manage the details of the different specific 
types of governmental inspections that could take place 
at the plant in Venezuela. 
Power map Identified the different interest groups that surrounded 
the production platform and analyzed their potential 
impact on Latam’s operations.  This map allowed 
Latam to design ways to interact with these interest 
groups. 
Analytical Matrixes  
(2009, 2010, 2011) 
Identified and evaluated the main themes that affected 
production operations.   
 
These matrixes supported the development of strategies 
and indicators that allowed production operations to be 
sustained in Venezuela.   
Ready Project Prepared production operations for an expropriation.  
This was a confidential project. 
Total 
documents 
37 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
In addition to these documents, we revised several media articles that described 
the political events that took place in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua to validate the 
chronology of events from 1999-2011 in each country.  We also found three articles that 
discussed some of Latam’s strategic responses to political uncertainties in Venezuela.  
Although Latam always tried to maintain a low and politically neutral profile, the media 
managed to publish articles about some of its strategic responses.  Below, Table 12 
describes our archival data. 
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Table 12: Archival data 
Source Document Description 
Media 
Articles about Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
(60) 
These articles came from different sources of 
information to assure the inclusion of the most relevant 
events in the chronologies built for each country. 
Articles about Latam (3) 
 
These articles described the strategic responses of 
Latam towards the high political uncertainty 
confronted in Venezuela. 
Total archival 
data 
63 
 
 
 
  
 Source: Elaborated by author 
We created a case study database that categorized all interview recordings and 
transcripts, documents, and archival data so that they were readily available for 
subsequent reinterpretation.  This database also enabled the tracing of a chain of 
evidence from the research questions to the conclusions (Yin, 2009). 
4.4.1.5 Data analysis 
We followed three steps to analyze our data.  The first step consisted in building 
three individual chronologies of the critical political events that Latam confronted in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua from 1999-2011.  These chronologies ranged from 
10-53 pages and included descriptions of the political events that took place, the 
uncertainties these events generated for Latam, the strategic responses of Latam towards 
these uncertainties, and the outcomes of these strategic responses.  Moreover, each 
chronology described the adaptive political capabilities development process, focusing 
on the flexible responses of Latam towards the different political challenges it faced.  
These chronologies were built upon the triangulation of interviewees, documents, and 
archival data which allowed us to retrospectively reconstruct each timeline.  Our aim 
was to develop a longitudinal factual account of the most important events in each 
context following Miles and Huberman’s (1994) suggestion of conducting within case 
analysis through data time-ordered displays of critical incidents.  Through these visual 
displays we presented information systematically to understand the sequence, location, 
and connection of events.  We intended to clarify and add detail to an accurate and 
reliable description of accounts that showed how Latam developed adaptive political 
capabilities.  More important, building on the work of Kobrin (1979, 1981), through 
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these chronologies we created the basis of a political assessment tool for Latam by 
codifying its past political uncertainties, strategic responses, and outcomes.  To 
complement these chronologies, we created graphs from the data found in the 
documents provided by Latam to illustrate the evolution of sales and number of 
employees from 1999-2011 for each country.  Once the three chronologies were built, 
we cross-checked each one individually across key informants to enhance their validity 
and reliability (Yin, 2009).   
In the second data analysis step, we compared the three chronologies and graphs 
in terms of similarities and differences.  The visual displays of the chronologies and 
graphs were very useful at this stage but they were complemented with a coding 
exercise of the 60 interviews that was supported by the NVivo 9® software (sponsored 
by Cranfield University).  Our analysis drew attention to the visual displays of the 
chronologies and graphs “making sense of them”, knitting them together with the 
themes arising from the interviews.  Our analysis focused on the themes we found to 
guide the development process of adaptive political capabilities in the case of Latam.  
We used quotes from the interviews to support our explanation of these different 
themes. 
The third and final step consisted in comparing the themes the firm followed to 
develop adaptive political capabilities with the literature.  Through multiple 
comparisons between data and theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), we developed exploratory 
propositions that supported our suggestion of a framework to guide the development of 
adaptive political capabilities.  During this stage, through our understanding of the 
development process of adaptive political capabilities, we also suggested a taxonomy of 
corporate adaptive political strategies that makes explicit the flexible responses that 
were used by Latam to adapt to its political contexts.  This process lasted three months 
and involved a constant iteration between theory and data to sharpen the validity of 
results.  Since the result of this final stage was our suggestion of a framework to 
develop adaptive political capabilities and a taxonomy of corporate adaptive political 
strategies, we describe our first study as a one that extended theory since it extended the 
RBV theory and dynamic capabilities by contributing to our understanding of a specific 
set of capabilities (adaptive political capabilities) and their development (Lee, Mitchell, 
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and Sablynski, 1999).  And, it also extended reactive corporate political activity 
research through the suggestion of a taxonomy of corporate adaptive political strategies 
that can be used by firms to understand their choices to adapt to host political contexts. 
After concluding our first study, we decided to conduct a second study to further 
advance our inquiry.  Through this second study, we utilized a survey to test the 
exploratory propositions that resulted from our first study. 
4.5 Study 2: Survey 
4.5.1 Research methodology 
Since the results of our first study allowed us to suggest several exploratory 
propositions that support a framework to guide the development of adaptive political 
capabilities by firms, the objective of our second study focused on testing through an 
exploratory quantitative study the generalizability of these exploratory propositions – at 
least within their specific context. 
Consequently, in our second study we adopted a deductive logic that allowed us 
to test our exploratory propositions by collecting appropriate data (Blaikie, 2007).  Our 
aim was to test our exploratory propositions by matching them with data from a cross-
sectional survey that followed guidelines provided by Fink (2013).  This involved 
understanding the development process of adaptive political capabilities from a top 
down approach that initiated with the testing of our exploratory propositions through the 
collection of relevant data and finalized with the use of statistical techniques to reject or 
provisionally accept each exploratory proposition.  (Accepting an exploratory 
proposition is always provisional since new data may emerge that rejects it later on). 
4.5.1.1 Unit of analysis  
Our first study focused on the case of Latam, a Latin American origin processed 
food firm with a corporate office in Colombia that sustained operations in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua between 1999 and 2011.  Since we wanted to test the 
generalizability of the exploratory propositions that resulted from this first case study, 
we decided to conduct a survey to other processed food firms that had operations in any 
of the three emerging markets of our inquiry (Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua) 
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between 1999 and 2011.  Hence, we describe our unit of analysis as processed food 
firms that had operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011. 
4.5.1.2 Population 
To estimate our population of study, we first investigated publicly available 
secondary data to try to identify which processed food firms had operations in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999 and 2011.  However, our research 
efforts were not fruitful.  The public data we found available was very limited and did 
not allow us to find or deduce in any way such information.  Consequently, we 
acknowledged we required primary data to identify the population of processed food 
firms that had operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999 and 2011.  
The difficulty in accessing primary data in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua lied in 
that researchers in the CPA field currently run high risks of being persecuted in these 
three countries, therefore we were not allowed by our research sponsors to travel to 
these countries or to even contact processed food firms in these countries through phone 
calls.  We found that the best way to safely proceed with our study was to contact all 
processed food firms located in a different country from Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua, to identify which had operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
between 1999 and 2011.  Since Latam, the firm that constituted our case study, had its 
corporate office located in Colombia, we decided to investigate all of the processed food 
firms operating in Colombia to identify which had operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua between 1999 and 2011.   
Through the Chambers of Commerce in Colombia we were able to access the 
contact information of the processed food firms operating in Colombia’s largest cities.  
According to these official records, there are 1219 processed food firms in Colombia’s 
largest cities.  Below, Table 13 shows for each city the number of processed food firms 
that were identified.   
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Table 13: Processed food firms in Colombia 
Cities 
Processed food 
firms that were 
identified 
Processed food 
firms that 
complied with 
criteria 
Processed food firms that 
answered the survey 
Medellin 351 7 7 100% 
Bogota 84 14 8 57% 
Cali 262 16 11 69% 
Barranquilla 108 2 2 100% 
Cartagena 102 0 0 0% 
Pereira 311 1 1 100% 
Manizales 1 1 1 100% 
Total 1219 41 30 73% 
Source: Elaborated by author 
We contacted by phone each processed food firm that was identified in every 
city to ask its International Manager/Director/Coordinator or General Manager if the 
firm had operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999 and 2011.  To 
guarantee a truthful response on behalf of each firm, we previously developed a phone 
call protocol that was followed during all phone calls.  This protocol can be found in 
Appendix 5.  About this phone call protocol, we want to highlight two points.  Maria De 
Villa (PhD candidate presenting this thesis) works as an Assistant Professor at EAFIT 
University in Colombia.  Therefore, it was very important to introduce ourselves to all 
firms as a group of researchers from EAFIT University and Cranfield University, taking 
advantage of the fact that EAFIT University has a very strong brand in Colombia and 
firms trust its School of Management.  This gave confidence to the contacted firms.  
Secondly, we offered the contacted firms the possibility to participate in a contest to win 
an executive education course offered by EAFIT University if they met the criteria to 
participate in our study.  This statement was also very important because it quickly 
allowed the contacted firms to perceive the seriousness of the study due to its 
institutional support. 
We found that from the total 1219 processed food firms that were contacted, 
only 41 met with the criteria of having had operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua between 1999-2011.  It is important to note, that from those 41 processed 
food firms that constituted our population, 90% (37) of them are located in Bogota, 
Medellin, and Cali.  This was not surprising since these three cities are Colombia’s 
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largest cities and 71.5% of the employment provided by the industry is concentrated in 
firms located in Bogota (40.1%), Medellin (19.8%), and Cali (11.6%) (DANE, 2010). 
4.5.1.3 Sample  
Since a small number of firms constituted our population (41 processed food 
firms), we invited all of them to participate in our study.  In response, 30 processed food 
firms (73%) accepted our invitation and completed the survey throughout the second 
semester of 2013.  These 30 firms answered the survey appropriately and completely so 
no surveys had to be discarded, all were usable.  Thus, our final response rate was 73%. 
We describe our sample as a non-probabilistic convenience sample since we 
invited all of the firms in our small population to answer the survey and conveniently 
used the responses of the firms that eventually accepted to participate by appropriately 
and completely answering the survey. 
4.5.1.4 Respondents  
Once we identified our population of firms and invited all of them to participate, 
given that we defined our unit of analysis as processed food firms that had operations in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011, the issue then became what level 
of response from a particular firm was necessary to be considered a reliable 
representation of the firm?  The use of single respondent data has been found to 
introduce potential error, as an individual’s response may not be a fully accurate 
reflection of the firm (Norburn, 1974).  Consequently, we decided to incorporate in our 
study two respondents per firm.  Respondents were firm employees whose position was 
either International Managers/Directors/Coordinators or General Managers. 
From the 30 firms that responded the survey, 24 firms had two of their 
employees conjunctly respond (completing one survey per firm) while 6 firms had two 
of their employees respond separately (completing two surveys per firm).  For the 6 
firms in which the two employees responded separately, we calculated the Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient to assess the level of agreement between the two individual 
respondents upon the two most important variables in our study: “control or cooperative 
responses” and “flexible responses”.  For the variable “control or cooperative 
responses” we found SPSS could not calculate the Spearman’s rank correlation 
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coefficient because the responses of the two respondents per firm were exactly the same 
in the six cases.  For the variable “flexible responses”, the average correlation 
coefficient was 0.8, which suggests very strong inter-rater agreement between the two 
respondents in the 6 firms. 
Two important methodological implications followed from the high levels of 
consistency found between the two separate respondents for the 6 firms.  First, this 
confirmed that a reliable representation of a firm can be derived by averaging the two 
individual responses from a firm.  This procedure was followed to provide a single firm 
level response for each of the 6 firms in the sample for which there were two 
respondents.  Second, the high levels of reliability (agreement) between individual 
respondents from the same firm also implied that two respondents who simultaneously 
answered a single survey for one firm were likely to be reliable of the perception held 
by the firm.  In other words, our results provide justification for the inclusion in this 
study of those surveys that were responded by two separate individuals constituting two 
separate surveys per firm and of those surveys that were responded by two individuals 
simultaneously constituting only one survey per firm. 
4.5.1.5 Survey design 
The design of the survey we utilized to collect our data started by listing our 
exploratory propositions and identifying their variables.  Below,  
Table 14 encompasses our exploratory propositions from study one and 
identifies the variables of each proposition. 
Table 14: Propositions and variables 
Propositions Variables from propositions 
P1: Host firms depend more on adapting through flexible 
responses than on influencing governments through 
control or cooperative responses to sustain their 
operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts.  
 Flexible responses 
 Control or cooperative responses 
P2a: Host firms that own a production operation in a 
foreign high political uncertainty context, depend more on 
developing flexible responses to confront potential 
expropriation than on developing flexible responses to 
confront policy changes, to sustain their production 
operation. 
 Flexible responses to confront 
potential expropriation 
 Flexible responses to confront 
policy changes 
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Propositions Variables from propositions 
P2b: Host firms that own a distribution operation in a 
foreign high political uncertainty context, depend more on 
developing flexible responses to confront policy changes 
than on developing flexible responses to confront potential 
expropriation, to sustain their distribution operation. 
 Flexible responses to confront 
policy changes  
 Flexible responses to confront 
potential expropriation 
 
P2c: Host firms that own a distribution and a production 
operation simultaneously in a foreign high political 
uncertainty context, depend on developing both, flexible 
responses to policy changes and flexible responses to 
potential expropriation, to sustain their distribution and 
production operations.  
 Flexible responses to confront 
policy changes  
 Flexible responses to confront 
potential expropriation 
P3: Host firms rely more on their human capital resources 
than on their organizational and physical resources in 
their development of adaptive political capabilities to 
sustain operations in foreign high political uncertainty 
contexts. 
 Human capital resources 
 Organizational resources 
 Physical resources 
 
P4: The higher the level of political uncertainty perceived 
by host firms in a foreign context, the more they rely on 
the contextual knowledge of their internal and external 
human resources to develop adaptive political capabilities 
to sustain their operations.  
 Level of political uncertainty 
perceived 
 Contextual knowledge of internal 
and external human resources 
 
P5: The higher the level of political uncertainty perceived 
by host firms in a foreign context, the more they 
reconfigure their organizational structure and processes 
to sustain their operations.  
 Level of political uncertainty 
perceived 
 Reconfigurations of 
organizational structure and 
processes 
 
P6: Most host firms are obliged to invest in physical 
resources to develop flexible responses in contexts with 
political uncertainty, despite the level of political 
uncertainty they perceive in these contexts. 
 
 Investments in physical resources 
 Level of political uncertainty 
perceived 
 
P7: Host firms with lower managerial commitment to 
knowledge articulation and codification perceive they are 
more likely over time to lose the knowledge they have 
developed to sustain their operations in foreign high 
political uncertainty contexts. 
 Managerial commitment to 
knowledge articulation and 
codification 
 Lose the knowledge developed 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Following this first step, we proceeded to carefully study the conceptual 
meaning and dimensions or items that make up the definition of each of the variables in 
our propositions.  Then, we revised the existing literature to identify the measurement 
instruments that had already been used to operationalize these variables.  We only found 
measurement instruments had been developed in the literature for the variables “level of 
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political uncertainty perceived” and “control or cooperative responses”.  We decided to 
adopt the measurement instruments of these two variables in our survey taking steps to 
ensure these were appropriate for our sample firms and context.  However, the lack of 
measurement instruments for our other variables meant that for their operationalization 
or the definition of their measures, we had to use their definitions and dimensions or 
items available in the literature and in some cases resulting from our research.  Only in 
the case of the variables “flexible responses”, “flexible responses to confront policy 
changes”, and “flexible responses to confront a potential expropriation”, due to an 
absence in the literature of a robust definition of these concepts and their dimensions or 
items, we used the results of our first study (the taxonomy of corporate adaptive 
political strategies) to develop their measures.  It was not surprising to note an absence 
in the literature of these last three variables since from the start and throughout our 
inquiry we observed that these variables have not been very much addressed in CPA 
research. 
After having defined the operationalization of the variables in our propositions, 
we defined several control variables that included size, country of origin of the firm, 
experience in high political uncertainty contexts, amongst four more control variables to 
test their influence on our propositions.  Then, we coded all dimensions or items for all 
variables by assigning a numeric value to every possible answer for each.  For a detail 
account of this process to which we refer to as the “back-bone” or construction process 
of our survey, please refer to Appendix 6. 
After having constructed our survey’s “back-bone”, we proceeded to elaborate 
its first draft and presented it to three experts in the CPA field in Colombia (Juan David 
Escobar, Jose Ignacio López, Jorge Ignacio Paz).  This was a very important step to 
validate with experts that the design, content, and language of the survey would “make 
sense” to its target respondents.  These experts made two interesting suggestions.  First, 
that in the items were we used the term “lobbying” we should include its definition to 
make sure respondents had the same interpretation of the term.  Therefore, we 
proceeded to include a definition of “lobbying” in the survey.  We defined the act of 
“lobbying” as communicating opinions or information to policy makers through 
informal meetings, formal settings or social settings to influence the government 
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towards the firm’s own interests.  Second, that after completing the survey we asked 
respondents if their firm had used any other tactic that was not included in the survey to 
deal with the high political uncertainty contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua.  
We followed this suggestion and found that in neither the pilot nor the final survey was 
any additional tactic suggested by respondents. 
After the validation of the survey by these experts, we conducted a pilot study 
within Latam.  We had 7 respondents answer our survey which was in the form of a 
printed Microsoft Word document.  We presented our survey in the form of a printed 
Microsoft Word document to the participants in this first pilot study because at that time 
we thought we were going to gain access to a food industry association meeting were 
many managers were going to be present and no computers were going to be available 
for them to complete a digital survey.  From this first pilot study, respondents’ feedback 
allowed us to note three important ways in which we could improve our survey.  First, 
despite we explained respondents the reason why we presented to them a Microsoft 
Word document version of our survey, they suggested we should definitely change it to 
a digital version which could be friendlier to respondents by using filters to their 
answers to only show the questions that were applicable to their case instead of showing 
all questions.  This would make the survey shorter and easier to answer.  Second, re-
ordering questions could also improve the presentation of the survey by starting with the 
obligatory questions for all respondents and then proceeding with the filtered questions 
according to the previous answers of each respondent.  Third, respondents suggested we 
should be present and available to future respondents as they answered the survey in 
case they had any questions.  They highlighted that the nature of their suggestion was 
not based “on a bad survey design” but on the fact that as respondents they had never 
answered before a survey about this topic or any related topic and they felt it was 
probably going to be the same for most respondents.  In such case, they thought that 
being able to ask for any help gave them confidence about their answers.   
In response to this feedback we developed an improved digital version of the 
survey using Qualtrics® software (sponsored by Cranfield University) and decided to 
be available to respondents during their completion of the survey.  Thereafter, we 
conducted a second pilot study in which 6 different respondents from Latam answered 
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our digital survey.  This time, respondents manifested they found the survey to be clear 
and easy to answer.  As researchers, we found our presence during respondents’ 
completion of the survey enabled them to answer it without any difficulties.  Due to this 
positive feedback, we decided to initiate data collection in September 2013 using this 
last digital version of our survey. 
4.5.1.6 Variables and measures 
In this section, we explain the variables that informed our survey and the 
operationalization of their measures. 
Variables from propositions 
Level of political uncertainty perceived.  Level of political uncertainty perceived refers 
to the perception of firms about the level of political uncertainty.  We measured this 
variable for Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua between 1999 and 2011.  We used the 
“government/political policies” instrument that is part of the “Perceived Environmental 
Uncertainty 2” instrument used by Brouthers and others (2002) to assess Perceived 
Environmental Uncertainty.  This instrument was developed and tested by Werner and 
others (1996), based on the work of Miller (1993).  The “Perceived Environmental 
Uncertainty 2” instrument consists of 28 items aggregated to measure the perception of 
a country’s government policies, macroeconomics, materials, product market, and 
competition.  We only used its government/political policies instrument (composed of 
10 items) since our objective was to only measure the level of perceived political 
uncertainty by firms in the three countries of our study.  This instrument was included 
in our survey through one question composed of 10 items that measured the level of 
political uncertainty perceived by each firm in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
through a scale from 1 (being very unpredictable) to 5 (being very predictable).  To find 
the score for the level of political uncertainty perceived by each firm in each country, 
the median of the 10 items was calculated.  (This instrument can be found in question 
number 10 in the digital version of the survey.) 
Control or cooperative responses.  Control and cooperative responses to political 
uncertainty involve firms’ attempts to influence or shape governments in favourable 
ways towards their own particular interests (Baysinger, 1984; Miller, 1992).  Hillman 
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and Hitt’s (1999) taxonomy of corporate political strategies, presents three theoretically 
distinct strategies, each comprising of a variety of tactics that describe the control or 
cooperative responses that a firm can use to influence the political environment.  In 
2003, Hillman used these control or cooperative responses in a survey she conducted to 
US multinationals.  Since the labels of the three strategies in Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) 
taxonomy (information, financial incentive, and constituency building) would not hold 
meaning for our respondents, instead 14 items about the specific tactics or control or 
cooperative responses that make up these strategies were used.  Respondents were asked 
to rate to what extent they used each control or cooperative response from a scale of 1 
(being none) to 5 (being a lot) for each of the four possible types of operations they 
could have had in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999 to 2011 (exported 
directly to its clients or third parties not to its own distribution, owned production and 
distribution operations simultaneously in one country, only owned distribution 
operations did not owned production operations, or owned production operations did 
not owned distribution operations).  To find the score for the use of control or 
cooperative responses by each firm, the median of the total number of items rated 
according to the types of operations of each firm was calculated.  For example, if a firm 
only had two types of operations, it would therefore rate a total of 28 items from which 
the median would be calculated to find the firm’s score for control or cooperative 
responses.  (The items that constitute this variable can be found as the first 14 items in 
questions 16 through 19 in the digital version of the survey). 
Flexible responses.  Flexible responses are those responses through which firms can 
adapt to substantial, uncertain, and fast-occurring political changes (Miller, 1992).  Due 
to an absence in the literature of a robust definition of this concept and its dimensions or 
items, we used the taxonomy of corporate adaptive political strategies that resulted from 
our first study to describe the flexible responses that a firm can use to adapt to the 
political environment.  In our taxonomy, flexible responses are grouped into four 
distinct strategies (neutrality, compliance, reconfiguration, anticipatory).  Since these 
labels would not hold meaning for our respondents, instead 29 items about the specific 
flexible responses that make up these strategies were used.  Respondents were asked to 
rate to what extent they used each flexible response from a scale of 1 (being none) to 5 
(being a lot) for each of the four possible types of operations they could have had in 
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Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999 to 2011.  To find the score for the use 
of flexible responses by each firm, the median of the total number of items rated 
according to the types of operations of each firm was calculated.  (The items that 
constitute this variable can be found after the first 14 items in questions 16 through 19 
in the digital version of the survey.  However, the last item in questions 16 through 19 
belongs to another variable). 
Flexible responses to confront potential expropriation.  The variable “flexible 
responses” encompasses the variables “flexible responses to confront potential 
expropriation” and “flexible responses to confront policy changes”.  From the 29 
flexible responses in our taxonomy, 12 were categorized as flexible responses to 
confront both potential expropriation and policy changes simultaneously.  Only 7 
flexible responses were found to be used exclusively to confront potential expropriation.  
Consequently, to find the score for the use of flexible responses to confront potential 
expropriation by each firm, the median of the total number of items rated according to 
the types of operations of each firm was calculated.  The type of operation, “exported 
directly to its clients or third parties not to its own distribution” did not include the 7 
items that constitute this variable since firms that export directly to their clients or third 
parties do not have assets in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua which can confront 
potential expropriation.  (The items that constitute this variable can be found as the 7 
items before the last item in questions 17 through 19 in the digital version of the 
survey). 
Flexible responses to confront policy changes.  From the 29 flexible responses in our 
taxonomy, only 10 flexible responses were found to be used exclusively to confront 
policy changes.  Consequently, to find the score for the use of flexible responses to 
confront policy changes by each firm, the median of the total number of items rated 
according to the types of operations of each firm was calculated.  (The items that 
constitute this variable can be found as the 10 items prior to the 7 items that constitute 
the variable “flexible responses to confront potential expropriation” in questions 17 
through 19 and the 10 items pervious to the last item in question 16 in the digital 
version of the survey). 
 81 
Human capital resources.  According to Barney (1991), human capital resources 
include the training, experience, judgement, intelligence, and insight of individual 
managers and workers in a firm.  Following this same line, our first study found 
experience and knowledge were the foundations of capabilities and that these resided in 
a firm’s human capital.  Therefore, taking into account Barney’s (1991) definition and 
our findings, we measured human capital resources through three items: previous 
experience of the firm’s employees, knowledge of internal employees about the context 
of a specific country, and knowledge of external organizations or people to the firm 
about the context of a specific country.  Respondents were asked to rate to what extent 
they used each item from a scale of 1 (being none) to 5 (being a lot) in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua to confront the high political uncertainty that they perceived in 
each country.  To find the score for the use of human capital resources by each firm, the 
median of the total number of items rated for the countries in which it had operations 
was calculated.  For example, if a firm only had operations in two countries, it would 
therefore rate a total of 6 items from which the median would be calculated to find the 
firm’s score for human capital resources.  (The items that constitute this variable can be 
found as the third, fourth, and fifth items in question 11 in the digital version of the 
survey). 
Organizational resources.  According to Barney (1991), organizational resources 
include a firm’s formal reporting structure, its formal and informal planning, 
controlling, and coordinating systems, as well as informal relations among groups 
within a firm and between a firm and those in its environment.  Through our first study, 
we found that interviewees mainly referred to the firm’s organizational structure and 
organizational processes to describe its organizational resources.  Consequently, we 
measured the use of organizational resources through these two items.  Respondents 
were asked to rate to what extent they used or reconfigured each from a scale of 1 
(being none) to 5 (being a lot) in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua to confront the high 
political uncertainty that they perceived in each country.  To find the score for the use of 
organizational resources by each firm, the median of the total number of items rated for 
the countries in which it had operations was calculated.  (The items that constitute this 
variable can be found as the first and second items in question 11 in the digital version 
of the survey). 
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Physical resources.  According to Barney (1991), physical resources include the 
physical technology used by a firm, a firm’s plant and equipment, its geographic 
location, and its access to raw materials.  We used these four items to measure physical 
resources.  Respondents were asked to rate to what extent they used each item from a 
scale of 1 (being none) to 5 (being a lot) in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua to 
confront the high political uncertainty that they perceived in each country.  To find the 
score for the use of physical resources by each firm, the median of the total number of 
items rated for the countries in which it had operations was calculated.  (The items that 
constitute this variable can be found as the sixth, seventh, eight, and ninth items in 
question 11 in the digital version of the survey). 
Contextual knowledge of internal and external human resources.  Contextual 
knowledge of internal and external human resources refers to knowledge about the 
particularities of a specific context that internal or external people to the firm have 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  We used two items to measure this variable: knowledge 
of internal employees about the context of a specific country and knowledge of external 
organizations or people to the firm about the context of a specific country.  Respondents 
were asked to rate to what extent they used each item from a scale of 1 (being none) to 5 
(being a lot) in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua to confront the high political 
uncertainty that they perceived in each country.  To find the score for the use of 
contextual knowledge of internal and external human resources by each firm in each 
country, the median of these two items was calculated.  (The items that constitute this 
variable can be found as the fourth and fifth items in question 11 in the digital version 
of the survey). 
Reconfigurations of organizational structure and processes.  Reconfigurations of 
organizational structure and processes are defined as the redesign of certain elements or 
components of an organization’s structure (Karim, 2006).  We used 2 items to measure 
this variable: reconfigurations in organizational structure and reconfigurations in 
organizational processes.  Respondents were asked to rate to what extent they used each 
item from a scale of 1 (being none) to 5 (being a lot) in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua to confront the high political uncertainty that they perceived in each country.  
To find the score for the use of reconfigurations of organizational structure and 
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processes by each firm in each country, the median of these 2 items was calculated.  
(The items that constitute this variable can be found as the first and second items in 
question 11 in the digital version of the survey). 
Investments in physical resources.  According to Barney’s (1991) definition of physical 
resources, we defined the following items as measures for the variable investments in 
physical resources: investments in technological infrastructure, investments in 
machinery and equipment, investments in access to raw material, and investments in a 
new geographical location for the firm.  Respondents were asked to rate to what extent 
they used each item from a scale of 1 (being none) to 5 (being a lot) in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua to confront the high political uncertainty that they perceived in 
each country.  To find the score for the use of investments in physical resources by each 
firm in each country, the median of these 4 items was calculated.  (The items that 
constitute this variable can be found as the sixth, seventh, eight, and ninth items in 
question 11 in the digital version of the survey). 
Managerial commitment to knowledge articulation and codification.  Managerial 
commitment to knowledge articulation and codification refers to commitment to 
learning (McLarney and Dastrala, 2001) or to investments in learning (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002) that assure knowledge articulation and codification efforts take place in 
the firm and support the development process of capabilities.  Knowledge articulation is 
the process through which experience and implicit knowledge is articulated by 
individuals through collective discussions, debriefing sessions, and outcomes evaluation 
processes (Zollo and Winter, 2002).  Knowledge codification takes place when 
individuals codify their understandings of the outcome implications of internal 
processes in written tools, such as frameworks, manuals, spread sheets, decision support 
systems, etc (Zollo and Winter, 2002).  In accordance to these definitions, we used the 
following 4 items to operationalize the variable managerial commitment to knowledge 
articulation and codification: sessions of collective discussions about what was learned 
though operations, interviews to the key employees involved, formal evaluation of the 
strategies implemented and their outcomes, and creation of written tools such as 
manuals, protocols, frameworks, systems or others to support decision making.  
Respondents were asked to rate to what extent they conducted the activities described 
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by each item from a scale of 1 (being none) to 5 (being a lot) to preserve the knowledge 
they had developed about how to sustain operations in foreign high political uncertainty 
markets through their experience in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-
2011.  To find the score for managerial commitment to knowledge articulation and 
codification by each firm, the median of these 4 items was calculated.  (The items that 
constitute this variable can be found in question 8 in the digital version of the survey). 
Lose the knowledge developed.  The variable lose the knowledge developed refers to the 
perception firms have about the risk they run of losing the knowledge they have 
developed about how to sustain their operations in high political uncertainty contexts.  
In our first study, we found Latam felt it could risk losing its knowledge when the 
following situations occur: people forget what they have learned, the people who 
possess the knowledge retire or leave the firm, and a disaster takes place and affects the 
firm (fire, flood, robbery, computer break down, viruses).  We used these 3 items to 
measure the variable lose the knowledge developed.  Respondents were asked to rate 
from a scale of 1 (being none) to 5 (being a lot) their perception of the possibility of the 
firm losing the knowledge it had developed about how to sustain operations in high 
political uncertainty contexts, when the situations described by each item occurred.  To 
find the score for the variable lose the knowledge developed by each firm, the median of 
these 3 items was calculated.  (The items that constitute this variable can be found in 
question 9 in the digital version of the survey). 
Control variables 
We used 7 control variables to test their influence on our propositions.  Below, 
we explain these control variables. 
Country of origin of the firm.  Foreign versus domestic ownership or country of origin 
has been identified as an important antecedent of firms’ corporate political activities 
(Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; Hansen and Mitchell, 2001; Hillman et al., 2004; Getz, 
1996).  We asked respondents to indicate the country of origin of their firm.  We then 
classified firms as those having a Latin American origin versus those having a different 
origin from that of Latin America.  Since we found Latin American firms are used to 
dealing with uncertain political environments (IHS Global Insight, 2012), we wanted to 
see if there was a significant difference throughout our propositions between the 
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behaviors of Latin American and non-Latin American country of origin firms.  (This 
variable is addressed by question 3 in the digital version of the survey). 
Size.  A firm variable often connected to corporate political activities is size (Boddewyn 
and Brewer, 1994; Hillman et al., 2004; Keim and Baysinger, 1988; Schuler, Rehbein, 
and Cramer, 2002).  We asked respondents to indicate the size of their firm according to 
the criteria established by the Colombian law 905 of 2004.  This law classifies firms as 
micro, small, medium or large according to their assets and number of employees 
(details of this classification can be found in question 4 in the digital version of the 
survey).  We then classified firms as micro and small versus medium and large.  We 
wanted to explore if there was a significant difference throughout our propositions 
between firms according to their size.  (This variable is addressed by question 4 in the 
digital version of the survey). 
Experience in foreign high political uncertainty contexts.  Firms’ experience has also 
been linked to the success and choice of corporate political activities (Hillman, 2003; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004).  We asked respondents to indicate the 
number of years from 0 to 13 that their firm had operations in Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua between 1999 and 2011.  We then selected the highest number of years of 
experience among the three countries for each firm and classified firms into two groups: 
those having between 0 and 6 years of experience (as low experience in foreign high 
political uncertainty contexts) and those having between 7 and 13 years of experience 
(as high experience in foreign high political uncertainty contexts).  We wanted to 
explore if the level of experience in foreign high political uncertainty contexts had any 
influence throughout our propositions.  (This variable is addressed by question 6 in the 
digital version of the survey). 
Country scope.  Tallman and Li (1996) defined and measured country scope as the 
number of foreign countries where a firm operates.  Previous research has found that the 
more internationally diversified a firm is, the more it is dependent on multiple sources 
of sovereignty (Sundaram and Black, 1992), and the more likely it is to engage in 
political strategies (Hillman, 2003).  We asked respondents to indicate the number of 
countries excluding Colombia, where their firms operated at the time of our survey 
despite the type of their operations.  We then classified firms into two groups: those 
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having presence from 1 up to 50 countries (as low country scope) and those having 
presence in more than 50 countries (as high country scope).  We wanted to study the 
influence of firms’ country scope on our propositions.  (This variable is addressed by 
question 5 in the digital version of the survey). 
Status of operations in high political uncertainty contexts.  Several prior studies have 
focused on the relation between corporate political activities and firms’ performance 
(Banker, Das, and Ou, 1997; Bowman, Navissi, and Burgess, 2000; Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Marsh, 1998; Shaffer, Quasney, and Grimm., 2000).  
These studies have measured firms’ performance as market value or returns.  
Differently, in our study we were interested in comparing the performance of firms in 
high political uncertainty contexts not by their market value or returns but by the status 
of their operations.  This means, we were interested in contrasting the behavior of firms 
that had managed to sustain their operations in these contexts versus firms that had 
closed their operations.  We asked respondents to select the statement that best 
described their firm’s operations between 1999-2011 in Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua.  Respondents indicated if their firm had: sustained operations, closed 
operations or had no operations in each of the three countries.  We classified firms as 
having sustained operations in high political uncertainty contexts if they had done so in 
any of the three markets.  We also classified firms as having closed operations in high 
political uncertainty markets if they had not sustained operations in at least one market 
and they had closed operations in at least one market.  All firms were classified in either 
one of these two groups which also allowed us to explore if there was any significant 
difference throughout our propositions among firms that sustained operations in these 
high political uncertainty contexts versus those firms that closed operations.  (This 
variable is addressed by question 7 in the digital version of the survey). 
Type of operations in high political uncertainty contexts.  We found no prior research 
had studied the relation between the type of operations of firms and their corporate 
political activities.  Our research wanted to explore if the type of operations of firms in 
high political uncertainty contexts had any relation with their corporate political 
activities.  Therefore, we asked respondents to indicate what types of operations their 
firm had in the high political uncertainty contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua.  
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There were four types of operations: exported directly to its clients or third parties not to 
its own distribution, owned production and distribution operations simultaneously in 
one country, only owned distribution operations did not owned production operations, 
and owned production operations did not owned distribution operations.  We classified 
firms into two groups: firms having only exported versus firms having exported and/or 
having any other type of operation (owned production and distribution operations 
simultaneously in one country, only owned distribution operations did not owned 
production operations or owned production operations did not owned distribution 
operation).  We wanted to explore if there was any significant difference throughout our 
propositions among the behaviour of firms that had only exported and those that had 
exported and/or had any other type of operation.  In other words, we wanted to find if 
there was any significant difference throughout our propositions between firms that had 
only selected a market entry mode which involved no or low commitments on foreign 
assets, such as exporting, and firms that had selected other market entry modes which 
involved higher commitments on foreign assets, such as distribution and/or production.  
(This variable is addressed by questions 12 through 15 in the digital version of the 
survey). 
Level of headquarters control.  We found previous research had not addressed the 
relation between the level of headquarters control and firms’ corporate political 
activities.  However, our research was interested in exploring this relation.  Therefore, 
we asked respondents to rate to what extent their firm’s counterparts had been involved, 
for the different types of operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua, in the 
decisions of the firm regarding how to confront these foreign political contexts.  A scale 
of 1 (being none) to 5 (being a lot) was used.  To find the score for the variable level of 
headquarters control by each firm, the median of the responses by each firm was 
calculated.  Then, we categorized firms as having a low level of headquarters control if 
their score was between 1 and 3 or as having a high level of headquarters control if their 
score was between 3.1 and 5.  We were interested in investigating if the level of 
headquarters control had any influence on our propositions.  (The items that constitute 
this variable can be found as the last items in questions 16 through 19 in the digital 
version of the survey). 
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It is important to note, that for all variables we decided to use the median to 
calculate their scores since this measure is not affected by extreme values. 
4.5.1.7 Data collection 
Data collection in emerging markets requires energy, especially in Latin 
America.  Initially, we had gained access and agreement to a food industry association, 
but later this access was denied by a new incoming contact.  After facing this quandary, 
we had to maximize potential responses to our survey by using various other strategies, 
which supported our data collection efforts.  First, we motivated the participation of 
firms by inviting them to be part of a contest when completing the survey.  Through this 
contest they could win an executive education course offered by EAFIT University 
between 2013-2014.  The winner firm was able to select the executive education course 
of its preference from the portfolio of executive courses of EAFIT University and 
benefit by training one employee of its choice.  We believe this was a good strategy 
since throughout our data collection several firms suggested “it is great that we have the 
chance of winning a course to train our employees”, “this must be a very serious study 
to include the contest of a course offered by a university such as EAFIT”.  We also 
motivated firms to complete the survey by offering them access to an executive 
summary of the survey findings which was sent exclusively to the participating firms 
upon the conclusion of the study.  We also claimed firm responses would be 
anonymous, confidential, and exclusively used for academic purposes, granting firms 
with the trust they needed to decide to participate in our study. 
To facilitate and assure the appropriate completion of the survey on behalf of the 
firms that stated to meet the criteria and accepted to respond, we organized a travelling 
schedule.  This schedule allowed us to visit the different cities around Colombia where 
these firms were located and have face to face meetings with each of our respondents at 
the site of each firm.  The 24 firms that had two respondents answer the survey 
simultaneously were visited only once, while the 6 firms that had two respondents 
answer the survey separately were visited twice for this purpose.  All of the firm visits 
involving these meetings took place throughout the second semester of 2013.  In order 
to have effective meetings with our respondents we used a presentation letter to refresh 
and inform them about the objective and context of our survey.   
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We believe this data collection strategy proved to be successful due to the Latin 
American culture of our respondents.  What we mean is that travelling and having 
meetings with respondents was necessary to ensure responses to our survey.  Previously 
we had sent the survey through email links to potential respondents and this was not 
effective (we received 0 responses).  Our perception is that relations and trust play a 
crucial role in Latin America to get firms or individuals to participate in research 
projects.  Consequently, having face to face meetings was the best way to ensure 
responses to our survey - which dealt with a very sensible topic such as corporate 
political activities.  As Fowler (2009: 69) claims, “the choice of data collection mode is 
related directly to the research topic, characteristics of the sample, and available staff 
and facilities; it has implications for response rates and question form”. 
A Microsoft Word English version of the presentation letter and our survey can 
be found in Appendix 7.  A Microsoft Word Spanish version of the presentation letter 
and our survey can be found in Appendix 8.  And, the final digital Spanish version of 
the survey in Qualtrics® software (which was the version of the survey that was 
actually used) can be found by accessing the link provided in Appendix 9.  It is 
important to note, that the content of three versions was updated to be the same; the 
only difference that exists among them besides language, is that the design and order of 
the digital version is friendlier and more efficient for its administration due to its 
incorporation of filters.  The pilot studies and the final survey were conducted in 
Spanish and then their results were translated to English.  All translations were 
validated by a third party.   
4.5.1.8 Data analysis 
The choice of the statistical tests we used to analyse our quantitative data was in 
line with the purpose of our second study which was to test the exploratory propositions 
resulting from our first study.  Since the sample from which our quantitative data came 
from was a non-probabilistic convenience sample, we used non-parametric tests to test 
our exploratory propositions.  Other mixed methods studies published in SMJ that have 
used non-parametric test to analyze their data are Walsh (1989) and King and Zeithaml 
(2002).  Below, Table 15 shows which non-parametric tests we used to test each 
exploratory proposition and the effect of our control variables. 
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Table 15: Non-parametric tests and propositions 
Non-parametric tests Propositions 
Mann-Whiteny U P1, P2a, P2b, P7 
Spearman’s rank  P4, P5 
Kruskal Wallis P3 
Chi square P6 
Source: Elaborated by author 
To run these non-parametric tests we used SPSS 20® software (sponsored by 
Cranfield University). 
Mann-Whitney U.  The Mann–Whitney U test (also called the Mann–Whitney–
Wilcoxon (MWW), Wilcoxon rank-sum test, or Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test) is a 
non-parametric test of the null hypothesis that two populations have equal medians 
against an alternative hypothesis that two populations have medians which are not 
equal.  In most cases, the alternative hypothesis intends to show that a particular 
population tends to have larger values than the other.  When as a result of this test, the p 
value is less than α = 0.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted.  We used this test for P1, P2a, P2b, and P7 since we wanted to 
find if the values of one variable were statistically significantly different to the values of 
another variable. 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.  The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
or Spearman’s rho is a non-parametric measure of correlation, using ranks to calculate 
the correlation.  It examines the direction and magnitude of the correlation between two 
variables.  This correlation is examined through a correlation test were the null 
hypothesis is that there is no correlation between two variables and the alternative 
hypothesis is that there is correlation between the two variables.  If the correlation 
coefficient is equal to 0, this means there is no correlation.  If Spearman’s rho is 
between 0 and 1 there is a positive correlation or if it is between 0 and -1 there is a 
negative correlation.  If the p value is less than α = 0.05, the correlation is statistically 
significant.  We used this correlation test P4 and P5 since we wanted to find if there was 
a statistically significant correlation between the two variables in each proposition. 
 91 
Kruskal Wallis.  The Kruskal–Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks is a non-
parametric method for testing whether samples originate from the same distribution.  It 
is used for comparing more than two samples that are independent, or not related.  The 
parametric equivalent of the Kruskal-Wallis test is the one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA).  When the Kruskal-Wallis test leads to significant results, then at least one 
of the samples is different from the other samples.  It is an extension of the Mann–
Whitney U test to 3 or more groups.  The null hypothesis for this test is that samples 
originate from populations with equal medians and the alternative hypothesis is that at 
least one of the medians of a group differs from that of another.  When as a result of this 
test, the p value is less than α = 0.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted.  We used this test for P3 since we wanted to find if 
there were statistically significant differences among 3 groups. 
Chi square.  The chi-square test for independence, also called Pearson’s chi-square test 
or the chi-square test of association, is a non-parametric test used to discover if there is 
a relationship between two categorical variables.  This test contrasts the null hypothesis 
that there is no association between two variables and the alternative hypothesis that 
there is association between them.  When as a result of this test, the p value is less than 
α = 0.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted.  
We used this test for P6 since we wanted to analyze the association between two 
variables. 
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5 RESULTS OF STUDY 1: CASE STUDY  
This chapter presents our empirical findings about “how” and “why”, Latam, a 
Latin American food firm, developed adaptive political capabilities to confront high 
political uncertainty contexts in the emerging economies of Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua (1999–2011).  We introduce this chapter by first describing the organization 
of Latam’s operations in these markets.  Then, we analyze the political uncertainties 
Latam confronted and discuss its overall strategic response to sustain and start 
operations in these contexts.  We analyze the role of the knowledge management 
function, the state of learning mechanisms, and managerial commitment within Latam.  
We also explain “why” Latam developed adaptive political capabilities.  Finally, we 
provide an analytical overview of the chronologies of accounts that took place from 
1999-2011 in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua through a detailed longitudinal 
examination of the foundations and themes that guided the development of adaptive 
political capabilities by Latam.  We investigate “how” Latam developed adaptive 
political capabilities with particular focus on the strategic responses it adopted towards 
the political uncertainties it confronted in these three markets.  We show through our 
inductive study, that a range of strategic responses were adopted by Latam to 
simultaneously adapt and align with its political environments. Our analysis uncovers 
the foundations and themes that played a role in the development of adaptive political 
capabilities and their interactions to create competitive benefits.   
 
5.1 Latam’s operations7  
Latam initiated its distribution operations in Venezuela and Ecuador during 1995 
and later in Nicaragua during 2004.  It also owns a production platform in Venezuela 
that was acquired during 1996 and does not own production platforms in Nicaragua and 
Ecuador.  Our research focused on the timeframe of 1999-2011 since the first political 
uncertainties that affected Latam’s operations in these three markets took place during 
1999 or later.  Nevertheless, our record of events for each country starts during 1999 or 
                                                 
7
 This section is based on the firm’s organizational structure and interviewees I001, I003, I005, I007, 
I008, I017, I031, I045, and I058. 
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in some cases several years before, in order to take into account historical events that 
are relevant to understand either the history of Latam’s operations or the political 
environment of the different countries (see Appendixes 10, 11, and 12). 
The products Latam offers in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua belong to four 
different business lines which we refer to as 1, 2, 3, and 4.  Latam’s operations in these 
three countries involve distribution platforms in Venezuela and Ecuador which sell and 
distribute products from business lines 1, 2, and 3, a distribution platform in Nicaragua 
which sells and distributes products from business lines 1 and 2, and a production 
platform in Venezuela which manufactures products from business line 4.  Every 
business line has a VP that focuses on developing each business.  Similarly, each 
distribution or production platform has a general manager in charge of the operation.  It 
is important to note, that the VP of business line 1 is in charge of supervising all of 
Latam’s operations in the north region which includes Nicaragua.  Also, the VP of 
business line 2 is in charge of supervising all of Latam’s operations in the south region 
which includes Venezuela and Ecuador.  These VPs’ “corporate roles” intend to 
strengthen team work and assure a unified vision at the corporate level.  
Latam’s business lines focus on six core functions which are business level 
strategic planning, manufacturing, R&D, marketing, logistics, and human resources. All 
of the business lines are supported by centralized services which include: legal advice, 
internal audit, procurement, communications, accounting, human resources, taxes, 
financial planning, IT, treasury, administrative services, risks, and insurance.  The 
philosophy behind this organizational structure is that the business lines concentrate on 
the development, manufacturing, and promotion of their products while centralized 
services provide a “back office” support.  At the top of this structure is a corporate 
office that leads corporate planning and finance.  This corporate office guides and 
supervises the business units and all operations.  Below, Figure 8 shows the 
organization of Latam’s operations in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.   
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Figure 8: Organization of Latam’s operations in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
 
Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
The distribution platforms located in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua import 
Latam’s products from production platforms located in varied countries.  Each 
production platform belongs to a specific business line.  Similarly, the production 
platform for business line 4 in Venezuela has bought not finished products but raw 
materials from Colombia, and later from within Venezuela, in order to manufacture its 
products.  Below, Figure 9 shows the countries of origin from where the business lines’ 
production platforms provide exports to the distribution platforms in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua. 
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Figure 9: Countries of origin from where the business lines’ production platforms provide 
exports to the distribution platforms in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
 
Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
After understanding how Latam has organized its operations in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua, in the following section, we analyze the political uncertainties 
it has confronted in these markets. 
5.2 Political uncertainties 
We found that the operating experience of Latam in Latin America agreed with 
the evolution of the political ratings of the countries in the region by identifying 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua as the most politically uncertain countries.
8
  Latam 
confronted a total of 36 political uncertainties in these countries: 23 in Venezuela, 12 in 
                                                 
8
 I001, I008, and I017.  These codes indicate the interviewees from whom this information comes from.   
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Ecuador, and one in Nicaragua.  Despite the fact that Latam only confronted one 
political uncertainty in Nicaragua before entering this market, this context is relevant to 
our study because this political uncertainty imposed a major obstacle for Latam in 
entering the market and consequently required significant firm resources to do so.  As 
the CEO of Latam stated:   
Across time we have experienced uncertainty in Venezuela due to its political 
environment.  We have also confronted challenges stemming from the political 
environment in less degree in Ecuador, and then in Nicaragua.  These are the 
markets where we have found the political context to affect our operations. 
[I001]  
Latam also perceived that although each country had confronted its operations 
with different political uncertainties, the three countries shared having authoritarian 
regimes and weak institutions.
9
  As two VPs highlighted: 
We need to study Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua with caution because they 
have various characteristics in common: political left-wing polarization and fast 
changing policies which affect businesses. [I003] 
The institutional frameworks of these types of countries are not very solid and 
the firm needs to find ways to protect it-self as much as possible. [I004] 
Within the political contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, we found 
Latam had confronted different types of political uncertainties.  In Venezuela, Latam 
had confronted both policy and expropriation uncertainties, while in Ecuador and 
Nicaragua, it had only confronted policy uncertainties.
10
   
The production platform in Venezuela was affected by expropriation uncertainty 
due to its high capital investment.  This meant that if this operation was expropriated, 
Latam could suffer a significant loss.  The distribution platform in Venezuela also faced 
expropriation uncertainty but its capital investment was much less since it only owned 
the inventory it distributed, making it a less risky operation for Latam in terms of a 
                                                 
9
 I001, I003, and I004. 
10
 I001, I002, I003, I004, I005, I007, I008, I017, I031, I045, and I058. 
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potential loss due to an expropriation.
11
  As the managers of the production and 
distribution platforms in Venezuela said: 
In our production platform in Venezuela we had to make sure we complied with 
every single law and requirement installed by the government since any non-
compliance could be used as a reason for expropriation and the firm’s 
investment in this platform had been significant.  This operation counts with a 
big production plant that could be taken over affecting the firm financially. 
[I031] 
In the case of an expropriation of our distribution operation in Venezuela, what 
the firm would lose is the inventory that can be available at the site.  This loss 
would be important for the firm but not as much as that in the case of an 
expropriation of the production platform. [I007] 
Building on the work of Kobrin (1981), we also categorized the effect of the 
expropriation and policy uncertainties that Latam confronted in Venezuela, Ecuador, 
and Nicaragua, as macro when they had an impact at the country level or as micro when 
they had an impact at the industry, firm or project levels.  We found that the political 
uncertainties confronted by Latam had in their majority a micro effect by impacting the 
industry or the firm directly, while political uncertainties with a macro effect or that had 
a country level impact were less.  Specifically, out of 36 uncertainties, 25 had a micro 
effect while 11 had a macro effect.  Our findings agree with Kobrin’s (1982), claim that 
the most pertinent challenges affecting a firm stem not from the general country 
environment (the macro level), but from specific policies and actions that have 
differential effects across industries, firms, and projects (the micro level).  
What all political uncertainties in Venezuela and Ecuador had in common was 
that they occurred after Latam had invested in operations in these countries.
12
  These 
uncertainties modified the established “rules of the game” for Latam as ex-post 
investment uncertainties.  We found that only in the case of Nicaragua a policy change 
in the political environment took place before Latam decided to start operations in this 
                                                 
11
 I004, I007, I014, and I031. 
12
 I001, I004, and I015. 
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market.
13
  Therefore, before entering the Nicaraguan market, Latam faced uncertainty 
about the political conditions that could be established or negotiated for its entrance.  As 
one VP stated: 
Before investing in Nicaragua, we were aware of the sovereignty tax that was 
imposed to Colombian imports.  We were uncertain about how we could enter 
the market but we knew that most probably to sell our products in Nicaragua we 
would not be able to import these from our production platforms in Colombia 
because they would not be competitive due to this sovereignty tax. [I008] 
In the case of most political uncertainties, we found these generated response or 
state uncertainty for Latam.  Response uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge about 
response options or the inability to predict the likely consequence of a response choice.  
State uncertainty refers to not understanding how the components of the political 
environment might change (Milliken, 1987).  In fewer cases, political uncertainties 
generated effect uncertainty for Latam.  Effect uncertainty is the inability to predict 
what the impact of a future state of the political environment or change would be on the 
firm (Milliken, 1987).  We found Latam worked hard on quickly understanding the 
impact of the political environment on its operations.  This explained why political 
uncertainties mostly generated Latam, response and state uncertainties, rather than 
effect uncertainties.  Below, Table 16 synthesizes our analysis of the political 
uncertainties that Latam confronted in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.   
 
                                                 
13
 I001 and I008. 
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Table 16: Analysis of political uncertainties confronted by Latam
14
 
Political uncertainties 
Levels of analysis 
Concept related Effect related Chronology related Typology related 
Venezuela 
The installation of a left-wing government in Venezuela created 
operational uncertainty for Latam  
Policy uncertainty 
 
Expropriation uncertainty 
Micro Ex-post State uncertainty 
Anti-foreign operations feelings, fuelled by the Venezuelan 
government, confronted Latam with uncertainty surrounding how 
to prevent this sentiment from impacting on its operations  
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post Effect uncertainty 
The closure of the Venezuelan borders confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of not knowing when it could continue exporting 
products to its distribution operation  
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post State uncertainty 
Political tensions translated into delays in the renovations of the 
sanitary registrations of products.  Latam faced the uncertainty of 
not knowing when it would receive the renovations of the sanitary 
registrations of those products which at that moment were in the 
process of having their registrations renewed 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post State uncertainty 
The deterioration of diplomatic relations challenged Latam with the 
uncertainty of how to manage its relations with both the host and 
home country governments 
Policy uncertainty 
 
Expropriation uncertainty 
Macro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
As the Commission of Foreign Currency Administration in 
Venezuela (CADIVI) stopped working efficiently, Latam faced the 
uncertainty of how and when it would recover its pending 
payments from CADIVI 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post State uncertainty 
  
                                                 
14
 This table was elaborated triangulating all of the interviews conducted. 
 101 
Political uncertainties 
Levels of analysis 
Concept related Effect related Chronology related Typology related 
Venezuela 
CADIVI restricted the authorization of certificates of non-
production and Latam’s business lines faced the uncertainty of 
when they would receive these certificates which authorized the 
import of their products through the distribution operation in 
Venezuela 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post State uncertainty 
The overall evolution of Venezuela’s political context confronted 
Latam with a generalized increase in political uncertainty 
Policy uncertainty 
 
Expropriation uncertainty 
Macro Ex-post State uncertainty 
Frequent expropriations in Venezuela challenged Latam with the 
uncertainty of a potential expropriation of its operations.  The 
investment in the distribution operation was much less, and 
therefore, the uncertainty of a potential expropriation was less for 
the distribution operation than for the production operation 
Expropriation uncertainty Micro Ex-post State uncertainty 
Chavez expanded his government model in Venezuela and Latam 
faced the uncertainty of the impact that the different interest groups 
could have on its production operation 
Expropriation uncertainty Micro Ex-post Effect uncertainty 
The growing instability in the diplomatic relations generated 
uncertainty among the local employees about the stability and 
continuity of the distribution and production operations in 
Venezuela 
Policy uncertainty  
 
Expropriation uncertainty 
Micro Ex-post Effect uncertainty 
Increasing political uncertainty ensured that the production 
operation had to deal with the uncertainty of how to manage the 
different themes that could potentially affect its operations: 
compliance with laws, governmental inspections, and community 
and labor relations 
Policy uncertainty 
 
Expropriation uncertainty 
Micro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
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Political uncertainties 
Levels of analysis 
Concept related Effect related Chronology related Typology related 
Venezuela 
CADIVI stopped its payments and Latam faced the uncertainty of 
how to continue operations in the Venezuelan market despite this 
suspension and the uncertainty of when it would receive its 
pending payments 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post 
 
Response 
uncertainty 
 
State uncertainty 
The government instigated energy cuts which  meant that the 
production operation in Venezuela faced the uncertainty of 
disruption of energy supply  
Policy uncertainty Macro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
Due to reiterative expropriations, Latam faced the uncertainty of 
not knowing if it would be able to access information about its 
operations in Venezuela if the Venezuelan government decided to 
take over its sites 
Expropriation uncertainty Micro Ex-post Effect uncertainty 
Law no. 39.658 in the defense of the people for their access to 
goods and services obliged the distribution and production 
operations in Venezuela to deal with the uncertainty of new policy 
changes 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post Effect uncertainty 
The Venezuelan government prohibited the selling of dollars by 
closing the free market through law no. 5.975.  Latam faced the 
uncertainty of how to access dollars to sustain its operations in 
Venezuela 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
The Venezuelan government created the System of Transactions of 
Foreign Exchange Titles in Venezuela (SITME) through law no. 
39.439 which confronted Latam with the uncertainty of sustaining 
operations in Venezuela since through SITME Latam now had 
restricted access to 350,000 USD per month to pay for the imports 
of its distribution operation 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
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Political uncertainties 
Levels of analysis 
Concept related Effect related Chronology related Typology related 
Venezuela 
The Venezuelan government had installed the conduction of 
inspections in firms and the distribution operation received an 
inspection that resulted in a sanction because of a non-compliance.  
Latam faced the uncertainty of finding a way to ensure its 
distribution operation would not be again disrupted due to 
sanctions arising from governmental inspections 
Policy uncertainty 
 
Expropriation uncertainty 
Micro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
The Venezuelan government committed to the payment of the debt 
of CADIVI to firms.  Nevertheless, Latam faced the uncertainty of 
which markets would help the recovery of the sales it lost in 
Venezuela due to currency restrictions 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
Law no. 8.331about just costs and prices, gave power to the 
Venezuelan government to determine the profit margins of firms 
and sanction those that did not follow such margins.  Latam 
confronted the uncertainty of not knowing if its operations would 
be affected by this law 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post Effect uncertainty  
Law no. 39.741 about sports, physical activity, and education 
installed an annual 1% tax to firms’ net utilities.  Latam faced the 
uncertainty of been able to sustain its distribution operation in 
Venezuela with increasing operational costs 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
The stabilization of diplomatic relations confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of whether or not to invest more resources in its already 
existing operations in Venezuela 
Policy uncertainty 
 
Expropriation uncertainty 
Macro Ex-post State uncertainty 
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Political uncertainties 
Levels of analysis 
Concept related Effect related Chronology related Typology related 
Ecuador  
The declaration of a “bank holiday” or the freezing of accounts 
confronted Latam with the uncertainty of cash flow availability to 
continue its operations due to governmental policies 
Policy uncertainty Macro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
The dollarization and devaluation exposed Latam to the uncertainty 
of fast-changing prices for negotiations and accounts receivables 
Policy uncertainty Macro Ex-post Effect uncertainty 
A coup d'état and the dismissing of Presidents by the Congress 
brought overall political uncertainty in Ecuador for firms 
Policy uncertainty Macro Ex-post State uncertainty 
The prohibition of outsourcing confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of being able to sustain operations due to the higher 
costs that were involved in the direct recruitment of additional 
employees who were previously contracted through outsourcing  
Policy uncertainty Macro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
Anti-foreign operations feelings fuelled by the Ecuadorian 
government confronted Latam with uncertainty surrounding how to 
prevent this sentiment from impacting on its operations  
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post Effect uncertainty 
The breaking of diplomatic relations made Latam experience the 
uncertainty of potential frontier closures or the imposition of 
restrictive measures  
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post State uncertainty 
Indications that the Ecuadorian President could be willing to 
increase taxes confronted Latam with policy uncertainty 
Policy uncertainty Macro Ex-post State uncertainty 
The introduction of quotas and tariffs to imports confronted Latam 
with the uncertainty of determining how these safeguards 
threatened its exports to Ecuador 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post Effect uncertainty 
A ratification of quotas and tariffs to imports confronted Latam 
with the uncertainty of being able to sustain its operations over 
time  
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
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Political uncertainties 
Levels of analysis 
Concept related Effect related Chronology related Typology related 
Ecuador  
A regulation that determined the amounts of fat, saturated fat, 
sugar, and salt that can be sold in food products to under age 
students, confronted Latam with the uncertainty of how to respond 
to the requirements of this legislation 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
The increase in tax to currency exit from 2% to 5% confronted 
Latam with the uncertainty of how to respond to this governmental 
policy 
Policy uncertainty Macro Ex-post 
Response 
uncertainty 
An upcoming communication law confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of not knowing if the law would be approved and if 
approved how it should best respond to its requirements 
Policy uncertainty Macro Ex-post State uncertainty 
Political uncertainties 
Levels of analysis 
Concept related Effect related Chronology related Typology related 
Nicaragua 
The imposition of a tax to imports confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of how could it compete in the Nicaraguan market 
Policy uncertainty Micro Ex-ante 
Response 
uncertainty 
Source: Elaborated by author 
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5.3 Latam’s decision to sustain and start operations 
We must clarify that the term “sustain operations” was used by most of our 
interviewees, and therefore it will be used throughout this research.  The term “sustain 
operations” means that Latam maintained operations, no matter if sales decreased. 
Despite all of the political uncertainties faced by Latam in Venezuela and 
Ecuador, its generalized strategic response was to sustain its operations in these markets 
by adapting to their political environments.
15
  As one VP claimed: 
Venezuela and Ecuador are natural markets for the firm regardless of their 
political situations.  We need to sustain our operations during difficult times in 
these countries in order to maintain the presence of our products and brands.  
To do so, we must manage the uncertainties that challenge our operations in 
these markets. [I017]  
In the case of Nicaragua, Latam’s response involved finding a way to start and 
also sustain operations in this market by adapting to its political environment.
16
  As one 
VP stated: 
Nicaragua is a Central American market where we want to have presence. If 
political decisions affect the competitiveness of the products we produce in the 
production platforms of a particular country (that is Colombia), then we had to 
find a way to overcome this limitation and offer our products competitively in 
Nicaragua. [I008] 
5.4 Latam’s flexible responses to political uncertainties17 
Latam described its strategic responses to the political uncertainties it confronted 
in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua as adopting a politically neutral stance and a low 
profile to start and sustain its operations.  Latam explained that to respond to the 
uncertainty of a potential expropriation it managed low inventories, payed just prices to 
suppliers, priced its products moderately, complied strictly with local regulations, and 
                                                 
15
 I001, I003, I005, I007, I008, I017, I026, I031, and I045. 
16
 I001 and I008. 
17
 This section was elaborated triangulating all interviewee’s observations. 
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never incurred in acts of corruption.  Latam pointed out that it also avoided the media 
and sustained constant, clear, and coherent internal communications about the state of 
its operations.  It devoted efforts on building good community relations and keeping a 
healthy working environment.  Where anti-Colombian feelings emerged, it made sure 
locals leaded all negotiations with clients and interactions with local governments.  As 
the CEO explained:  
The message we conveyed was that we are neutral, that we are socially 
responsible, and that we play a positive role in the country where we operate.  
More importantly, we not only state this message but our day to day behavior is 
coherent with it.  We are not dedicated to promoting any political stance; our 
only interest is promoting our business operations. [I001] 
In the face of commercial restrictions stemming from the political contexts, Latam 
explained that it searched for options to supply restricted markets through the most 
competitive alternatives it could design.  Specifically, Latam exported products to these 
markets from alternative production platforms from which restrictions could be 
overcome, it acquired production platforms in a strategic location to supply the 
Caribbean region and Nicaragua, it identified within its portfolio the most competitive 
products which could be sold under restrictive conditions, and it made different logistic 
arrangements to assure the supply of restricted markets.  Latam invested in developing 
healthier products to comply with legal requirements and also changed the origin of its 
raw materials from imported to local, keeping in mind the idea of being perceived as a 
local value-adding company to protect itself from a potential expropriation.  To confront 
deteriorating operational conditions in Venezuela, Latam acquired two energy plants to 
have access to energy when the government started to interrupt electricity services.  In 
the face of financial restrictions, Latam provided cash flow to the different affected 
operations by reconfiguring its financial procedures, negotiating government bonds and 
bank certificates or transferring funds.  Latam even searched for more distributors who 
could import its products to overcome cash restrictions per importer in the financially 
restricted Venezuelan market.  It also searched for ways to reduce operational costs.  A 
VP described one of the Latam’s strategic responses to commercial restrictions by 
saying:  
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When we could not continuously supply the Venezuelan distribution platform 
through the production platforms located in Colombia due to commercial 
restrictions imposed as a result of the political tension between both countries, 
we invested efforts in developing products in the production platform of Peru, 
from where we could competitively supply products to Venezuela. [I017] 
Furthermore, to diminish the potential loss caused by an expropriation of its 
production platform in Venezuela, Latam explained it modified its legal investment 
structure by changing the origin of this investment from Colombian to Costa Rican 
since Costa Rica has an expropriation agreement with Venezuela.  Although this 
agreement does not prevent expropriation, it does guarantee that the World Bank 
assures that a just price is payed back to the investor in case of an expropriation.  Latam 
also designed replication systems that allowed an up-dated access to all of the 
information about its operations in Venezuela through computer servers located outside 
of that country – which guaranteed a “safe second copy” in case of an expropriation.  
Particularly, the managers of the distribution and production platforms in Venezuela 
also designed some tools to guide their operations in compliance with the law and to 
enable responses towards governmental visits or in the case of a potential expropriation.  
The production platform also developed a map of its interest groups and analytical 
matrixes to better understand and deal with the Venezuelan political context.  As one 
Venezuelan manager explained: 
I started to develop a checklist to guide our operations in Venezuela after the 
distribution platform was sanctioned by the Venezuelan government with the 
temporary closure of the site for 3 days because of a minor non-compliance.  
After this event, I had to design a tool that would guarantee that the occurrence 
of a non-compliance would never interrupt operations again. [I007] 
To avoid increasing its exposure to political uncertainties, Latam did not incur 
into further investments in Venezuela and Ecuador but focused on sustaining or 
adequating its existing investments through outsourcing, direct hiring or cuts.  Finally, 
Latam highlighted that in general it concentrated on monitoring and interpreting these 
contexts while adapting to comply with their legislation by supporting the local 
managers and creating fast-response interdisciplinary teams to assess the challenges in 
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each country.  In all cases, Latam also used local human capital to better interpret and 
interact in each context.  During this process, Latam emphasized it used its corporate 
values as guidelines to direct decisions and operations.  As two VPs highlighted: 
The managers in the local operations, the corporate office, centralized services 
and the VPs of the business lines we all had to work together to be able to 
sustain or start our operations in these countries.  We also used external 
lawyers, accounting firms, and political analysts in this process. [I017] 
We had to become more agile in interpreting the political context and 
responding to its challenges.  We have learned a lot from our experience in these 
markets but we need to continue to develop this capability. [I002] 
Overall, through a detailed analysis of Latam’s varied strategic responses, we 
found that it essentially adapted to the political contexts it experienced in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua.  Latam never tried to directly influence these political 
contexts.  Latam declared that in these political contexts it had never considered 
lobbying or other influence tactics to be an adequate strategic response.  In fact, it 
claimed to have deliberately avoided influencing any government or entity because this 
could only increase its visibility.  Being visible could motivate the implementation of 
hostile policies, corruption requests or its chances of been expropriated.  As the CEO 
explained: 
Consciously we decided that we should avoid lobbying because of several 
reasons.  One aspect we discussed at that time was that lobbying in these 
contexts would take us to scenes where we would be asked to incur in acts of 
corruption.  Another aspect was that lobbying could make us “more visible” and 
visibility would increase our chances of suffering hostile measures of different 
nature. [I001] 
It is important to note, that we explain in detail the specific strategic responses of 
Latam to each of the political uncertainties it confronted in Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua in Appendixes 10, 11, and 12, the later sections about each context, and in 
the discussion in chapter 0. 
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5.5 The knowledge management function 
We found the knowledge management function within Latam was coordinated 
by one employee in the IT Department of centralized services with a part-time 
dedication.  Business line 1 had hired one full-time employee dedicated since 2008 to 
the development of knowledge management within that business line.
18
  Differently, the 
other business lines had included the function of knowledge management as a part-time 
task of the Innovation Director or R&D Manager.  The knowledge management 
function was rather at an embryonic stage in Latam.  It had just recently conducted a 
diagnosis about its stage of development through which it had found that although some 
knowledge management activities did take place, Latam had only codified mostly 
operational routines.  As a consequence of this diagnosis, Latam had just recently 
started the process of codifying its acquisition experiences and critical knowledge from 
“about to retire” employees.  To support this knowledge codification effort, the 
knowledge management function designed one information processing system to 
manage the knowledge about acquisition experiences.
19
  As one interviewee stated:   
The knowledge management diagnosis rated our development in this topic with a 
2 on a scale from 1-5.  This means we are at an exploratory stage.  When we 
reach the rating of 5 this will mean that we are effectively using knowledge 
management within the firm’s processes and innovation. [I028] 
5.6 Learning mechanisms 
We found that the knowledge Latam had developed particularly through its 
operations in the high political uncertainty markets of Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua, was in the experiences accumulated by the individuals who had participated 
in such operations.  This means, that Latam’s experiential knowledge about operating in 
high uncertainty political markets resided in individuals’ heads.20  As a VP expressed: 
                                                 
18
 I002. 
19
 I027 and I028. 
20
 All interviewee’s observations. 
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At the moment, the knowledge gained through our operations in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua belongs to individuals.  It should be captured and 
made corporate knowledge. [I002] 
Previous to our research, Latam had not conducted or planned meetings or 
activities through which this experiential knowledge could be articulated by 
individuals.
21
  Some interviewees even commented that the exercise of being 
interviewed for the purpose of our research made them aware of the many lessons they 
before had not acknowledged with such precision.  During our interviews two VPs 
stated: 
I had never before been asked to share my insights on this topic.  This interview 
has been a great exercise for me to define with precision the events which took 
place and the process we followed to respond to political challenges.  Making 
the effort of explaining such events brings into perspective an integral picture. 
[I003] 
As an input from our conversation, I think we should include the political 
context as a variable that is part of our internationalization model. [I008] 
All interviewees agreed they had been able to identify that the lessons they had 
learnt in one market benefited their ability to confront political uncertainties in another.  
They recognized that although the contexts and the political uncertainties were different, 
they sensed a generalized improved ability to confront new challenges stemming from 
political environments.
22
  As the CEO described: 
It has been a process of permanent learning using the experience acquired in 
one country in others in future cases. Nicaragua’s restriction was imposed 
during the same year that Chavez modified the Venezuelan Constitution and 
some of the most difficult challenges in Venezuela took place previously to the 
most critical moments in Ecuador.  So what we learned in Nicaragua and 
especially in Venezuela, indeed was useful to build the corporate philosophy and 
corporate stands in these situations, and of course was useful in Ecuador. [I001] 
                                                 
21
 I001, I002, I027, and I028. 
22
 I001, I002, I003, 1004, I014, I015, I018, I019, I020, I021, I022, I023, I026, and I031. 
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Many members of Latam even expressed their fear that over time this 
experiential knowledge that had been acquired by the individuals involved in such 
operations could be lost as they left Latam.  They insisted that this experiential 
knowledge had improved “their way of responding” to high political uncertainty 
markets and that it had costed them tremendous efforts which they wanted Latam to 
continue benefiting from instead of losing over time.
23
  As a VP recognized: 
An advantage for the firm is that the individuals who have confronted political 
uncertainties in these countries work in the firm today.  What I fear is that when 
these individuals are no longer in the firm, it will lose a lot of valuable 
experiential knowledge. [I004] 
A manager stated: 
We have learned so much about how to respond to this type of challenges, it will 
cost the firm a great loss to over time see the individuals who have experienced 
these challenges forget how the firm managed these situations or retire taking 
with them this valuable asset. [I009] 
5.7 Managerial commitment 
To start and pursue Latam’s adaption to the political contexts of Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua, Latam relied on the commitment of its CEO and top 
management team to leading such process by participating in committees, meetings, and 
allowing Latam to be flexible and adapt.
24
  On the other hand, although a knowledge 
management function had been created within Latam, it had not supported the 
development of adaptive political capabilities.
25
  As the knowledge management 
director stated: 
Hearing the CEO speak about knowledge management is delightful.  We are just 
starting to develop this topic and what we feel we need to work on is making the 
VPs and everyone in the firm more aware of how knowledge management can 
aggregate value to their business lines and the firm.   
                                                 
23
 I004, I009, I026, and I031. 
24
 I002, I003, I004, I007, I008, and I017.  
25
 All interviewee’s observations. 
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We have not worked on capturing the firm’s knowledge about operating in high 
political uncertainty contexts. [I028] 
Before further understanding in more detail “how” Latam developed adaptive 
political capabilities, our next section explains “why” we found Latam had developed 
adaptive political capabilities to confront political uncertainties in Venezuela, Ecuador, 
and Nicaragua. 
5.8 “Why” Latam developed adaptive political capabilities 
As Latam confronted political uncertainties in Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua, it decided to re-evaluate and accelerate its internationalization strategy by 
both, further penetrating other existing markets and diversifying its international 
markets.
26
  Despite the intention of accelerating Latam’s international expansion, 
Venezuela and Ecuador were definitely natural markets for Latam which it could not 
just simply exit.  Nicaragua was a Central American market that, although small, was 
part of a strategic region where Latam’s products were demanded.  In the case of the 
three countries, exiting or not entering would have been the “easiest” decision for 
Latam.  But it was aware that, although not operating in these markets would mean 
avoiding political uncertainties, Latam’s vision called upon a long-term perspective that 
suggested it to create and sustain operations in these markets despite political 
challenges.
27
  Consequently, in order to create and sustain operations in these countries, 
Latam found that it had to adapt and align to their political environments since exerting 
influence did not seem to be the best alternative – this is “why” it had to develop 
adaptive political capabilities.
28
 
In the next sections, we focus on “how” Latam developed adaptive political 
capabilities through its experience in the political contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua.  We examine in detail the foundations and themes that guided their 
development. 
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 I001, I008, I012, I017, I025, and I039. 
27
 I001, I003, I008, I017, and I037. 
28
 I001. 
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5.9 Context One: Venezuela 
Venezuela was a traditional and natural market for Latam since this country’s 
underdeveloped industry relies on imports to attend its internal demand.
29
  For long, 
Venezuela was the most important international market for Latam in terms of size (it 
represented an average of 43.4% of Latam’s international sales from 2002-2009) and 
profitability
30
.  In Venezuela, Latam’s distribution operation was its biggest and most 
profitable international operation and its production operation was its first international 
acquisition.
31
  Before the Venezuelan government started to control prices, these could 
be raised by companies and they would keep on selling, even a lot better than in other 
Latin American countries.
32
  Such was the case, that at some point Latam even faced 
internal debates about whether it should increase or not the amount of products it sold in 
the profitable Venezuelan market by decreasing the amounts it sold to other markets.
33
  
However, this “ideal” market started to change as a left-wing Venezuelan government 
“changed the rules of the game” for businesses and initiated the expropriation of firms.  
The political environment soon deteriorated the business environment and very rapidly 
firms’ operations in Venezuela became exposed to higher risks with lesser profits.34 
Despite this political context, Latam decided it needed to work hard to sustain its 
operations in Venezuela.  It believed that those firms which sustained their brands 
through politically uncertain times would surely receive benefits after the political 
environment stabilized.
35
  In the next section, we analyze the strategic responses Latam 
developed to achieve the objective of sustaining its operations in Venezuela. 
5.9.1 Types of strategic responses 
The Venezuelan political context triggered not control or cooperative responses 
but flexible responses by Latam to sustain its distribution and production operations in 
                                                 
29
 I047, I048, and I052. 
30
 I014. 
31
 I001, I005, I007, I008, I017, and I031. 
32
 I001, I039, and I043. 
33
 I039 
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 I007, I026, and I031. 
35
 I001 and I017. 
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this market.  The different types of operations made Latam implement different flexible 
responses.  As one VP said: 
Our production platform in Venezuela has made the firm search for ways to 
minimize the impact of its potential expropriation while our distribution 
platform has made us search for ways to sustain operations despite the 
government’s multiple measures to control currency exit.  Although the 
distribution platform may also face expropriation, for its case, our main concern 
has been managing policy changes.  [I017] 
Below, we synthesize in Table 17 the flexible responses Latam adopted towards 
political uncertainties in Venezuela. 
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Table 17: Flexible responses adopted by Latam towards the Venezuelan market 
Political uncertainties Flexible responses Outcomes Illustrative quotes 
The installation of a left-wing 
government in Venezuela created 
operational uncertainty for Latam 
Latam decided to sustain both of its 
operations in the Venezuelan market by 
adopting a long term view.  Consequently, it 
had to concentrate on developing ways to 
sustain its operations in this market.  
However, it simultaneously planed an 
international strategy that could decrease its 
“dependency” on Venezuela by further 
penetrating and diversifying its markets.  It 
decided to keep a low profile in Venezuela 
and never incur in acts of corruption as stated 
by the its values 
During 2002 the Venezuelan 
market accounted for 44% of 
the international sales of Latam.  
By 2010 it accounted for 26% 
of its international sales because 
it had successfully decreased its 
dependency on the Venezuelan 
market by further penetrating 
and diversifying its markets 
 
We have been working hard to decrease our dependency on the 
Venezuelan market but we still want to remain in this market because 
surely commercial conditions will change at some point in the future 
[I008] 
A specialized study allowed us to detail how to move forward our 
internationalization strategy [I001] 
Be politically neutral and have a low profile since hostile host 
governments are scanning to identify “against to the regime” firms to 
apply hostile measures against them or even expropriate them [I001] 
We follow our values and never risk our operation through corruptive 
activities [I015] 
Anti-foreign operations feelings, 
fuelled by the Venezuelan 
government, confronted Latam 
with uncertainty surrounding how 
to prevent this sentiment from 
impacting on its operations 
To avoid the interference of anti-foreign 
operations feelings in the distribution and 
production operations in Venezuela, all 
interactions with the government and 
customers were led by Venezuelans within 
these operations.  Latam also adopted a low 
profile 
 
The political neutrality of 
Latam avoided these anti-
foreign operations feelings to 
affect its operations in 
Venezuela. Venezuelans ranned 
all negotiations for Latam 
because they were better 
received by the context and all 
negotiations progressed 
Venezuelans always receive governmental inspections [I007] 
When we presented the firm to ask for certificates of non-production or 
in our meetings with clients, Venezuelans always took the lead [I026] 
The closure of the Venezuelan 
borders confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of not knowing when it 
could continue exporting products 
to its distribution operation 
Latam sustained its operations and changed 
the way it coordinated logistics to assure that 
its products had the best chances of arriving 
to their destination once the frontier re-
opened and despite future logistic difficulties 
due to political decisions 
During frontier closures, all 
product movements were 
definitely frozen but during all 
other times Latam was always 
able to deliver its products 
through different logistic plans 
We operated at new schedules, developed various alternatives to 
transfer products from origin to destination, improved relations with 
intermediaries in the logistic chain, and included security measures 
during product movements [I050] 
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Political uncertainties Flexible responses Outcomes Illustrative quotes 
Political tensions translated into 
delays in the renovations of the 
sanitary registrations of products.  
Latam faced the uncertainty of not 
knowing when it would receive the 
renovations of the sanitary 
registrations of those products 
which at that moment were in the 
process of having their registrations 
renewed 
Latam requested sanitary registrations for 
products with a Peruvian origin and invested 
in adequating its production plant in Peru to 
produce such products.  Latam intensified its 
search for other markets that could demand 
products from B2 which would be produced 
in Colombia to fill in the recent production 
expansion that had been made based on 
expectations of increasing sales in Venezuela 
Latam received the approval of 
the sanitary registrations it 
requested and it started 
exporting these products while 
other firms in the industry 
which insisted in getting 
renewed their old registrations 
failed to do so 
We could competitively sell in Venezuela products coming from our 
plant in the new origin. 
We had to sell in other markets which could occupy our already 
installed production capacity [I017] 
The deterioration of diplomatic 
relations challenged Latam with the 
uncertainty of how to manage its 
relations with both the host and 
home country governments 
Latam deliberately avoided lobbying any 
government or entity because this could only 
increase its visibility.  Being visible could 
motivate the implementation of hostile 
policies, corruption requests, or its chances of 
being expropriated 
Latam continued operating 
while other firms that became 
visible were expropriated like 
Polar or Exito, among others 
Consciously we decided that we should avoid lobbying the Venezuelan 
or country of origin governments [I001] 
As the Commission of Foreign 
Currency Administration in 
Venezuela (CADIVI) stopped 
working efficiently, Latam faced 
the uncertainty of how and when it 
would recover its pending 
payments from CADIVI 
Latam continued to sell its products in 
Venezuela through CADIVI expecting to 
receive its accumulated payments.  It 
constantly monitored the developments in 
CADIVI while it sold the amounts of 
products that the certificates of non- 
production authorized 
Latam recognized it should 
have reacted sooner than it did 
to this situation by earlier 
stopping its accumulation of 
pending payments in CADIVI.  
Some firms from the industry 
decided to abort the Venezuelan 
market because of CADIVI, 
however Latam continued 
operating searching for 
alternatives 
We continued selling through CADIVI and although we monitored 
CADIVI, perhaps we should have stopped accumulating pending 
payments through CADIVI sooner than we did [I017] 
CADIVI restricted the 
authorization of certificates of non-
production and Latam’s business 
lines faced the uncertainty of when 
they would receive these 
certificates that authorized the 
import of their products through the 
distribution operation in Venezuela 
The distribution operation focused on 
becoming very agile in the process of 
requesting the certificates of non-production.  
It hired one person to be in charge of these 
certificates 
Other firms in the industry did 
not have one person fully in 
charge of this process; this gave 
an advantage to Latam 
One person focused on requesting the certificates of non-production, 
monitoring their approval, and informing the distribution operation 
and the business lines once these were authorized [I026] 
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Political uncertainties Flexible responses Outcomes Illustrative quotes 
The overall evolution of 
Venezuela’s political context 
confronted Latam with a 
generalized increase in political 
uncertainty 
As political uncertainty increased in 
Venezuela, Latam integrated one committee 
for both operations and used the knowledge 
of human capital about the Venezuelan 
context to understand, anticipate, and react 
The result of the consolidation 
of this committee was that 
decisions about Latam’s 
operations were made in 
conjunction assuring a 
corporate stance towards its 
operations in Venezuela 
It was important that we shared a corporate stance towards Venezuela 
so we integrated one committee [I001] 
Frequent expropriations in 
Venezuela challenged Latam with 
the uncertainty of a potential 
expropriation of its operations.  
The investment in the distribution 
operation was much less, and 
therefore, the uncertainty of a 
potential expropriation was less for 
the distribution operation than for 
the production operation 
 
Latam changed the production platform’s 
investment origin from Colombian to Costa 
Rican.  As a preventive measure, Latam also 
provisioned the value of the production 
platform in its financial statements.  Latam 
kept a politically neutral stance and avoided 
the media.  The production platform started to 
develop the READY Project which was a 
confidential project to prepare Latam to 
respond to a potential expropriation.  It also 
started to buy the materials it previously 
imported from Colombia to local suppliers in 
Venezuela.  It made sure it payed just prices 
to its suppliers 
The costs of a potential 
expropriation were significantly 
reduced by Latam while other 
firms in the industry maintained 
their levels of exposure 
 
We modified the legal proprietary structure of the production 
operation in Venezuela to a different origin. [I004] 
We provisioned the value of our production operation in Venezuela 
[I001] 
We kept a politically neutral stance and avoided any communications 
to the media that could be considered against the host government 
[I001] 
We started to work on a project to be prepared in case of an 
expropriation.  It was very important to have a plan we can activate if 
we eventually confront this situation [I031] 
We bought a raw material from local suppliers in Venezuela because 
we could no longer import it and because it made us appear as a firm 
adding value to Venezuela [I031] 
Chavez expanded his government 
model in Venezuela and Latam 
faced the uncertainty of the impact 
that the different interest groups 
could have on its production 
operation 
Latam created a “power map” that identified 
the different interest groups that surrounded 
the production operation and analyzed their 
potential impact  
This allowed Latam to design 
structured plans to interact with 
these interest groups to 
diminish their potential impact 
on operations while most 
foreign firms in its industry 
lacked this type of plans 
Our power map allowed us to better understand and relate to different 
groups which influence our business [I031] 
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Political uncertainties Flexible responses Outcomes Illustrative quotes 
The growing instability in the 
diplomatic relations generated 
uncertainty among the local 
employees about the stability and 
continuity of the distribution and 
production operations in Venezuela 
Internal communications within Latam 
became very important. Latam focused on 
transmitting a corporate message that was 
clear and diminished employees’ uncertainty 
about the continuity of their jobs and ratified 
Latam’s neutral political stance  
While the rotation of employees 
was high in the industry due to 
uncertainty, the clarity of Latam 
gave a sense of tranquility to  its 
employees making its rotation 
rate much lower 
Being clear in our communications and keeping these active was very 
important.  Not communicating with our employees would only 
increase uncertainty [I034] 
Increasing political uncertainty 
ensured that the production 
operation had to deal with the 
uncertainty of how to manage the 
different themes that could 
potentially affect its operations: 
compliance with laws, 
governmental inspections, and 
community and labor relations 
The production operation created an 
analytical matrix that was revised on an 
annual basis through which it identified and 
evaluated the main themes that could 
potentially affect its operations.  It also 
developed a protocols system that instructed 
employees on how to manage governmental 
inspections  
These tools were innovative for 
the industry and unique to 
Latam.  They allowed Latam to 
sustain its operations in 
compliance with the law and 
through good community and 
labor relations  
Our matrixes allow us to keep track of our work to assure the 
continuity of operations.   
The protocols improve our preparation to receive governmental 
inspections[I031] 
CADIVI stopped its payments and 
Latam faced the uncertainty of how 
to continue operations in the 
Venezuelan market despite this 
suspension and the uncertainty of 
when it would receive its pending 
payments 
Latam decided to sell in the Venezuelan 
market only what could be collected 
immediately due to the suspension of 
payments from CADIVI.  To do so, it 
changed its financial and marketing 
processes.  It focused on identifying which 
where the most profitable and strategic 
products to sustain in Venezuela 
The modification of Latam’s 
processes allowed it to stop 
accumulating pending payments 
in CADIVI and to receive much 
faster the dollars corresponding 
to its exports to Venezuela 
while other firms in the industry 
just stopped selling in this 
market.  A renewed marketing 
strategy allowed it to focus on 
promoting the most profitable 
products 
We changed our financial processes completely by determining that to 
export products to Venezuela, we first, had to buy dollars in the free 
market and then, after having assured their availability to pay the 
business lines, these proceeded to export their products [I014] 
Instead of focusing on a long term marketing strategy, we had to 
identify which products we should aim to sustain in Venezuela because 
of their brand trajectory and profitability.  Marketing became short 
term and focused on profitability [I053] 
The government instigated energy 
cuts which  meant that the 
production operation in Venezuela 
faced the uncertainty of disruption 
of energy supply 
The production operation invested resources 
in acquiring two energy plants that provided 
the site with energy during the cuts installed 
by the government 
Production operations were not 
disrupted for Latam while other 
firms that lacked these plants 
could not produce at cuts 
We had to invest in energy plants because we could not stop producing 
[I031] 
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Political uncertainties Flexible responses Outcomes Illustrative quotes 
Due to reiterative expropriations, 
Latam faced the uncertainty of not 
knowing if it would be able to 
access information about its 
operations in Venezuela if the 
Venezuelan government decided to 
take over its sites 
Latam implemented a replica of the its 
information about operations in Venezuela in 
an external country from Venezuela, creating 
a necessary back up 
Latam could access its 
information without restrictions 
even if expropriated while 
many firms that had been 
expropriated had lost access to 
their operations’ information 
We designed a system through which we can access all of our 
information about Venezuela without being in Venezuela [I036 ] 
Law no. 39.658 in the defense of 
the people for their access to goods 
and services obliged the 
distribution and production 
operations in Venezuela to deal 
with the uncertainty of new policy 
changes 
The distribution and production operations 
decided to adequate their activities to assure 
their compliance with the requirements of this 
new law by keeping low inventories and 
pricing their products moderately 
Latam complied with this law 
while other firms throughout 
various industries were 
sanctioned 
We kept our inventories low and our prices followed those leading the 
market to make sure we could not be accused of price speculation 
[I007] 
The Venezuelan government 
prohibited the selling of dollars by 
closing the free market through law 
no. 5.975.  Latam faced the 
uncertainty of how to access dollars 
to sustain its operations in 
Venezuela 
Latam monitored the context to identify 
opportunities that would allow it to have 
access to dollars in Venezuela 
Latam started to work on 
rapidly identifying alternatives 
to access dollars while other 
firms in its industry could not 
view other alternatives 
When the free market was closed we spent time searching for a way the 
context could eventually allow us to access dollars [I007 ] 
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Political uncertainties Flexible responses Outcomes Illustrative quotes 
The Venezuelan government 
created the System of Transactions 
of Foreign Exchange Titles in 
Venezuela (SITME) through law 
no. 39.439 which confronted Latam 
with the uncertainty of sustaining 
operations in Venezuela since 
through SITME Latam now had 
restricted access to 350,000 USD 
per month to pay for the imports of 
its distribution operation 
Latam decided to start using SITME and 
learned the process of requesting dollars 
through this new system.  It also learned 
about and participated in the emission of 
bonds through which it could acquire 
additional dollars to amplify its sales in 
Venezuela.   
The distribution operation gradually 
contracted to adapt its costs to decreasing 
sales in order to continue being sustainable.  
In the process, the distribution operation 
changed from having its entire staff 
contracted as direct employees who attended 
all types of clients to having less staff who 
only attended directly retail chains and 
contracting external distributors who attended 
wholesalers and stores.  All logistic 
operations were also outsourced.  
Consequently, the approach towards human 
capital within the distribution operation 
changed to encouraging teamwork rather than 
pushing for sales.  Latam searched for other 
importers who could sell its products  
Latam had access to the 
monthly 350.000 USD granted 
by Venezuela’s Central Bank.  
It also managed to buy some 
bonds and amplified this way its 
available dollars to pay for 
exports to Venezuela’s 
distribution platform.  Other 
firms in its industry did not 
catch sight of the alternative of 
buying bonds to increase their 
available dollars 
We learned how to access dollars through SITME and how to 
participate in the emission of bonds in order to access as many dollars 
as we could for our operations in Venezuela [I014] 
We had to reduce costs by reducing our staff, developing distributors, 
and outsourcing [I007] 
We have to motivate our people to work better as a team in order to be 
able to sustain operations despite selling less [I017] 
We have developed 13 distributors who can access 350.000 USD each 
through SITME to import and sell our products in Venezuela [I017] 
The Venezuelan government had 
installed the conduction of 
inspections in firms and the 
distribution operation received an 
inspection that resulted in a 
sanction because of a non-
compliance.  Latam faced the 
uncertainty of finding a way to 
ensure its distribution operation 
would not be again disrupted due to 
sanctions arising from 
governmental inspections 
 
The manager of the distribution operation 
created several tools to make sure that Latam 
complied with all of the requirements that 
were identified and managed governmental 
inspections in the best possible way.  These 
tools were: strategic checklist, operative 
checklist, directory of legal advice services in 
Venezuela, corporate support, calendar for 
payment of taxes, legal status of brands and 
sanitary registries, and protocol to manage 
governmental inspections 
These tools helped the manager 
of the distribution platform and 
his team make sure they took 
the necessary measures to 
prevent future sanctions or the 
disruption of operations.  They 
were unique to Latam 
improving its ability to comply 
with Venezuelan laws 
The firm had to be sure it would never face the disruption of its 
operations due to non-compliances [I007] 
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Political uncertainties Flexible responses Outcomes Illustrative quotes 
The Venezuelan government 
committed to the payment of the 
debt of CADIVI to firms.  
Nevertheless, Latam faced the 
uncertainty of which markets 
would help the recovery of the 
sales it lost in Venezuela due to 
currency restrictions 
 
Latam acquired a U.S. production platform 
for B1 in order to compensate the sales lost in 
the Venezuelan market. 
 
Other new markets where Latam was able to 
create sales through distributors were Africa, 
the Middle East, and Southeast Asia 
The international sales of Latam 
grew from 2002 to 2010 by 
330% well above industry 
average growth 
We should have done this acquisition years ago.  However, it only 
happened when we were forced to look at how to compensate the 
business that was lost in Venezuela [I001] 
We have entered new international markets with a lot of growth 
potential [I001] 
Law no. 8.331about just costs and 
prices, gave power to the 
Venezuelan government to 
determine the profit margins of 
firms and sanction those that did 
not follow such margins.  Latam 
confronted the uncertainty of not 
knowing if its operations would be 
affected by this law 
Latam investigated which firms or products 
had to follow this law.  It found that only 19 
products had been affected by the 
determination of specific profit margins.  
Latam recognized it had to keep on 
monitoring the possible extension of this law 
to other products 
Latam continued to monitor this 
law while other firms were 
sanctioned for not complying 
with the prices and margins that 
were stated for specific 
products 
None of our products have yet been affected by this law.  We have to 
keep on monitoring its potential extension to cover more products 
[I007 ] 
Law no. 39.741 about sports, 
physical activity, and education 
installed an annual 1% tax to firms’ 
net utilities.  Latam faced the 
uncertainty of being able to sustain 
its distribution operation in 
Venezuela with increasing 
operational costs 
Latam decided to pay this annual tax and to 
continue monitoring its operational costs in 
order to determine improvement 
opportunities 
Paying this tax was the correct 
response to continue complying 
with governmental policies, 
firms that didn’t were 
sanctioned 
This law increased our operational costs.  This is no good news in an 
already highly restricted market [I007 ] 
The stabilization of diplomatic 
relations confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of whether or not to 
invest more resources in its already 
existing operations in Venezuela 
Latam decided not to grow its infrastructure 
since although diplomatic relations had 
improved, this could be temporary.  The 
decision was to preserve current operations 
Latam kept its investments at 
the same level, other firms in its 
industry left Venezuela, while 
none invested further in the 
country 
Our challenge is not to invest more in Venezuela but to do so in other 
countries [I001 ] 
 Source: Elaborated by author 
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For a detailed account of events, see Appendix 10 that describes a chronology 
about the impact of Venezuela’s political environment on Latam’s operations.  This 
chronology shows the political events that took place, the political uncertainties these 
events generated for Latam, the strategic responses Latam adopted towards these 
uncertainties, and the outcomes of these strategic responses. 
5.9.2 Resources and adaptive political capabilities 
In the case of Venezuela, interviewees acknowledged Latam’s resources played 
a central role in the development of adaptive political capabilities by enabling Latam to 
produce flexible responses to adapt to the political context.  Specifically, the managers 
of the distribution and production operations in Venezuela recognized that the 
foundation of Latam’s adaptive political capabilities initiated from its resources.  Latam 
introduced new resources and used existing ones to create flexible responses that could 
adapt and align it with the political context of Venezuela. 
The interviewees who were involved in operations in Venezuela defined the 
resources that had enabled the development of adaptive political capabilities as human 
(experience and knowledge), organizational (structure and coordinating systems), and 
physical (technological infrastructure and systems).  They stated that these resources 
had been reconfigured and deployed by Latam to create adaption.  We categorized the 
emergent themes we found to describe these three resources in Table 18. 
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Table 18: Resources involved in the development of adaptive political capabilities for the 
Venezuelan political context
36
 
Resources Illustrative quotes 
 
Human 
 
 
“The experience and knowledge of our people”,  “we hired 
the services of lawyers, firms specialized in accounting and 
tax consulting, and firms that assessed the Venezuelan 
political context, their knowledge was used by the firm” 
 
 
Organizational 
 
 
“Our organizational structure”, “the legal structure of our 
production platform”, “a committee about Venezuela”, 
“planning and coordinating systems” 
 
 
Physical 
 
 
“Our technological infrastructure and systems”, “we 
acquired two power plants”, “we changed from importing 
our raw materials from Colombia to buying them in 
Venezuela” 
 
 
 Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
5.9.3 The development process of adaptive political capabilities37 
The top management team of Latam played a vital role in the development of 
adaptive political capabilities to confront the Venezuelan political context.  When 
management sensed that the political environment in Venezuela could potentially affect 
its operations, it started to accelerate its international expansion strategy, but it also 
decided to organize around the objective of evaluating how to manage its distribution 
and production operations in Venezuela.  Latam created a committee that was 
constituted by the CEO, the VP of Corporate Finance, the General Secretary, the VP of 
Centralized Services, the VP of business line 2 and in charge of the south region that 
included Venezuela, the VPs of business lines 1, 3, and 4, the manager of the 
distribution platform, and the manager of the production platform of business line 4 in 
Venezuela.  This committee was led by the CEO and was capable of joint action.  The 
role of the managers of the distribution and production platforms in Venezuela was 
crucial for Latam’s monitoring and interpretation of the environment.  Sometimes this 
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committee called upon other individuals within Latam or individuals outside of Latam 
to participate or give advice to such committee.   
The intention of this committee was that decisions about Latam’s operations 
were made in conjunction assuring a corporate stance towards its operations in 
Venezuela.  The central objective of this committee was to create and lead Latam’s 
adaption to the Venezuelan political context that generated different types of 
uncertainties and challenges towards which Latam had to take action.  As the 
Venezuelan political context became more hostile, Latam increased the frequency of the 
meetings of the committee and the interactions between committee members.  As the 
CEO explained: 
When the context became hostile we formed a committee to lead the decisions of 
the firm towards Venezuela, it integrated the distribution and production 
operations.  We met with more frequency and in face to face meetings as the 
context became more challenging. [I001] 
An executive of Latam described the committee by stating: 
The committee reflected a complete articulation of the firm.  The different 
business lines were not making individual decisions.  The CEO and top 
management team worked together to confront the challenges in Venezuela. 
[I043] 
The experience and knowledge of the members of the committee played a key 
role in the development of adaptive political capabilities.  Their positions within Latam 
and cognition defined the assessments they made about what could be the impact of the 
Venezuelan political environment on Latam’s operations and which should be Latam’s 
strategic responses to the challenges derived from this environment.  The members of 
the committee already had worked together as a team during daily operations so these 
previous experiences and their knowledge about Latam’s operations set routines for 
their interactions.  As two VPs described: 
In the committee meetings we had discussions in which the members expressed 
their different views, which not always coincided.  We had to discuss these 
different perspectives to come to a consensus.  This was a very interesting 
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learning process.  All of the members always participated and we came to 
consensual decisions.  Our CEO was involved throughout this process. [I002] 
Another VP highlighted: 
We all had our own concerns, I shared with the VP of business line 3 his 
preoccupation around complying with the law so that no reason would be given 
to the governmental authorities to take measures against the firm while the VP 
of business line 1 was concerned about being able to sell seasonal products 
which were of great interest for business line 1. [I017] 
The development of adaptive political capabilities initiated after the committee 
was organized around the objective of evaluating how to manage its distribution and 
production operations in Venezuela despite the country’s high political uncertainty 
context.  The committee searched for viable alternatives to achieve its objective.  The 
alternatives Latam chose to pursue implied using diverse types of resources, differed in 
their combination, and the nature of the tasks required.  Over time, Latam learned by 
doing and accumulated experience on how to adapt to Venezuela’s high political 
uncertainty context.  As one executive explained: 
Our learning process has come to a point where today our experience on how to 
deal with uncertainty lets us understand more easily situations that before 
seemed far more difficult. [I014] 
5.9.4 Reconfigurations of organizational structure and processes 
One of the ways adaptive political capabilities were developed by Latam was 
through the reconfiguration of its structure.  The distribution platform gradually 
contracted the size of its structure to adapt its costs to decreasing sales in order to 
continue being sustainable (see Figure 10).  In the process, the distribution platform 
changed from having its entire staff contracted as direct employees who attended all 
types of clients, to having less staff who only attended directly retail chains and 
contracting external distributors who attended wholesalers and stores.  All logistic 
operations were also outsourced.   
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Figure 10: Evolution of sales and number of direct employees in the Venezuelan distribution 
operation  
 
Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
Latam also associated its development of adaptive political capabilities to 
modifying its structure through the development of exports to Venezuela’s distribution 
platform from another production platform besides that in Colombia.  This structural 
reconfiguration was achieved by Latam to assure the supply of the Venezuelan market 
despite political tensions between Colombia and Venezuela.  Specifically, Latam 
developed additional imports from Peru to overcome the political obstacles that affected 
Colombian imports in Venezuela. 
Latam also developed adaptive political capabilities by modifying its structure 
through the involvement of additional importers who could import its products in 
Venezuela (apart from its own distribution platform).  This structural modification 
allowed Latam to overcome the monthly financial restriction that the Venezuelan 
government imposed to all importers by only allowing each to import at the most a total 
value of USD 350.000.  Although these importers faced a lot of difficulties to access 
dollars, Latam eventually exported more products to Venezuela through a couple of 
these importers.
38
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Finally, Latam associated developing adaptive political capabilities with 
changing the legal investment structure of the production platform in Venezuela.  It 
changed the legal origin of this investment from Colombian to Costa Rican since Costa 
Rica has an expropriation agreement with Venezuela that can protect Latam’s 
investment in case of a potential expropriation.
39
 
Furthermore, within the organizational structure of Latam, three processes 
reconfigured the way it coordinated tasks and the nature of the tasks coordinated.  The 
first was the financial process that guaranteed that exports to Venezuela were payed 
back to the different business lines.  Initially, the business lines exported and the 
distribution platform received approval of the payment of these imports through 
Venezuela’s Commission of Foreign Currency Administration (CADIVI) which meant 
that this Venezuelan entity would pay the business lines.  As CADIVI stopped working 
effectively and the business lines did not receive timely payments for their exports, 
Latam changed its financial process.  The new process involved the distribution 
platform to first secure the availability of dollars to pay back the business lines, and 
then upon confirmation of payment, the business lines would export their products.  
Additionally, Latam modified its accounting practices and taxing procedures to 
adequate to the changing financial policies of the Venezuelan government.
40
  
The second process that Latam modified was its logistics process.  Latam 
changed the way it coordinated logistic operations to assure that its products had the 
best chances of arriving to their destination.  This translated into operating at new 
schedules, developing various alternatives to transfer products from origin to 
destination, improving relations with intermediaries in the logistics chain, and including 
security measures during product movements.
41
  Latam also changed its inventory 
policy to comply with the law by reducing its inventory levels.
42
 
The last process that Latam modified was marketing.  Latam had to change its 
marketing activities from regular promotion activities to what one Marketing Director 
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referred to “as not doing traditional marketing”.  Instead, Latam’s marketing process 
focused on identifying which where its most profitable and strategic products to sustain 
in Venezuela.  This involved leaving aside traditional marketing activities and 
exclusively analyzing the profitability and brand positioning of products.
43
 
5.9.5 Human capital contributions  
Human capital resources were seen as central in the development of adaptive 
political capabilities.  The experience and knowledge of the top management team and 
also of the individuals who were involved in the different levels of the distribution and 
production operations in Venezuela were very much valued.  Especially the knowledge 
and insights of the local managers in Venezuela and their teams were of great 
importance for Latam’s understanding of that context.  The support of Centralized 
Services in the interpretation of regulations and exploration of alternatives was also 
critical.  The committee or any of its members would also call upon individuals who 
they knew could provide useful insights into the search of alternatives.  Individuals 
were crucial in the implementation stage of the alternatives decided to be followed.  
Their ability to understand the Venezuelan context, to coordinate, and deliver the tasks 
that were required was very important in materializing adaptive political capabilities 
into flexible responses.
44
   
Furthermore, the coordination of human capital also contributed to the 
development of adaptive political capabilities.  The setting of Venezuelans instead of 
Colombians in the face of Latam’s interactions with the Venezuelan government and 
customers played a key role in adapting to Venezuela’s political environment.45 
Also bringing in the advice of externals was associated by Latam with the 
development of adaptive political capabilities.
46
  Specifically, Latam consulted external 
lawyers who could help interpret the impact of the laws published by the Venezuelan 
government on its operations.
47
  Latam also relied on external firms that provided 
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financial advice related to accounting and taxing issues derived from governmental 
policies.
48
  And, it also used the knowledge of local political analysts to understand the 
political environment - its development and impact.
49
 
5.9.6 Physical capital investments 
Latam recognized that by acquiring the services of new technological platforms 
it enhanced the development of its adaptive political capabilities.  In the face of 
potential expropriation, counting with a replica of its operations in Venezuela, in an 
external country from Venezuela, was critical in creating a necessary back up.  This 
involved a considerable investment in physical capital to assure that the replica of 
information about Latam’s operations in Venezuela was activated and continued 
working over time.
50
 
Through the development of its adaptive political capabilities, Latam also 
acquired two power plants that supplied electricity during the disruptions the 
government installed to this service.  These plants allowed operations to continue 
despite energy cuts.  Latam also changed the origin of its raw materials by buying them 
in Venezuela instead of importing them from Colombia to avoid import restrictions and 
present itself as a local player creating local value.
51
 
5.10 Context Two: Ecuador 
Ecuador had been a strategic natural market for Latam.  Nevertheless, the 
Ecuadorian market used to be a smaller market than that of Venezuela.  Paradoxically, 
this quickly changed as the Venezuelan market decreased in size due to its political 
context while the Ecuadorian market grew becoming bigger than Venezuela (see Figure 
11).  Ecuador’s market growth made it become the most important international 
distribution operation for Latam.
52
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Figure 11: Comparison between sales of the distribution platforms in Ecuador and Venezuela 
 
Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
Despite market growth, Ecuador had also challenged Latam by confronting it 
with various political uncertainties.  The following section, analyzes the strategic 
responses Latam implemented to confront political uncertainties in Ecuador. 
5.10.1 Types of strategic responses 
In Ecuador, Latam adopted various not control or cooperative but flexible 
responses to adapt and align with its political environment.  The CEO described these 
challenges and flexible responses by stating:  
In Ecuador, we did not confront expropriation uncertainty but we were 
confronted with difficult situations which involved trade restrictions and also 
anti-Colombian feelings.  We responded to these uncertainties by keeping a long 
term vision and staying in the country, we assured our employees we were going 
to continue our operations and we did as much business as we would be allowed 
by quotas and tariffs.  We were politically neutral. [I008] 
Below, we synthesize in Table 19 the flexible responses Latam adopted towards 
each political uncertainty in Ecuador. 
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Table 19: Flexible responses adopted by Latam towards the Ecuadorian market 
Political uncertainties Flexible responses Outcomes Illustrative quotes 
The declaration of a “bank holiday” 
or the freezing of accounts 
confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of cash flow 
availability to continue its 
operations due to governmental 
policies 
 
Latam kept a team working together to make 
decisions about the Ecuadorian market and 
permanently used the knowledge of human 
capital about the Ecuadorian context to 
understand, anticipate, and react. 
 
To make cash available, Latam used and sold 
bank certificates, it sent cash from Colombia 
to Ecuador, and it increased the distribution 
operation’s capital to avoid its legal 
dissolution 
The distribution platform’s timely 
and successful negotiation of bank 
certificates allowed it to avoid the 
loss of approximately 
USD120,000.  Several firms in the 
industry had to delay many of their 
operations while Latam managed 
to continue operating 
The agility of the firm to decide and sell bank certificates resulted in 
preventing a significant loss for the firm.  Also the cash injected to the 
operation allowed us to continue selling [I055] 
 
The dollarization and devaluation 
exposed Latam to the uncertainty 
of fast-changing prices for 
negotiations and accounts 
receivables 
Latam changed price lists while permanently 
revising its competitiveness. 
Latam converted its accounts receivable from 
sucres to dollars and amortized during the 
following 5 years (since 2000) the losses 
generated by the differential currency 
exchange 
The distribution platform’s sales 
decreased by 6% from 1999 to 
2000.  The products that were 
found to be more competitive after 
the dollarization were the products 
in which Latam offered a higher 
aggregate value because these were 
not as price sensitive.  Latam 
concentrated on selling more of 
this type of products than before 
We permanently monitored prices every week and then every day.  
[I056] 
We adjusted our accounting with the legal requirements the 
government obliged firms to follow [I055] 
We found we more competitive in our higher aggregate value products 
and therefore we had to focus on promoting the sales of these products 
[I056] 
 
A coup d'état and the dismissing of 
Presidents by the Congress brought 
overall political uncertainty in 
Ecuador for firms 
Latam adopted a long term perspective that 
enabled it to sustain operations despite 
political instability. 
Latam acquired a production platform for 
business line 2 in Peru. Through this new 
production platform it could provide products 
to the distribution platform in Ecuador 
despite political tensions between Colombia 
and Ecuador 
Latam acquired a production 
operation in a new origin. Through 
this new production operation it 
could more easily provide products 
to the distribution operation in 
Ecuador despite political tensions 
Brand awareness and positioning is very important and had already 
been set in Ecuador so we had to keep on as our long term view 
indicated [I001] 
Our new production operation gave us the security of having a second 
origin of exports through which we could provide products to Ecuador. 
[I017] 
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Political uncertainties Flexible responses Outcomes Illustrative quotes 
The prohibition of outsourcing 
confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of being able to sustain 
operations due to the higher costs 
that were involved in the direct 
recruitment of additional 
employees who were previously 
contracted through outsourcing 
Latam directly hired 150 employees who 
before were contracted through outsourcing.  
Latam introduced austerity plans to reduce 
operational costs 
Operational costs augmented by 
1%.  To compensate the increase of 
operational costs, the distribution 
platform in Ecuador introduced an 
austerity plan and worked on 
increasing sales 
We hired our outsourced employees directly to comply with the law 
[I045] 
Anti-foreign operations feelings 
fuelled by the Ecuadorian 
government confronted Latam with 
uncertainty surrounding how to 
prevent this sentiment from 
impacting on its operations 
Latam was politically neutral and all 
negotiations with retail chains were led by 
Ecuadorians within the distribution operation, 
not by Colombians 
Ecuadorians were better received 
in negotiations and these ranned 
smoothly 
We adopted a politically neutral stance, not in favour of any 
government or party [I001] 
Our negotiations with retail chains were managed by Ecuadorians 
[I045] 
The breaking of diplomatic 
relations made Latam experience 
the uncertainty of potential frontier 
closures or the imposition of 
restrictive measures 
Taking into account that the frontier could be 
closed at any point in time, the distribution 
operation in Ecuador increased its inventory 
stock from 25 to 45 days 
This measure was a preventive 
response that guaranteed the 
availability of products in case of a 
border closure due to any political 
conflict 
This measure was a preventive response that intended to guarantee the 
availability of products in case of a border closure due to any political 
conflict [I057] 
Indications that the Ecuadorian 
President could be willing to 
increase taxes confronted Latam 
with policy uncertainty 
As a result of these expectations, Latam 
permanently monitored the development of 
tax legislation in Ecuador.  These 
expectations also made Latam evaluate if 
sustaining a distribution operation was more 
profitable and less risky than initiating 
production operations 
The distribution platform’s 
awareness about possible changes 
in tax regulations allowed it to 
quickly assess the impact of any 
new taxes or changes on current 
tax legislation 
We monitored the development of tax legislation through the media 
[I054] 
Expectations of increments made the firm evaluate if sustaining 
distribution was more profitable and less risky than initiating 
production operations in Ecuador [I045] 
The introduction of quotas and 
tariffs to imports confronted Latam, 
with the uncertainty of determining 
how these safeguards threatened its 
exports to Ecuador 
Latam identified what products were affected 
by the quotas and tariffs.  It sold what the 
quotas allowed and the products that could 
maintain a competitive position despite the 
increase in prices due to tariffs 
Latam learned that it could not 
depend on products that were sold 
at low fractions of coins.  It should 
rely more on higher profit margin 
products with higher aggregate 
value 
The installment of safeguards upon imports affected our sales.  We lost 
market participation [I017] 
We understood we had to sell more higher aggregate value products 
that had higher margins[I056] 
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Political uncertainties Flexible responses Outcomes Illustrative quotes 
A ratification of quotas and tariffs 
to imports confronted Latam with 
the uncertainty of being able to 
sustain its operations over time  
Latam transmitted a clear message of political 
neutrality and assured employees the 
continuity of operations 
Employees’ commitment to Latam 
did not decrease  
We had to keep “up” the moral of our employees because there were 
doubts about the continuity of doing business in Ecuador, there were 
even doubts that we would close our operations.  We communicated we 
were going to continue operations always with a sense of political 
neutrality [I001] 
A regulation that determined the 
amounts of fat, saturated fat, sugar, 
and salt that can be sold in food 
products to under age students, 
confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of how to respond to 
the requirements of this legislation 
Latam has initiated a revision of its portfolio 
and raw materials.  It has oriented its research 
and development investment towards 
developing products that comply with this 
legislation 
Latam has invested resources to 
comply with this law, aware that 
this law can become a future trade 
restriction in the case that any 
government decides to ban the 
products that do not comply 
The firm has committed R&D resources to this big challenge. We 
believe that this is happening today in Ecuador and other countries, 
and it will become a future global market demand [I017] 
The increase in tax to currency exit 
from 2% to 5% confronted Latam 
with the uncertainty of how to 
respond to this governmental 
policy 
Latam reduced its operational costs by 2% 
and started a savings plan of 1%. 
Additionally, it revised the prices of products 
in order to increase profit to partially cover 
this tax without losing competitiveness 
The imposition of the tax was 
overcome and operations continue 
with a close monitoring of costs, 
prices, sales, and market 
participation 
The firm decided to continue distribution operations despite this tax 
and is constantly looking for ways to improve efficiency and decrease 
costs [I045] 
An upcoming communication law 
confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of not knowing if the 
law would be approved and if 
approved how it should best 
respond to its requirements 
Latam is anticipating possible strategies to 
comply with the potential requirements of 
this law 
Anticipating alternatives to comply 
with this law is what Latam is 
focusing on 
We must anticipate to the approval of this law by visualizing possible 
ways to comply with its requirements at the minimum costs [I045] 
 Source: Elaborated by author 
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For a detailed account of events, see Appendix 11 that describes a chronology 
about the impact of Ecuador’s political environment on Latam’s operations.   
5.10.2 Resources and adaptive political capabilities 
All of the interviewees agreed on the fact that resources were very important in 
developing adaptive political capabilities to confront political uncertainties in Ecuador.  
The VP who supervised the south strategic region and the manager of the distribution 
operation in Ecuador, emphasized that the development of adaptive political capabilities 
would start from Latam’s resources.  Latam introduced new resources and used existing 
ones to create flexible responses that would adapt and align it with the political context 
of Ecuador. 
The interviewees who participated in the operations regarding Ecuador defined 
the resources that had enabled the development of adaptive political capabilities as 
human (experience and knowledge), organizational (structure and coordinating 
systems), and physical (investments in R&D).  These resources had been reconfigured 
and deployed to create adaption.  We categorized the emergent themes we found to 
describe these three resources in Table 20. 
Table 20: Resources involved in the development of adaptive political capabilities for the 
Ecuadorian political context
53
 
Resources Illustrative quotes 
 
Human 
 
 
“Experience specially from operations in Venezuela”, 
“knowledge about the Ecuadorian market” 
 
 
Organizational 
 
 
“Formal organizational structure”, “planning and 
coordinating systems” 
 
 
Physical 
 
 
“Investments in R&D”, “new raw materials” 
 
 
 Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
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5.10.3 The development process of adaptive political capabilities54 
In Ecuador, the top management team of Latam also played a vital role in the 
development of adaptive political capabilities.  When Latam started to experience 
challenges stemming from the Ecuadorian political environment that could potentially 
affect its operations, it decided to organize around the objective of evaluating how to 
manage its distribution operations in Ecuador.  Latam already had a committee that 
supervised operations in Ecuador that was constituted by the CEO, the VP of Corporate 
Finance, the VP of business line 2 and in charge of the south region that included 
Ecuador, the VPs of business lines 1 and 3, and the manager of the distribution platform 
in Ecuador.  This committee was led by the CEO and was capable of joint action.  The 
role of the manager of the distribution platform in Ecuador focused on monitoring and 
interpreting the environment and was key in searching for alternatives to adapt to 
Ecuador’s political challenges.   
According to the types of uncertainties that were confronted, individuals from 
specific areas would be approached to request their participation or Latam would search 
for external advice.  The intention of this committee was that decisions about Latam’s 
operations were made in conjunction between the three business lines having their 
products sold in Ecuador to assure that Latam adopted a corporate stance towards its 
operations.  The central objective of this committee was to create and lead Latam’s 
adaption to the Ecuadorian political context that generated different types of 
uncertainties and challenges towards which Latam had to take action.  Latam had formal 
committee meetings during four times a year but sustained a permanent interaction 
between its members and called upon additional meetings when the circumstances 
required.  As the distribution manager explained: 
The way we organized to manage the political uncertainties in Ecuador was very 
similar to the way the firm organized to manage the political uncertainties which 
presented in Venezuela.  We had committee meetings and we permanently 
communicated to monitor the evolution of operations. [I045] 
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The experience and knowledge of the members of the committee was central in 
the development of adaptive political capabilities.  The positions and cognition of the 
members defined the assessments they made about what could be the impact of the 
Ecuadorian political environment on Latam’s operations and which should be Latam’s 
strategic responses to the challenges derived from this environment.  The members of 
the committee already had worked as a team during daily operations and in the case of 
Venezuela, so these previous experiences and their knowledge about Latam’s operations 
set routines for their interactions.  As one VP explained: 
When safeguards were installed in Ecuador, we saw similar uncertainties to 
those we had faced in Venezuela were approaching.  Therefore, we quickly 
understood that we had to apply the same elements of understanding the 
environment and its impact and making fast decisions.  [I017] 
The development of adaptive political capabilities initiated after the committee 
was organized around the objective of evaluating how to manage its distribution 
operation in Ecuador under a high political uncertainty context.  The committee 
searched for viable alternatives to achieve its objective.  The alternatives Latam chose to 
pursue implied using diverse types of resources, differed in their combination, and the 
nature of the tasks required.  Over time Latam learned by doing and accumulated 
experience on how to adapt to the high political uncertainty context of Ecuador.  
Particularly, when the safeguards were installed to Colombian imports in Ecuador, 
Latam had already accumulated experience dealing with similar political challenges in 
Venezuela, which helped it confront this situation.  As the distribution manager 
explained: 
What we learned in Venezuela about confronting challenges stemming from the 
political environment helped us in a very important way to confront the 
installment of safeguards in Ecuador. [I045] 
5.10.4 Reconfigurations of organizational structure and processes 
Latam related the modification of the structure of its distribution platform in 
Ecuador with the development of adaptive political capabilities.  Latam modified its 
structure by directly hiring 106 employees, who before 2007, were contracted through 
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outsourcing.  This modification only intended to comply with the law that prohibited 
outsourcing in Ecuador; it was not related to increasing sales (see Figure 12).
55
  Latam 
also developed exports to Ecuador through a production platform of business line 2 in 
Peru, through which it sustained the supply of products in Ecuador despite political 
tensions between Colombia and Ecuador.
56
 
Figure 12: Evolution of sales and number of direct employees in the Ecuadorian distribution 
operation 
 
Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
Latam reconfigured three processes due to Ecuador’s political uncertainty.  
Latam’s financial process changed by adapting to the new accounting policies and tax 
legislation, increasing the monitoring of prices, and designing new ways to guarantee 
cash flow.
57
  Secondly, the logistics process installed preventive inventory measures to 
assure the supply of products during potential frontier closures related to political 
tensions between Ecuador and Colombia.
58
  Finally, marketing had to reconfigure its 
traditional activities due to the imposition of safeguards by focusing on identifying 
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which products were the most competitive in Ecuador in terms of profit and brand 
positioning.
59
 
5.10.5 Human capital contributions  
As in the case of Venezuela, human capital resources were key to the 
development of adaptive political capabilities to confront the uncertainties of the 
Ecuadorian market.  Again, the experience and knowledge of the top management team, 
the local manager and team, and the individuals who were involved in the different 
levels of the distribution operation were critical.  The support of Centralized Services in 
the interpretation of regulations and exploration of alternatives was also important.  To 
search for alternatives, the committee or any of its members called upon individuals 
who they knew could provide useful insights.  Individual’s ability to understand the 
Ecuadorian context and coordinate and deliver the tasks that were required was also 
fundamental in materializing flexible responses.   
Also bringing in the advice of externals was associated by Latam as central to 
the development of adaptive political capabilities.  Especially, Latam referred to 
externals who provided financial advice related to accounting and taxing issues derived 
from governmental policies.  Lastly, Latam also used the knowledge of local political 
analysts to understand the political environment. 
The coordination of human capital also contributed to the development of 
adaptive political capabilities by setting Ecuadorians instead of Colombians in the face 
of Latam’s negotiations.60 
5.10.6 Physical capital investments 
Latam identified its investments in R&D and its commitment to the development 
of new raw materials as having an important role in the development of adaptive 
political capabilities.  Latam currently expects these investments to enable its 
production of healthier products that can comply with developing regulations in 
Ecuador.  Furthermore, Latam intends these healthier products to also go to other 
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markets where nutrition requirements or standards are expected to be imposed by future 
laws or market demands.
61
 
5.11 Context Three: Nicaragua 
For Latam, Nicaragua was a small Central American market described as a 
“price market”.  However, having presence in this market was important for Latam as 
part of its expansion strategy in the Central American region.  As one VP explained: 
We are present in many Central American countries.  Our experience has been 
that when the Nicaraguan market has lower than average results, then other 
markets in the region increase average results and vice versa. [I008] 
Latam sells in Nicaragua products from business lines 1 and 2 that are produced 
in production platforms in Costa Rica.  The distribution platform in Nicaragua does not 
sell products from business line 3 because these are not competitive since they are only 
produced by production platforms in Colombia and consequently are affected by a 
sovereignty tax imposed by Nicaragua to Colombian imports.
62
 
In the next section, we analyze how Latam responded to the restriction it 
encountered in Nicaragua to start its operations. 
5.11.1 Types of strategic responses 
In Nicaragua, Latam confronted a commercial restriction that stemmed from 
political decisions.  As a VP stated:  
A territorial dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua has generated the 
imposition of a tax to Colombian imports by the Nicaraguan government.  We 
found that the way to operate in this market was through the acquisition of a 
production platform in Costa Rica and the creation of a distribution platform in 
Nicaragua that imported products with a Costa Rican origin into Nicaragua.  
Costa Rican origin products are not sanctioned with a sovereignty tax and can 
therefore be competitive in the Nicaraguan market. [I008] 
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Below, we synthesize in Table 21 the strategic responses Latam adopted towards 
political uncertainty in Nicaragua.  All of these, were flexible responses. 
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Table 21: Flexible responses adopted by Latam towards the Nicaraguan market 
Political uncertainty Flexible responses Outcomes Illustrative quotes 
The imposition of a tax to imports 
confronted Latam with the 
uncertainty of how could it 
compete in the Nicaraguan market 
Latam knew that while the sovereignty tax to 
Colombian imports existed, it would not be 
able to compete in the Nicaraguan market 
with products produced in Colombian 
production platforms 
 
Consequently, Latam organized a team to 
evaluate potential acquisitions in the Central 
American region that could efficiently supply 
Nicaragua and other Central American 
markets with competitive products 
 
Latam decided to aim for acquisitions in 
Costa Rica that offered a strategic position to 
supply Nicaragua and other Central American 
markets. Through the acquisition of the two 
production platforms in Costa Rica, the 
distribution platform that was founded in 
Nicaragua was in a competitive position to 
import products from business lines 1 and 2 
from Costa Rica since these products were 
not charged with a soveregnity tax 
 
Latam used the knowledge of human capital 
about the Costa Rican and Nicaraguan 
contexts to understand, anticipate, and react 
 
Latam was able to design a way to 
offer products in the Nicaraguan 
market while competitors were still 
investigating how to do so 
We bought production operations in a new origin to improve our 
participation in the Central American market.  Through these 
acquisitions we found production operations from which to 
competitively supply the Nicaraguan market. [I001] 
Source: Elaborated by author 
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For a detailed account of events, see Appendix 12 that describes a chronology 
about the impact of Nicaragua’s political environment on Latam’s operations. 
5.11.2 Resources and adaptive political capabilities 
The interviewees involved in operations in Nicaragua highlighted that Latam’s 
resources were key in the development of adaptive political capabilities.  The manager 
of the distribution operation in Nicaragua and the VP in charge of the operations of the 
north strategic region argued that Latam’s resources allowed its adaption to the 
commercial restrictions in the Nicaraguan market.  Latam introduced new resources and 
used existing ones to create flexible responses that would adapt and align it with the 
political context of Nicaragua. 
The interviewees that made part of Latam’s operations in Nicaragua defined the 
resources which had enabled the development of adaptive political capabilities as 
human (experience and knowledge), organizational (structure and coordinating 
systems), and physical (geographical location).  They stated that these resources had 
been reconfigured and deployed by Latam to create adaption.  We categorized the 
emergent themes we found to describe these three resources in Table 22. 
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Table 22: Resources involved in the development of adaptive political capabilities for the 
Nicaraguan political context
63
 
Resources Illustrative quotes 
 
Human 
 
 
“We used the experience of an inter-disciplinary team to 
create alternatives to have presence in the Nicaraguan 
market”, “knowledge about the context”, “human capital 
from Costa Rica and Nicaragua” 
 
 
Organizational 
 
 
“Our organizational structure developed to allow our 
presence in Nicaragua”, “planning”, “coordination systems” 
 
 
Physical 
 
 
 
“The new geographical location of our production 
platforms”, “the equipment and technology of the 
production platforms”, “the distribution site” 
 
 
 Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
5.11.3 The development process of adaptive political capabilities64 
To start operations in Nicaragua despite political challenges, the top 
management team had to design a way to competitively approach the market.  As Latam 
recognized the sovereignty tax imposed to Colombian imports in Nicaragua, it decided 
to organize around the objective of evaluating how to competitively enter the 
Nicaraguan market.  Latam organized a team to evaluate potential acquisitions in the 
Central American region.  The central objective of this team was to create and lead 
Latam’s expansion in the Central American region, including Nicaragua.   
The experience and knowledge of the team members was central in the 
development of adaptive political capabilities.  The development of adaptive political 
capabilities initiated after the team was organized around the objective of evaluating the 
best potential acquisitions that  could enable its presence in the Central American 
region, including Nicaragua.  The team searched for viable potential acquisitions to 
achieve its objective.  The acquisitions Latam chose to pursue implied using and 
acquiring diverse types of resources, their combination, and the definition of the nature 
of the tasks required.   
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5.11.4 Reconfigurations of organizational structure and processes 
The modification of the structure of Latam was related to the development of 
adaptive political capabilities to allow its operation in the Nicaraguan market.  Latam 
acquired two production platforms in Costa Rica to amplify and adequate its structure to 
be able to competitively offer products in Nicaragua.  Then, having the opportunity to 
supply the Nicaraguan market through these production platforms, Latam created a 
distribution platform in Nicaragua that imported its products from Costa Rica.  Latam 
only modified its daily organizational processes to include attending the Nicaraguan 
market.
65
 
5.11.5 Human capital contributions  
Human capital played an important role in the development of adaptive political 
capabilities towards the Nicaraguan market.  The knowledge of the inter-disciplinary 
team that was conformed to evaluate alternatives to expand in Central America and 
enter Nicaragua was appreciated due to the diversity of its participants and their 
previous experience in other acquisitions made by Latam. 
Through the acquisitions of the production platforms in Costa Rica, Latam 
acquired Costa Rican human capital whose knowledge about producing and 
commercializing in Central America was determinant for the development of adaptive 
political capabilities that  allowed Latam’s presence in Nicaragua.  Similarly, Latam’s 
creation of a distribution platform in Nicaragua involved Nicaraguan human capital, 
who contributed to its operations through first-hand knowledge about the Nicaraguan 
market and its political context.
66
 
5.11.6 Physical capital investments 
Latam described the “new” geographical location of its production platforms in 
Costa Rica as a physical investment that allowed it to develop adaptive political 
capabilities by entering the Nicaraguan market through the benefits of a geographical 
location with a better political relation with Nicaragua.  Through its production 
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platforms in Costa Rica, Latam overcame the commercial restrictions stemming from 
political tensions between Colombia and Nicaragua. 
The investment in these production platforms was also associated with the 
development of adaptive political capabilities by providing Latam with equipment and 
technology which allowed it to manufacture products that  could be competitive in the 
Nicaraguan market.  The investment in Latam’s distribution site in Nicaragua also 
granted the necessary infrasructure to sell its products in this market.
67
  
5.12 Concluding remarks 
In summary, we found that despite the challenges in the political contexts of 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, Latam decided to sustain and even start operations 
in these markets by developing adaptive political capabilities through flexible responses 
rather than by exerting influence on political actors.  Latam explained that its decision 
to adapt rather than influence was based on its perception that exerting influence could 
easily lead these governments to install policies to disrupt its business or even 
expropriate its sites. 
We also found that although each political context had particular characteristics 
that  confronted Latam with different types of political uncertainties, it eventually used 
the same three types of resources (organizational, human, and physical) to develop its 
adaptive political capabilities.  
We identified that the development of adaptive political capabilities by Latam 
pursued a similar goal (to sustain operations) in the contexts of Venezuela and Ecuador, 
while in Nicaragua it pursued a different goal (to start operations).  The difference 
between the goals that triggered the development of adaptive political capabilities is 
explained by the fact that in Venezuela and Ecuador Latam already had established 
operations that  it aimed to sustain, while in Nicaragua, it aimed to find a way to enter 
the market despite political uncertainties.  
We also identified that the development of adaptive political capabilities by 
Latam involved the accumulation of experience.  This experience was related to 
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confronting political uncertainties in various contexts (despite the differences between 
them) or to previous acquisitions made by Latam.  Specifically, the experience Latam 
had accumulated about the political uncertainties it had confronted in Venezuela helped 
it confront similar challenges in Ecuador.  Similarly, the experience Latam had 
developed in previous acquisitions helped it acquire the productions plants in Costa 
Rica that were necessary to enter the Nicaraguan market. 
Finally, we also found that the experience Latam had accumulated about 
operating in the high political uncertainty contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua resided in individuals.  Latam had made no deliberate efforts to involve 
individuals in the articulation and codification of their experiences.  The knowledge 
management function was at an embryonic stage and had not yet played a role in the 
development of adaptive political capabilities.  Particularly, the distribution and 
production managers in Venezuela had been the only individuals who had codified part 
of the knowledge they had acquired into tools that they used with their local teams.  
Latam’s experiential knowledge was found to be at a state of development in which it 
should be articulated and codified to assure its transfer from the individual to the firm.  
Many interviewees agreed that they feared Latam would lose the benefits derived from 
its experiences as time passed and either the memory of individuals faded or they left 
Latam.  Table 23 synthesizes our comparison of Latam’s development of adaptive 
political capabilities in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. 
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Table 23: Comparison of Latam’s development of adaptive political capabilities in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
 Venezuela Ecuador Nicaragua 
 
Goal 
 
 
To sustain operations 
 
To sustain operations 
 
To start operations 
 
Aim of responses 
 
 
To adapt rather than 
influence 
 
To adapt rather than 
influence 
 
To adapt rather than 
influence 
 
Political uncertainties 
confronted by Latam 
 
 
Total: 23 
 
Concept related 
Policy uncertainty: 20 
Expropriation 
uncertainty: 10 
 
Effect related 
Micro: 19 
Macro: 4 
 
Chronology related 
Ex-post: 23 
Ex-ante: 0 
 
Typology related 
State uncertainty: 9 
Effect uncertainty: 6 
Response uncertainty: 9 
 
 
Total: 12 
 
Concept related 
Policy uncertainty: 12 
Expropriation 
uncertainty: 0 
 
Effect related 
Micro: 5 
Macro: 7 
 
Chronology related 
Ex-post: 12 
Ex-ante: 0 
 
Typology related 
State uncertainty: 4 
Effect uncertainty: 3 
Response uncertainty: 5 
 
 
Total: 1 
 
Concept related 
Policy uncertainty: 1 
Expropriation 
uncertainty: 0 
 
Effect related 
Micro: 1 
Macro: 0 
 
Chronology related 
Ex-post: 0 
Ex-ante: 1 
 
Typology related 
State uncertainty: 0 
Effect uncertainty: 0 
Response uncertainty: 1 
 
 
Resources used by 
Latam to develop 
adaptive political 
capabilities 
 
 
Organizational 
Human 
Physical 
 
Organizational 
Human 
Physical 
 
Organizational 
Human 
Physical 
 
Experience 
accumulated that 
supported the 
development of 
adaptive political 
capabilities 
 
 
The general and 
previous experience 
accumulated by each 
member of the 
committee and by the 
committee as a team 
 
The experience 
accumulated by each 
individual and by the 
committee about the 
political uncertainties 
Latam had confronted 
in Venezuela 
 
 
The experience 
accumulated by each 
individual and by the 
team about previous 
acquisitions made by 
Latam 
 
Location within 
Latam of accumulated 
experience about 
operating in high 
uncertainty political 
contexts 
 
 
Individuals 
 
Individuals 
 
Individuals 
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 Venezuela Ecuador Nicaragua 
Efforts of the 
knowledge 
management function 
to support the 
development of 
adaptive political 
capabilities 
 
None 
 
Efforts were made by 
the distribution and 
production operations 
managers who codified 
part of the knowledge 
they had acquired into 
tools wich they used 
with their local teams 
 
 
None 
 
None 
 
State of knowledge 
within Latam about 
operating in high 
uncertainty political 
contexts 
 
 
Highly experiential, 
although some 
codification efforts 
were found 
 
Experiential 
 
Experiential 
Source: Elaborated by author 
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6 DISCUSSION OF STUDY 1: CASE STUDY 
This chapter discusses how our empirical findings relate to the theoretical 
foundations examined previously in chapter 3.  We develop a taxonomy of corporate 
adaptive political strategies that makes explicit the flexible responses that were used by 
Latam through its adaptive political capabilities to manage the political contexts of 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.  We also suggest some exploratory propositions 
that support the conceptualization of a framework to guide the development of adaptive 
political capabilities by firms.  Finally, we explain how our analysis contributes to the 
extension of the RBV theory by amplifying our understanding of dynamic capabilities 
through our investigation of adaptive political capabilities and their development.  And, 
to the extension of CPA research, by suggesting a taxonomy of corporate adaptive 
political strategies, that can be used by firms to adapt to political contexts. 
 
6.1 Internationalization process and political uncertainty assessment 
We found that Latam had included a general geopolitical analysis in the design 
of its internationalization strategy.  Nevertheless, this analysis excluded a detailed 
assessment of political contexts.  Only over time, had Latam become aware of the 
significant impact that the political environment could have on its operations, as it 
started confronting challenges stemming from political factors.  Research has found that 
firms have traditionally based their internationalization strategies on different factors 
which have frequently excluded the detailed analysis of the political environment 
(Delios and Henisz, 2003; Henisz and Zelner, 2010; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Kobrin 
et al., 1980; Ring et al., 1990).   
However, although Latam had not developed a formal political assessment tool, 
it had invested a lot of the time of its human capital in understanding and adapting to the 
political contingencies it found in particularly three of its strategic markets.  Latam did 
not only evaluate bank reports or risk indexes.  Rather, it spent time and resources 
understanding the contingencies that would arise from political factors affecting directly 
its operations, strategy, and structure and designing alternatives to respond to such 
contingencies.  In other words, Latam invested resources in developing adaptive 
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political capabilities to respond to the challenges it faced in its foreign political 
contexts.  The issue that Latam confronted was that it had not equally invested resources 
in building a body of knowledge through which it could assure the continuous and 
future exploitation of the experience it had accumulated through its operations in high 
political uncertainty contexts.  As a result, Latam was facing the possibility of over time 
losing the experience it had accumulated as the memory of the individuals who 
possessed this experience faded or they left the firm. 
6.2 Strategic responses to political uncertainties and capabilities 
We found that Latam decided it should respond to political uncertainties in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua by avoiding directly influencing the governments of 
these political environments.  This decision was based on the fact that Latam described 
these political contexts as sharing authoritarian regimes and weak institutions, which it 
believed required less control or cooperative responses, but more flexible responses, in 
order to sustain its operations in the most efficient possible way.  This meant Latam did 
not develop political capabilities to enable control or cooperative responses.  Rather, 
Latam decided to adapt to these environments through flexible responses that had to be 
enabled through its development of adaptive political capabilities.  Latam explained that 
in the case of these three markets, it had decided to adapt through flexible responses 
since influencing the environment could further open requests, which could involve 
corruption and increase its visibility by motivating host governments to install hostile 
measures or even expropriate its sites impacting its cost structure. 
Miller (1992) and Holburn and Zelner (2010) found that to confront political 
uncertainty, firms followed different types of strategic responses that were enabled by 
different capabilities.  Latam’s decision to adapt rather than influence, agreed with 
Mascarenhas’s (1982) argument that sometimes firms face uncertain political contexts 
with specific characteristics where influencing the environment is not the best response.  
Some studies have even found that firms’ political embeddedness in host countries can 
have a declining or negative value for firms (Sun, Mellahi, and Thun, 2010) or that 
building strong ties to political regimes does not necessarily enhance firm performance 
even if they are stable political regimes (Henisz and Delios, 2004).  However, Latam’s 
decision to adapt rather than influence, challenges the traditional view of corporate 
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political activities research which has focused on studying how firms can influence the 
political environment (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004; Holburn and 
Vanden Berg, 2002; Lawton and Rajwani, 2011; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008).  Since 
firms have traditionally developed political capabilities or lobbying capabilityies to 
confront political uncertainties (Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2002; Holburn and Zelner, 
2010; Lawton and Rawjani, 2011), our research adds value by providing firms with a 
framework to guide their development of adaptive political capabilities, in case they 
confront high political uncertainty contexts in which they find that exerting influence is 
not the best response. 
The following exploratory proposition synthesizes the nature of the strategic 
responses that our research findings suggest host firms depend more on developing to 
sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts characterized by 
authoritarian regimes and weak institutions: 
Proposition 1.  Host firms depend more on adapting through flexible responses 
than on influencing governments through control or cooperative responses to 
sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts.  
This means that in foreign high political uncertainty contexts characterized by 
authoritarian regimes and weak institutions, developing adaptive capabilities that enable 
adaption to political uncertainties rather than political capabilities that enable 
influencing host governments can be more important for host firms to sustain their 
international operations. 
6.3 Taxonomy of corporate adaptive political strategies for reactive 
corporate political activity 
We found that in Venezuela, Latam confronted the potential expropriation of its 
production operation while all of its operations in the three countries confronted policy 
changes.  Using data about seizures of foreign assets by host country governments in 
emerging economies and a study by Minor (1994), Henisz and Zelner (2010) found that 
in emerging markets policy changes had increased while expropriations had fallen from 
1962-2008.  Their finding was consistent with Kobrin’s et al. 1980 and 1984 forecasts 
which indicated that the rate of expropriations would continue to be low.  This seemed 
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to be the case for Latam since it confronted policy changes that affected all of its 
operations in the three countries while expropriation uncertainty only affected one of its 
operations in a single country. 
Since Latam confronted policy changes and potential expropriation in the 
political contexts that were analyzed to understand the development of adaptive political 
capabilities, our research findings indicate that the flexible responses enabled by 
Latam’s adaptive political capabilities to confront political uncertainties, can be 
categorized as either flexible responses to policy changes or flexible responses to 
potential expropriation.  Below, Table 24 shows all of the flexible responses enabled by 
Latam’s adaptive political capabilities.  This table has two main columns, one 
identifying the flexible responses to policy changes and the other identifying the 
flexible responses to potential expropriation.  Each of these two main columns is 
subsequently divided by other two, one providing a short description of each flexible 
response and a second synthesizing each flexible response as a tactic.  We synthesized 
each flexible response to build a summarized list of Latam’s flexible responses to which 
we refer to as the tactics towards policy changes or tactics towards potential 
expropriation that Latam used to adapt to three high political uncertainty contexts.  
Similarly, Hillman and Hitt (1999) included in their taxonomy of corporate political 
strategies a summarized list of control and cooperative responses used by firms to 
influence political contexts which they called tactics.  As Hillman and Hitt (1999), we 
view “tactics” as short term activities designed to fine tune strategy. 
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Table 24: Flexible responses enabled by adaptive political capabilities 
Flexible responses to policy changes Flexible responses to potential expropriation 
Description Tactics Description Tactics 
Latam decided to sustain both of its 
operations in the Venezuelan market by 
adopting a long term view.  
Consequently, it had to concentrate on 
developing ways to sustain its 
operations in this market.  However, it 
simultaneously planed an international 
strategy that could decrease its 
“dependency” on Venezuela by further 
penetrating and diversifying its 
markets.  It decided to keep a low 
profile in Venezuela and never incur in 
acts of corruption as stated by its 
values 
- Further penetrating existing markets 
 
- Diversifying markets 
 
- Not incurring in acts of corruption 
 
 
Latam decided to sustain both of its 
operations in the Venezuelan market by 
adopting a long term view.  Consequently, 
it had to concentrate on developing ways to 
sustain its operations in this market.  
However, it simultaneously planed an 
international strategy that could decrease its 
“dependency” on Venezuela by further 
penetrating and diversifying its markets.  It 
decided to keep a low profile in Venezuela 
and never incur in acts of corruption as 
stated by the its values 
- Further penetrating existing markets 
 
- Diversifying markets 
 
- Adopting a low public profile 
 
- Not incurring in acts of corruption 
To avoid the interference of anti-
foreign operations feelings in the 
distribution and production operations 
in Venezuela, all interactions with the 
government and customers were led by 
Venezuelans within these operations.  
Latam also adopted a low profile 
- Representing the firm through locals 
before host governments and local 
customers 
 
- Adopting a low public profile 
 
Latam changed the production platform’s 
investment origin from Colombian to Costa 
Rican.  As a preventive measure, Latam 
also provisioned the value of the production 
platform in its financial statements.  It kept 
a politically neutral stance and avoided the 
media.  The production platform started to 
develop the READY Project that was a 
confidential project to prepare Latam to 
respond to a potential expropriation.  It also 
started to buy the materials it previously 
imported from Colombia to local suppliers 
in Venezuela.  It made sure it payed just 
prices to its suppliers 
- Changing the country of origin in the 
legal structure of an investment 
 
- Provisioning in financial statements the 
value of the investments that face 
potential expropriation in a host market  
 
- Adopting a politically neutral stance 
 
- Avoiding the media 
 
- Creating plans to manage a potential 
expropriation 
 
- Substituting imports by local production 
to appear as local value- adding firm 
 
- Payment of just prices to suppliers 
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Flexible responses to policy changes Flexible responses to potential expropriation 
Description Tactics Description Tactics 
Latam sustained its operations and 
changed the way it coordinated 
logistics to assure that its products had 
the best chances of arriving to their 
destination once the frontier re-opened 
and despite future logistic difficulties 
due to political decisions 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
processes not to comply with the law but to 
help it sustain its operations more 
competitively.  For example, by modifying 
its logistic processes to assure the arrival of 
products to their final destination despite 
political tensions 
Latam created a “power map” that 
identified the different interest groups who 
surrounded the production platform and 
analyzed their potential impact on its 
operations 
- Mapping and analyzing the potential 
impact of interest groups in the firm’s 
operations 
Latam requested sanitary registrations 
for products with a Peruvian origin and 
invested in adequating its production 
plant in Peru to produce such products.  
Latam intensified its search for other 
markets that could demand products 
from B2 which would be produced in 
Colombia to fill in the recent 
production expansion that had been 
made based on expectations of 
increasing sales in Venezuela 
- Developing ways to supply a restricted 
market (Venezuela).  For example, through 
the development of an alternative 
production origin in Peru, a country with 
lesser restrictions  
 
- Further penetrating existing markets and 
diversifying markets 
Latam implemented a replica of the 
information about its operations in 
Venezuela in an external country from 
Venezuela, creating a necessary back up 
- Acquiring physical resources to 
overcome political challenges.  For 
example, technological infrastructure and 
software to guarantee access to the 
information about the firm’s operations in 
Venezuela in case a hostile expropriation 
by the host government takes place 
Latam deliberately avoided lobbying 
any government or entity because this 
could only increase its visibility.  Being 
visible could motivate the 
implementation of hostile policies, 
corruption requests, or its chances of 
being expropriated 
- Avoiding corporate political activities that 
aim to influence the host or country of 
origin governments 
Latam deliberately avoided lobbying any 
government or entity because this could 
only increase its visibility.  Being visible 
could motivate the implementation of 
hostile policies, corruption requests, or its 
chances of being expropriated 
- Avoiding corporate political activities 
that aim to influence the host or country 
of origin governments 
As political uncertainty increased in 
Venezuela, Latam integrated one 
committee for both operations and used 
the knowledge of human capital about 
the Venezuelan context to understand, 
anticipate, and react 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
structure not to comply with the law but to 
help it sustain its operations competitively.  
For example, modifying the organizational 
structure of the firm to include a committee 
that studies and makes decisions about a 
restricted market such as Venezuela 
 
- Using human capital with knowledge 
about the host context to understand, 
anticipate, and react 
As political uncertainty increased in 
Venezuela, Latam integrated one committee 
for both operations and used the knowledge 
of human capital about the Venezuelan 
context to understand, anticipate, and react 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
structure not to comply with the law but 
to help it sustain its operations 
competitively  For example, modifying 
the organizational structure of the firm to 
include a committee that studies and 
makes decisions about a specific market 
such as Venezuela 
 
- Using human capital with knowledge 
about the host context to understand, 
anticipate, and react 
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Flexible responses to policy changes Flexible responses to potential expropriation 
Description Tactics Description Tactics 
Internal communications within Latam 
became very important. Latam focused 
on transmitting a corporate message 
that was clear and diminished 
employees’ uncertainty about the 
continuity of their jobs and ratified its 
neutral political stance  
- Sustaining permanent clear internal 
communications focused on the firm’s 
operations rather than on assuming a 
political stance 
Internal communications within Latam 
became very important. Latam focused on 
transmitting a corporate message that was 
clear and diminished employees’ 
uncertainty about the continuity of their 
jobs and ratified its neutral political stance  
- Sustaining permanent clear internal 
communications focused on the firm’s 
operations rather than on assuming a 
political stance 
The production operation created an 
analytical matrix that was revised on an 
annual basis through which it identified 
and evaluated the main themes that 
could potentially affect its operations.  
It also developed a protocols system 
that instructed employees on how to 
manage governmental inspections 
- Developing tools to assure the firm’s 
compliance with laws and adequate 
management of governmental inspections 
 
 
The production operation created an 
analytical matrix that was revised on an 
annual basis through which it identified and 
evaluated the main themes that could 
potentially affect its operations.  It also 
developed a protocols system that 
instructed employees on how to manage 
governmental inspections 
- Developing tools to assure the firm’s 
compliance with laws, adequate 
management of governmental 
inspections, and maintenance of positive 
community and labor relations 
 
The manager of the distribution 
operation created several tools to make 
sure that Latam complied with all of 
the requirements that were identified 
and managed governmental inspections 
in the best possible way.  These tools 
were: strategic checklist, operative 
checklist, directory of legal advice 
services in Venezuela, corporate 
support, calendar for payment of taxes, 
legal status of brands and sanitary 
registries, and protocol to manage 
governmental inspections 
- Developing tools to assure the firm’s 
compliance with laws and its adequate 
management of governmental inspections 
 
The manager of the distribution operation 
created several tools to make sure that 
Latam complied with all of the 
requirements that were identified and 
managed governmental inspections in the 
best possible way.  These tools were: 
strategic checklist, operative checklist, 
directory of legal advice services in 
Venezuela, corporate support, calendar for 
payment of taxes, legal status of brands and 
sanitary registries, and protocol to manage 
governmental inspections 
- Developing tools to assure the firm’s 
compliance with laws and its adequate 
management of governmental inspections 
 
Latam decided not to grow its 
infrastructure since although 
diplomatic relations had improved, this 
could be temporary.  The decision was 
to preserve current operations 
- Carefully evaluating future investments Latam decided not to grow its infrastructure 
since although diplomatic relations had 
improved, this could be temporary.  The 
decision was to preserve current operations 
- Carefully evaluating future investments 
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Flexible responses to policy changes Flexible responses to potential expropriation 
Description Tactics Description Tactics 
Latam continued to sell its products in 
Venezuela through CADIVI expecting 
to receive its accumulated payments.  It 
constantly monitored the developments 
in CADIVI while it sold the amounts of 
products that the certificates of non- 
production authorized 
- Monitoring of context    
The distribution operation focused on 
becoming very agile in the process of 
requesting the certificates of non-
production.  It hired one person to be in 
charge of these certificates 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
structure not to comply with the law but to 
help it sustain its operations competitively.  
For example, modifying the organizational 
structure of the firm to increase its agility in 
requesting the host government 
documented authorization for the import of 
its products 
  
Latam decided to sell in the 
Venezuelan market only what could be 
collected immediately due to the 
suspension of payments from CADIVI.  
To do so, it changed its financial and 
marketing processes.  It focused on 
identifying which where the most 
profitable and strategic products for it 
to sustain in Venezuela 
 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
processes not to comply with the law but to 
help it sustain its operations competitively.  
For example, modifying the financial 
processes to assure the immediate 
collection of payments from sales in a 
specific market; modifying accounting 
practices and taxing procedures to adequate 
to the changing financial policies of the 
Venezuelan government; modifying 
marketing processes to focus on identifying 
the most profitable and strategic products to 
sustain in a specific market 
  
The production platform invested 
resources in acquiring two energy 
plants that provided the site with 
energy during the cuts installed by the 
government 
- Acquiring physical resources to overcome 
political challenges.  For example, energy 
plants to overcome energy cuts installed by 
a host government 
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Flexible responses to policy changes Flexible responses to potential expropriation 
Description Tactics Description Tactics 
The distribution and production 
platforms decided to adequate their 
activities to assure their compliance 
with the requirements of this new law 
by keeping low inventories and pricing 
their products moderately 
- Adequating the firm’s activities and 
products to ensure their compliance with 
the law.  For example, by keeping low 
inventories, pricing their products 
moderately, and modifying their labels 
  
Latam monitored the context to 
identify opportunities that would allow 
it to have access to dollars in 
Venezuela 
- Monitoring of context    
Latam decided to start using SITME 
and learned the process of requesting 
dollars through this new system.  It 
also learned about and participated in 
the emission of bonds through which it 
could acquire additional dollars to 
amplify its sales in Venezuela.   
The distribution operation gradually 
contracted to adapt its costs to 
decreasing sales in order to continue 
being sustainable.  In the process, the 
distribution operation changed from 
having its entire staff contracted as 
direct employees who attended all 
types of clients to having less staff who 
only attended directly retail chains and 
contracting external distributors who 
attended wholesalers and stores.  All 
logistic operations were also 
outsourced.  Consequently, the 
approach towards human capital within 
the distribution operation changed to 
encouraging teamwork rather than 
pushing for sales.  Latam searched for 
other importers who could sell its 
products  
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
processes not to comply with the law but to 
help it sustain its operations competitively.  
For example, by learning and implementing 
new financial processes to assure the access 
to dollars to support operations 
 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
structure not to comply with the law but to 
help it sustain its operations competitively.  
For example, modifying the firm’s 
organizational structure to match 
decreasing sales 
 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
processes not to comply with the law but to 
help it sustain its operations competitively.  
For example, modifying its approach 
towards human capital from “pushing for 
sales” to “encouraging teamwork” 
 
- Developing ways to supply a restricted 
market.  For example, through the 
development of new distributors to amplify 
the firm’s sales in Venezuela 
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Flexible responses to policy changes Flexible responses to potential expropriation 
Description Tactics Description Tactics 
Latam acquired a U.S. production 
platform for B1 in order to compensate 
the sales lost in the Venezuelan market. 
Other new markets where Latam was 
able to create sales through distributors 
were Africa, the Middle East, and 
Southeast Asia 
- Diversifying markets    
Latam investigated which firms or 
products had to follow this law.  It 
found that only 19 products had been 
affected by the determination of 
specific profit margins.  Latam 
recognized it had to keep on 
monitoring the possible extension of 
this law to other products  
- Monitoring of context   
Latam decided to pay this annual tax 
and to continue monitoring its 
operational costs in order to determine 
improvement opportunities 
- Reducing operational costs to overcome 
increasing operational expenses related to 
governmental policies 
  
Latam kept a team working together to 
make decisions about the Ecuadorian 
market and permanently used the 
knowledge of human capital about the 
Ecuadorian context to understand, 
anticipate, and react 
 
To make cash available, Latam used 
and sold bank certificates, it sent cash 
from Colombia to Ecuador, and it 
increased the distribution operation’s 
capital to avoid its legal dissolution 
- Using human capital with knowledge 
about the host context to understand, 
anticipate, and react  
 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
processes not to comply with the law but to 
help it sustain its operations competitively.  
For example, developing alternatives to 
provide cash flow to overcome policy 
restrictions that limit cash availability for 
operations in restricted markets 
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Flexible responses to policy changes Flexible responses to potential expropriation 
Description Tactics Description Tactics 
Latam changed price lists while 
permanently revising its 
competitiveness. 
Latam converted its accounts 
receivable from sucres to dollars and 
amortized during the following 5 years 
(since 2000) the losses generated by 
the differential currency exchange 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
processes to comply with the law.  For 
example, modifying the currency in 
financial statements and price lists to 
comply with the dollarization of the 
economy 
  
Latam adopted a long term perspective 
that enabled it to sustain operations 
despite political instability. 
 
Latam acquired a production platform 
for business line 2 in Peru. Through 
this new production platform it could 
provide products to the distribution 
platform in Ecuador despite political 
tensions between Colombia and 
Ecuador 
- Developing ways to supply a restricted 
market (Ecuador).  For example, through 
the development of an alternative 
production origin in Peru, a country with 
lesser restrictions 
 
  
Latam directly hired 150 employees 
who before were contracted through 
outsourcing.  Latam introduced 
austerity plans to reduce operational 
costs 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
structure to comply with the law that 
prohibited outsourcing 
 
- Reducing operational costs to overcome 
increasing operational expenses related to 
governmental policies 
  
Latam was politically neutral and all 
negotiations with retail chains were led 
by Ecuadorians within the distribution 
platform, not by Colombians 
- Adopting a politically neutral stance  
 
- Representing the firm through locals 
before local customers 
  
Taking into account that the frontier 
could be closed at any point in time, 
the distribution operation in Ecuador 
increased its inventory stock from 25 to 
45 days 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
processes not to comply with the law but to 
help it sustain its operations competitively.  
For example, modifying inventory 
arrangements to assure the availability of 
products 
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Flexible responses to policy changes Flexible responses to potential expropriation 
Description Tactics Description Tactics 
As a result of these expectations, 
Latam permanently monitored the 
development of tax legislation in 
Ecuador.  These expectations also 
made Latam evaluate if sustaining a 
distribution platform was more 
profitable and less risky than initiating 
production operations 
- Monitoring of context 
 
- Carefully evaluating future investments in 
a restricted market 
  
Latam identified what products were 
affected by the quotas and tariffs.  It 
sold what the quotas allowed and the 
products that could maintain a 
competitive position despite the 
increase in prices due to tariffs 
- Identifying products which can 
competitively and profitably be supplied to 
a restricted market 
  
Latam trasmited a clear message of 
political neutrality and assured 
employees the continuity of operations 
- Adopting a politically neutral stance 
 
- Sustaining permanent clear internal 
communications focused on the firm’s 
operations rather than on assuming a 
political stance 
  
Latam has initiated a revision of its 
portfolio and raw materials.  It has 
oriented its research and development 
investment towards developing 
products that comply with this 
legislation 
- Revising products in the light of 
upcoming policies demanding “healthier 
products” 
 
- Investing in initiatives to sustain and 
improve the competitive position of the 
firm.  For example, by investing in 
developing “healthier” raw materials to 
manufacture products that comply with 
upcoming policies demanding “healthier 
products” in Ecuador. 
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Flexible responses to policy changes Flexible responses to potential expropriation 
Description Tactics Description Tactics 
Latam reduced its operational costs by 
2% and started a savings plan of 1%. 
Additionally, it revised the prices of 
products in order to increase profit to 
partially cover this tax without losing 
competitiveness 
 
- Reducing operational costs to overcome 
increasing operational expenses related to 
governmental policies 
 
- Revising prices to maintain 
competitiveness and assure the best 
possible profit 
  
Latam is anticipating possible 
strategies to comply with the potential 
requirements of this law 
- Anticipating possibilities to comply with 
potential upcoming policies 
  
Latam knew that while the sovereignty 
tax to Colombian imports existed, it 
would not be able to compete in the 
Nicaraguan market with products 
produced in Colombian production 
platforms. Consequently, Latam 
organized a team to evaluate potential 
acquisitions in the Central American 
region that could efficiently supply 
Nicaragua and other Central American 
markets with competitive products. 
Latam decided to aim for acquisitions 
in Costa Rica that offered a strategic 
position to supply Nicaragua and other 
Central American markets. Through 
the acquisition of the two production 
platforms in Costa Rica, the 
distribution platform that was founded 
in Nicaragua was in a competitive 
position to import products from 
business lines 1 and 2 from Costa Rica 
since these products were not charged 
with a soveregnity tax. Latam used the 
knowledge of human capital about the 
Costa Rican and Nicaraguan contexts 
to understand, anticipate, and react 
- Modifying the firm’s organizational 
structure not to comply with the law but to 
help it start its operations competitively.  
For example, modifying the organizational 
structure of the firm to include a team that 
evaluates potential acquisitions in the 
Central American region  
 
- Developing ways to supply a restricted 
market (Nicaragua).  For example, through 
the development of an alternative 
production origin in Costa Rica, a country 
with lesser restrictions and a distribution 
platform in a restricted market such as 
Nicaragua 
 
- Acquiring physical resources to overcome 
political challenges.  For example, a new 
geographical location (in Costa Rica), 
machinery, equipment, and infrastructure to 
supply a restricted market such as 
Nicaragua 
 
- Using human capital with knowledge 
about the host context to understand, 
anticipate, and react 
  
Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
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All of these flexible responses or tactics can be grouped into 4 distinct strategies 
that were followed by Latam to adapt and sustain its operations in high political 
uncertainty contexts.  Below, we describe these four strategies that can be useful for 
other firms to adapt to their political contexts.  Each one of the four strategies can be 
used by a firm to confront policy changes, potential expropriation or both.  
Consequently, each strategy includes two lists of tactics, one of tactics towards policy 
changes and other of tactics towards potential expropriation.  In some cases, within a 
strategy the same tactic can be used towards policy changes and towards potential 
expropriation, while in other cases, tactics towards policy changes and potential 
expropriation are different.  It is important to note, that the use of one adaptive political 
strategy or tactic within, does not, preclude the use of another strategy or tactic.  Firms 
can use all sorts of combinations of strategies and tactics to adapt to their political 
contexts (see Table 25). 
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Table 25: Taxonomy of corporate adaptive political strategies 
Strategy Tactics towards policy changes Tactics towards potential expropriation 
Neutrality Strategy 
 
 Avoiding corporate political activities that aim to influence the host or country of origin 
governments 
 Avoiding corporate political activities that aim to influence the host or country of 
origin governments 
 Adopting a low public profile  Adopting a low public profile 
 Adopting a politically neutral stance  Adopting a politically neutral stance 
 Representing the firm through locals before host governments and local customers 
 Sustaining permanent clear internal communications focused on the firm’s operations 
 Representing the firm through locals before host governments and local customers 
 Sustaining permanent clear internal communications focused on the firm’s operations 
 
 Avoiding the media 
 
Compliance Strategy 
 
 
 Not incurring in acts of corruption  
 Developing tools to assure the firm’s compliance with laws and adequate management 
of governmental inspections 
 Adequating the firm’s products to ensure their compliance with the law 
 Modifying the firm’s organizational structure and processes to comply with the law 
 Not incurring in acts of corruption  
 Developing tools to assure the firm’s compliance with laws, adequate management of 
governmental inspections, and maintenance of positive community and labor relations  
 Paying just prices to suppliers 
Reconfiguration Strategy 
 
 Modifying the firm’s organizational structure and processes not to comply with the law 
but to help it sustain its operations competitively 
 Developing ways to supply a restricted market 
 Acquiring physical resources to overcome political challenges 
 
 Changing the country of origin in the legal structure of an investment  
 Acquiring physical resources to overcome political challenges 
 Substituting imports by local production to appear as local value-adding firm 
 
Anticipatory Strategy 
 
 
 Further penetrating existing markets  Further penetrating existing markets 
 Diversifying markets  Diversifying markets 
 Monitoring the context 
 Reducing operational costs to overcome increasing operational expenses related to 
governmental policies  
 Revising prices to maintain competitiveness and assure the best possible profit 
 Using human capital with knowledge about the host context to understand, anticipate, 
and react 
 Carefully evaluating future investments 
 Identifying products that can competitively and profitably be supplied in accordance to 
changing policies  
 Anticipating possibilities to comply with potential upcoming policies 
 Investing in initiatives to sustain and improve the competitive position of the firm 
 Provisioning in financial statements the value of the investments that face potential 
expropriation in a host market  
 Creating plans to manage a potential expropriation 
 Mapping and analyzing the potential impact of interest groups in the firm’s operations 
 Using human capital with knowledge about the host context to understand, anticipate, 
and react 
 Carefully evaluating future investments 
  
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
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The first in our taxonomy is the neutrality strategy.  It involves non-participation 
in politics or public affairs, allowing firms to minimize their visibility and reduce the 
likelihood of being the target of adverse policies or expropriation.  This strategy targets 
government, the firm’s employees, customers, and the media.  It includes tactics 
towards policy changes and potential expropriation such as avoiding CPA intended to 
influence host or country of origin governments, adopting a low public profile, pursuing 
a politically neutral stance, deploying locals to represent the firm when interacting with 
host governments or customers to be perceived as a local value-adding firm, sustaining 
internal communications to let employees know that the firm is focused on its business 
operations rather than on assuming a political stance despite political tensions, and, 
towards a potential expropriation, avoiding media attention and interaction, to make 
sure that any of the firm’s statements are not manipulated or thought of as related to any 
political stance. 
The second is the compliance strategy.  This strategy attempts to ensure that 
firms comply with government regulations rapidly and completely, so as to avoid 
sanctions, closure or even expropriation.  This strategy is targeted at any institution or 
entity that verifies and polices corporate regulatory compliance.  Its tactics must be 
implemented by the firm’s employees to ensure the firm’s compliance with all 
regulations.  These include tactics to deal with policy changes and potential 
expropriation such as not engaging in acts of corruption that can lead governments to 
sanction, close or expropriate the firm and developing tools to ensure the firm’s 
compliance with laws and the management of governmental inspections.  To deal with 
potential expropriation, tactics include developing tools to ensure the maintenance of 
positive community and labor relations and paying just prices to suppliers to show 
fairness in commercial operations.  This strategy also includes tactics for dealing with 
policy changes such as ensuring the firm’s products comply fully with the law.  For 
instance, as when Latam modified its product labels in Venezuela to comply with law 
no. 39.658.  Another tactic is modifying the firm’s organizational structure and 
processes to comply with the law.  For example, when Latam directly hired employees 
to comply with the Constitutional Mandate no. 8 that prohibited outsourcing in Ecuador 
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or when it modified its accounting practices and taxing procedures to meet the changing 
financial policies of the Venezuelan government. 
The third is the reconfiguration strategy that aims to align and adapt the structure 
and processes of firms to operate competitively in challenging political contexts.  It 
differs from the compliance strategy in that although one of its most important tactics is 
the same - modifying the firm’s organizational structure and processes - the aims of this 
tactic differ within each strategy.  In the compliance strategy, modifying the firm’s 
organizational structure and processes is intended to ensure the firm’s compliance with 
regulations; while in reconfiguration strategy, the aim is to help the firm to 
competitively sustain its operations.  This strategy targets the non-market environment 
to which the firm wants to align and adapt and must be implemented by the firm’s 
employees, who must lead and be responsible for reconfiguring the firm’s structure and 
processes.  It includes tactics for dealing with policy changes, such as modifying the 
firm’s organizational structure and processes.  This is done, not to comply with the law, 
but to help the firm to competitively sustain its operations.  As for instance, when Latam 
created a committee that studied and made decisions about the Venezuelan market or 
when it modified its logistic processes to ensure the arrival of products at their 
destination despite political tensions.  Other tactics involve finding ways to supply a 
restricted market (as when Latam developed alternative production origins in countries 
from which products could be imported with competitive conditions to restricted 
markets or when it developed new distributors to increase sales) and acquiring physical 
resources to overcome political challenges (as the acquisition of energy plants to 
overcome energy cuts installed by a host government, the acquisition of a new 
geographical location to supply Nicaragua, or the acquisition of machinery, equipment 
and infrastructure to supply this same market).  It also includes some tactics for dealing 
with potential expropriation, such as changing the country of origin in the legal 
structure of an investment.  Also, acquiring physical resources to overcome political 
challenges (such as when Latam acquired technological infrastructure and software to 
guarantee access to information about its operations in Venezuela in case a hostile 
expropriation by the host government takes place), and substituting imports for local 
production to appear as a local value-adding firm. 
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The last is the anticipatory strategy that aims to gain firms a first mover 
advantage by anticipating future public policy.  It targets the non-market environment 
and relies on employees who are called upon to engage in anticipatory activities and 
decision-making.  It includes tactics for managing policy changes and potential 
expropriation such as deciding to further penetrate existing markets, diversifying 
markets, using human capital with knowledge about the host context to understand, 
anticipate, and react, as when Latam hired political analysts, lawyers, and consultants; 
and carefully evaluating future investments to avoid an unexpected increase in resource 
commitment in high political uncertainty markets.  Other tactics towards policy changes 
include constantly monitoring the context; reducing operational costs to overcome 
increasing operational expenses related to governmental policies; identifying products 
that can competitively and profitably be supplied in accordance with changing policies 
(as when Latam identified the products it could sell according to policy changes in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua); anticipating possibilities to comply with potential 
upcoming policies (as when Latam started to design alternatives to comply with an 
upcoming communication law in Ecuador); and investing in initiatives to sustain and 
improve the competitive position of the firm (as when Latam decided to invest in 
developing healthier raw materials to manufacture products that comply with upcoming 
nutrition policies demanding healthier products in Ecuador).  A few other tactics 
towards potential expropriation include provisioning in financial statements the value of 
the investments that face potential expropriation in a host market, creating plans to 
manage a potential expropriation, and mapping and analyzing the potential impact of 
interest groups in the firm’s operations. 
As Hillman and Hitt (1999) contributed to proactive CPA research by building a 
taxonomy of corporate political strategies that firms use to influence the political 
context, we claim that this taxonomy of corporate adaptive political strategies 
contributes to reactive corporate political activity research and can be used by firms to 
adapt to political contexts. 
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6.4 Adaptive political capabilities, flexible responses, and types of 
operations 
As Latam developed adaptive political capabilities, it used the four corporate 
adaptive political strategies in each political context.  Through these corporate adaptive 
political strategies Latam used, reconfigured, or acquired different types of resources to 
enable the flexible responses (tactics) that adapted it to its political contexts (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000).  Barney (1991) conceptualized resources as human, organizational, 
and physical.  We found Latam used all of these three types of resources to develop 
adaptive political capabilities to adapt to the political contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador, 
and Nicaragua.  What differentiated the development of adaptive political capabilities 
by Latam in each context, were not the combinations of corporate adaptive political 
strategies but the combinations of flexible responses to policy changes and flexible 
responses to potential expropriation that were enabled by its resources.  This explains 
that the development of adaptive political capabilities by Latam was idiosyncratic in its 
details within each context, although it also shared commonalities across the different 
contexts (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
According to our interviewees, the combination of Latam’s flexible responses in 
Venezuela was equally inclined towards deploying resources that enabled responses to 
policy changes and responses to potential expropriation.  Differently, in Ecuador and 
Nicaragua, Latam’s flexible responses inclined towards deploying resources that 
enabled only responses to policy changes (see Figure 13). 
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Figure 13: Combinations of flexible responses 
 
Source: Elaborated by author based on firm data 
In Venezuela, we found that Latam developed adaptive political capabilities that 
enabled flexible responses to potential expropriation to mainly protect its production 
operation.  These flexible responses assured the production operation adapted to avoid 
or diminish the impact of a potential expropriation.  Although the production operation 
also had to adapt to policy changes, it invested more efforts on developing flexible 
responses to potential expropriation due to the higher financial consequences an 
expropriation could have.  If the production operation was expropriated it simply could 
not continue operating while it could more easily overcome policy challenges.  
Therefore in Venezuela, Latam mainly addressed the development of adaptive political 
capabilities to enable flexible responses to policy changes, to allowing its distribution 
operation to continue business.  For Venezuela’s distribution operation, the effect of 
policy changes had higher financial consequences than potential expropriation.  If 
expropriated, the distribution operation would just lose its inventory while if Latam did 
not adapt to policy changes it would not be able to sustain any distribution operations in 
the Venezuelan market.  The financial cost of closing its distribution operations due to 
policy changes was higher than that of the inventory on the site that could be overtaken 
in a potential expropriation.   
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Similarly to the distribution operation in Venezuela, in the case of Ecuador and 
Nicaragua, these distribution operations required Latam to invest all of its efforts in 
developing adaptive political capabilities that enabled flexible responses to policy 
changes.  For these distribution operations, not adapting to policy changes would also 
imply not sustaining distribution operations in the Ecuadorian and Nicaraguan markets.  
For the distribution operations in Ecuador and Nicaragua, potential expropriation was 
not a concern.   
The following exploratory propositions summarize the nature of the flexible 
responses our research findings indicate that host firms depend on to sustain different 
types of operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts: 
Proposition 2a.  Host firms that own a production operation in a foreign high 
political uncertainty context, depend more on developing flexible responses to 
confront potential expropriation than on developing flexible responses to confront 
policy changes, to sustain their production operation. 
Proposition 2b.  Host firms that own a distribution operation in a foreign high 
political uncertainty context, depend more on developing flexible responses to 
confront policy changes than on developing flexible responses to confront potential 
expropriation, to sustain their distribution operation.  
Proposition 2c.  Host firms that own a distribution and a production operation 
simultaneously in a foreign high political uncertainty context, depend on 
developing both, flexible responses to policy changes and flexible responses to 
potential expropriation, to sustain their distribution and production operations.  
6.5 The foundations of adaptive political capabilities and resources 
We found the main resource Latam relied on to develop and deploy adaptive 
political capabilities was actually its human capital – specifically, its experience and 
knowledge.  We found Latam’s organizational and physical resources were used, 
reconfigured, and acquired through the experience and knowledge of its human capital.  
In Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, Latam claimed to have used the experience and 
knowledge of its “own internal people” and of “people external to the firm who had 
relevant knowledge about the different foreign contexts”.  Consequently, we point at 
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experience and knowledge as the foundations of adaptive political capabilities and 
highlight that these are embedded in a firm’s internal and external human capital 
resource.  It is important to note, that according to Zollo and Winter (2002) experience 
refers to a trial and error learning process through which individuals accumulate 
information.  While knowledge is generated upon experience through deliberate efforts 
that allow individuals or groups to figure out what works and what does not (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002).  
Our findings relate to Teece’s (1998) argument that the ability to create, 
integrate, transfer, and use knowledge on an on-going basis underpins a firm’s 
capabilities.  Similarly, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) referred to the nature and 
evolution of capabilities in terms of knowledge.  Other scholars have even referred to 
experience and knowledge management as facilitators of capabilities (Cepeda and Vera, 
2005; Gold, Malhotra, and Segars, 2001; Haas and Hansen, 2005; Sher and Lee, 2004; 
Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
Furthermore, we acknowledge that although Latam described human, 
organizational, and physical resources as resources involved in the development of 
adaptive political capabilities and capable of creating value, our findings show that 
human capital resources had a protagonist role in Latam’s development of adaptive 
political capabilities.  This means Latam relied more on its human capital resource than 
on its organizational and physical resources to develop adaptive political capabilities.  
Human capital resources actually were the ones to determine the use, reconfiguration, 
and acquisition of organizational and physical resources in Latam’s development of 
adaptive political capabilities.  Furthermore, it was the experience and knowledge of 
Latam’s internal and external human capital the foundations that guided the 
development of adaptive political capabilities.  Our findings resonate with Bowman and 
Ambrosini’s (2000) claim that the source of value of a firm is in the combination and 
deployment of human capital with other resources.  Barney (1986), Castanias and Helfat 
(1991), and Wernerfelt (1989) also made a distinction between resources by arguing 
that human capital resources constituted a firm’s resources of above normal returns, not 
physical resources.  Our findings also indicate that the experience and knowledge of 
Latam’s internal and external human capital became increasingly important resources as 
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it faced high political uncertainty.  Similarly, Miller and Shamsie (1996) found that 
knowledge-based resources are more valuable in uncertain environments.  Below, 
Figure 14 shows the foundations of adaptive political capabilities and the interactions 
between human, organizational, and physical resources that support the development of 
adaptive political capabilities by a firm to sustain its operations in high political 
uncertainty contexts. 
Figure 14: Foundations of adaptive political capabilities and interactions between resources 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
The following exploratory proposition summarizes the nature of the interactions 
that our research indicates take place between human, organizational, and physical 
resources in the development of adaptive political capabilities by host firms to sustain 
their operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts: 
Proposition 3.  Host firms rely more on their human capital resources than on their 
organizational and physical resources in their development of adaptive political 
capabilities to sustain operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts. 
6.6 Human capital contributions in the development of adaptive 
political capabilities 
Our findings indicate that Latam highly valued its human capital as a resource 
that enabled its development of adaptive political capabilities.  This resonates with 
Barney’s (1991) description of human capital as a resource capable of creating value for 
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the firm.  We found that in the development of adaptive political capabilities, Latam 
used similar combinations of human capital to adapt to the political contexts of 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.  These human capital combinations involved 
internal human capital from various origins within Latam (belonging to different 
business functions) and internal and external human capital that was located in either 
one of the foreign contexts and/or had knowledge about either one of the foreign 
contexts.  The human capital with various origins within Latam was selected because of 
its knowledge about the different business lines or internal processes (as marketing, 
finance, and logistics).  While the internal and external human capital that was located 
in either one of the foreign contexts and/or had knowledge about either one of the 
foreign contexts, was selected precisely because of its contextual knowledge about the 
specificities of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua.   
In Venezuela and Ecuador, Latam found the contextual knowledge of its internal 
managers and their teams whom where located in these countries was critical.  
Furthermore, Latam recognized that additionally to the contextual knowledge of its 
internal human capital it had to acquire the specialized contextual knowledge of external 
human capital.  The external human capital who had contextual knowledge included 
lawyers, finance firms, and political analysts.   
In the case of Nicaragua, internal human capital from different origins within 
Latam was crucial for the acquisition of production operations in Costa Rica.  The 
knowledge of this human capital about Latam and its previous acquisitions was of great 
value.  But once the production operations were acquired, the contextual knowledge of 
the human capital located in these production platforms became very important for 
manufacturing and commercialization.  Similarly, the distribution operation that was 
started in Nicaragua heavily relied on the contextual knowledge about the market of its 
own human capital.   
Therefore, we argue that to sustain operations in foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts, the contextual knowledge of internal and external human capital 
was crucial for Latam.  Furthermore, we claim that in the case of Venezuela, Latam 
intensively used human capital with contextual knowledge to understand and respond to 
this context.  We found that this intense use of human capital to address Venezuela was 
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related to the perception Latam had of this market as its most uncertain foreign political 
context.  In Ecuador and Nicaragua, Latam also relied on the contextual knowledge of 
its human capital, but in a lesser degree in each case, in accordance again to the level of 
political uncertainty it had rated to perceive in each host context. 
The following exploratory proposition summarizes the nature of the relation 
between host firms’ perceived level of political uncertainty in a host market and the 
human contributions that we found to be involved in the development process of 
adaptive political capabilities for firms to sustain their operations in foreign high 
political uncertainty contexts: 
Proposition 4.  The higher the level of political uncertainty perceived by host firms 
in a foreign context, the more they rely on the contextual knowledge of their 
internal and external human resources to develop adaptive political capabilities to 
sustain their operations.  
6.7 Reconfigurations of organizational structure and processes in the 
development of adaptive political capabilities 
Our findings indicate Latam radically modified its organizational structure and 
processes to fit or match its foreign high political uncertainty environments.  These 
findings resonate with Miller’s (1986) claim that the configuration of an organizational 
structure is linked to its strategy and environment.  Since 1961, Burns and Stalker stated 
that if an organization is to achieve enhanced performance then its structure must “fit” 
or match its environment.  We found that although there is extensive research on the 
configurations of organizational structures and processes (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 
Karim, 2006; Mintzberg, 1979), scholars have not addressed the relation between 
foreign high political uncertainty contexts and the configurations of organizational 
structures and processes to adapt to political uncertainties. 
Our research shows that in Venezuela, when confronting policy changes, Latam 
radically contracted the size of its distribution operation while it simultaneously 
expanded its organizational structure by involving additional importers or distributors 
and creating a new production with origin in Peru from which it could import products 
to Venezuela.  Differently, in the face of potential expropriation, Latam did not expand 
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or contract its organizational structure.  Rather, it shifted the legal constitution of its 
organizational structure by changing the origin of its investment in the production 
operation in Venezuela from Colombian to Costa Rican.  Latam also modified its 
financial, logistics, and marketing processes to adapt to policy changes and to assure 
that the compliance with local regulations prevented or diminished its possibilities of a 
potential expropriation. 
In Ecuador, Latam expanded the structure of its distribution operation by 
directly hiring employees who before operated through outsourcing and by creating a 
new production with origin in Peru from which it could import products to Ecuador.  
Latam also modified its financial, logistics, and marketing processes to adapt to policy 
changes.  In Nicaragua, Latam expanded its structure, in this case, by acquiring 
production operations in Costa Rica and creating a distribution operation in Nicaragua.  
Latam also modified its day to day processes to include the operation of the Nicaraguan 
market. 
Latam had rated Venezuela as its highest politically uncertain market, then 
Ecuador as its second, and lastly Nicaragua.  Through our research we found that the 
higher Latam had rated its perceived political uncertainty in each of these markets, the 
more reconfigurations it had made to its organizational structure and processes to adapt 
to that specific market’s political uncertainties. 
Consequently, the following exploratory proposition summarizes our findings 
about the nature of the relation between host firms’ perceived level of political 
uncertainty in a host market and their organizational structure and processes 
reconfigurations to sustain international operations: 
Proposition 5.  The higher the level of political uncertainty perceived by host firms 
in a foreign context, the more they reconfigure their organizational structure and 
processes to sustain their operations.  
6.8 Physical capital investments in the development of adaptive 
political capabilities 
We found that in Venezuela Latam had invested in new technological platforms 
to assure information replicas, power plants to supply energy, and had developed the 
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provision of raw materials locally to overcome import restrictions and create local 
value.  Latam’s experience in Ecuador triggered significant investments in R&D to 
develop new products to fit legal requirements.  For Nicaragua, Latam acquired a new 
geographical location to supply this restricted market, it obtained equipment and 
technology to support the manufacturing process of products oriented to Nicaragua, and 
it acquired infrastructure to distribute its products in this new market.  Latam had rated 
Venezuela as the country with the highest political uncertainty, followed by Ecuador, 
and then Nicaragua.  Despite the level of political uncertainty it perceived in each of the 
three countries, it invested in physical resources in the three markets to materialize its 
flexible responses.  Latam indicated that without these investments it would have not 
adapted as efficiently to the challenges of these political contexts.  Similarly Barney 
(1991) explained that physical capital could create value for a firm. 
These findings challenge the widespread assumption that when firms perceive 
political uncertainty they must stop and/or divest their investments.  Our data shows that 
some investments may be necessary for host firms to manage to adapt to contexts 
presenting political uncertainties, despite these host firms’ own perception of the level 
of political uncertainty in these contexts. 
The following exploratory proposition summarizes the nature of the physical 
capital investments our findings suggest to be involved in the development process of 
adaptive political capabilities: 
Proposition 6.  Most host firms are obliged to invest in physical resources to 
develop flexible responses in contexts with political uncertainty, despite the level of 
political uncertainty they perceive in these contexts. 
6.9 The development process of adaptive political capabilities 
After understanding the nature of the strategic responses Latam adopted towards 
the political uncertainties it confronted, building a taxonomy of corporate adaptive 
political strategies, analyzing the relation between Latam’s flexible responses and its 
types of operations, and examining the resources involved in the development of 
adaptive political capabilities, we now focus on the process that ties all of these themes 
together: the development of adaptive political capabilities.   
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We found Latam was able to start the development process of adaptive political 
capabilities because there was managerial commitment towards allowing it to adapt and 
towards leading its adaption process.  The CEO of Latam allowed it to be flexible and 
was ready to lead and participate in its process of adapting to the political uncertainties 
in the contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.  The top management team was 
also oriented to developing alternatives to cope with the political uncertainties in these 
contexts.  Consequently, in the presence of managerial commitment to adapt, Latam 
proceeded to start the foundation stage of adaptive political capabilities - which is the 
first stage of the lifecycle of a set of capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).  During this 
initial stage, Latam effectively organized teams capable of joint action and which had 
some type of leadership.  These teams focused on the objective of adapting Latam to its 
uncertain political contexts. 
We found that after organizing the teams, Latam entered the second stage in the 
lifecycle of a set of capabilities by searching for viable flexible responses to create its 
adaption (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Winter, 2000).  This stage involved the learning by 
doing of individuals and of the teams as a whole.  During this stage both, the individuals 
and the teams, accumulated experience about the political uncertainties faced by Latam, 
the political events that triggered these uncertainties, Latam’s strategic responses to 
these uncertainties, and the outcomes of its responses.  In other words, Latam exercised 
the learning mechanism of experience accumulation (Zollo and Winter, 2002).  It was 
during this stage that flexible responses to policy changes and potential expropriation 
were developed through the use, reconfiguration, and acquisition of human, 
organizational, and physical resources (Barney, 1991; Miller, 1992).  As flexible 
responses were developed and deployed, individuals and their teams accumulated 
experience about the outcomes of these strategic responses.  Nevertheless, these 
outcomes were not codified as feedback to inform Latam and allow its over time 
evolution of adaptive political capabilities.  The outcomes of flexible responses were 
only captured and accumulated by individuals and their teams but not codified by 
Latam.  In other words, only the learning mechanism of experience accumulation was 
exercised.  Below, Figure 15 synthesizes this development process of adaptive political 
capabilities followed by Latam. 
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Figure 15: The development process of adaptive political capabilities followed by Latam 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
We found that although Latam had been successful in adapting to its foreign 
high political uncertainty contexts, the development process of its adaptive political 
capabilities faced important challenges.  In other words, the development stage of its 
adaptive political capabilities could be disrupted.  Despite the CEO and the top 
management team had committed to initiating the founding stage of adaptive political 
capabilities by organizing to adapt, they had only supported the learning mechanism of 
experience accumulation.  Latam had not invested efforts in articulating and codifying 
the knowledge that the individuals or teams had developed through the experience they 
had accumulated.  The outcomes of flexible responses had only amplified the 
experience accumulated by individuals or teams but had not contributed codified 
feedback to Latam on how it could evolve its adaptive political capabilities over time.  
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their operations, further efforts in knowledge codification were required to facilitate the 
learning of individuals about causal relationships and the definition of what works, what 
doesn’t work, and why.  This could facilitate Latam’s identification of opportunities or 
new proposals through a deliberate retrospective sense-making with respect to the 
outcome implications of flexible responses (Weick, 1979, 1995).  Most importantly, it 
could capture the knowledge of individuals or teams converting it into organizational 
knowledge.   
Consequently, although there was managerial commitment to start the 
development of adaptive political capabilities, we identified a generalized lack of 
understanding about the role that the learning mechanisms of knowledge articulation 
and codification played in the development stage of adaptive political capabilities.  
Research has found that for the development process of adaptive political capabilities to 
start and evolve, managerial commitment has to exist and is determined by managers’ 
preparedness to adapt and attitude towards investing in learning (Helfat and Peteraf, 
2003; McLarney and Dastrala, 2001; Zollo and Winter, 2002).  Evidently, Latam had 
been prepared to adapt but its attitude towards learning had not enabled the articulation 
and codification of knowledge to such an extent that it could support the development 
of adaptive political capabilities over time.  This situation restricted Latam’s ability to 
create new knowledge (from the exploration of its environment) and use existing 
knowledge (exploitation) (Crossan et al., 1999; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991) to sustain its operations in foreign high 
political uncertainty contexts.  Consequently, the development stage of adaptive 
political capabilities could be disrupted by the absence of managerial commitment 
towards investing in enabling the learning mechanisms of knowledge articulation and 
codification which assured the creation, retention, transfer, and use of knowledge over 
time. 
Furthermore, although Latam had created a knowledge management function, 
this area had not enabled the learning mechanisms that underpin capability development 
(Zollo and Winter, 2002).  This function was not creating, retaining, transferring or 
using the experience and knowledge of Latam about sustaining operations in foreign 
high political uncertainty contexts to help it create value and competitive benefits (Alavi 
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and Leidner, 2001; Cepeda and Vera, 2005; Eaterby-Smith and Prieto, 2008).  We 
found that the embryonic stage of the knowledge management function within Latam 
and the lack of understanding about how knowledge articulation and codification 
support the development of adaptive political capabilities had translated into the 
absence of these efforts.  Therefore, Latam faced the threat of losing over time the 
knowledge it had accumulated to sustain its operations in foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts as the memory of individuals faded or they retired from Latam.   
Although the CEO and top management team were available to conduct 
knowledge articulation activities, meaning interviews for this research, the knowledge 
management function sensed that it had to work a long way on making the VPs and 
everyone in Latam better aware of how knowledge management could aggregate value 
to their business lines and the organization as a whole.  We acknowledged that the 
future role of the knowledge management function as an enabler of learning 
mechanisms that developed adaptive political capabilities depended on the level of 
understanding and commitment to learning that the CEO, board of directors, and VPs of 
Latam developed in the short term.  As Tensaki and Boland (1996) claimed, the role of 
a knowledge management function (in the development process of adaptive political 
capabilities) is determined by the willingness of employees to contribute to and use 
organizational knowledge. 
The following exploratory proposition summarizes the nature of the relation that 
was suggested by the findings of our research between managerial commitment to 
knowledge articulation and codification and the perception host firms may have of 
losing over time the knowledge they have developed to sustain their operations in 
foreign high political uncertainty contexts: 
Proposition 7.  Host firms with lower managerial commitment to knowledge 
articulation and codification perceive they are more likely over time to lose the 
knowledge they have developed to sustain their operations in foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts. 
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6.10 Conceptualization of a framework to guide the development of 
adaptive political capabilities 
Dynamic capabilities have been discussed since 1997 by various authors (Helfat 
and Peteraf, 2003; Helfat et al., 2007; Eisenhardt and Martin; 2000; Teece, 1997; Zollo 
and Winter, 2002).  However, attention to specific capabilities and empirical studies 
addressing specific capabilities and their development have been less.  Our study 
showed how Latam developed adaptive political capabilities to confront political 
uncertainties in three emerging economies.  We reviewed research on 
internationalization, uncertainty, the RBV, dynamic capabilities, and corporate political 
activity to examine the insights of Latam’s case.  One of the results of our analysis is 
the suggestion of a framework to guide the development of adaptive political 
capabilities by host firms to address the high political uncertainty contexts of their 
foreign emerging markets which are characterized by authoritarian regimes and weak 
institutions.  Our framework is the result of a detailed and iterative examination of 
Latam’s exploratory case and existing research.  Our aim is for firms to view this 
framework as a walking stick (Hafsi and Howard, 2005) to guide their own 
development of adaptive political capabilities for their adaption to foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts with such characteristics.   
To explain our framework, we use a visual display found below in Figure 16.  
During our discussion, we present its themes in italics and we identify each exploratory 
proposition that relates to each theme as P1, P2, P3, etc.  
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Figure 16: Framework to guide firms in their development of adaptive political capabilities to 
confront foreign high political uncertainty contexts  
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Our framework builds on our suggestion that adapting to political uncertainties 
rather than influencing host or country of origin governments can be more important for 
host firms to sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts 
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adapting to political uncertainties can be achieved through host firms’ development of 
their own adaptive political capabilities. 
We suggest that to start and evolve the development process of adaptive political 
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knowledge codification, to guarantee that host firms do not over time lose the 
knowledge they develop about how to sustain their operations in foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts.  The learning mechanism of experience accumulation by its own 
will not be enough to guarantee host firms’ fruitful over time development of their 
adaptive political capabilities.  The three learning mechanisms must be present to assure 
that host firms are able to codify and capture the knowledge they acquire, and further on 
exploit it, when confronting new political challenges.  Only through the existence of the 
three learning mechanisms, we believe host firms will be able to over time manage and 
benefit from their own development of adaptive political capabilities.  Accordingly, we 
suggest that, host firms that have a low managerial commitment to the learning 
mechanisms of knowledge articulation and codification should perceive they are more 
likely over time to lose the knowledge they have developed to sustain their operations in 
foreign high political uncertainty contexts (P7). 
We claim experience and knowledge are the foundations of adaptive political 
capabilities.  These reside in host firms’ human capital resources and in the knowledge 
host firms should codify over time through their knowledge management function.  We 
argue that through adaptive political capabilities (experience and knowledge), host firms 
can use, reconfigure, and acquire organizational, human, and physical resources to 
develop flexible responses through corporate adaptive political strategies to confront 
their foreign high political uncertainty contexts.  (For a detailed account of the corporate 
adaptive political strategies and the flexible responses -listed as tactics towards policy 
changes and tactics towards potential expropriation- which can be used by host firms, 
please refer to Table 25). 
Since human capital resources encapsulate the foundations of experience and 
knowledge, we suggest that they might have a protagonist role in host firms’ 
development of adaptive political capabilities (P3).  This means host firms might rely 
more on their human capital resources than on their organizational and physical 
resources; hence, human capital resources are the resources that determine the use, 
reconfiguration, and acquisition of organizational and physical resources in the 
development process of adaptive political capabilities.  Furthermore, we suggest there 
might be a relation between the level of political uncertainty perceived by host firms 
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and their use of human and organizational resources.  Drawing on Latam’s case, we 
predict that the higher the level of political uncertainty perceived by host firms in their 
foreign high political uncertainty contexts, the more they will use the contextual 
knowledge of their internal and external human resources about that specific market 
(P4) and the more reconfigurations they will make to their organizational structure and 
processes (P5) in their development of adaptive political capabilities to sustain their 
host operations.  Differently, in the case of physical resources, there is a widespread 
tenet that when host firms perceive political uncertainty they must stop and/or divest 
their investments.  Contrarily, we suggest that in high political uncertainty contexts 
most host firms might find they are obliged to invest to materialize their responses, even 
regardless of their own perception of the level of political uncertainty in these contexts 
(P6). 
We suggest that host firms’ corporate adaptive political strategies will allow 
them to develop both, flexible responses towards policy changes and flexible responses 
towards potential expropriation.  We believe the types of flexible responses host firms 
develop might be related to the type of operations they have in these foreign high 
political uncertainty contexts.  Meaning that, host firms that own a production operation 
will depend more on developing flexible responses towards a potential expropriation 
(P2a).  Host firms that own a distribution operation will depend more on developing 
flexible responses towards policy changes (P2b).  And, host firms that own a production 
and a distribution operation simultaneously in one foreign high political uncertainty 
context, will depend on developing in some degree both types of flexible responses to 
sustain their operations (P2c). 
Finally, we suggest that for host firms to be able to over time continue the 
development of their adaptive political capabilities, the outcomes of both types of their 
flexible responses must be incorporated as codified feedback into their knowledge 
management function.  For these outcomes to become codified feedback they must be 
captured by host firms as codified knowledge that will assure the over time evolution of 
adaptive political capabilities through the exploration (development) and exploitation 
(use) of knowledge.   
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Lastly, as managerial commitment is firstly required to start the development 
process of adaptive political capabilities, it is also required to allow over time the 
continuous development and evolution of adaptive political capabilities.  As our 
framework illustrates, managerial commitment supports both the start and evolution of 
these capabilities by enabling the existence of a knowledge management function and 
the interaction of the three learning mechanisms. 
By following this framework and its discussion, we believe host firms may find 
a walking stick (Hafsi and Howard, 2005) that can guide them in their understanding of 
the development process of adaptive political capabilities for foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts.  With our conceptualization of this framework, we conclude the 
discussion of the results of our first study.  The following chapters will present the 
results and discussion of our second study, and then finally, our last chapter will 
uncover the conclusion of our inquiry. 
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7 RESULTS STUDY 2: SURVEY 
In our second study, we tested the generalizability of the exploratory 
propositions resulting from our first study by using a survey that was administered to 
host processed food firms which had operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
between 1999-2011.  To present the results of our second study, this chapter is divided 
into three sections.  In the first section, we focus on the presentation of the descriptive 
statistics that characterize our sample firms.  Then, we show the results of the tests we 
conducted to our propositions.  Finally, in our last section we present the results of the 
influence of our control variables on our propositions. 
 
7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Our sample firms were 30 host processed food firms that had operations in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011.  Throughout this section, we 
describe the characterization of our sample firms through an analysis of the control 
variables in our study. 
Country of origin of the firm.  Our sample firms had predominantly a Latin American 
origin (25), originating 24 from Colombia, 1 from Mexico, 3 from the United States, 1 
from Italy, and 1 from Switzerland. 
Size.  According to the Colombian law 905 of 2004, the majority of firms in our sample 
were classified as medium or large (24), while the rest were classified as small or micro 
(6) (see Figure 17). 
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Figure 17: Size of firms 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Experience in foreign high political uncertainty contexts.  Regarding the number of 
years of experience that our sample firms had in the three contexts of our study between 
1999-2011, we found that firms that had operations in Venezuela had an average of 7.7 
years of experience (SD=4.1 years) in this market.  Firms that had operations in 
Ecuador had an average of 8.1 years of experience (SD=4.6 years) in this market. And, 
firms that had operations in Nicaragua had an average of 9.8 years of experience in this 
market (SD=5.2 years).  We categorized sample firms into two groups: those having 
less than 7 years of experience (as low experience) and those having 7 or more years of 
experience (as high experience).  We found that 19 of our sample firms were classified 
as being highly experienced firms in dealing with high political uncertainty. 
Country scope.  The country scope of our sample firms was analyzed by the number of 
countries (besides Colombia) where firms operated at the time of our survey despite the 
type of their operations.  It is important to note, that there were firms that operated in 
only one more country besides Colombia while others operated in up to 198 countries.  
We found    ⁄  of our sample firms operated in 10 countries or less (Median=10 
countries, Interquartile Range=17 countries).  However, we categorized firms into two 
groups: those operating in from 1 up to 50 countries (as low country scope) and those 
operating in more than 50 countries (as high country scope).  We found   ⁄  (24) of our 
sample firms sold their products in less than 50 countries, having a low country scope. 
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Status of operations in high political uncertainty contexts.  As it can be observed below 
in Figure 18, between 1999 and 2011 the country in which the highest number of our 
sample firms managed to sustain their operations was Ecuador, followed by Venezuela, 
and then Nicaragua.  Venezuela was the country in which the highest number of firms 
closed their operations, while in Nicaragua no firms closed their operations and the 
highest number of firms had no operations during this time period. 
Figure 18: Status of operations  
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
We found that among our sample firms, 23 sustained their operations in at least 
one of the three countries until 2011, while the remaining 7 closed or had no operations 
in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua.  
Type of operations in high political uncertainty contexts.  Below, Figure 19 shows that 
27 of our sample firms had operations in Venezuela, 22 in Ecuador, and 6 in Nicaragua.  
Sample firms classified their operations in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua as: 
exports, distribution, production, and production and distribution simultaneously in one 
country.  A firm could have no operations, one type or various types of operations in 
each of the three markets of our study.  When we analyzed the type of operations of our 
sample firms, we observed 27 had exports, 4 had distribution operations, 4 had 
distribution and production operations simultaneously in one country, and 3 had 
production operations.  Furthermore, we observed 22 of firms only exported to at least 
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one other type of operation, while only 3 firms did not export but had at least one other 
type of operation (distribution, production or distribution and production operations 
simultaneously in one country). 
Venezuela was the destination for most exports and the country where the 
greatest number of production operations and distribution and production operations 
simultaneously in one country were found.  Ecuador and Nicaragua were the countries 
where the highest numbers of distribution operations were found.  In Venezuela and 
Ecuador, the 4 types of operations took place, while in Nicaragua no production 
operations were found among our sample firms (see Figure 19). 
Figure 19: Type of operations  
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Level of headquarters control.  We asked firms to rate the involvement of their 
counterparts in the different types of operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua, in 
the decisions of the firm regarding how to confront these foreign political contexts from 
a scale of 1 (none) to 5 (much).  We then categorized firms into two groups: those 
having a low level of headquarters control (between 1 and 3) and those having a high 
level of headquarters control (between 3.1 and 5).  We found 19 firms had a high level 
of headquarters control. 
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7.2 Exploring our propositions 
Throughout this section, we present the results of the tests we conducted to each 
of our propositions.   
In terms of our first proposition: 
Proposition 1.  Host firms depend more on adapting through flexible responses than on 
influencing governments through control or cooperative responses to sustain their 
operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts. 
On a scale from 1 to 5 (1 being none and 5 being a lot), we found that   ⁄  of 
host firms scored 3.5 (Interquartile range = 1.5) for their use of flexible responses and 
  ⁄  of host firms scored 1 (Interquartile range = 0) for their use of control or 
cooperative responses to sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty 
contexts.  For flexible responses, host firms scored their use between 1 and 5 while for 
control or cooperative responses, host firms scored their use between 1 and 2.5 (see 
Figure 20). 
Figure 20: Box-plot for flexible and control or cooperative responses 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
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To test P1we used the Mann-Whiteny U test to compare the medians of flexible 
responses and control or cooperative responses.  We found a statistically significant 
difference between the use of these two types of responses by host firms.  Host firms 
depended more on using flexible responses than control or cooperative responses to 
sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts (Mann-Whitney 
U= 50.5; p=0.000). 
When looking at proposition 2a: 
Proposition 2a.  Host firms that own a production operation in a foreign high political 
uncertainty context, depend more on developing flexible responses to confront potential 
expropriation than on developing flexible responses to confront policy changes, to 
sustain their production operation. 
We found from our sample firms that only 3 owned a production operation in a 
foreign high political uncertainty context.  On a scale from 1 to 5 (1 being none and 5 
being a lot), we found that   ⁄  of host firms scored 3 for their use of flexible responses 
to confront potential expropriation and   ⁄  of host firms scored 4 for their use of 
flexible responses to confront policy changes to sustain their production operation.  For 
flexible responses to confront potential expropriation, host firms scored their use 
between 3 and 4 while for flexible responses to confront policy changes, host firms 
scored their use between 2 and 4 (see Figure 21). 
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Figure 21: Box-plot for flexible responses to confront potential expropriation and policy 
changes related to a production operation 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
To test P2a we used the Mann-Whiteny U test to compare the medians of 
flexible responses to confront potential expropriation and flexible responses to confront 
policy changes among host firms with a production operation in a foreign high political 
uncertainty context.  We found no statistically significant difference between the use of 
flexible responses to confront potential expropriation and flexible responses to confront 
policy changes among these host firms (Mann-Whitney U=4.00; p=1.000). 
Regarding proposition 2b: 
Proposition 2b.  Host firms that own a distribution operation in a foreign high political 
uncertainty context, depend more on developing flexible responses to confront policy 
changes than on developing flexible responses to confront potential expropriation, to 
sustain their distribution operation. 
We found from our sample firms that only 4 owned a distribution operation in a 
foreign high political uncertainty context.  On a scale from 1 to 5 (1 being none and 5 
being a lot), we found that   ⁄  of host firms scored 4 (Interquartile range = 1.5) for 
their use of flexible responses to confront policy changes and   ⁄  of host firms scored 
1.5 (Interquartile range = 1.75) for their use of flexible responses to confront potential 
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expropriation to sustain their distribution operation.  For flexible responses to confront 
policy changes, host firms scored their use between 2 and 4 while for flexible responses 
to confront potential expropriation, host firms scored their use between 1 and 3 (see 
Figure 22). 
Figure 22: Box-plot for flexible responses to confront policy changes and potential 
expropriation related to a distribution operation 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
To test P2b we used the Mann-Whiteny U test to compare the medians of 
flexible responses to confront policy changes and flexible responses to confront 
potential expropriation among host firms with a distribution operation in a foreign high 
political uncertainty context.  We found no statistically significant difference between 
the use of flexible responses to confront policy changes and flexible responses to 
confront potential expropriation among these host firms (Mann-Whitney U=1.5; 
p=0.057). 
About proposition 2c: 
Proposition 2c.  Host firms that own a distribution and a production operation 
simultaneously in a foreign high political uncertainty context, depend on developing 
both, flexible responses to policy changes and flexible responses to potential 
expropriation, to sustain their distribution and production operations. 
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When analyzing if host firms that owned a distribution and production operation 
simultaneously in a foreign high political uncertainty context used both, flexible 
responses to policy changes and flexible responses to potential expropriation, we found 
that the median of each of both of these responses for all host firms with this type of 
operation was not equal to 1 on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 being none and 5 being a lot).  
This means that all host firms that owned a distribution and production operation 
simultaneously in a foreign high political uncertainty context, used in some degree both 
of these types of responses (see Table 26). 
Table 26: Scores of flexible responses to confront potential expropriation and policy changes 
by host firms that own a distribution and production operation simultaneously in a foreign high 
political uncertainty context 
Host firms’ 
scores 
Flexible responses 
to confront 
potential 
expropriation 
Flexible responses 
to confront policy 
changes 
n Fraction n Fraction 
1 (None) 0 0 0 0 
2  2   ⁄  0 0 
3 (Some) 2   ⁄  0 0 
4 0 0 2   ⁄  
5 (A lot) 0 0 2   ⁄  
Source: Elaborated by author 
We found only 4 host firms had distribution and production operations 
simultaneously in a foreign high political uncertainty context.  Since these 4 host firms 
claimed to use in some degree both, flexible responses to confront potential 
expropriation and flexible responses to confront policy changes, we could not use 
statistical tests to evaluate this proposition.  However, it is important to note that our 
data shows hosts firms with this type of operation used both responses in some degree, 
as our proposition suggests. 
Regarding proposition 3: 
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Proposition 3.  Host firms rely more on their human capital resources than on their 
organizational and physical resources in their development of adaptive political 
capabilities to sustain operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts. 
On a scale from 1 to 5 (being 1 none and 5 a lot), we found that   ⁄  of host 
firms scored 4 (Interquartile range = 1.13) for their use of human capital resources,   ⁄  
of host firms scored 2 (Interquartile range = 2) for their use of physical resources, and 
  ⁄  of host firms scored 2 (Interquartile range = 1.5) for their use of organizational 
resources in their development of adaptive political capabilities to sustain operations in 
foreign high political uncertainty contexts.  For human capital resources host firms 
scored their use between 1 and 5, for physical resources host firms scored their use 
between 1 and 4.5, and for organizational resources host firms scored their use between 
1 and 5 (see Figure 23). 
Figure 23: Box-plot for the use of human capital, physical, and organizational resources 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
To test P3 we used Kruskal Wallis.  We found there were statistically significant 
differences among the use of human capital resources, organizational resources, and 
physical resources by host firms in their development of adaptive political capabilities 
to sustain operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts (Kruskal Wallis; 
p=0.000), which means that at least one of these resources was used more than the 
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others by host firms.  Above, Figure 23 shows that human capital resources obtained 
higher usage scores by host firms than organizational and physical resources. 
In terms of proposition 4: 
Proposition 4.  The higher the level of political uncertainty perceived by host firms in a 
foreign context, the more they rely on the contextual knowledge of their internal and 
external human resources to develop adaptive political capabilities to sustain their 
operations.  
We analyzed the level of political uncertainty perceived by host firms in each of 
the three countries in our study using a scale from 1 to 5 (being 1 very unpredictable 
and 5 very predictable, in other words, the lowest the score the highest the level of 
political uncertainty perceived by host firms).  As Figure 24 shows, the median of the 
level of political uncertainty perceived by host firms was statistically significantly 
different among the three countries (Kruskal Wallis, p=0.000) being it lower for 
Venezuela.  In other words, this means that Venezuela was the country where host firms 
perceived the highest levels of political uncertainty. 
We also analyzed the use of host firms of the contextual knowledge of their 
internal and external human resources in each of the three countries in our study using a 
scale from 1 to 5 (being 1 none and 5 a lot).  As Figure 25 shows, the medians for this 
variable among the three countries are not statistically significantly different (Kruskal 
Wallis, p=0.237). 
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Figure 24: Box-plot for the level of political 
uncertainty perceived 
Figure 25: Box-plot for the use of host firms 
of the contextual knowledge of their internal 
and external human resources 
  
Source: Elaborated by author 
Below, Table 27 shows the measures of position for both variables in each of the 
three countries. 
Table 27: Measures of position for the level of political uncertainty perceived and the use of 
host firms of the contextual knowledge of their internal and external human resources: 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
Country 
Level of political uncertainty 
perceived 
Use of the contextual knowledge 
of their internal and external 
human resources 
Median IR
*
 Min-Max Median IR Min-Max 
Venezuela 2.0 1.0 1.0-4.0 3.5 1.5 1.5-5.0 
Ecuador 4.0 1.0 2.0-4.5 3.0 1.3 1.0-5.0 
Nicaragua 3.8 0.6 3.0-4.0 3.0 0.8 2.0-3.5 
*
 IR= Interquartile range 
Source: Elaborated by author 
To test P4 we used Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to find if there was a 
correlation between both of the variables  for each of the three countries in our study.  
We also found the corresponding levels of significance (p value) to prove if the 
correlations of these variables for each country were statistically significant.  When we 
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evaluated the behaviour of both variables, level of political uncertainty perceived and 
the use of contextual knowledge of their internal and external human resources, in the 
case of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, we found there was no statistically 
significant relationship between the two variables (Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient, Venezuela= -0.730, p=0.716; Ecuador=0.142; p=0.530; Nicaragua=0.075; 
p=0.692).  Below, Figure 26 shows the dispersion graphs for both variables in each of 
the three countries. 
Figure 26: Dispersion graphs for the level of political uncertainty perceived and the use of host 
firms of the contextual knowledge of their internal and external human resources: Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
  
Venezuela Ecuador 
 
Nicaragua 
Source: Elaborated by author 
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About proposition 5: 
Proposition 5.  The higher the level of political uncertainty perceived by host firms in a 
foreign context, the more they reconfigure their organizational structure and processes 
to sustain their operations.  
For P5, we used the analysis of the variable level of political uncertainty 
perceived that was conducted for P4.  We also analyzed the use of reconfigurations of 
host firms’ organizational structure and processes in each of the three countries in our 
study using a scale from 1 to 5 (being 1 none and 5 a lot).  As Figure 27 shows, the 
medians for this variable among the three countries are not statistically significantly 
different (Kruskal Wallis, p=0.500). 
Figure 27: Box-plot for host firms’ reconfigurations of organizational structure and processes 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Below, Table 28 shows the measures of position for the variable 
reconfigurations of organizational structure and processes in each of the three countries. 
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Table 28: Measures of position for the reconfigurations of organizational structure and 
processes: Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
Country 
Reconfigurations of organizational structure and 
processes 
Median IR Min-Max 
Venezuela 2.0 2.5 1.0-5.0 
Ecuador 2.0 1.5 1.0-5.0 
Nicaragua 2.0 1.5 1.0-2.5 
Source: Elaborated by author 
To test P5 we used Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to find if there was a 
correlation between both variables for each of the three countries in our study.  We also 
found the corresponding levels of significance (p value) to prove if the correlations of 
these variables for each country were statistically significant.  When we evaluated the 
behaviour of both variables, level of political uncertainty perceived and the 
reconfigurations of organizational structure and processes, in the case of Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua, we found there was no statistically significant relationship 
between the two variables (Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, Venezuela= 0.114, 
p=0.573; Ecuador=102; p=0.651; Nicaragua =-0.567; p=0.241).  Below, Figure 28 
shows the dispersion graphs for both variables in each of the three countries. 
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Figure 28: Dispersion graphs for the level of political uncertainty perceived and the 
reconfigurations of organizational structure and processes: Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
  
Venezuela Ecuador 
 
Nicaragua 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Regarding proposition 6: 
Proposition 6.  Most host firms are obliged to invest in physical resources to develop 
flexible responses in contexts with political uncertainty, despite the level of political 
uncertainty they perceive in these contexts. 
We recategorized the level of political uncertainty perceived by host firms as 
high (scores below 3), medium (scores between 3 and below 4), and low (scores 
between 4 and 5).  To test P6 we used the chi-square test of independence to find if the 
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level of political uncertainty perceived by host firms in contexts with political 
uncertainty was associated to their decision to invest in physical resources.  We found 
there is no association between both variables (Chi square, p=0.799).  We observed that 
host firms that perceived a high level of political uncertainty had invested in physical 
resources (YES,   ⁄ ) and that host firms that perceived a low level of political 
uncertainty had equally decided to invest (YES,   ⁄ ) and not to invest (NO,   ⁄ ) in 
physical resources (see Table 29). 
Table 29: Investments in physical resources by the level of political uncertainty perceived by 
host firms 
Level of 
political 
uncertainty 
perceived 
Host firms that invested in 
physical resources 
Total 
YES  
N 
NO  
n 
High  15 
7 
9 
31 
10 
5 
9 
24 
25 
Medium 12 
Low 18 
Total 55
68
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Regarding proposition 7: 
Proposition 7.  Host firms with lower managerial commitment to knowledge 
articulation and codification perceive they are more likely over time to lose the 
knowledge they have developed to sustain their operations in foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts. 
To test P7, we reclassified host firms according to their level of managerial 
commitment to knowledge articulation and codification.  Host firms with a score 
between 1 and 2 for this variable were referred to as having low managerial 
commitment.  Host firms with a score above 2 and up to 5 for this variable were referred 
to as having high managerial commitment.    ⁄  of host firms were found to have a high 
                                                 
68
 Since a firm can have operations in one, two or three of the countries in our study, this number is 
greater than 30 which is the number of surveyed firms. 
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managerial commitment.  Subsequently, we analyzed host firms’ scores for their 
perception of losing over time the knowledge they have developed to sustain their 
operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts from a scale of 1 to 5 (being 1 
none and 5 much).  Half of the surveyed host firms scored 2.5 or less for their 
perception of losing their knowledge (Interquartile range=2).  Some host firms scored 1 
while others scored 5. 
To test P7 we used the Mann-Whiteny U test to compare the medians of the 
perception of losing their knowledge between host firms having a low and a high 
managerial commitment.  We found there was no statistically significant difference 
between host firms with a low and a high managerial commitment to knowledge 
articulation and codification in their perception about the possibility of losing over time 
the knowledge they have developed (Mann-Whitney U=60.0; p=0.520).   
Figure 29: Box-plot for the perception about the possibility of losing over time the knowledge 
developed and managerial commitment 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
As can be observed in Figure 29, although no statistically significant differences 
were found between host firms with low and high managerial commitment, the median 
for the perception about the possibility of over time losing the knowledge developed 
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was lower for host firms with high managerial commitment to knowledge articulation 
and codification (Medians 3.5 versus 2.0). 
7.3 Influence of control variables 
Finally, in our last section we present a series of tables that show the results of 
the influence of our control variables on each proposition. 
For proposition 1: 
Proposition 1.  Host firms depend more on adapting through flexible responses than on 
influencing governments through control or cooperative responses to sustain their 
operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts. 
Below, Table 30 shows none of our control variables influence the results of P1. 
Table 30: Influence of control variables on P1 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Regarding propositions 2a, 2b, and 2c: 
Proposition 2a.  Host firms that own a production operation in a foreign high political 
uncertainty context, depend more on developing flexible responses to confront potential 
expropriation than on developing flexible responses to confront policy changes, to 
sustain their production operation. 
Median IR Median IR
Latin American origin 25 3.50 1.75 1.00 0.00 0.000
Non-Latin American origin 5 4.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.008
Micro and small 6 3.25 2.38 1.00 0.38 0.026
Medium and large 24 3.75 1.38 1.00 0.00 0.000
0 to 6 years 11 4.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.000
7 to 13 years 19 3.50 1.50 1.00 0.00 0.000
1 to 50 countries 24 3.25 1.63 1.00 0.00 0.000
More than 50 countries 6 4.00 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.029
Sustained operations 23 4.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.000
Closed operations 7 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.001
Only exported 22 3.50 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.000
Exported and/or had any 
other type of operation
8 3.25 2.75 1.00 0.00 0.001
Low 11 3.00 2.50 1.00 0.00 0.002
High 19 4.00 1.50 1.00 0.00 0.000
Flexible responses
nControl variables p
* Influence
No
No
Control or cooperative 
responses 
No
No
No
No
No
Country scope
Status of operations
Level of headquarters 
control
Country of origin
Size
Experience
Type of operations
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Proposition 2b.  Host firms that own a distribution operation in a foreign high political 
uncertainty context, depend more on developing flexible responses to confront policy 
changes than on developing flexible responses to confront potential expropriation, to 
sustain their distribution operation. 
Proposition 2c.  Host firms that own a distribution and a production operation 
simultaneously in a foreign high political uncertainty context, depend on developing 
both, flexible responses to policy changes and flexible responses to potential 
expropriation, to sustain their distribution and production operations. 
Due to the low number of firms in our sample that own production, 
distribution, and distribution and production operations simultaneously in a foreign high 
political uncertainty context, we were not able to test the influence of our control 
variables on the previous propositions (P2a, P2b, and P2c). 
About proposition 3: 
Proposition 3.  Firms rely more on their human capital resources than on their 
organizational and physical resources in their development of adaptive political 
capabilities to sustain operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts. 
Below, Table 31 shows some of our control variables influence the results of P3.  
The variables that have some influence are: size (micro and small firms), experience (0 
to 6 years), country scope (more than 50 countries), and status of operations (closed 
operations). 
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Table 31: Influence of control variables on P3 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Regarding proposition 4: 
Proposition 4.  The higher the level of political uncertainty perceived by firms in a 
foreign context, the more they rely on the contextual knowledge of their internal and 
external human resources to develop adaptive political capabilities to sustain their 
operations.  
Below, Table 32 shows none of our control variables influence the results of P4. 
Median IR Median IR Median IR
Latin American origin 25 3.50 1.75 1.00 2.25 1.50 1.25 0.003
Non-Latin American origin5 4.00 0.75 2.00 1.00 2.50 1.50 0.022
Micro and small 6 3.25 3.13 1.00 3.75 1.75 1.13 0.442
Medium and large 24 4.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.88 0.001
0 to 6 years 11 4.00 1.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.00 0.133
7 to 13 years 19 3.50 1.00 2.50 1.50 2.00 1.50 0.002
1 to 50 countries 24 3.25 1.63 1.50 2.13 1.75 1.50 0.002
More than 50 countries 6 4.00 0.38 2.25 1.25 2.75 2.00 0.051
Sustained operations 23 4.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.50 0.001
Closed operations 7 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.430
Only exported 22 3.75 2.25 1.00 2.13 1.75 1.13 0.009
Exported and/or had 
any other type of 
operation
8 4.00 1.00 2.00 1.25 2.50 2.00 0.016
Low 11 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.005
High 19 4.00 1.00 2.50 2.50 2.00 2.00 0.024
Country scope Yes
Status of operations Yes
Level of headquarters 
control
No
Type of operations No
Country of origin No
Size Yes
Experience Yes
Influence
Physical resources
Control variables n
Human resources Organizational resources
p
**
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Table 32: Influence of control variables on P4 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
In terms of proposition 5: 
Proposition 5.  The higher the level of political uncertainty perceived by firms in a 
foreign context, the more they reconfigure their organizational structure and processes 
to sustain their operations.  
Below, Table 33 shows none of our control variables influence the results of P5. 
Median IR Median IR
Latin American origin 25 3.00 1.75 3.50 1.50 -0.069 0.745
Non-Latin American origin5 4.00 1.50 4.00 1.00 0.312 0.574
Micro and small 6 2.75 1.25 3.00 1.25 -0.455 0.365
Medium and large 24 3.00 2.00 3.50 1.38 0.124 0.562
0 to 6 years 11 2.50 1.00 3.50 1.50 -0.378 0.251
7 to 13 years 19 3.00 0.00 3.50 0.00 0.411 0.081
1 to 50 countries 24 3.00 2.00 3.50 1.40 -0.060 0.772
More than 50 countries 6 3.50 1.75 4.00 1.13 0.833 0.167
Sustained operations 23 3.00 2.00 3.50 1.00 0.060 0.784
Closed operations 7 2.50 1.00 2.50 2.00 -0.038 0.935
Only exported 22 3.00 1.63 3.50 1.63 -0.005 0.981
Exported and/or had 
any other type of 
operation
8 3.50 1.00 3.50 0.88 0.276 0.509
Low 11 3.00 2.00 3.50 1.50 -0.315 0.346
High 19 3.00 2.00 3.50 1.50 0.260 0.283
Experience No
Spearman’s 
rho
Control variables n
Level of political 
uncertainty perceived
Contextual knowledge of 
internal and external 
human resource
p
** Influence
Country of origin No
Size No
Country scope No
Status of operations No
Level of headquarters 
control
No
Type of operations No
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Table 33: Influence of control variables on P5 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
For proposition 6: 
Proposition 6.  Most host firms are obliged to invest in physical resources to develop 
flexible responses in contexts with political uncertainty, despite the level of political 
uncertainty they perceive in these contexts. 
Below, Table 34 shows none of our control variables influence the results of P6. 
Median IR Median IR
Latin American origin 25 3.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 -0.078 0.709
Non-Latin American origin5 4.00 1.50 2.50 1.50 0.625 0.260
Micro and small 6 2.75 1.25 1.75 1.13 -0.500 0.312
Medium and large 24 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.88 0.190 0.375
0 to 6 years 11 2.50 1.00 2.00 1.00 -0.050 0.884
7 to 13 years 19 3.00 0.00 2.00 1.50 0.071 0.773
1 to 50 countries 24 3.00 2.00 1.75 1.50 -0.010 0.960
More than 50 countries 6 3.50 1.75 2.75 2.00 0.889 0.111
Sustained operations 23 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.50 -0.050 0.821
Closed operations 7 2.50 1.00 1.50 1.00 0.520 0.232
Only exported 22 3.00 1.63 1,,75 1.13 -0.020 0.928
Exported and/or had 
any other type of 
operation
8 3.50 1.00 2.50 2.00 0.691 0.691
Low 11 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 -0.062 0.857
High 19 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.269 0.265
Experience No
Control variables n
Level of political 
uncertainty perceived
Reconfigurations of 
organizational structure and 
processes
Spearman’s 
rho
p
** Influence
Country of origin No
Size No
Country scope No
Status of operations No
Level of headquarters 
control
No
Type of operations No
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Table 34: Influence of control variables on P6 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
 
 
YES NO 
n n 
High 4 3
Medium 6 3
Low 7 2
High 2 0
Medium 1 0
Low 2 0
High 1 1
Medium 0 1
Low 1 2
High 5 2
Medium 7 2
Low 8 0
High 2 2
Medium 3 1
Low 2 1
High 4 1
Medium 4 2
Low 7 1
High 4 3
Medium 6 3
Low 8 2
High 2 0
Medium 2 0
Low 2 0
High 5 2
Medium 3 3
Low 9 1
High 1 1
Medium 4 0
Low 0 1
High 6 5
Medium 3 3
Low 1 4
High 1 0
Medium 2 1
Low 4 0
High 1 1
Medium 2 3
Low 3 1
High 5 2
Medium 5 0
Low 6 1
p
** Influence
Level of 
political 
uncertainty 
perceived
Firms that invested 
in physical resources
Type of operations
Only exported
Exported and/or had any 
other type of operation
0.676
-- 
***
No
No
Control variables
0.422 No
0.386 No
1 to 50 countries
More than 50 countries
Status of operations
Sustained operations
Closed operations
Latin American origin
Non-Latin American origin
Size
Micro and small
Medium and large
Experience
0 to 6 years
7 to 13 years
Country of origin
Country scope
0.687 No
0.284 No
0.757
Level of 
headquarters 
control
Low
High 0.405 No
0.208 No
0.103 No
0.572 No
No
0.638 No
0.676 No
-- 
*** No
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About proposition 7: 
Proposition 7.  Firms with lower managerial commitment to knowledge articulation and 
codification perceive they are more likely over time to lose the knowledge they have 
developed to sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts. 
Below, Table 35 shows none of our control variables influence the results of P7. 
Table 35: Influence of control variables on P7  
 
 
 Source: Elaborated by author 
 
Low High Median IR
Latin American origin 25 5 20 3.00 2.00 0.247
Non-Latin American origin 5 1 4 2.00 2.00 0.264
Micro and small 6 0 6 3.00 3.25 --
Medium and large 24 6 18 2.50 2.00 0.332
0 to 6 years 11 2 9 2.00 3.00 0.381
7 to 13 years 19 4 15 3.00 2.00 0.796
1 to 50 countries 24 5 21 3.00 2.00 0.297
More than 50 countries 6 1 3 1.50 1.00 0.317
Sustained operations 23 5 18 3.00 2.00 0.939
Closed operations 7 1 6 2.00 2.00 0.19
Only exported 22 4 18 3.00 2.00 0.592
Exported and/or had any 
other type of operation 8
2 6 2.00 2.00 0.857
Low 11 3 8 2.00 2.00 0.579
High 19 3 16 3.00 3.00 0.645
Experience No
Control variables n
Managerial commitment 
to knowledge articulation 
and codification
Perception of losing 
overtime the knowledge 
developed
p
** Influence
Country of origin No
Size No
Country scope No
Status of operations No
Level of headquarters 
control
No
Type of operations No
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8 DISCUSSION STUDY 2: SURVEY 
This chapter discusses the relation between the empirical findings of our survey 
and the generalizability of the exploratory propositions resulting from our first study.  
This chapter is divided into three sections.  In the first section, we discuss the results of 
the tests we conducted to our exploratory propositions.  In the second section, we 
discuss the influence of our control variables on our exploratory propositions.  And, in 
our last section, we present some concluding remarks about this second study. 
 
8.1 Exploring our propositions 
The results of the tests we conducted to the exploratory propositions from our 
first study provide interesting insights about their generalizability to other firms in the 
processed food industry in Colombia that have had operations between 1999 and 2011 
in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua.   
Our first proposition states: “Host firms depend more on adapting through 
flexible responses than on influencing governments through control or cooperative 
responses to sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts.”  
Prior research in the corporate political activity field has mainly focused on proactive 
corporate political activities that enable firms to produce control or cooperative 
responses which aim to influence the political environment (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Hillman et al., 2004; Shaffer, 1995).  Differently, reactive corporate political activities 
enable firms to produce flexible responses which aim to adapt firms to the political 
environment without trying to exert any influence on government affairs.  Hillman and 
Hitt (1999) argued that as researchers in the CPA field, their interest on proactive 
corporate political activity was explained by the fact that a firm that followed a reactive 
stance towards corporate political activity could be sure that other interest groups were 
proactively working to shape government policies in a direction that benefited their own 
interests - which could or not coincide with those of the firm.  Similarly, Oliver and 
Holzinger (2008) argued that firms that used corporate political strategies were more 
likely to strengthen their competitive advantage than firms that were passive or 
politically inactive.  
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Our quantitative data shows there is a statistically significant difference among 
our sample firms between their dependence on flexible responses and control or 
cooperative responses to sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty 
contexts (Mann-Whitney U= 50.5; p=0.000).  We found our sample firms depended 
more on using flexible responses than control or cooperative responses to sustain their 
operations in these contexts (Flexible responses Median = 3.5; IR = 1.5; Control or 
cooperative responses Median = 1; IR = 0.).  In other words, our sample firms 
depended more on developing reactive than proactive corporate political activities to 
sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts.   
We view this finding as perhaps one of the most important in our thesis, since it 
suggests that despite the traditional view of CPA research has focused on proactive 
corporate political activities (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004; Holburn and 
Vanden Berg, 2002; Lawton and Rajwani, 2011; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008), 
developing the reactive corporate political activities research stream can be fruitful to 
broadening our understanding of firms’ political behavior.  Evidently, at least in the 
case of foreign high political uncertainty contexts, reactive corporate political activities 
enabled host firms to produce flexible responses that were used more to strengthen their 
competitive advantage than control or cooperative responses as Oliver and Holzinger 
(2008) had suggested.  This means that despite in foreign high political uncertainty 
contexts, other interest groups can proactively work to shape government policies in a 
direction that benefits their own interests - which can or not coincide with those of hosts 
firms (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), host firms depend more on adapting to these political 
contexts than on influencing their governments to sustain their foreign operations.   
Finding evidence in our quantitative data that supports this proposition is 
extremely interesting because counter intuitively to the traditional focus of CPA 
research on its proactive stream, our data indicates that in high political uncertainty 
contexts, host firms depend more on reactive corporate political activities, that enable 
them to produce flexible responses, than on proactive corporate political activities that 
enable them to produce control or cooperative responses.  We believe that perhaps the 
focus of prior CPA research on proactive corporate political activities can be explained 
by the fact that this field has mainly developed through studies that address political 
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contexts in developed economies, while studies that address political contexts in 
emerging economies are more recent.  In developed economies, characterized by 
democratic regimes and stronger institutions, influencing governments through 
corporate political strategies can strengthen the competitive advantage of firms (Oliver 
and Holzinger, 2008).  However, our quantitative data shows that in foreign high 
political uncertainty contexts in emerging economies characterized by authoritarian 
regimes and weak institutions, host firms depend more on adapting to these political 
contexts than on influencing their governments. 
 
Our proposition 2a states: “Host firms that own a production operation in a 
foreign high political uncertainty context, depend more on developing flexible responses 
to confront potential expropriation than on developing flexible responses to confront 
policy changes, to sustain their production operation” and our proposition 2b suggests: 
“Host firms that own a distribution operation in a foreign high political uncertainty 
context, depend more on developing flexible responses to confront policy changes than 
on developing flexible responses to confront potential expropriation, to sustain their 
distribution operation.”  We could not find prior research that studied the relation 
between the types of operations of firms and their corporate political activities.  
For proposition 2a, our quantitative data indicates there is no statistically 
significant difference between the use of flexible responses to confront potential 
expropriation and flexible responses to confront policy changes among host firms with a 
production operation in a foreign high political uncertainty context (Mann-Whitney 
U=4.00; p=1.000).  Similarly, for proposition 2b, our quantitative data indicates there is 
no statistically significant difference between the use of flexible responses to confront 
policy changes and flexible responses to confront potential expropriation among host 
firms with a distribution operation in a foreign high political uncertainty context (Mann-
Whitney U=1.5; p=0.057). 
For proposition 2a, our data shows   ⁄  of host firms scored 3 for their use of 
flexible responses to confront potential expropriation and   ⁄  of host firms scored 4 for 
their use of flexible responses to confront policy changes to sustain their production 
operation.  This may suggest that despite we found there is no statistically significant 
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difference among the use of both types of responses, host firms with production 
operations might be concentrating more efforts on developing flexible responses to 
confront policy changes than to confront a potential expropriation, despite expropriation 
is a high risk for production operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts.  
For proposition 2b, our data shows   ⁄  of host firms scored 4 (Interquartile range = 
1.5) for their use of flexible responses to confront policy changes and   ⁄  of host firms 
scored 1.5 (Interquartile range = 1.75) for their use of flexible responses to confront 
potential expropriation to sustain their distribution operation.  This shows that despite 
we found there is no statistically significant difference among the use of both types of 
responses, host firms with a distribution operation in a foreign high political uncertainty 
context used more flexible responses to confront policy changes, as it was suggested by 
our proposition. 
However, we must highlight that the results of propositions 2a and 2b can be 
affected by the type II error, related to small samples (Fink, 2013).  In our sample firms, 
we found only 3 host firms had a production operation and only 4 host firms had a 
distribution operation.  This means that having such a small number of host firms within 
our sample that meet with the types of operations fitting the criteria to test these 
propositions can cause the results of our tests to suffer from this error.  In hypotheses 
testing, this error accepts the null hypothesis, although the alternative hypothesis is the 
true state of nature.  It concludes there are no differences, where there actually are.  
Therefore, we could be claiming there are no statistically significant differences 
between both types of responses among firms with a production operation or a 
distribution operation when there are.  Consequently, to further develop the discussion 
of these two exploratory propositions, we suggest that to be able to find reliable results, 
a sufficient sample including more host firms that meet their criteria should be sought. 
 
Our proposition 2c states: “Host firms that own a distribution and a production 
operation simultaneously in a foreign high political uncertainty context, depend on 
developing both, flexible responses to policy changes and flexible responses to potential 
expropriation, to sustain their distribution and production operations.”  As for 
propositions 2a and 2b, in the case of this proposition we found no prior research has 
 217 
studied the relation between the types of operations of firms and their corporate political 
activities.  Since from our sample firms only 4 had distribution and production 
operations simultaneously in a foreign high political uncertainty context and all of these 
4 host firms claimed to have used in some degree both, flexible responses to confront 
potential expropriation and flexible responses to confront policy changes, we could not 
use statistical tests to evaluate this proposition.  However, it is important to note that our 
data shows host firms with this type of operation used both types of responses in some 
degree, as our exploratory proposition suggests.  Nevertheless, as for the cases of 
exploratory propositions 2a and 2b, we suggest that to be able to find reliable results for 
this proposition, a sufficient sample including more host firms that meet its criteria 
should be sought.  Therefore, undoubtfully exploratory propositions 2a, 2b, and 2c 
provide interesting avenues for further research. 
 
Our proposition 3 states:  “Host firms rely more on their human capital 
resources than on their organizational and physical resources in their development of 
adaptive political capabilities to sustain operations in foreign high political uncertainty 
contexts.”  Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) claimed that the source of value of a firm is 
in the combination and deployment of human capital with other resources.  Barney 
(1986), Castanias and Helfat (1991), and Wernerfelt (1989) also made a distinction 
between resources by arguing that human capital resources constituted a firm’s 
resources of above normal returns, not physical resources.  Similarly, Miller and 
Shamsie (1996) found that knowledge-based resources are more valuable in uncertain 
environments. 
Our quantitative data shows there are statistically significant differences among 
the use of human capital resources, organizational resources, and physical resources by 
host firms in their development of adaptive political capabilities to sustain operations in 
foreign high political uncertainty contexts (Kruskal Wallis; p=0.000), which means that 
at least one of these resources was used more than the others by host firms.  Our data 
indicates   ⁄  of host firms scored 4 (Interquartile range = 1.13) for their use of human 
capital resources,   ⁄  of host firms scored 2 (Interquartile range = 2) for their use of 
physical resources, and   ⁄  of host firms scored 2 (Interquartile range = 1.5) for their 
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use of organizational resources in their development of adaptive political capabilities to 
sustain operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts.  This means that host 
firms relied more on human capital resources in their development of adaptive political 
capabilities to sustain operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts. 
Our findings support the idea that the source of value of a firm is in the 
combination and deployment of human capital with other resources (Bowman and 
Ambrosini, 2000).  Through study one, we found knowledge and experience were the 
foundations of adaptive political capabilities and that these resided in a firm’s human 
capital resource.  Thus, if the foundations of adaptive political capabilities reside in its 
human capital resource, we should expect human capital resources to lead the 
development of adaptive political capabilities by host firms - as our data shows.  
Moreover, Miller and Shamsie (1996) found that knowledge-based resources are more 
valuable in uncertain environments.  Our findings also support this claim since host 
firms are relying more on human capital resources in their development of adaptive 
political capabilities in foreign high political uncertainty contexts where the knowledge 
of human resources is of high value. 
 
Our proposition 4 states “The higher the level of political uncertainty perceived 
by host firms in a foreign context, the more they rely on the contextual knowledge of 
their internal and external human resources to develop adaptive political capabilities to 
sustain their operations.”  Prior research has described the knowledge of human capital 
as a resource capable of creating value for the firm (Barney, 1991).  However, the 
relationship between the level of political uncertainty perceived by firms and their use 
of internal and external human resources’ contextual knowledge has not been explored. 
Despite in the case of Latam, our data suggested that the higher the level of 
political uncertainty perceived by the host firm in the three contexts of our study, the 
more it relied on the contextual knowledge of its internal and external human resources, 
our quantitative data indicates that these two variables have no statistically significant 
relationship among our sample firms (Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, 
Venezuela= -0.730, p=0.716; Ecuador=0.142; p=0.530; Nicaragua=0.075; p=0.692).  
This means that despite the case of Latam, the level of political uncertainty perceived by 
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host firms in a foreign context is not related to the extent to which these host firms rely 
on the contextual knowledge of their internal and external human resources about that 
specific context. 
 
Our proposition 5 states: “The higher the level of political uncertainty perceived 
by host firms in a foreign context, the more they reconfigure their organizational 
structure and processes to sustain their operations.”  Miller (1986) claimed that the 
configuration of an organizational structure is linked to its strategy and environment.  
Since 1961, Burns and Stalker stated that if an organization is to achieve enhanced 
performance then its structure must “fit” or match its environment.  However, we found 
that although there is extensive research on the configurations of organizational 
structures and processes (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Karim, 2006; Mintzberg, 1979), 
scholars have not addressed the relation between the level of political uncertainty 
perceived by firms in a foreign context and their configurations of organizational 
structures and processes.  
In the case of Latam, our data showed that the higher the level of political 
uncertainty perceived by the host firm in each of the three contexts of our study, the 
more reconfigurations it made to its organizational structure and processes to sustain its 
operations.  Differently, our quantitative data indicates that the level of political 
uncertainty perceived and the reconfigurations of organizational structure and processes, 
in the case of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, have no statistically significant 
relationship among our sample firms (Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, 
Venezuela= 0.114, p=0.573; Ecuador=102; p=0.651; Nicaragua =-0.567; p=0.241).  
In other words, despite Latam increased the reconfigurations it made to its 
organizational structure and processes in relation to the level of political uncertainty it 
perceived in each of the three contexts in our study, our sample firms do not follow this 
behavior. 
 
Our proposition 6 states:  “Most host firms are obliged to invest in physical 
resources to develop flexible responses in contexts with political uncertainty, despite the 
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level of political uncertainty they perceive in these contexts.”  Prior research has 
explained that physical capital can create value for a firm (Barney, 1991).  Nevertheless, 
there is a generally accepted tenet that when firms perceive political uncertainty they 
must stop and/or divest their investments.  In the case of Latam, our data showed that 
some investments were necessary for the host firm to manage to adapt to contexts 
presenting political uncertainties, regardless of Latam’s own perception of the level of 
political uncertainty in these contexts. 
Our quantitative data shows there is no association between investments on 
physical resources and the level of political uncertainty perceived by host firms among 
our sample (Chi square, p=0.799).  We observed that host firms that perceived a high 
level of political uncertainty had invested in physical resources (YES,   ⁄ ) and that 
host firms that perceived a low level of political uncertainty had equally decided to 
invest (YES,   ⁄ ) and not to invest (NO,   ⁄ ) in physical resources.  We highlight that 
despite Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua are countries rated as having high levels of 
political uncertainty by worldwide rankings (IHS Global insight, 2012), we found that 
more than half of the firms invested in physical resources in at least one of these 
markets to materialize their flexible responses.  Our data therefore rejects the 
widespread tenet that, when firms perceive political uncertainty they must stop and/or 
divest their investments by showing that in high political uncertainty contexts most host 
firms invest to materialize their responses even regardless of their own perception of the 
level of political uncertainty in these contexts. 
 
Our proposition 7 states: “Host firms with lower managerial commitment to 
knowledge articulation and codification perceive they are more likely over time to lose 
the knowledge they have developed to sustain their operations in foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts.”  Prior research has found that for the development process of 
capabilities to start and evolve, managerial commitment has to exist and is determined 
by managers’ attitude towards investing in knowledge articulation and codification 
efforts (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; McLarney and Dastrala, 2001; Zollo and Winter, 
2002).  Knowledge articulation and codification are learning mechanisms that underpin 
capability development (Zollo and Winter, 2002).  Lacking an understanding of how 
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knowledge articulation and codification efforts support the development of capabilities 
can translate into the absence of these efforts which threatens firms with over time 
losing the knowledge they have developed.  In our first study, we found Latam had not 
invested efforts in articulating and codifying the knowledge that the individuals or 
teams had developed through the experience they had accumulated.  Latam felt it was 
highly likely that it could lose its knowledge about how to sustain its operations in 
foreign high political uncertainty contexts, especially when the following situations 
occur: people forget what they have learned and the people who possess the knowledge 
retire or leave the firm.  In other words, Latam had a low managerial commitment to 
knowledge articulation and codification which made it perceive it was more likely to 
over time lose the knowledge it had developed about how to sustain its operations in 
high political uncertainty contexts.   
Through P7 we wanted to test if other host firms in the process food industry 
with low managerial commitment to knowledge articulation and codification shared this 
perception.  To test this proposition, we reclassified our sample firms according to their 
level of managerial commitment to knowledge articulation and codification.  Host firms 
with a score between 1 and 2 for this variable were referred to as having low managerial 
commitment.  Host firms with a score above 2 and up to 5 for this variable were referred 
to as having high managerial commitment.  We found there was no statistically 
significant difference between host firms with a low and a high managerial commitment 
to knowledge articulation and codification in their perception about the possibility of 
losing over time the knowledge they have developed (Mann-Whitney U=60.0; 
p=0.520).  Although no statistically significant differences were found between host 
firms with low and high managerial commitment, the median for the perception about 
the possibility of over time losing the knowledge developed was lower for host firms 
with high managerial commitment to knowledge articulation and codification (Medians 
3.5 versus 2.0). 
Finding no statistically significant difference among host firms with low and 
high managerial commitment may suggest that despite host firms with a low managerial 
commitment had a higher median for their perception about the possibility of losing 
over time the knowledge developed, our sample firms in general are still not that aware 
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of the benefits or threats involved in investing or not in knowledge articulation and 
codification efforts.  We suggest that more than an issue of host firms having or not 
enough resources to invest in these efforts, it is the lack of a thorough understanding of 
these learning mechanisms and the role they play in the capability development process 
what explains our results. 
8.2 Influence of control variables 
We analyzed the influence of 7 control variables on our exploratory 
propositions.  As our results in section 7.3 show, only P3 was influenced by the 
following control variables: size (micro and small firms), experience (0 to 6 years), 
country scope (more than 50 countries), and status of operations (closed operations).  
However, below we discuss each of the control variables in our study. 
Country of origin of the firms.  Foreign versus domestic ownership or country of origin 
has been identified as an important antecedent of firms’ corporate political activities 
(Hillman et al., 2004; Getz, 1996).  Specifically, foreign firms have been found to 
behave differently to domestic firms in their corporate political activities (Hansen and 
Mitchell, 2000; Hansen and Mitchell, 2001).  Since our research focused exclusively on 
the study of foreign ownership or host country of origin firms which had operations in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua between 1999-2011, we decided to contrast host 
firms that had a regional ownership or country of origin, in other words a Latin 
American country of origin versus host firms that had a non-Latin American country of 
origin.   
Since Latin American firms have for long concentrated their internationalization 
efforts in other Latin American countries (Chudnovsky and Lopez, 2000), it was not 
surprising to find our sample firms had predominantly a Latin American country of 
origin (25).  However, host firms with a non-Latin American country of origin were 
also surveyed.  This composition of our sample firms allowed us to compare the 
behavior of host Latin American country of origin and host non-Latin American country 
of origin firms.  We found there were no statistically significant differences throughout 
our exploratory propositions between these two groups of host firms.  This means that 
despite many Latin American country of origin firms may for long have been used to 
operating in the high political uncertainty contexts of some Latin American countries 
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(IHS Global Insight, 2012), our results suggest their origin does not make them behave 
differently in regards to our exploratory propositions from host non-Latin American 
country of origin firms. 
Size.  A firm variable often connected to corporate political activities is size (Boddewyn 
and Brewer, 1994; Keim and Baysinger, 1988; Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer, 2002).  
Firms’ size has been considered a proxy for resources that provides some indication 
about firms’ ability to become politically engaged (Hillman et al., 2004; Schuler and 
Rehbein, 1997;).  Boddewyn and Brewer (1994), Keim and Baysinger (1988), and 
Masters and Keim (1985) all argue that larger firms are more politically active.  
However, Cook and Fox (2000) show somewhat surprisingly that small firms were the 
most politically active in their study.  According to the Colombian law 905 of 2004, the 
majority of host firms in our sample were classified as medium or large (24), while the 
rest were classified as small or micro (6).  Finding medium or large and small or micro 
host firms in our sample, allowed us to explore if there were significant differences 
throughout our exploratory propositions between host firms according to their size.  
Our results show the only exploratory proposition that is influenced by size 
(micro and small) is P3.  Despite micro and small host firms’ median for the use of 
human capital resources is higher than the other two medians for the use of physical and 
organizational resources; this was not a statistically significant difference.  This implies 
that in micro and small host firms, their amount of resources explain that they do not 
significantly rely more on human capital resources than on physical and organizational 
resources in their development of adaptive political capabilities. 
Experience in foreign high political uncertainty contexts.  Firms’ experience has also 
been linked to the success and choice of corporate political activities (Hillman, 2003; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004).  Years of experience signal the 
commitment of firms’ to their host country operations (Luo, 2001).  Regarding the 
number of years of experience that our sample firms had in the three contexts of our 
study between 1999-2011, we categorized our sample firms into two groups: those 
having less than 7 years of experience (as low experience) and those having 7 or more 
years of experience (as high experience).  We found that 19 of our sample firms were 
classified as having high experience in foreign high political uncertainty contexts.  
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Having a majority of host firms classified as highly experienced, evidenced that many 
of our sample firms had managed to sustain for a significant period of time their 
operations in these countries.  This provided us with the opportunity of exploring if the 
level of experience of host firms in foreign high political uncertainty contexts had any 
influence throughout our exploratory propositions.  
Our results show the only exploratory proposition that is influenced by 
experience (0 to 6 years) is P3.  For low experience host firms, the median for their use 
of human capital resources was higher than the other two medians for their use of 
physical and organizational resources; nevertheless this was not a statistically 
significant difference.  This means that for host firms with low experience, their level of 
experience explains that they do not rely significantly more on their human capital 
resources than on their physical and organizational resources in their development of 
adaptive political capabilities.   
Country scope.  Previous research has found that the more internationally diversified a 
firm is, the more it is dependent on multiple sources of sovereignty (Sundaram and 
Black, 1992), and the more likely it is to engage in political strategies (Hillman, 2003).  
Tallman and Li (1996) defined and measured country scope as the number of foreign 
countries where a firm operates.  We classified our sample firms into two groups: those 
having presence from 1 up to 50 countries (as low country scope) and those having 
presence in more than 50 countries (as high country scope).  We found 24 of our sample 
firms operated in less than 50 countries, having a low country scope.  We expected to 
find most firms in our sample had a low country scope since the majority had a Latin 
American origin and Latin American firms are still in the process of broadening the 
scope of their internationalizing efforts.  However, other host firms in our sample 
presented a high country scope which allowed us to analyze the influence of the country 
scope of our sample firms on our exploratory propositions. 
Our results show the only exploratory proposition that is influenced by country 
scope (more than 50 countries) is P3.  Despite host firms with a high country scope had 
a median for their use of human capital resources that was higher than the other two 
medians for their use of physical and organizational resources; this was not a 
statistically significant difference.  This implies that for firms with a high country scope, 
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the high number of countries in which they operate explains that they do not 
significantly rely more on human capital resources than on physical and organizational 
resources in their development of adaptive political capabilities. 
Status of operations in high political uncertainty contexts.  Several prior studies have 
focused on the relation between corporate political activities and firms’ performance 
(Banker, Das, and Ou, 1997; Bowman, Navissi, and Burgess, 2000; Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Marsh, 1998; Shaffer, Quasney, and Grimm., 2000).  
These studies have measured firms’ performance as market value or returns.  
Differently, in our study we were interested in comparing the performance of host firms 
in foreign high political uncertainty contexts not by their market value or returns but by 
the status of their operations.  This means, we were interested in contrasting the 
behavior of host firms that managed to sustain their operations in these contexts versus 
host firms that closed their operations in these contexts between 1999 and 2011.  We 
found that among our sample firms, 23 had sustained their operations in at least one of 
the three countries until 2011, while the remaining 7 had closed operations in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua.  It was interesting to find that a majority of host 
firms had sustained their operations.  This meant these host firms had been successful to 
some extent in these foreign high political uncertainty contexts.  Consequently, it was 
important to explore if there was any significant difference throughout our exploratory 
propositions among the host firms that sustained their operations versus the host firms 
that closed their operations. 
Our results show the only exploratory proposition that is influenced by the status 
of operations (closed operations) is P3.  For host firms that closed their operations, the 
median for their use of human capital resources was higher than the other two medians 
for their use of physical and organizational resources; nevertheless this was not a 
statistically significant difference.  This means that for host firms that closed their 
operations, the status of their operations explains that they do not rely significantly 
more on their human capital resources than on their physical and organizational 
resources in their development of adaptive political capabilities.   
Type of operations in high political uncertainty contexts.  We found no prior research 
had studied the relation between the type of operations of firms and their corporate 
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political activities.  Our research wanted to explore if the type of operations of host 
firms in foreign high political uncertainty contexts had any relation with their corporate 
political activities.  When we analyzed the type of operations of our sample firms, we 
observed 27 had exports, 4 had distribution operations, 4 had distribution and 
production operations simultaneously in one country, and 3 had production operations.  
Furthermore, we observed 22 of host firms only exported to at least one of the three 
markets.  Regarding the remaining 8, 5 host firms exported and had at least one other 
type of operation, while only 3 host firms did not export but had at least one other type 
of operation (distribution, production or distribution and production operations 
simultaneously in one country).  These numbers reflect that in foreign high political 
uncertainty markets, more host firms had operations that required fewer investments on 
assets while fewer host firms had operations that demanded higher investments.  
Perhaps this can be explained by the high uncertainty that characterizes these markets 
which makes a potential expropriation a highly possible risk for host firms (especially 
those having production operations).  Consequently, it is possible that host firms prefer 
to operate in these markets through exports or distribution operations which regularly 
involve fewer investments on assets.  However, the composition of the type of 
operations of our sample firms allowed us to explore if there was any significant 
difference throughout our exploratory propositions among the behaviour of host firms 
that had only exported and those that had exported and/or had any other type of 
operation that involved higher investments on assets.   
Our data indicated there were no statistically significant differences among these 
two groups of host firms throughout our exploratory propositions.  This means, that host 
firms that selected market entry modes which involved no or low commitments on 
foreign assets (such as exporting) behaved similarly to host firms that selected market 
entry modes which involved higher commitments on foreign assets (such as production 
or distribution). 
Level of headquarters control.  We found previous research had not addressed the 
relation between the level of headquarters control and firms’ corporate political 
activities.  Our research was interested in exploring this relation.  To do so, we 
categorized host firms into two groups: those having a low level of headquarters control 
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(between 1 and 3) and those having a high level of headquarters control (between 3.1 
and 5).  We found 19 of our sample firms had a high level of headquarters control.  This 
meant that the majority of host firms in our sample worked closely with their corporate 
office or their counterparts to decide upon their operations in these three countries.  
However, the composition of our sample firms allowed us to investigate if firms’ level 
of headquarters control had any influence on our exploratory propositions.  Our data 
showed there were no statistically significant differences throughout our exploratory 
propositions among host firms with a high and a low level of headquarters control. 
8.3 Concluding remarks 
Upon the results of this second study, we make some concluding remarks that 
intend to contribute to the discussion of the framework that was suggested as one of the 
results from our first study.  To recall our framework to guide host firms in their 
development of adaptive political capabilities to confront foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts in emerging markets characterized by authoritarian regimes and 
weak institutions, we present it below in Figure 30. 
 228 
Figure 30: Framework to guide firms in their development of adaptive political capabilities to 
confront foreign high political uncertainty contexts  
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
This framework was developed as a result of our first study, based on our 
suggestion that adapting to political uncertainties rather than influencing host or country 
of origin governments can be more important for host firms to sustain their operations 
in foreign high political uncertainty contexts and that this can be achieved through their 
development of adaptive political capabilities.  In our second study, our data showed 
that other host processed food firms which had operations between 1999 and 2011 in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua, similarly to Latam, had depended more on adapting 
through flexible responses than on influencing governments through control or 
cooperative responses to sustain their operations in these foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts (P1).  Both of these findings, allow us to conclude that our 
suggestion of a framework to guide host firms in their development of adaptive political 
capabilities is a useful contribution, since not only Latam but other host processed food 
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firms, have worked more on adapting than on influencing governments in their foreign 
high political uncertainty contexts.  Therefore, probably many other host firms are 
adopting or searching for ways to adopt this political behaviour, making our framework 
a walking stick (Hafsi and Howard, 2005) from which they might benefit by broadening 
their understanding of how to initiate and manage their adaption to foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts. 
Through our first study we suggest that to start and evolve the development of 
adaptive political capabilities, managerial commitment is required to organize teams to 
search for alternatives and to enable the existence of a knowledge management function.  
This knowledge management function must support the interaction of the three learning 
mechanisms of: experience accumulation, knowledge articulation, and knowledge 
codification, to guarantee that host firms do not over time lose the knowledge they 
develop about how to sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty 
contexts.  In our first study, we found Latam had not invested efforts in developing the 
learning mechanisms of knowledge articulation and codification, despite the host firm 
had a knowledge management function.  Latam felt it was highly likely that it could 
lose its knowledge about how to sustain its operations in foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts.  In other words, Latam had a low managerial commitment towards 
knowledge articulation and codification that made it perceive it was more likely to over 
time lose the knowledge it had developed about how to sustain its operations in foreign 
high political uncertainty contexts.  Although this was the case for Latam, through our 
second study, we found that there was no statistically significant difference among other 
host processed food firms with low and high managerial commitment in their perception 
about the possibility of over time losing the knowledge they had developed about how 
to sustain their operations in foreign high political uncertainty contexts (P7).  We 
believe this finding can be explained by the notion that firms in general are still not that 
aware of the benefits or threats involved in investing or not in knowledge articulation 
and codification efforts.  Furthermore, we suggest that more than an issue of firms 
having or not enough resources to invest in these efforts, it is the lack of a thorough 
understanding of these learning mechanisms and the role they play in the capability 
development process what explains these findings.  Our first study suggested that the 
learning mechanism of experience accumulation by its own will not be enough to 
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guarantee host firms’ fruitful over time development of their adaptive political 
capabilities.  The three learning mechanisms must be present to ensure that host firms 
are able to codify and capture the knowledge they acquire, and further on exploit it, 
when confronting new political challenges.  Only through the existence of the three 
learning mechanisms, we believe host firms will be able to over time manage and 
benefit from their own development of adaptive political capabilities. 
Our first study also allowed us to claim that experience and knowledge are the 
foundations of adaptive political capabilities.  These reside in host firms’ human capital 
resources and in the knowledge host firms should codify over time through their 
knowledge management function.  We argue that through adaptive political capabilities 
(experience and knowledge), host firms can use, reconfigure, and acquire 
organizational, human, and physical resources to develop flexible responses through 
corporate adaptive political strategies to confront their foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts.  (For a detailed account of the corporate adaptive political 
strategies and the flexible responses -listed as tactics towards policy changes and tactics 
towards potential expropriation- which can be used by host firms, please refer to Table 
25). 
In our first study, we suggest that human capital resources might have a 
protagonist role in host firms’ development of adaptive political capabilities since these 
resources encapsulate their foundations (experience and knowledge).  This means host 
firms might rely more on their human capital resources than on their organizational and 
physical resources; hence, human capital resources are the resources that determine the 
use, reconfiguration, and acquisition of organizational and physical resources in the 
development process of adaptive political capabilities.  Through our second study, we 
found that not only Latam, but most of the other host processed food firms, relied more 
on their human capital resources than on their organizational and physical resources in 
their development of adaptive political capabilities to sustain operations in foreign high 
political uncertainty contexts (P3).  We found that only for some host processed food 
firms this was not the case.  These host firms were characterized by a micro or small 
size, 0 to 6 years of experience in high political uncertainty contexts, a high country 
scope that signifies operations in more than 50 countries, or by having closed any of 
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their operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011.  These 
variables explained that they did not statistically significantly relied more on human 
capital resources than on physical and organizational resources in their development of 
adaptive political capabilities.  However, the medians for the use of human resources 
were higher for these host firms too.  Nevertheless, this suggests that host firms’ size, 
experience in high political uncertainty contexts, country scope, and status of their 
operations, shaped the degree in which they relied on each of the three resources in their 
development of adaptive political capabilities. 
Our first study suggests there could be a relation between the level of political 
uncertainty perceived by host firms and their use of human and organizational 
resources.  Upon Latam’s case, we predicted that the higher the level of political 
uncertainty perceived by host firms in their foreign high political uncertainty contexts, 
the more they used the contextual knowledge of their internal and external human 
resources about that specific market (P4) and the more reconfigurations they made to 
their organizational structure and processes (P5) in their development of adaptive 
political capabilities to sustain their host operations.  However, our second study shows 
that despite Latam’s case, there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
level of political uncertainty perceived by other host firms and their use of the 
contextual knowledge of their internal and external human resources about a specific 
market and the reconfigurations these host firms make to their organizational structures 
and processes.  These are interesting findings since they allow us to conclude that most 
other host firms use the contextual knowledge of their internal and external human 
resources and reconfigure their organizational structure and processes to sustain their 
operations in disregards to their perception of the level of political uncertainty in foreign 
high political uncertainty contexts. 
In the case of physical resources, there is a widespread tenet that when host 
firms perceive political uncertainty they must stop and/or divest their investments.  
Contrarily, in our first study we suggest that in high political uncertainty contexts most 
host firms might find they must invest to materialize their responses, even regardless of 
their own perception of the level of political uncertainty in these contexts (P6).  In the 
case of Latam, this host firm invested in all of the three markets in our study, despite the 
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level of political uncertainty it perceived in each market.  Accordingly, our second study 
quantitative data rejects the widespread tenet about stopping or divesting investments by 
showing that, as in the case of Latam, in high political uncertainty contexts most other 
host firms were obliged to invest to materialize their responses even regardless of their 
own perception of the level of political uncertainty in these contexts. 
Our first study also suggests that host firms’ corporate adaptive political 
strategies will allow them to develop both, flexible responses towards policy changes 
and flexible responses towards potential expropriation.  We suggested that the types of 
flexible responses host firms develop might be related to the type of operations they 
have in these foreign high political uncertainty contexts, as in the case of Latam.  
Meaning that, host firms that own a production operation will depend more on 
developing flexible responses towards a potential expropriation (P2a).  Host firms that 
own a distribution operation will depend more on developing flexible responses towards 
policy changes (P2b).  And, host firms that own a production and a distribution 
operation simultaneously in a foreign high political uncertainty context, will depend on 
developing in some degree both types of flexible responses to sustain their operations 
(P2c).  Through our quantitative study, we found there is no statistically significant 
difference between the use of both types of responses by other host firms that have a 
production or a distribution operation in a foreign high political uncertainty context 
(P2a, P2b).  Nevertheless, our quantitative data suggested that the results we obtained 
for propositions 2a and 2b could suffer the type II error related to small samples.  
Therefore, we suggest that to further develop the discussion of these two exploratory 
propositions, to be able to find reliable results a sufficient sample including more host 
firms that meet their criteria should be sought.  For proposition 2c, we could not use 
statistical tests.  However, our data shows other host firms with this type of operation 
used both types of responses in some degree, as our exploratory proposition suggests.  
Nevertheless, as for the cases of propositions 2a and 2b, we suggest that to be able to 
find reliable results for this exploratory proposition, again a sufficient sample including 
more host firms that meet its criteria should be sought.  Therefore, undoubtedly 
exploratory propositions 2a, 2b, and 2c provide interesting avenues to be explored by 
further research. 
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Finally, we suggest that for host firms to be able to over time continue the 
development of their adaptive political capabilities, the outcomes of both types of their 
flexible responses must be incorporated as codified feedback into their knowledge 
management function.  For these outcomes to become codified feedback they must be 
captured by host firms as codified knowledge that will assure the evolution over time of 
adaptive political capabilities through the exploration (development) and exploitation 
(use) of knowledge.   
Lastly, as managerial commitment is firstly required to start the development 
process of adaptive political capabilities, it is also required to allow over time the 
continuous development and evolution of adaptive political capabilities.  As our 
framework illustrates, managerial commitment supports both the start and evolution of 
these capabilities by enabling the existence of a knowledge management function and 
the interaction of the three learning mechanisms. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explains the positioning of our research and its results, its 
contributions to knowledge, and their implications for practice.  We also explicate the 
generalizability of our results and the limitations of our research.  We conclude by 
highlighting future research avenues. 
 
Firms have traditionally addressed their strategies towards the market 
environment, but for many firms the non-market environment has increasingly gained 
importance.  This is specially the case for firms with markets that are highly impacted 
by their governments (Baron, 1995).  Therefore, despite firms spend considerable effort 
in crafting appropriate market strategies; they should treat non-market strategy in the 
same way (Viney and Baines, 2012).  In support of this line of thought, this thesis was 
positioned to address the non-market environment and strategy. 
9.1 Contributions to knowledge 
The contributions to knowledge of this thesis are therefore set within the 
strategic management field, specifically dynamic capabilities research emerging from 
the resource based-view theory, and the corporate political activity field.  The first of 
our contributions is the conceptualization of adaptive political capabilities as a set of 
capabilities that can allow firms to adapt to high political uncertainty contexts in host 
markets.  Political capabilities have been amply discussed as capabilities that enable 
firms to influence their political environment (Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Lawton and 
Rajwani, 2011).  However, adapting to political environments is a response many host 
firms are also adopting.  Therefore, our central contribution lies in the conceptualization 
of a set of capabilities that enable firms to adapt to their political context.  This 
contribution responds to the call for “research into firm resources and capabilities that 
aid political activities” (Hillman et al., 2004: 851).  However, its uniqueness lies in that 
it focuses on a set of capabilities that aid activities that enable firms’ adaption instead of 
influence towards their political environment.  Specifically, adaptive political 
capabilities are particularly pertinent for host firms to address emerging economies’ 
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political contexts characterized by high uncertainty and where there are authoritarian 
regimes and weak institutions. 
Our second contribution was achieved through Latam’s case study.  Its empirical 
findings allowed us to contribute to reactive corporate political activity research within 
the corporate political activity field, by suggesting a taxonomy of corporate adaptive 
political strategies.  This taxonomy explains what strategies firms can use to adapt to 
political contexts.  Our taxonomy complements Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) taxonomy of 
corporate political strategies which relates to proactive corporate political activity 
research within the corporate political activity field.  Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) 
taxonomy presents the corporate political strategies firms can use to influence political 
contexts.  We argue that, through both of these taxonomies, firms and researchers can 
access a broader perspective in the corporate political activity field of the different 
strategies (influential and adaptive) firms can use to manage their political environment.  
We claim our suggestion of a taxonomy of corporate adaptive political strategies 
extends the corporate political activity field since at the time of this research, although 
Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) had presented strategies such as compliance, avoidance, 
and circumvention, this field had not yet developed a robust taxonomy of strategies that 
enable firms to adapt to their political contexts.  Furthermore, we see methodological 
value in our contribution of a taxonomy of corporate adaptive political strategies since 
Hillman and Hitt’s taxonomy of corporate political strategies was theoretically 
developed while our taxonomy was inductively developed from empirical research. 
Our third contribution to knowledge is broadening our understanding of how 
adaptive political capabilities are developed by suggesting and testing several 
propositions that support a framework to guide their development by host firms.  
Although there is interesting research on the development processes of capabilities 
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Lawton and Rajwani, 2011), our findings provide insights on 
how the specific set of adaptive political capabilities are developed to enable host firms’ 
adaption to political environments.  Hence, our contribution extends research on 
capability development within dynamic capabilities.  Moreover, it provides the 
corporate political activity field with knowledge about how a set of capabilities that 
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enable host firms’ adaption to political contexts can be developed by host firms that 
decide upon adapting to their political context. 
Additionally to these three theoretical contributions to knowledge, we highlight 
two contextual contributions from this thesis which are related to its research setting.  
First, our research was conducted in emerging economies found in Latin America.  This 
setting addresses Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani’s (2013) claim that “an up-and-
coming challenge for corporate political activity scholars is to understand non-market 
activity in emerging economies” (p. 14).  From 1963–2009, only 206 articles in 17 
academic management journals were found to discuss Latin America (Nicholls-Nixon et 
al., 2011).  Therefore, we argue our research contributes to our understanding of Latin 
America as an emergent region, and furthermore, to strategic management and 
corporate political activity in this setting.  Second, our research was more specifically 
set in the processed food industry.  This industry has not yet been addressed in 
capabilities research.  Hence, our research expands the types of industries where 
capabilities studies have been conducted. 
Finally, the design of this thesis enables us to claim a modest methodological 
contribution.  Cameron and Molina-Azorin (2009) found that only 15% of all empirical 
articles published in the Strategic Management Journal (SMJ) from 1997-2006 were 
based on a mixed methods approach.  This thesis followed a mixed methods qualitative 
to quantitative developmental sequence design by building a taxonomy and several 
exploratory propositions from a case study and subsequently testing the generalizability 
of these exploratory propositions through a survey.  Despite some empirical articles 
published in SMJ follow a mixed methods qualitative to quantitative developmental 
sequence design, only a few (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002; McEvily and Marcus, 2005; 
Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998) involve capabilities research. 
9.2 Implications for practice 
We must clarify that all of the above contributions to knowledge resulting from 
this thesis, do not suggest that host firms should exclusively use adaptive political 
capabilities to address political contexts in emerging economies with authoritarian 
regimes and weak institutions.  Whether host firms decide to influence or adapt to 
governments is a managerial decision that we leave to the host firm.  Our principal 
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contributions are that we conceptualize adaptive political capabilities, make explicit a 
taxonomy of corporate adaptive political strategies, and suggest and test a set of 
exploratory propositions that support a framework to guide the development of adaptive 
political capabilities by host firms.  These contributions intend to enable host firms to 
envision how, if appropriate, they can adapt to political contexts, in case they decide 
that adapting is an adequate strategic approach.  Thus, our research has important 
implications for managerial practice. 
Emerging economies are either already existing or becoming potential markets 
for many transnational firms or groups.  The findings of this thesis allow managers to 
become aware of and reflect upon a set of capabilities that their firms can develop to 
allow them to start and sustain operations in emerging economies that pursue 
authoritarian regimes and have weak institutions.  In this sense, our conceptualization of 
adaptive political capabilities provides managers with a different set of capabilities from 
political capabilities, which have for long been discussed as the capabilities firms 
should use to address their political contexts.  Having knowledge about and access to 
understanding adaptive political capabilities can drive and facilitate firms’ 
internationalization processes in emerging economies with such characteristics.  We 
want to note, that throughout our inquiry several managers who approached us with the 
purpose of getting to know our research, manifested they were really interested in 
having access to its results since some of their firms’ markets were in emerging 
economies with authoritarian regimes and weak institutions.  They explained that they 
perceived value in learning how their firms could perhaps better approach the political 
contexts of these markets through adaption. 
Besides the concept of adaptive political capabilities, this thesis also offers 
managers through its taxonomy of corporate adaptive political strategies and the 
exploratory propositions that support a framework to guide the development of adaptive 
political capabilities by host firms, what Hafsi and Howard (2005) referred to as 
“walking sticks”.  In their view, “walking sticks” are the results of strategy research that 
can provide guidance to managers and their firms.  Specifically, our taxonomy of 
corporate adaptive political strategies provides managers with an explicit description of 
the strategies their firms can use to adapt to political contexts.  Through the use of this 
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“walking stick” firms can enhance their strategic repertoire with an alternative to 
traditional corporate political strategies which aim to influence governments.  Having 
knowledge about corporate adaptive political strategies can help host firms enable their 
adaption to political contexts.  A second “walking stick” that our research offers are the 
exploratory propositions that support a framework to guide the development of adaptive 
political capabilities by host firms.  Through the discussion of these exploratory 
propositions and framework, host firms can find some guidance on how they can design 
and approach their own development process of adaptive political capabilities. 
Our research findings can be therefore interesting not only to researchers in the 
strategic management and corporate political activity fields but to managers and firms 
internationalizing into emerging economies with authoritarian regimes and weak 
institutions.  Moreover, within firms we believe not only managers, CEOs, management 
teams, and board members can find value in our results.  Also international directors, 
knowledge management directors, teams in host countries, and consulting firms can 
visualize how they play a critical role in supporting the adaption of firms to their host 
political contexts. 
Furthermore, this thesis informs governments and policymakers about the 
different capabilities and strategies host firms are using or can use in their intent to start 
and sustain operations in political contexts in emerging economies with authoritarian 
regimes and weak institutions.  In other words, our findings show that host firms’ 
responses to political contexts are challenging the traditional view that firms have the 
only option of influencing governments in their interactions with political environments. 
9.3 Generalizability of results 
Regarding the generalizability of our results, we must annotate that the findings 
of our first study aimed only at explaining “how” and “why” a host firm developed 
adaptive political capabilities.  Differently, the results of our second quantitative follow-
up study aimed at testing the generalizability of the exploratory propositions that 
resulted from our first study.  Therefore, only the results of our second study are 
generalizable.  They are generalizable to the population of firms in the processed food 
industry in Colombia that have had operations between 1999 and 2011 in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua. 
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9.4 Limitations 
To explain the limitations of our research, we adopt two different perspectives of 
the meaning of “limitations”.  Our first perspective, views limitations as the limits set to 
our findings as a result of our research design choices.  A second perspective, views 
limitations as the limits, restrictions or difficulties we encountered throughout our 
research journey which unintentionally shaped our research.  To address our first 
perspective of limitations, we start by briefly describing the choices we made in our 
research design and the limitations which inevitably emerged in our research from such 
choices.  Lastly, to address our second perspective of limitations, we specifically 
discuss two limitations we encountered during our inquiry which are related to our 
research topic and process. 
Our research design choices were significantly determined by the state of 
knowledge and research regarding our phenomena of interest at the time we decided to 
initiate our inquiry.  As we highlighted in the introduction of this thesis, strategic 
management and corporate political activities research have focused on the study of 
political capabilities that firms use to influence their political contexts.  Indeed, little 
research has directed towards the study of other capabilities that can enable firms with 
different strategic responses towards their political contexts.  Consequently, to better 
understand the unexplored phenomenon of adaptive political capabilities, we decided to 
initiate our research by using the case study method as suggested by Barley (1990), 
Boucharad (1976), and Eisenhardt (1989).  Subsequently, to test the generalizability of 
several exploratory propositions that emerged from our case study, we administered a 
survey to other host firms. 
To start our research, we decided to concentrate in the in-depth study of the case 
of a single firm in a single industry for various reasons.  We determined our research 
would gain more insights from the in-depth study of the case of a single firm than from 
a less profound study of several cases, because due to limited resources, several cases 
would not have been conducted in the same depth as a single case.  Our purpose of 
delving into one case responded to the little available research that explained how firms 
adapted to their host political contexts.  We sensed we had the need to submerge in the 
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case of a single firm to really uncover its adaption to high uncertainty host political 
contexts.   
The single firm we selected as our case belonged to the processed food industry 
since we found this industry was upon the most affected by the political contexts of the 
three countries in our study.  As we decided to subsequently conduct a second study that 
involved the administration of a survey to test the generalizability of the exploratory 
propositions that emerged from our case study, we determined that the firms we would 
target to respond our survey had to originate from the processed food industry as our 
case study firm.  Since we wanted to test the generalizability of our exploratory 
propositions, conducting the survey within firms from the same industry limited our 
findings to that specific industry but also allowed us to deeply understand the behavior 
of firms towards their host political contexts within that industry through the exclusion 
of industry effects.   
Despite the above reasons underlying the choices involved in our research 
design, we realize all research designs inevitably entail several limitations.  Evidently, 
through the selection of our own research design, our findings were constrained to a 
specific industry: the processed food industry.  Furthermore, our findings were also 
contextualized in a specific setting, that of emerging economies with authoritarian 
regimes and weak institutions in Latin America.  This raises the question of whether 
host firms in other industries or contextual settings can show evidence of the 
development of adaptive political capabilities.  Furthermore, if adaptive political 
capabilities are mostly developed by host firms in less developed economies or if they 
are also utilized by host firms when interacting with governments in developed 
economies.   
It is also important to note, that besides the limitations that rose from our 
research design choices, we found other limitations rose from our research topic and 
process.  Broadly speaking, we found our research topic by its own implied a limitation.  
We encountered it was difficult to gain access to and the credibility of firms to engage 
in research about their corporate political activities.  In fact, many firms revealed that 
they had accepted to participate in our research only after knowing we were sponsored 
by EAFIT University (a high credibility University in the region).  This means that to 
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conduct research about adaptive political capabilities, paradoxically, we had to develop 
and use lobbying capabilities to gain firms’ trust and participation. 
Similarly, another limitation in our research emerged during our research 
process from the high risks we ran as researchers in the CPA field of being persecuted 
in the three countries of our study.  We were not allowed by our research sponsors to 
travel to these countries or to even contact host processed food firms in these countries 
through phone calls.  This made our second study quite difficult by limiting our ways of 
accessing firms to respond to our survey.  Having such a restriction and limited 
resources, we decided to search for firms in the processed food industry in Colombia 
which had operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011.  Our 
population of firms meeting this criteria was a small population composed of 41 firms.  
Despite the response rate to our survey was very high (73%), it would have been ideal 
to be able to access a larger population of firms. 
Nonetheless, despite these limitations, we believe the contributions of our 
research add value to future theoretical and empirical studies that will now have the 
opportunity of acknowledging adaptive political capabilities, a framework that guides 
their development by host firms, and a taxonomy of corporate adaptive political 
strategies.   
9.5 Future research 
Our results definitely set the scene for further research to continue exploring 
firms’ adaption to host political contexts at the crossroads between strategic 
management and corporate political activity.  Our results have responded to “how” and 
“why” research questions which we find can lead initial inquiries of a broader research 
agenda that we suggest to include the further exploration of “when” and “what” 
research questions regarding the underexplored phenomena of adaptive political 
capabilities. 
To start unbundling this research agenda, let’s address the context where this 
thesis was set.  Our inquiry focused in the emergent region of Latin America, 
specifically in countries within this region that have authoritarian regimes and weak 
institutions.  To expand our inquiry we see value in that further research addresses for 
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example, what are the similarities or differences to our findings in the development of 
adaptive political capabilities by host firms in other emergent regions of the world?  
This research avenue raises another related potential research question: when are 
adaptive political capabilities mostly developed by host firms?  When only operating in 
less developed economies or are they also utilized by host firms when interacting with 
governments in developed economies?  In other words, how does the level of economic 
and institutional development of a country influence the type of capabilities developed 
by host firms to address their political context?  
Following a similar line of thought, we suggest there is scope for future research 
to also investigate the development process of adaptive political capabilities by host 
firms in different industries since our research focused exclusively on the processed 
food industry.  This approach can provide further insights on whether the development 
process of this set of capabilities has significant differences or similarities between 
various industries.  For example, what differences or similarities exist in the 
development of adaptive political capabilities between host firms in the automotive 
industry, the oil industry, the construction industry, and processed food industry?  And 
more interestingly we should investigate: what differences or similarities exist in the 
development of adaptive political capabilities between host firms in highly politicized 
and low politicized industries? 
Another line of inquiry that we propose to be part of this broader research 
agenda can address country of origin effects on institutional diversity.  Our research 
involved host processed food firms having diverse countries of origin which entailed 
institutional diversity.  The majority came from Latin America (25), originating 24 from 
Colombia, 1 from Mexico, 3 from the United States, 1 from Italy, and 1 from 
Switzerland.  We have observed that the level of compatibility or disagreement between 
the governments of a firm’s country of origin and its host market affects the orientation 
and intensity of its corporate political activities.  Hence, it can be fruitful to explore if 
host firms from a country of origin that shares the values that guide the political regime 
in its host market develop the same capabilities to manage this host political context as 
host firms having a country of origin whose government is not in line with its host 
market’s political regime.  For example, what capabilities do processed food firms from 
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Argentina develop or use to address Venezuela’s political environment?, Do they use 
adaptive political capabilities at all or do they develop political capabilities?, With what 
intensity?, Are these capabilities similar to those developed or used by processed food 
firms from Colombia to address Venezuela’s political environment?  Further expanding 
this intriguing research avenue, it can also be interesting to explore if the development 
of capabilities to address a political context is significantly different between host firms 
and local firms in a single country.  For example, what capabilities do Venezuelan firms 
develop to address their local political environment?  Are these capabilities different to 
those that host firms in Venezuela develop to manage Venezuela’s political context? 
Overall, these are just a few of the diverse research avenues that can be pursued 
on behalf of the findings of this thesis.  These research avenues offer creative 
opportunities to extend our knowledge about the non-market environment and strategy.  
The toughest challenge we predict we will confront as scholars at the crossroads 
between strategic management and corporate political activity, will be gaining access to 
and the trust of firms to participate in research discussing their corporate political 
activities.  On the other hand, we believe that our determination in creating valuable 
research and knowledge for these fields and managerial practice can potentially assist 
our future research efforts by outreaching this challenge. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY 
 
 
According to Tranfield et al. (2003), the aim of a systematic literature review is 
to provide insights through theoretical synthesis into fields and sub-fields.  For 
academics, this reviewing process increases methodological rigour.  For practitioners, a 
systematic literature review develops a reliable knowledge base by accumulating 
knowledge from a range of studies. 
The objective of the systematic literature review that was conducted to build the 
theoretical positioning chapter of this thesis was to provide a deeper understanding of 
our phenomena of interest to help us build and position our research question(s).  To 
obtain this output, this systematic review focused on reviewing the literature of four 
related domains:  internationalization, uncertainty, the resource-based view (RBV) - 
dynamic capabilities, and corporate political activity (CPA).  By this means, this review 
increases the methodological rigour of our overall research programme through the 
development of a critical and reliable knowledge base that further informed subsequent 
studies.  To do so, this review followed the systematic review process in Figure 1, 
described by Tranfield et al. (2003).  
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Figure 1: Systematic Review Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following this systematic review process, the process architecture presented in 
Figure 2 was extracted from David Denyer’s 2009 class and was further complemented 
with numbered blue boxes that orderly summarize a description of the specific steps that 
this systematic review followed.   
 
Figure 2: Systematic Review Process Architecture 
 Stage 1: Planning the Review
Step 1 - Forming a review panel
Step 2 - Mapping your field of study
Stage 2: Identifying and evaluating studies
Step 4  - Conducting a systematic search
Step 5 - Evaluating studies
Step 6 - Conducting data extraction 
Step 7 - Conducting data synthesis
Stage 4 - Reporting
Step 8 - Reporting the findings 
Step 9 - Informing research
Step 3 - Producing a review protocol
Stage 3: Extracting and synthesising data
Stage 5 - Utilising the findings 
Step 10 - Informing practice
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Review plan
2. Form Panel
3. Map field
1. Research 
Issue
2. Panel:  Cranfield
academics, 
information specialists 
and practitioner
3. Literature 
Domains: 
Internationalization, 
uncertainty, the 
RBV-DC, and CPA
Review Questions:
- What types of uncertainty do 
internationalizing organizations confront?
- What are the components of adaptive 
political capabilities?
- How do adaptive political  capabilities 
develop in organizations(in the specific 
situation where organizations are 
internationalizing into high uncertainty 
environments)?
4. Comprehensive 
search
5. Title and      
abstract screening
10. Utilisation
7. Evaluation
6. Explicit 
selection criteria
8. Extraction & 
Synthesis9. Reporting
Others
Referenced
Keywords 
search
4. Total references 
found: 11,549
Irrelevant
Relevant
5. Total references 
selected by title and 
abstract: 260. 
References 
discarded: 11,289
Relevant
Irrelevant
7. Total references 
selected by full text and 
quality evaluation: 127
References discarded: 
133
Poor quality
Adequate 
quality
Descriptive 
Information
Thematic 
InformationWhat we 
know
What we 
don't know
Informs 
policy / 
practice
Informs 
Research
10. The findings 
provide the theoretical 
foundations necessary 
to build and position 
our research 
question(s)
9. Through this review the author obtained 
a deeper understanding of what are the 
components of adaptive political 
capabilities and the key themes that will 
guide their development by organizations 
confronting high political uncertainty in 
their international markets while some 
research gaps emerged
6. “Selection criteria” 
and “Quality appraisal 
tool” sections describe 
explicit inclusion and 
exclusion criteria
8. “Data extraction procedure” 
and “Synthesis procedure” 
sections describe these 
processes.  
The findings section includes a 
descriptive statistical analysis 
and a thematic analysis  
conducted through Refworks.
270 
 
 
1.1 Consultation Panel 
A consultation panel composed of several academics, two information 
specialists from Cranfield University, and a senior practitioner were involved in the 
design and development of this systematic literature review to ensure that it was 
correctly and comprehensively undertaken.  This panel worked with Maria De Villa 
individually as the review progressed through sessions at Cranfield, email, Skype, and 
face to face meetings.  They all provided guidance and comments during all stages of 
this systematic review.   
As a supervisor, Tazeeb Rajwani guided this work through his permanent 
feedback.  He also challenged the articulation of the overall research.  Thomas Lawton 
as an expert in strategy, internationalization and politics also provided enlightening 
insights to the whole process.  Along, all panel members were very helpful on advising 
how to focus the review according to the phenomena of interest.  They all provided 
different perspectives, enriching this process: Carlos Mena, the Panel Chair, as the 
Maria De Villa’s cohort leader and an expert in the food industry and Heather 
Skipworth as the systematic review specialist.  David Denyer, Colin Pilbeam, and 
Emma Parry guided the methodological process of this systematic review, assuring 
quality standards.  Heather Woodfield and Anita Beal patiently supported the access to 
database searches and other sources of information.  Finally, to add a practitioner’s 
perspective to the process, a CEO of a food firm provided his insights as an 
entrepreneur expert in the industry.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
271 
 
Table 1: Members of Consultation Panel 
 
Person Organization Involvement 
Tazeeb Rajwani, PhD 
Senior Lecturer in Strategic 
Management, Cranfield 
University 
Supervisor 
Thomas Lawton, PhD 
Professor of Strategy and 
International Business, Open 
University 
Supervisor 
Carlos Mena, PhD 
Senior Research Fellow and 
Doctoral Cohort Director 
2009 - 2013, Cranfield 
University 
Panel Chair 
Heather Skipworth, PhD 
Senior Research Fellow, 
Cranfield University 
Panel Member 
David Denyer, PhD 
Director of Research, 
Cranfield University 
Systematic Review Process 
Colin Pilbeam, PhD 
Senior Research Fellow, 
Cranfield University 
Systematic Review Process 
Emma Parry, PhD 
Principal Research Fellow 
Organization Studies, 
Cranfield University 
Systematic Review Process 
Heather Woodfield 
Social Sciences Information 
Specialist, Cranfield 
University 
Search strategies, online 
information sources 
Anita Beal 
Students off-site Liason, 
Cranfield University 
Access to information sources 
CEO 
CEO of a firm in the food 
industry 
Practitioner’s perspective 
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1.2 Review Questions 
In order to guide this systematic review, the following questions were used to 
address three lines of inquiry: 
 
1. What types of uncertainty do internationalizing organizations confront? 
2. What are the components of adaptive political capabilities? 
3. How do adaptive political capabilities develop in organizations?  
a) How do adaptive political capabilities develop in the specific situation where 
organizations are internationalizing into high uncertainty environments? 
 
1.3 Search Strategy 
The search required for this systematic review had the purpose of identifying a 
comprehensive list of primary sources, both published and unpublished, which informed 
the review questions and the phenomena of interest.  To initiate this search, a list of 
potential sources of information was elaborated.  Then, according to each review 
question, a list of keywords that could be used to create the search strings was defined 
to address the search related to answering each question.  Afterwards, these key words 
were carefully crafted into search strings and tried out on ABI Inform (Proquest) and 
EBSCO Business Source Complete.  These two databases were selected due to their 
recognition as the most relevant databases in management.  Lastly, the results obtained 
through both the direct searches within these two databases and the recommendations 
from the consultation panel were documented.   
Furthermore, this search strategy was refined by explicit selection criteria that was 
designed and utilized to determine the inclusion or exclusion of references through the 
evaluation of their titles and abstracts, and subsequently of their full texts.  Alongside 
these selection criteria, a quality appraisal tool was also designed and applied to 
complement the selection of references by including an evaluation of their quality along 
with that of their relevance.  
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A more detailed description of the search strategy process is orderly presented in 
the following sections. 
1.3.1 Potential Sources of Information by Category 
The sources of information included by default in this systematic review were 
peer-reviewed academic journals.  Other potential sources of information that were 
included were: 
 
 Conference proceedings, working or unpublished papers from the last 6 
years: These papers presented recent different views or new perspectives that 
contributed to the research.  They were searched for through the databases and 
by following recommendations from the consultation panel. 
 
 Books: Written by scholars or practitioners from all times and any place, and 
which informed any of the review questions.  These books were consulted in the 
King’s Norton Library or bought through the Café Book Shop or Amazon. 
 
 Consulting reports, industry and company documents: These reports 
provided useful information about the industry and its companies.  Many were 
provided by CEO included in the panel. 
1.3.2 Keywords 
According to the review questions, a list of keywords was developed which was 
then utilized to create the search strings that guided the search of references throughout 
the different databases.  The list of these keywords is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2: List of Keywords  
List of Keywords 
1. What types of uncertainty do internationalizing organizations confront? 
Referring to the context that enables and 
requires adaptive capabilities  
Uncertainty 
Unpredictability 
Risks 
Referring to the unit of analysis Internationalizing Organizations/Organisations 
International Organizations/ Organisations 
2. What are the components of adaptive political capabilities? 
Different possible terms referring to the 
phenomenon of interest 
 
Adaptive political capabilities 
Adaptative political capabilities 
Adaption 
Reconfiguration  
Aggregative political capabilities 
Characteristics or components of 
adaptive political capabilities 
Characteristics  
Components 
Elements 
Possible components of  adaptive 
political capabilities 
 
Modes of entry 
Market entry modes 
Structure 
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List of Keywords 
3. How do adaptive political capabilities develop in organizations? 
a) How do adaptive political capabilities develop in the specific situation where 
organizations are internationalizing into high uncertainty environments? 
Referring to the phenomenon of interest 
 
Adaptive political capabilities 
Adaptative political capabilities 
Adaption 
Reconfiguration 
Aggregative political capabilities 
Referring to development of the 
phenomenon of interest 
Development 
Develop 
Creation 
Generation 
Referring to the context that enables and 
requires adaptive political capabilities  
Uncertainty 
Unpredictability 
Risks 
Referring to the unit of analysis Internationalizing Organizations/Organisations 
International Organizations/Organisations 
 
1.3.3 Search Strings 
From the previous keywords, the following search strings presented in Table 3 
were developed.  
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Table 3: List of Search Strings 
List of Search Strings 
1. What types of uncertainty do internationalizing organizations confront? 
This search string is about organizations and 
uncertainty. international* AND (organization* OR 
organisation*) AND (uncertain* OR 
unpredictab* OR risk*) 
2. What are the components of adaptive political capabilities? 
Then, the possible characteristics or 
components of adaptive political capabilities 
will be included in the search. 
 (adapt* AND political AND capabilit*) OR 
adaption OR reconfigur* OR (aggregat* AND 
political AND capabilit*) AND 
(characteristic* OR component* OR 
element*) 
(adapt* AND political AND capabilit*) OR 
adaption OR reconfigur* OR (aggregat* AND 
political AND capabilit*) AND (modes OR 
entry OR market) 
(adapt* AND political AND capabilit*) OR 
adaption OR reconfigur* OR (aggregat* AND 
political AND capabilit*) AND structure 
3. How do adaptive political capabilities develop in organizations? 
This search string is about adaptive political 
capabilities and their development. (adapt* AND political AND capabilit*) OR 
adaption OR reconfigur* OR (aggregat* AND 
political AND capabilit*) AND (develop* OR 
generat* OR creat*) 
a) How do adaptive political capabilities develop in the specific situation where organizations 
are internationalizing into high uncertainty environments? 
This search string is about the development of 
adaptive political capabilities and the types of 
uncertainty confronted by internationalizing 
organizations. 
(adapt* AND political AND capabilit*) OR 
adaption OR reconfigur* OR (aggregat * AND 
political AND capabilit*) AND (develop* OR 
generat* OR creat*) AND (uncertain* OR 
unpredictab* OR risk*) AND international* 
AND (organization* OR organisation*) 
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1.3.4 Search Results 
To start the search, the search strings were used in ABI Inform (Proquest) and 
EBSCO Business Source Complete.  For ABI Inform Proquest, the strings were 
searched for in citations and abstracts.  Within EBSCO, the following databases were 
included in the search criteria: Business Source Complete, E-Journals and British 
Library Document Supply Centre Inside Serials & Conference Proceedings.  For 
EBSCO, the strings were searched for in titles or abstracts.  In both databases, the 
search was narrowed to scholarly peer reviewed results, and alerts for new references 
were set in order to keep track of any sources of information that could inform this 
review throughout the development of the research programme.  The results found are 
presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Search Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
278 
 
 ABI Inform (Proquest) EBSCO Business Source 
Complete 
1. What types of uncertainty do internationalizing organizations confront? 
Search Strings Total references found Total references found 
international* AND (organization* 
OR organisation*) AND (uncertain* 
OR unpredictab* OR risk*) 
 
2,714 
 
807 
2. What are the components of adaptive capabilities? 
Search Strings Total references found Total references found 
(adapt* AND political AND 
capabilit*) OR adaption OR 
reconfigur* OR (aggregat* AND 
political AND capabilit*) AND 
(characteristic* OR component* OR 
element*) 
 
560 
 
4,579 (includes search 
strings for Q2, Q3 & Q3a) 
(adapt* AND political AND 
capabilit*) OR adaption OR 
reconfigur* OR (aggregat* AND 
political AND capabilit*) AND 
(modes OR entry OR market) 
 
637 
 
(adapt* AND political AND 
capabilit*) OR adaption OR 
reconfigur* OR (aggregat* AND 
political AND capabilit*) AND 
structure 
 
484 
 
3. How do adaptive capabilities develop in organizations? 
Search Strings Total references found Total references found 
(adapt* AND political AND 
capabilit*) OR adaption OR 
reconfigur* OR (aggregat* AND 
political AND capabilit*) AND 
(develop* OR generat* OR creat*) 
1606  
4,579 (includes search 
strings for Q2, Q3 & Q3a) 
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Total References Found Through ABI & EBSCO 
11,543 
 
Several of the references that were recommended by the consultation panel were 
also traced by these search strings.  In addition to these search results, 6 books were 
included for evaluation, which were either recommended by the consultation group or 
identified through some strategy sessions attended at EAFIT.   
 
Total References Found 
Through ABI & EBSCO 
Additional 
Recommended 
References 
Total References Found 
11,543 6 11,549 
 ABI Inform (Proquest) EBSCO Business Source 
Complete 
3 a. How do adaptive capabilities develop in the specific situation where organizations 
are internationalizing into high uncertainty environments? 
Search Strings Total references found Total references found 
(adapt* AND political AND 
capabilit*) OR adaption OR 
reconfigur* OR (aggregat* AND 
political AND capabilit*) AND 
(develop* OR generat* OR creat*) 
AND (uncertain* OR unpredictab* 
OR risk*) AND international* AND 
(organization* OR organisation*) 
 
9 
 
4,579 (includes search 
strings for Q2, Q3 & Q3a) 
Ambidexterity 71 76 
Total references per database 6,081 5,462 
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1.4 Selection Criteria 
After finding numerous references, they were all studied to determine, through the 
following criteria, which would be relevant for the research and which would be 
excluded.  All of the selection criteria had an equal weight in the evaluation of both the 
references reviewed initially by title and abstract and then as full papers.  All sources of 
information were also evaluated with the same criteria. 
The broad selection criteria used for initially studying titles and abstracts is 
presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Criteria for Evaluating Titles and Abstracts 
Inclusion Criteria Rationale 
(a) Ability to inform the phenomenon of 
interest or context 
 
For Q1 references should inform uncertainty 
and internationalization. 
For Q2 and Q3 references should inform the 
adaptive political capabilities concept. 
For Q3a references should inform uncertainty, 
internationalization and the adaptive political 
capabilities concept. 
(b) All times  There will be no time frame limit for the 
selection of references.   
(c) All countries References can present research conducted at 
any country in the world. 
(d) All industries References can present research conducted in 
any industry. 
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Exclusion Criteria Rationale 
(a) Are found not to inform the 
phenomenon of interest or context 
 
References are found not to inform the review 
questions as indicated in the inclusion criteria. 
 
In addition to the criteria used for selecting references by titles and abstracts, the 
criteria presented in Table 6 were included for the evaluation and selection of the full 
references. 
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Table 6: Criteria for Evaluating Full References 
Inclusion Criteria Rationale 
(a) Books, conference proceedings, 
unpublished papers, consulting, 
industry or company reports, literature 
reviews, conceptual or empirical 
papers that present a methodology 
and/or contribution which can be 
useful for the research. 
 
Books that are a compilation of academic 
work, refer to academic work or are written by 
practitioners informing any of the lines of 
inquiry.  Their contribution must be 
recognized or they must be representative 
readings in a line of thought. 
 
Conference proceedings or working or 
unpublished papers within the last three years 
that present recent work that may inform the 
review.  They should provide a different view, 
perspective or new insight. 
 
Consulting, industry or company reports that 
must include an analysis of the 
internationalization process of the industry or 
its main companies. 
 
Literature reviews that present a review of the 
available literature in a complete and critical 
manner. 
 
Conceptual papers that contribute to the 
conceptual development or critical discussion.  
 
Empirical papers that use a qualitative or 
quantitative methodology.  They must have a 
clear description of the methodology, sample, 
findings, and contribution to knowledge.  
There is a special interest in papers that 
consider case studies. 
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Exclusion Criteria Rationale 
(b) Books, conference proceedings, 
unpublished papers, consulting, 
industry or company reports, literature 
reviews, conceptual or empirical 
papers that present a methodology 
and/or contribution which are not 
useful for the research. 
 
Books that do not offer a recognized 
contribution or are not representative in a line 
of thought. 
 
Conference proceedings that do not provide a 
different view, perspective or new insight. 
 
Consulting, industry or company reports that 
do not inform about an industry and its 
companies, or especially about their 
internationalization process. 
 
Literature reviews that are found to be 
incomplete or uncritical. 
 
Conceptual papers that neglect to contribute to 
the conceptual development or critical 
discussion.  
 
Empirical papers that use a qualitative or 
quantitative methodology but lack a clear 
description of the methodology, sample, 
findings, and/or contribution to knowledge.   
 
1.5 Quality Appraisal Tool 
The quality appraisal of the sources of information selected was conducted 
following the advice provided by David Denyer during the systematic review 2009 
sessions, which allowed the design of a quality appraisal tool that could facilitate a 
deeper analysis than that of journal rankings to assess quality.  The quality appraisal 
tool presented in Table 7 guided this task. 
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Table 7: Quality Appraisal Tool
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Elements to 
consider 
Level 
0 - Absence 1 – Low 2 – Medium 3 – High Not Applicable 
Contribution 
 
The reference does not 
provide enough 
information to assess this 
criteria 
 
The reference adds little 
to the body of knowledge 
in this area. 
 
The reference adds a 
contribution of limited 
importance to the body 
of knowledge.  
 
The reference adds a 
highly significant 
contribution to the body of 
knowledge. 
 
This element is not applicable 
to this reference 
Theory 
 
The reference does not 
provide enough 
information to asses this 
criteria 
 
Literature review is 
inadequate. 
 
Literature review is 
acceptable. 
 
Excellent literature review.  
In domain of theory. 
 
This element is not applicable 
to this reference 
Methodology 
(Design, sample, 
data collection) 
 
The reference does not 
provide enough 
information to asses this 
criteria 
 
Not fully explained, 
difficult to replicate. 
 
Acceptable explanation 
and replicability of 
methodology.   
 
Clear explanation of 
methodology and excellent 
records for audit trail. 
 
This element is not applicable 
to this reference 
Analysis 
 
The reference does not 
provide enough 
information to asses this 
criteria 
 
Data sample is 
insufficient.  Weak 
connection between data 
and story. 
 
Appropriate data sample.  
Adequate analysis but 
weak explanation. 
 
Adequate data sample, 
results support theoretical 
arguments.  Good 
explanations. 
 
This element is not applicable 
to this reference 
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References that scored an average of 2 or above were included; those that obtained 
average scores under 2 were excluded.  It is important to note that all of the elements of 
evaluation included in this quality appraisal tool had an equal weight on the final 
scoring of all types of references. 
 
1.6 Final Evaluation Process and Selected References  
After having identified the initial references obtained through the search of the 
databases and the recommendations from the consultation panel or through the strategy 
sessions at EAFIT, a careful evaluation-selection process started.  This process 
consisted initially of an evaluation of titles and abstracts.  Then, the references that 
passed this evaluation were evaluated again according to their full texts and quality.  
This rigorous evaluation-selection process resulted in the final definition of the 
references that were included in this systematic review.  The number of selected 
references by the initial evaluation of titles and abstract, and then by full texts and 
quality, can be observed in Table 8. 
The references that were discarded by the evaluation of their titles and abstracts 
were mainly excluded because they were not relevant. Most of them referred to other 
fields such as technology, engineering or biology.  These fields tend to use terms like 
adaption, adaptability or adaptation, and therefore appeared in the initial results.  Other 
references were closer to the lines of inquiry but were not informing the review 
questions according to the inclusion criteria.   
The references that were discarded by the evaluation of their full texts were 
excluded by irrelevancy or poor quality.  When reading full texts, some references were 
found to deviate from the review questions and not inform them as effectively as others.  
Also, other references that had been expected to contribute to the review were evaluated 
as having poor quality when using the quality appraisal tool, and therefore were 
excluded. 
 
Table 8: Selected References 
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ABI Inform (Proquest) 
EBSCO Business Source 
Complete 
1. What types of uncertainty do internationalizing organizations confront? 
Search Strings 
Total 
references 
found 
Selected 
by title 
and 
abstract 
Selected 
by full 
text and 
quality 
Total 
references 
found 
Selected by 
title and 
abstract 
(excluding 
ABI 
replicates) 
Selected 
by full 
text and 
quality 
international* 
AND 
(organization* 
OR 
organisation*) 
AND (uncertain* 
OR unpredictab* 
OR risk*) 
 
2,714 
 
91 40 807 25 13 
2. What are the components of adaptive capabilities? 
Search Strings 
Total 
references 
found 
Selected 
by title 
and 
abstract 
Selected 
by full 
text and 
quality 
Total 
references 
found 
Selected by 
title and 
abstract 
(excluding 
ABI 
replicates) 
Selected 
by full 
text and 
quality 
(adapt* AND 
political AND 
capabilit*) OR 
adaption OR 
reconfigur* OR 
(aggregat* AND 
political AND 
capabilit*) AND 
(characteristic* 
OR component* 
OR element*) 
 
560 
 
21 11 
4,579 
(includes 
search 
strings for 
Q2, Q3 & 
Q3a) 
1 1 
(adapt* AND 
political AND 
capabilit*) OR 
adaption OR 
reconfigur* OR 
(aggregat* AND 
political AND 
capabilit*) AND 
(modes OR entry 
 
637 
 
21 7 0 0 
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OR market) 
(adapt* AND 
political AND 
capabilit*) OR 
adaption OR 
reconfigur* OR 
(aggregat* AND 
political AND 
capabilit*) AND 
structure 
 
484 
 
28 19 3 1 
3. How do adaptive capabilities develop in organizations? 
Search Strings 
Total 
references 
found 
Selected 
by title 
and 
abstract 
Selected 
by full 
text and 
quality 
Total 
references 
found 
Selected by 
title and 
abstract 
(excluding 
ABI 
replicates) 
Selected 
by full 
text and 
quality 
(adapt* AND 
political AND 
capabilit*) OR 
adaption OR 
reconfigur* OR 
(aggregat* AND 
political AND 
capabilit*) AND 
(develop* OR 
generat* OR 
creat*) 
1606  30 23 
4,579 
(includes 
search 
strings for 
Q2, Q3 & 
Q3a) 
23 9 
3 a. How do adaptive capabilities develop in the specific situation where organizations 
are internationalizing into high uncertainty environments? 
Search Strings 
Total 
references 
found 
Selected 
by title 
and 
abstract 
Selected 
by full 
text and 
quality 
Total 
references 
found 
Selected by 
title and 
abstract 
(excluding 
ABI 
replicates) 
Selected 
by full 
text and 
quality 
(adapt* AND 
political AND 
capabilit*) OR 
adaption OR 
reconfigur* OR 
(aggregat* AND 
political AND 
capabilit*) AND 
(develop* OR 
 
9 
 
Relevant 
references 
already 
included 
in 
previous 
searches 
Relevant 
references 
already 
included 
in 
previous 
searches 
4,579 
(includes 
search 
strings for 
Q2, Q3 & 
Q3a) 
Relevant 
references 
already 
included 
in 
previous 
searches 
Relevant 
references 
already 
included 
in 
previous 
searches 
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TOTAL REFERENCES  
Total references 
found 
Selected by title 
and abstract 
Discarded 
by title and 
abstract 
Selected by full 
text and quality 
Discarded by 
full text and 
quality 
11,549 
 
260 11,289 127 133 
 
1.7 Data Extraction Procedure 
Refworks was used to keep track of the data extracted from each reference.  To do 
so, eight folders were created first, each corresponding to a database and review 
question.  As the review progressed, another folder was created for “ambidexterity”, 
since this concept was incorporated throughout the review as a keyword related to the 
phenomena of interest which could provide interesting insights.  The names of these 
folders can be observed in Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
generat* OR 
creat*) AND 
(uncertain* OR 
unpredictab* OR 
risk*) AND 
international* 
AND 
(organization* 
OR 
organisation*) 
Ambidexterity 71 17 2 76 1 1 
Total references 
per database 
6,081 208 102 5,462 52 25 
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Table 9: Folders Created in Refworks to Keep Track of References 
 
No. Folder name 
1 ABI Q1 
2 ABI Q2 
3 ABI Q3 
4 ABI Q3a 
5 EBSCO Q1 
6 EBSCO Q2 
7 EBSCO Q3 
8 EBSCO Q3a 
9 AMBIDEXTERITY 
 
Initially, all of the references found were evaluated by their titles and abstracts.  
Those references that according to the selection criteria were selected for inclusion were 
saved in Refworks in their corresponding folder.  Later on, the full text of each initially 
selected reference was evaluated according to the selection criteria and quality appraisal 
tool, to determine its final inclusion or exclusion from this review.  After this 
evaluation, the references that were found to be excluded from the review were 
transferred from their original folder to a new folder that had EXCLUDED added to the 
original folder name.  For example, the references which corresponded to the folder 
ABI Q1 and which were excluded from this review, were transferred to the folder ABI 
Q1 EXCLUDED. 
Through Refworks, each reference was easily traced, cited and consulted 
individually.  By default, Refworks most of the time included the following data for 
each reference in its information sheet:  name of journal or source of information, 
author, title, year, volume, issue and descriptors or keywords. When evaluating the full 
text and quality of the references initially selected by title and abstract, the following 
information was extracted from each reference and included in its information sheet: (1) 
abstract, (2) paper classification (as a: book / conference proceedings / unpublished 
work / consulting, industry or company reports / literature review / conceptual paper / 
empirical paper following qualitative or quantitative or mixed methods), (3) a synthesis 
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of what the reference was about and (4) a final appraisal informing if it was  included or 
excluded from the review.  If it was decided to include the reference, then (5) a brief 
explanation of how it could be used in the review was incorporated.  Below, Figure 3 
illustrates a screen shot of a reference information sheet in Refworks which includes all 
of the previously described data. 
 
Figure 3: Reference Information Sheet in Refworks 
 
 
 
Along with this thematic data extraction procedure, a descriptive data extraction 
procedure which consisted of a brief statistical analysis was conducted.  This descriptive 
analysis supported the construction of the following tables and graphs included at the 
start of section 4 which refers to findings: 
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1. Number of sources found and selected for each type of information source. 
2. Top three journals contributing to the review. 
3. Number of overall sources of information reviewed per year of publication. 
1.8 Synthesizing Information Procedure 
The synthesizing procedure followed in this review consisted first of extracting key 
ideas, theories, concepts, arguments, and methodological assumptions from the selected 
references.  Secondly, this information was synthesized by making connections between 
the different parts identified through its analysis.  This stage was all about recasting the 
information found into a new or different arrangement that showed connections and 
patterns that had not been previously produced, to inform the research question(s) and 
subsequent studies of the overall research programme as a result. 
 
 
2 FINDINGS 
This section presents the descriptive analysis of the findings of this systematic 
literature review process.  The thematic findings produced are discussed in the main 
body of this thesis in Chapter 3 Theoretical Positioning. 
 
2.1 Descriptive Analysis of Findings  
This section presents a brief statistical descriptive analysis of the references found 
and included in this systematic review. 
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Figure 4: Number of References Found for Each Type of Information Source 
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Figure 5: Number of References Selected for Each Type of Information Source 
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References
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proceedings, etc 
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The main number of references found and selected for this review were 
academic journals.  Books and book chapters were the second type of sources of 
information to contribute while conference procedings, working or unpublished papers 
from the last 6 years had a reduced contribution.  Even the selected references excluded 
reports. 
 
Figure 3: Top Three Journals Contributing to the Review 
 
22
19
9
18
16
8
16
12
8
0
5
10
15
20
25
SMJ JIBS AMR
Total references found
Selected by title & abstract
Selected full papers
 
 
Within academic journals, the Strategic Management Journal (SMJ) provided 
the highest number of references included in this review.  The Journal of International 
Business Studies (JIBS) was the second most relevant journal followed by the Academy 
of Management Review (AMR).  These results fit with the orientation of the research 
programme and of this systematic review by evidently focusing on the strategic 
management field and the internationalization process. 
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Figure 4:  Number of Overall Sources of Information Included per Year of 
Publication 
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Table 10: Number of Overall Sources of Information Included per Year of 
Publication 
Year No. of Papers Year No. of Papers 
1911 1 1986 1 
1937 1 1987 3 
1938 1 1988 4 
1947 1 1989 5 
296 
 
Year No. of Papers Year No. of Papers 
1949 1 1990 2 
1957 1 1991 3 
1958 1 1992 1 
1959 1 1993 4 
1962 1 1994 4 
1963 1 1995 1 
1967 2 1996 2 
1969 1 1997 1 
1971 1 1998 3 
1972 1 1999 4 
1973 1 2000 2 
1975 1 2001 3 
1976 1 2002 4 
1977 2 2003 8 
1978 2 2004 3 
1979 2 2005 7 
1980 2 2006 3 
1981 3 2007 1 
1982 4 2008 4 
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Year No. of Papers Year No. of Papers 
1983 3 2009 4 
1984 4 2010 6 
1985 2 2011 2 
 
Figure 7 and Table 10 evidence how the number of references included in this 
systematic review augments more significantly along recent years. However, the 
interesting dispersion over one hundred years of the selected references is explained by 
the deliberate effort of tracing the evolution of knowledge within the selected literature 
domains. 
3 CONCLUSIONS 
As a result of this systematic literature review, a deeper understanding of (1) the 
uncertainties internationalizing organizations confront, (2) the significance of political 
uncertainty and (3) the components of adaptive political capabilities was achieved along 
with (4) the identification of the key themes that can guide their deliberate development 
by organizations.  Although this deeper understanding of our phenomena of interest 
allowed us to build and position our research questions, it also uncovered many research 
gaps.  Through this review it was evidenced that the deliberate development of adaptive 
political capabilities can improve a firm’s competitive position, what was still unknown 
was how firms could best address the deliberate development of adaptive political 
capabilities. 
Below, we include the list of references that were identified through this systematic 
literature review process and included in our initial theoretical positioning of this 
research.  However, it is important to note, that since research involves and necessarily 
is an iterative process between theory and data, we must highlight that throughout our 
inquiry we included further references in the theoretical positioning chapter of this 
thesis as we gained a broader understanding of our phenomena of interest.  To identify 
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the references that were finally included in this thesis, please refer to the references 
section of its main body which is presented previously to the appendices. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS 
 
 
Code  Date    Position   Approx Time 
 
Pilot interviews 
P001  August 19
th
 2011 CEO of Pastry Firm    1hr 
P002  August 27
th
 2011 CEO of Ice Cream Firm   1hr 
 
Interviews 
I001  August 28
th
- 29
h
 2011 CEO      5 hrs 
I002  August 30
th
 2011 VP of Centralized Services   2.5 hrs 
I003  September 5
th
 2011 VP Business Line 3 (B3)   2 hrs 
I004  September 8
th
 2011 VP of Corporate Finance   1 hr  
I005  September 9
th
 2011 VP Business Line 4 (B4)   1 hr 
I006  September 9
th
 2011 Planning Manager B4    45 mins  
I007  September 9
th
 2011 Manager Distribution - Venezuela  2.5 hrs 
I008  September 13
th
 2011 VP Business Line 1 (B1)   2 hrs 
I009  September 13
th
 2011 Treasury Manager    1hr 
I010  September 13
th
 2011 International Manager B3   1hr 
I011  September 15
th
 2011 Auditing Manager    1 hr 
I012  September 15
th
 2011 International Director B3   1hr 
I013  September 16
th
 2011 International Documentation Coordinator B3 1hr 
I014  September 16
th
 2011 Director of Corporate Finance   1hr 
I015  September 20
th
 2011 General Secretary    1hrs 
I016  September 21
st 
2011 Administrative & Financial Manager B3 40 mins 
I017  September 21
st
 2011 VP Business Line 2 (B2)   2 hrs 
I018  September 22
nd
 2011 National Sales Manager - Venezuela  30 mins 
I019  September 22
nd
 2011 Administrative & Sales Coordinator - Ven 30 mins 
I020  September 22
nd
 2011 Human Resources Coordinator - Venezuela 30 mins 
I021  September 22
nd
 2011 Performance Control Coordinator - Ven  30 mins 
I022   September 22
nd
 2011   Logistics Director - Venezuela    30 mins 
I023  September 22
nd
 2011 Administrative Director - Venezuela  30 mins 
I024  September 26
th
 2011 Innovation Manager    1 hr 
I025  September 27
th
 2011 International Manager B1   45 mins 
I026  September 28
th
 2011 Ex-Manager Distribution - Venezuela  2 hrs 
I027  September 29
th
 2011 Knowledge Management Coordinator B1 2 hrs 
I028  September 29
th
 2011 Knowledge Management Director  2 hrs 
I029  September 29
th
 2011 Compensation to Collaborators Director 1 hr 
I030  October 3
rd
 2011 International Business Executive B2  45 mins 
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I031  October 5
th
 2011 Ex-Manager Production B4 - Venezuela 2 hrs 
I032  October 10
th
 2011 VP Marketing, Innovation & Nutrition  45 mins 
I033  October 19
th
 2011 Operations Manager B2   1 hr 
I034  December 15
th
 2011 Ex-Human Resources Manager   1 hr 
I035  December 15
th
 2011 Marketing Manager B4    40 mins 
I036  December 16
th
 2011 IT Solutions Director    50 mins 
I037  December 19
th
 2011 Ex-Board Member    40 mins 
I038  December 20
th
 2011 Risk, Insurance and Security Director  2 hrs 
I039  December 20
th
 2011 International Director B2   1 hr 
I040  December 21
st
 2011 Ex General VP     1 hr 
I041  December 23
rd
 2011 Technical Director B4    1 hr 
I042  December 29
th
 2011 Marketing Manager B3    50 mins 
I043  January 4
th
 2012 Marketing Manager B2    45 mins 
I044  January 5
th
 2012 International Brand Manager B2  1.5 hrs 
I045  January 5
th
 2012 Manager Distribution - Ecuador  2 hrs 
I046  January 11
th
 2012 Board Member     1 hr 
I047  January 11
th
 2012 President Analdex (Association of Exporters) 45 mins 
I048  January 12
th
 2012 Ex-CEO of CADA (Retail chain in Venezuela) 1 hr 
I049  January 16
th
 2012 Logistics Manager B1    1 hr 
I050  January 17
th
 2012 Logistics Manager B2    1 hr 
I051  January 17
th
 2012 International Logistics Coordinator B2  1 hr 
I052  January 18
th
 2012 Ambassador of Colombia in Ven. 2006-09 30 mins 
I053  February 16
th
 2012 DDBO Colombia Manager   40 mins 
I054  February 24
th
 2012 Administrative Manager - Ecuador  30 mins 
I055  February 24
th
 2012 Accountant - Ecuador    30 mins 
I056  February 24
th
 2012 IT Manager - Ecuador    30 mins 
I057  February 24
th
 2012 Logistics Manager - Ecuador   30 mins 
I058  February 28
th
 2012 Manager Distribution - Nicaragua  40 mins 
I059  February 28
th
 2012 Accounts Receivable Manager - Nicaragua 40 mins 
I060  March 27
th
 2012 Marketing Manager B1    45 mins 
 
 
 
B1: Business Line 1 
B2: Business Line 2 
B3: Business Line 3 
B4: Business Line 4 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
PRESENTATION LETTER 
Dear, 
NAME OF INTERVIEWEE 
 
As you may be aware, recent political events in some countries in the Middle East, Africa and 
Latin America have created uncertainty for firms with operations in these markets.  A common 
characteristic these markets share is that firms are obliged to deal with their political uncertainty 
in the need to sustain their operations.  Presently, firms are increasingly dealing with difficult 
political environments in many of their markets.  Consequently, practitioners and academics are 
trying to understand better how to confront this managerial challenge. 
Particularly, Latin American companies have been obliged to confront political uncertainty.    
Through this interview our objective is to understand specifically how Latam has confronted 
political uncertainty in Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua between 1999-2011. 
Before conducting this interview, we want to let you know that the overall objective of this 
research is helping firms improve their ability to confront the challenge of operating in high 
uncertainty political contexts.  This is a doctoral research project supported by EAFIT 
University and a panel of experts from Cranfield University.  We are currently collecting data 
and we estimate to finish the research by September 2013.  Hopefully its results will help Latam 
develop a more competitive position to confront future political uncertainties.    
We wish you enjoy discussing this challenge with us on the (day) of (month) at (time).  Thank 
you for your time! 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Maria Andrea De Villa 
Strategy Researcher 
mdevilla@eafit.edu.co
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
I. Before the interview 
I want to let you know that the information you will provide during this interview will be treated 
as confidential and will only be used with the approval of the firm.  As an individual, you can 
decide not to answer any of the questions I will ask or decide to withdraw at any time.  I want to 
ask for your consent to record this interview for the purpose of facilitating data analysis.  Will 
you allow me to do so?  Are there any aspects you would like to address before we start? 
Let’s start with some DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION: 
 Name 
 Area you work for within Latam  
 Let us know the title of your position and please give us a brief description of your 
functions 
 How long have you worked for Latam?  
 Have you held your current position in Latam during all of these years or what other 
positions have you held and for how long? 
 What is your nationality? 
 What is your highest academic degree and from which university is it? 
Note: Gender will be recorded as part of the data collected from the interview for the 
purpose of including this variable in our analysis. 
 
 
II. The interview 
 
Now, let me ask you: 
 
1. A. Which products are sold by the firm generally speaking and which ones has it sold in 
Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua?  
 
B. Which areas of service support operations in Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua? 
 
(REGARDING RESPONSES) 
2. What were the most critical political events that the firm confronted in Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Nicaragua and how did the firm responded to these events? 
 
 (REGARDING RECONFIGURATION) 
3. What internal changes took place or how did the firm reorganized its resources to 
enable each of these responses? 
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 (REGARDING THE PROCESS FOLLOWED TO CONFRONT POLITICAL 
UNCERTAINTY) 
4. When political uncertainties were confronted, what process was followed by the firm to 
decide how to respond to the challenges stemming from these uncertainties? 
5. Who triggered or initiated this process? ; Who leaded this process? 
6. Who participated in the process of deciding what to do? 
7. What were the views of the participants on the main issues, how were they similar or 
different? 
8. Who took the final decision about what responses were going to be taken? 
9. Who implemented these response decisions? 
 
(REGARDING LEARNING MECHANISMS: KNOWLEDGE EXPLORATION AND 
EXPLOITATION) 
10. Were these decisions “new responses” or had similar decisions been made before to 
confront other political uncertainties? 
11. Can you specifically point out what sources of information were taken into account to 
decide how to respond to political uncertainties? 
12. Was this decision process or its results documented in any form such as memos or 
meeting reports? 
13. Where any tools developed from the experiences of coping with these events to guide 
the firm when confronting future political uncertainties? 
 
(REGARDING OUTCOMES) 
14. After the response decisions were taken and actions were implemented, what were the 
outcomes? 
 
(REGARDING FEEDBACK) 
15. What aspects of the decision making process do you think had a positive impact and 
must be repeated when confronting future political uncertainties? 
16. What aspects of the decision making process would you change or what different 
aspects would you consider? 
17. Did you hold any meetings after your responses were implemented to review their 
outcomes? 
18. Were you requested to provide any feedback upon this process?, If so to whom and 
how? 
 
(REGARDING LEARNING MECHANISMS:  EXPERIENCE ACCUMULATION) 
19. What did you personally learn from these experiences? 
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20. Do you recall any previous experiences that you might consider influenced your 
individual responses towards political uncertainties in Venezuela, Ecuador and 
Nicaragua? 
21. Can you identify any external influence (from a friend, another organization) that 
influenced your individual responses towards political uncertainties in Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Nicaragua? 
22. Can you trace the influence of any specific belief or value in your individual responses 
towards political uncertainty in Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua? 
23. What do you think your area within the firm learned? 
24. What did the firm learn? 
25. Where do the lessons of your area and the firm reside? 
 
  
 
 
 
(REGARDING LEARNING MECHANISMS:  KNOWLEDGE EXPOLITATION) 
26. Have you personally used these lessons when coping with later political uncertainties? 
27. Do you think your area or the firm have used what they learned when coping with other 
political uncertainties? Or are the lessons kept at an individual level? 
 
 (REGARDING KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT) 
28. Has the firm collected and communicated within the firm the knowledge obtained by 
dealing with political uncertainties in Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua? 
29. If you wanted to recall what was learnt from this experience by other means than your 
own memory, whom would you approach or to what area within the firm would you go 
to? 
 
 
  
 
(REGARDING CORPORATE AND BUSINESS UNIT LEVELS) 
30. To what extent were the responses to these political uncertainties decisions made by the 
business as an individual unit or decisions made at the corporate level? 
 
 
P1 - These questions were included aiming to provide information 
about what experiences, external influences, beliefs, and values 
might have affected individual responses to political uncertainties.  
It is important to be aware of this within our research interest. 
 
P2 - This question was re worded to facilitate its understanding. 
 
P2 - The word “refer” was changed for “go”. 
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 (REGARDING STRUCTURE) 
31. Referring to the firm’s organizational structure and processes, how do you think these 
worked to support the challenge of confronting political uncertainties? 
32. Were they agile and flexible enough? 
33. Could the firm’s organizational structure and processes be improved in any way to 
enable faster and more informed decisions about how to deal with future political 
uncertainties? 
 
(REGARDING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE) 
34. Do the firm’s employees commonly share information about the lessons they learn from 
their individual experience? 
35. If so how do they do this? If not, to what extent do you think they would be willing and 
like to participate in activities to develop knowledge that can improve the firm’s 
position to cope with future political uncertainties? 
36. What obstacles, if any, do you visualize could be encountered in such efforts? 
 
(REGARDING MANAGERIAL DECISION) 
37. How much do you think political uncertainty can affect the firm’s operations in its 
strategic markets during the next 10 – 20 years? 
38. Is political uncertainty an environmental challenge the firm would like to be in a more 
competitive position to deal with? 
39. How much time and resources would the firm be willing to invest in a project to 
improve its position to cope with future political uncertainties? 
40. Please describe yourself professionally in one or a few words… 
 
 
 
 
TO IDENTIFY FUTURE INTERVIEWEES 
41. Please let me know the name and position of anybody within the firm who was exposed 
to dealing with decisions about Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua and who might not be 
on this interviewee list and you think should be included. 
 
  
P1 – This question was included to analyze how managers 
describe themselves professionally.  This information is 
interesting to enable our understanding of their role within the 
firm in relation to our phenomena of interest. 
 
P1 - This request was explicitly included in the protocol in order 
to remind myself to collect this information from all of the 
interviewees. 
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III. After the interview 
 
 Take note of any other information or documents that were mentioned through the 
interview and that must be further on collected or requested. 
 Take note of people that must be contacted as a result of the interview. 
 Record my own comments about the interview, other impressions. 
 
 
IV. Relation between factors and questions 
 
 
 
 
Factors Questions 
Responses 2 
Reconfiguration 3 
Process followed to confront political uncertainty 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Learning mechanisms: knowledge exploration and 
exploitation 
10, 11, 12, 13 
Outcomes 14 
Feedback 15, 16, 17, 18 
Learning mechanisms:  experience accumulation 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
24, 25 
Learning mechanisms:  knowledge exploitation 26, 27 
Knowledge management 28, 29 
Corporate and business unit levels 30 
Structure 31, 32, 33 
Organizational culture 34, 35, 36 
Managerial decision 37, 38, 39, 40 
 
 
V. Most relevant questions that must be answered 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
17 
18 
19 
23 
Was modified according to changes in the interview questions. 
 
Was modified according to changes in the interview questions. 
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24 
25 
27 
28 
29 
30 
32 
33 
31 
34 
38 
39 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
CARTA DE PRESENTACIÓN 
Apreciado, 
NOMBRE DEL ENTREVISTADO 
 
Como seguramente lo ha observado, las recientes crisis políticas en el Medio Oriente, África y 
América Latina han generado incertidumbre política para las empresas con operaciones en estos 
mercados.  Una característica que estos mercados comparten, es que las empresas se ven 
obligadas a “confrontar” su incertidumbre política debido a la necesidad de mantener sus 
operaciones.  En la actualidad, las empresas están incrementalmente confrontando difíciles 
entornos políticos en muchos de sus mercados.  Consecuentemente, los gerentes y académicos 
están intentando comprender mejor como confrontar este reto gerencial. 
Particularmente, las empresas latinoamericanas se han visto obligadas a confrontar alta 
incertidumbre política.  A través de esta entrevista nuestro objetivo es entender específicamente 
como Latam ha enfrentado la incertidumbre política en Venezuela, Ecuador y Nicaragua entre 
1999-2011. 
Antes de comenzar esta entrevista, queremos informarle que el objetivo general de nuestra 
investigación es apoyar a las empresas en el mejoramiento de su habilidad para enfrentar el reto 
de operar en entornos de alta incertidumbre política.  Esta es una investigación doctoral apoyada 
por la Universidad EAFIT y un panel de expertos de Cranfield University.  Actualmente nos 
encontramos en la etapa de recolección de datos y estimamos terminar la investigación durante 
Septiembre de 2013.  Deseamos que sus resultados ayuden Latam a desarrollar una posición 
más competitiva para afrontar futuras incertidumbres políticas. 
Esperamos que disfrute discutir con nosotros sobre este reto el (día) de (mes) a las (hora).  
¡Gracias por su tiempo! 
 
Cordial saludo, 
 
Maria Andrea De Villa 
Investigadora de Estrategia 
mdevilla@eafit.edu.co
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PROTOCOLO DE ENTREVISTA 
 
I. Antes de la entrevista 
Quiero dejarle saber que la información que usted nos brindará durante esta entrevista será 
tratada como confidencial y solo será utilizada con la aprobación de la empresa.  Como 
individuo, usted puede decidir no contestar a cualquiera de las preguntas que le haga o retirarse 
de la investigación en cualquier momento.  Quiero solicitar su consentimiento para grabar el 
audio de esta entrevista con el propósito de facilitar el análisis de la información recolectada.  
¿Me permite usted hacerlo?, ¿Quisiera discutir cualquier inquietud que tenga antes de 
comenzar? 
Empecemos con alguna INFORMACIÓN DEMOGRÁFICA: 
 Nombre 
 Área para la cual trabaja dentro de Latam 
 Por favor permítanos conocer el título de su cargo junto con una breve descripción de 
sus funciones  
 ¿Hace cuánto tiempo trabaja para Latam?  
 ¿Ha ocupado usted su cargo actual en Latam durante todos estos años o cuáles otros 
cargos ha ocupado y por cuánto tiempo? 
 ¿Cuál es su nacionalidad? 
 ¿Cuál es su más alto grado académico y cuál Universidad se lo otorgó?  
Nota: El género se tendrá en cuenta como parte de los datos recolectados a través de la 
entrevista con el objetivo de incluir esta variable en nuestro análisis. 
 
 
II. La entrevista 
 
Ahora, déjeme preguntarle: 
 
1. A. ¿Cuáles productos vende la empresa en términos generales y cuales ha vendido en 
Venezuela, Ecuador y Nicaragua? 
 
B. ¿Cuáles áreas de servicio apoyan las operaciones en Venezuela, Ecuador y 
Nicaragua? 
(Sobre respuestas - RESPONSES) 
2. ¿Cuáles fueron los eventos políticos más críticos que la empresa confrontó en 
Venezuela, Ecuador y Nicaragua y como respondió la empresa ante estos eventos? 
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 (Sobre reconfiguración - RECONFIGURATION) 
3. ¿Cuáles cambios a nivel interno realizó la empresa o como reorganizó sus recursos para 
facilitar cada una de estas respuestas? 
(Sobre el proceso seguido para confrontar la incertidumbre política - THE PROCESS 
FOLLOWED TO CONFRONT POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY) 
4. Cuando se confrontaron incertidumbres políticas, ¿Qué proceso siguió la empresa para 
decidir cómo responder a los retos provenientes de estas incertidumbres? 
5. ¿Quién inicio este proceso? y, ¿Quién lo lidero? 
6. ¿Quiénes participaron en el proceso de decidir qué hacer? 
7. ¿Cuáles fueron sus puntos de vista de los participantes? y, ¿Cómo fueron similares o 
diferentes? 
8. ¿Quién tomo la decisión final sobre qué respuestas se iban a tener? 
9. ¿Quién implementó estas respuestas?  
(Sobre mecanismos de aprendizaje: exploración y explotación del conocimiento - LEARNING 
MECHANISMS: KNOWLEDGE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION) 
10. ¿Fueron estas decisiones unas “nuevas respuestas” o se habían tomado antes decisiones 
similares para confrontar otras incertidumbres políticas? 
11. ¿Puede usted identificar específicamente cuáles fuentes de información se tuvieron en 
cuenta para decidir cómo responder ante las incertidumbres políticas? 
12. ¿Se documentó el proceso de decisión o sus resultados en cualquier medio como actas 
de reuniones o memos? 
13. ¿Se desarrolló alguna herramienta a partir de la experiencia de confrontar esta situación 
para guiar a la empresa en la confrontación de futuras incertidumbres políticas? 
 (Sobre resultados - OUTCOMES) 
14. Después de que se decidieron y se implementaron las respuestas, ¿Cuáles fueron sus 
resultados? 
(Sobre retroalimentación - FEEDBACK) 
15. ¿Cuáles aspectos del proceso de decisión cree usted que tuvieron un impacto positivo y 
deben repetirse cuando se confronten futuras incertidumbres políticas? 
16. ¿Cuáles aspectos del proceso de decisión cambiaria o cuáles otros aspectos diferentes 
consideraría? 
17. ¿Se realizaron reuniones después de la implementación de las respuestas para evaluar 
sus resultados? 
18. ¿Le fue solicitada alguna retroalimentación sobre este proceso?, De ser así, ¿quién le 
solicitó retroalimentación y cómo la realizó?  
(Sobre mecanismos de aprendizaje: acumulación de experiencia - LEARNING 
MECHANISMS: EXPERIENCE ACCUMULATION) 
19. ¿Qué aprendió a nivel personal de estas experiencias?   
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20. ¿Puede usted recordar alguna experiencia previa que haya vivido la cual crea haya 
influenciado sus respuestas individuales ante las incertidumbres políticas en Venezuela, 
Ecuador y Nicaragua? 
21. ¿Puede usted identificar cualquier influencia externa (de un amigo, otra empresa u 
organización) que haya influenciado sus respuestas individuales ante las incertidumbres 
políticas en Venezuela, Ecuador y Nicaragua? 
22. ¿Puede usted identificar la influencia de alguna de sus creencias o valores en sus 
respuestas individuales ante las incertidumbres políticas en Venezuela, Ecuador y 
Nicaragua? 
23. ¿Qué cree usted que su área al interior de la empresa aprendió? 
24. ¿Qué aprendió la empresa?  
25. ¿Dónde se encuentran las lecciones aprendidas por su área y la empresa? 
 
 
 
 
(Sobre mecanismos de aprendizaje: explotación del conocimiento - LEARNING 
MECHANISMS: KNOWLEDGE EXPOLITATION) 
26. ¿A usted personalmente utilizado estas lecciones al confrontar futuras incertidumbres 
políticas? 
27. ¿Cree usted que su área o la empresa han utilizado sus aprendizajes al confrontar 
siguientes incertidumbres políticas?, ¿O se han quedado estos aprendizajes a nivel 
individual? 
(Sobre gestión del conocimiento - KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT) 
28. ¿La empresa ha recolectado y comunicado a su interior el conocimiento que ha obtenido 
al confrontar incertidumbres políticas en Venezuela, Ecuador y Nicaragua? 
29. Si usted quisiera recordar lo que se aprendió de esta experiencia por otros medios 
además de su propia memoria, ¿A quién recurriría o a cual área dentro de la empresa se 
dirigiría? 
 
 
 
 
(Sobre los niveles corporativo y de unidad de negocios - CORPORATE AND BUSINESS 
UNIT LEVELS) 
30. ¿En qué medida las respuestas a estas incertidumbres políticas fueron decisiones 
realizadas por la empresa a nivel individual o decisiones realizadas a nivel corporativo? 
P1 – Estas preguntas fueron incluidas con el objetivo de proveer 
información sobre cuales experiencias, influencias externas, 
creencias y valores podrían haber afectado las respuestas 
individuales ante las incertidumbres políticas.  Es importante el 
estar atento a este punto dentro de nuestro interés investigativo. 
 
P2 – Se modificó la redacción de esta pregunta para facilitar su 
comprensión. 
 P2 – La palabra “referiría” se cambió por “dirigiría”. 
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(Sobre estructura - STRUCTURE) 
31. Si nos referimos a la estructura organizacional y los procesos de la empresa, ¿Cómo 
cree usted que estos apoyaron el reto de enfrentar incertidumbres políticas? 
32. ¿Fueron lo suficientemente ágiles y flexibles? 
33. ¿Podrían mejorarse la estructura organizacional y los procesos de la empresa para 
facilitar decisiones más informadas y rápidas al confrontar futuras incertidumbres 
políticas? 
(Sobre cultura organizacional - ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE) 
34. ¿Es común que los empleados de la empresa compartan información sobre las lecciones 
que aprenden a través de su experiencia individual? 
35. Si es así, ¿Como lo hacen? Si no es así, ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que estarían 
dispuestos y les gustaría participar en actividades para desarrollar conocimientos que 
mejoren la posición de la empresa para confrontar futuras incertidumbres políticas? 
36. ¿Cuáles obstáculos visualiza usted podrían ser encontrados durante estos esfuerzos? 
 (Sobre decisión gerencial - MANAGERIAL DECISION) 
37. ¿Qué tanto cree usted que durante los próximos 10 a 20 años las operaciones de la 
empresa en sus mercados estratégicos podrían verse afectadas por incertidumbre 
política? 
38. ¿Es la incertidumbre política un reto en el entorno el cual la empresa quisiera confrontar 
desde una posición más competitiva? 
39. ¿Cuánto tiempo y recursos estaría la empresa dispuesta a invertir en un proyecto para 
mejorar su posición para confrontar futuras incertidumbres políticas? 
40. Por favor descríbase usted mismo en términos profesionales en una o pocas palabras… 
 
 
 
 
 
PARA IDENTIFICAR FUTURAS PERSONAS A ENTREVISTAR 
41. Por favor permítanos conocer los nombres y cargos de los empleados de la empresa que 
hayan estado expuestos a las decisiones sobre Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua y 
quienes no estén en nuestra lista de entrevistados y deban de ser incluidos. 
 
 
 
 
 
P1 – Esta pregunta se incluyó para analizar cómo se describen los 
entrevistados profesionalmente.  Esta información es interesante 
para facilitar nuestra comprensión sobre su rol dentro de la 
empresa en relación con nuestro fenómeno de interés. 
 
P1 – Esta solicitud se incluyó de manera explícita en el protocolo 
para recordarme a mí misma el recolectar esta información de 
parte de todos los entrevistados. 
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III. Después de la entrevista 
 
 Tomar nota sobre cualquier otra información o documentos que hayan sido 
mencionados durante la entrevista y que deben ser recolectados o solicitados.   
 Tomar nota de las personas que deben ser contactadas como resultado de la entrevista. 
 Anotar mis propios comentarios e impresiones sobre la entrevista.  
 
 
IV. Relación entre factores y preguntas  
 
 
 
 
Factores Preguntas 
Respuestas - RESPONSES 2 
Reconfiguración - RECONFIGURATION 3 
Proceso seguido para confrontar la incertidumbre política - 
PROCESS FOLLOWED TO CONFRONT POLITICAL 
UNCERTAINTY 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Mecanismos de aprendizaje: exploración y explotación del 
conocimiento - LEARNING MECHANISMS: 
KNOWLEDGE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION 
10, 11, 12, 13 
Resultados - OUTCOMES 14 
Retroalimentación - FEEDBACK 15, 16, 17, 18 
Mecanismos de aprendizaje: acumulación de experiencia -
LEARNING MECHANISMS:  EXPERIENCE 
ACCUMULATION 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
24, 25 
Mecanismos de aprendizaje:  explotación del conocimiento - 
LEARNING MECHANISMS:  KNOWLEDGE 
EXPLOITATION 
26, 27 
Gestión del conocimiento - KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT 
28, 29 
Niveles corporativo y de unidad de negocio - CORPORATE 
AND BUSINESS UNIT LEVELS 
30 
Estructura - STRUCTURE 31, 32, 33 
Cultura organizacional - ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 34, 35, 36 
Decisión gerencial - MANAGERIAL DECISION 37, 38, 39, 40 
 
  
Se modificó de acuerdo a los cambios realizados a las preguntas 
de la entrevista. 
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V. Las preguntas más relevantes que deben responderse 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
17 
18 
19 
23 
24 
25 
27 
28 
29 
30 
32 
33 
31 
34 
38 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Se modificó de acuerdo a los cambios realizados a las preguntas 
de la entrevista. 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 
 
 
PHONE CALL PROTOCOL 
 
 
We are a group of researchers from EAFIT University (Colombia) and Cranfield 
University (United Kingdom) which are studying how firms in the Colombian 
processed food sector which have exported, distributed or produced their products in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011, have managed to sustain their 
operations in these foreign markets despite their high political uncertainty.   
 
We want to invite the firm that you work to be part of this study and to participate in a 
contest to win an executive education course offered by EAFIT University.  To evaluate 
if the firm meets with the criteria required to participate in this study, we need to ask 
you if the firm had operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011? 
 
IF THE ANSWER OF THE FIRM IS YES: 
 
Since your firm meets with the criteria required to participate in this study, let’s 
schedule a meeting at the firm during which we will discuss with you the details of this 
study and allow you to participate through the completion of a survey. 
 
IF THE ANSWER OF THE FIRM IS NO: 
 
Since your firm does not meet with the criteria required it cannot participate in this 
study.  Thank you for your time and kind information. 
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Variables from hypotheses Literature Review Findings in my research Type of variables Measurement scales Coding
interval (1) Very unpredictable                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3)                                                                             
(4)                                                                         
(5) Very predictable     
1                                                                  
2                                         
3                                        
4                                       
5      
interval (1) Very unpredictable                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3)                                                                             
(4)                                                                         
(5) Very predictable     
1                                                                  
2                                         
3                                        
4                                       
5      
interval (1) Very unpredictable                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3)                                                                             
(4)                                                                         
(5) Very predictable     
1                                                                  
2                                         
3                                        
4                                       
5      
interval (1) Very unpredictable                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3)                                                                             
(4)                                                                         
(5) Very predictable     
1                                                                  
2                                         
3                                        
4                                       
5      
interval (1) Very unpredictable                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3)                                                                             
(4)                                                                         
(5) Very predictable     
1                                                                  
2                                         
3                                        
4                                       
5      
interval (1) Very unpredictable                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3)                                                                             
(4)                                                                         
(5) Very predictable     
1                                                                  
2                                         
3                                        
4                                       
5      
interval (1) Very unpredictable                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3)                                                                             
(4)                                                                         
(5) Very predictable     
1                                                                  
2                                         
3                                        
4                                       
5      
Dimensions
APPENDIX 6
Legal regulations affecting the business sector
National laws affecting international business
Tax policies
Monetary policy
Prices controlled by the government
BACK-BONE OF SURVEY
Level of political uncertainty perceived Perceived Environmental Uncertainty was assessed 
by Bouthers et al.  in 2000 by using the PEU2 
instrument developed and tested by Werner et al . 
(1996), based on the work of Miller (1993). PEU2 
consists of 28 items aggregated to measure the 
perception of a country’s government policies, 
macroeconomics, materials, product market, and 
competition. We use its government/political 
policies instrument to measure the level of perceived 
political uncertainty:                                                                    
Government/political policies (Cronbach alpha = 
0.86)
(a) Ability of the party in power to maintain control 
of the government
(b) Threat of armed conflict
(c) Tax policies
(d) Monetary policy
(e) Prices controlled by the government
(f) National laws affecting international business
(g) Legal regulations affecting the business sector
(h) Tariffs on imported goods
(i) Enforcement of existing laws
(j) Public service provision                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
How certain can you be about each variable in the 
future? Indicate your answer by circling a number 
from 1 (very unpredictable) to 5 (very predictable) 
Ability of the party in power to maintain 
control of the government
Threat of armed conflict
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interval (1) Very unpredictable                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3)                                                                             
(4)                                                                         
(5) Very predictable     
1                                                                  
2                                         
3                                        
4                                       
5      
interval (1) Very unpredictable                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3)                                                                             
(4)                                                                         
(5) Very predictable     
1                                                                  
2                                         
3                                        
4                                       
5      
interval (1) Very unpredictable                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3)                                                                             
(4)                                                                         
(5) Very predictable     
1                                                                  
2                                         
3                                        
4                                       
5      
Lobbying the 
Colombian 
government (e.i. by 
communicating 
opinions or 
information to policy 
makers through 
informal meetings, 
formal settings or 
social settings to 
influence the 
government towards 
the firm’s own 
interests)
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Lobbying the 
governments of 
Venezuela, Ecuador 
or Nicaragua (e.i. by 
communicating 
opinions or 
information to policy 
makers through 
informal meetings, 
formal settings or 
social settings to 
influence any of 
these governments 
towards the firm’s 
own interests)
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Tariffs on imported goods
Enforcement of existing laws
Public service provision 
Level of political uncertainty perceived Perceived Environmental Uncertainty was assessed 
by Bouthers et al.  in 2000 by using the PEU2 
instrument developed and tested by Werner et al . 
(1996), based on the work of Miller (1993). PEU2 
consists of 28 items aggregated to measure the 
perception of a country’s government policies, 
macroeconomics, materials, product market, and 
competition. We use its government/political 
policies instrument to measure the level of perceived 
political uncertainty:                                                                    
Government/political policies (Cronbach alpha = 
0.86)
(a) Ability of the party in power to maintain control 
of the government
(b) Threat of armed conflict
(c) Tax policies
(d) Monetary policy
(e) Prices controlled by the government
(f) National laws affecting international business
(g) Legal regulations affecting the business sector
(h) Tariffs on imported goods
(i) Enforcement of existing laws
(j) Public service provision                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
How certain can you be about each variable in the 
future? Indicate your answer by circling a number 
from 1 (very unpredictable) to 5 (very predictable) 
 Control or cooperative responses Control and cooperative responses to political 
uncertainty involve firms’ attempts to influence or 
shape governments in favorable ways towards their 
own particular interests (Baysinger, 1984; Miller, 
1992).  Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) taxonomy of 
corporate political strategies, presents three 
theoretically distinct strategies, each comprising of a 
variety of tactics.  The tactics describe the control or 
cooperative responses that a firm can use to 
influence the political environment.  In 2003, 
Hillman used these control or cooperative responses 
in a survey she conducted to US multinationals.  
Below, is this taxonomy:                                                                                                                                                                  
Information strategy
Strategy Tactics 
Information strategy  Lobbying 
 Commissioning research projects and 
reporting research results 
 Testifying as expert witnesses 
 Supplying position papers or technical 
reports 
 
Financial incentive strategy  Contributions to politicians or party 
 Honoraria for speaking 
 Paid travel 
 Personal service (hiring people with 
political experience, relatives of 
political decision makers or having a 
firm member run for office) 
 
Constituency-building strategy  Grassroots mobilization of 
employees, suppliers, customers, etc. 
 Advocacy advertising 
 Public relations 
 Press conferences 
 Political education programs 
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Commissioning 
research projects and 
reporting research 
results to inform and 
influence the 
governments of 
Venezuela, Ecuador 
or Nicaragua
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Offering 
presentations as an 
“expert” firm about a 
given subject to 
influence the 
governments of 
Venezuela, Ecuador 
or Nicaragua
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Using position 
papers or technical 
reports to influence 
the governments of 
Venezuela, Ecuador 
or Nicaragua
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Making financial 
contributions to 
politicians, political 
parties or causes in 
Venezuela, Ecuador 
or Nicaragua
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Paying honoraria to 
politicians in 
Venezuela, Ecuador 
or Nicaragua for 
public speaking
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Paying travel 
expenses of 
government officers 
in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or 
Nicaragua
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
 Control or cooperative responses Control and cooperative responses to political 
uncertainty involve firms’ attempts to influence or 
shape governments in favorable ways towards their 
own particular interests (Baysinger, 1984; Miller, 
1992).  Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) taxonomy of 
corporate political strategies, presents three 
theoretically distinct strategies, each comprising of a 
variety of tactics.  The tactics describe the control or 
cooperative responses that a firm can use to 
influence the political environment.  In 2003, 
Hillman used these control or cooperative responses 
in a survey she conducted to US multinationals.  
Below, is this taxonomy:                                                                                                                                                                  
Information strategy
Financial incetive 
strategy
Strategy Tactics 
Information strategy  Lobbying 
 Commissioning research projects and 
reporting research results 
 Testifying as expert witnesses 
 Supplying position papers or technical 
reports 
 
Financial incentive strategy  Contributions to politicians or party 
 Honoraria for speaking 
 Paid travel 
 Personal service (hiring people with 
political experience, relatives of 
political decision makers or having a 
firm member run for office) 
 
Constituency-building strategy  Grassroots mobilization of 
employees, suppliers, customers, etc. 
 Advocacy advertising 
 Public relations 
 Press conferences 
 Political education programs 
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Hiring relatives of 
politicians or having 
a firm member run 
for office or 
participate in 
government affairs 
in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or 
Nicaragua
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Inviting employees, 
suppliers, and 
customers to 
mobilize in favor of 
a politician, political 
party or cause in 
Venezuela, Ecuador 
or Nicaragua
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Supporting 
advertisement of a 
political cause or 
message in 
Venezuela, Ecuador 
or Nicaragua
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Using public 
relations in favor of a 
politician, political 
party or cause in 
Venezuela, Ecuador 
or Nicaragua
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Offering thought 
leadership events or 
press conferences to 
support a politician, 
political party or 
cause in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or 
Nicaragua
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Constituency building 
strategy
 Control or cooperative responses Control and cooperative responses to political 
uncertainty involve firms’ attempts to influence or 
shape governments in favorable ways towards their 
own particular interests (Baysinger, 1984; Miller, 
1992).  Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) taxonomy of 
corporate political strategies, presents three 
theoretically distinct strategies, each comprising of a 
variety of tactics.  The tactics describe the control or 
cooperative responses that a firm can use to 
influence the political environment.  In 2003, 
Hillman used these control or cooperative responses 
in a survey she conducted to US multinationals.  
Below, is this taxonomy:                                                                                                                                                                  
Financial incetive 
strategy
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Leading or 
participating in 
political education 
programs in favor of 
a politician, political 
party or cause in 
Venezuela, Ecuador 
or Nicaragua
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Acquiring physicial resources to overcome 
political challenges
Constituency building 
strategy
Flexible responses Flexible responses are those responses through 
which firms can adapt to substantial, uncertain, and 
fast-occurring political changes (Miller, 1992).  
Avoiding influencing the host government
Sustaining permanent clear internal 
communication
Adopting a low profile
Adopting a politically neutral stance
Representing the firm through locals before 
host governments and local customers
Not incurring in acts of corruption
Developing tools to assure the firm’s 
compliance with laws, adequate management 
of governmental inspections, and maintenance 
of positive community and labor relations
The variable "flexible responses" encompasses 
flexible responses to confront a potential 
expropriation and flexible responses to confront 
policy changes.  
 Control or cooperative responses Control and cooperative responses to political 
uncertainty involve firms’ attempts to influence or 
shape governments in favorable ways towards their 
own particular interests (Baysinger, 1984; Miller, 
1992).  Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) taxonomy of 
corporate political strategies, presents three 
theoretically distinct strategies, each comprising of a 
variety of tactics.  The tactics describe the control or 
cooperative responses that a firm can use to 
influence the political environment.  In 2003, 
Hillman used these control or cooperative responses 
in a survey she conducted to US multinationals.  
Below, is this taxonomy:                                                                                                                                                                  
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interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Further penetrating the firm’s existing markets 
Provisioning in financial statements the value 
of the investments that face potential 
expropriation in a host market
Creating plans to manage a potential 
expropriation
Diversifying the firm’s markets
Flexible responses Flexible responses are those responses through 
which firms can adapt to substantial, uncertain, and 
fast-occurring political changes (Miller, 1992).  
Using human capital with knowledge about the 
host context to understand, anticipate and react
Carefully evaluating future investments 
Avoding the media
Paying just prices to suppliers
Changing the country of origin in the legal 
structure of an investment
Substituting imports by local production to 
appear as a local value-adding firm
The variable "flexible responses" encompasses 
flexible responses to confront a potential 
expropriation and flexible responses to confront 
policy changes.  
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interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Mapping and analyzing the potential impact of 
interest groups in the firm’s operations
Flexible responses Flexible responses are those responses through 
which firms can adapt to substantial, uncertain, and 
fast-occurring political changes (Miller, 1992).  
Adequating the firm’s products to ensure their 
compliance with the law
Modifying the firm’s organizational structure 
and processes to comply with the law
Modifying the firm’s organizational structure 
and processes not to comply with the law but 
to help it sustain its operations
Developing ways to supply a restricted market
Monitoring the context                                                                                  
Reducing operational costs to overcome 
increasing operational expenses related to 
governmental policies
Revising prices to maintain competitiveness 
and assure the best possible profit
Identifying products that can competitively and 
profitably be supplied in accordance to 
changing policies
Anticipating possibilities to comply with 
potential upcoming policies
The variable "flexible responses" encompasses 
flexible responses to confront a potential 
expropriation and flexible responses to confront 
policy changes.  
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interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Investing in initiatives to sustain and improve 
the competitive position of the firm
Flexible responses Flexible responses are those responses through 
which firms can adapt to substantial, uncertain, and 
fast-occurring political changes (Miller, 1992).  
Flexible responses to confront policy 
changes
Since Latam confronted policy changes and potential 
expropriation in the political contexts that were 
analyzed to understand the development of adaptive 
political capabilities, our research findings indicate 
that the flexible responses enabled by Latam’s 
adaptive political capabilities to confront political 
uncertainties, can be categorized as either flexible 
responses to policy changes or flexible responses to 
potential expropriation.
Adequating the firm’s products to ensure their 
compliance with the law
Modifying the firm’s organizational structure 
and processes to comply with the law
Since Latam confronted policy changes and potential 
expropriation in the political contexts that were 
analyzed to understand the development of adaptive 
political capabilities, our research findings indicate 
that the flexible responses enabled by Latam’s 
adaptive political capabilities to confront political 
uncertainties, can be categorized as either flexible 
responses to policy changes or flexible responses to 
potential expropriation.
Avoding the media
Paying just prices to suppliers
Changing the country of origin in the legal 
structure of an investment
Substituting imports by local production to 
appear as a local value-adding firm
Provisioning in financial statements the value 
of the investments that face potential 
expropriation in a host market
Creating plans to manage a potential 
expropriation
Mapping and analyzing the potential impact of 
interest groups in the firm’s operations
The variable "flexible responses" encompasses 
flexible responses to confront a potential 
expropriation and flexible responses to confront 
policy changes.  
Flexible responses to confront potential 
expropriation
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interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Investing in initiatives to sustain and improve 
the competitive position of the firm
Flexible responses to confront policy 
changes
Since Latam confronted policy changes and potential 
expropriation in the political contexts that were 
analyzed to understand the development of adaptive 
political capabilities, our research findings indicate 
that the flexible responses enabled by Latam’s 
adaptive political capabilities to confront political 
uncertainties, can be categorized as either flexible 
responses to policy changes or flexible responses to 
potential expropriation.
Modifying the firm’s organizational structure 
and processes not to comply with the law but 
to help it sustain its operations
Developing ways to supply a restricted market
Monitoring the context                                                                                  
Reducing operational costs to overcome 
increasing operational expenses related to 
governmental policies
Revising prices to maintain competitiveness 
and assure the best possible profit
Identifying products that can competitively and 
profitably be supplied in accordance to 
changing policies
Anticipating possibilities to comply with 
potential upcoming policies
Human capital resources According to Barney (1991), human capital 
resources include the training, experience, 
judgement, intelligence, and insight of individual 
managers and workers in a firm.
Experience and knowledge (people internal and 
external to the firm)
Previous experience of the firm’s employees 
Knowledge of internal employees about the 
context of a specific country 
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interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot 
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Reconfiguration of its organizational structure interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
New geographical location for the firm
Acces to raw materials
Organizational structure and processes Organizational processes
Organizational structure
Physical resources
Human capital resources According to Barney (1991), human capital 
resources include the training, experience, 
judgement, intelligence, and insight of individual 
managers and workers in a firm.
Experience and knowledge (people internal and 
external to the firm)
According to Barney (1991), physical capital 
resources include the physical technology used in a 
firm, a firm’s plant and equipment, its geographic 
location, and its access to raw materials.
 
Knowledge of external organizations or people 
to the firm about the context of a specific 
country 
Machinery and equipment
Technological infrastructure
Contextual knowledge of internal and 
external human resources
Knowledge of external organizations or people 
to the firm about the context of a specific 
country 
Organizational resources According to Barney (1991), organizational capital 
resources include a firm’s formal reporting 
structure, its formal and informal planning, 
controlling, and coordinating systems, as well as 
informal relations among groups within a firm and 
between a firm and those in its environment. 
Reconfigurations of organizational 
structure and processes
Are the redesign of certain elements or components 
of an organization’s structure (Karim, 2006).
Reconfiguration of its organizational structure
Knowledge about a specific context that internal or 
external people to the firm have (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000). 
Knowledge about a specific context that internal 
employees or external people and organizations to 
the firm have
Knowledge of internal employees about the 
context of a specific country 
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Reconfiguration of its organizational processes interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Reconfigurations of organizational 
structure and processes
Are the redesign of certain elements or components 
of an organization’s structure (Karim, 2006).
Reconfiguration of its organizational processes
Managerial commitment to knowledge 
articulation
Means commitment to learning (McLarney & 
Dastrala, 2001) or to investments in learning (Zollo 
& Winter, 2002) which refers to assuring that 
knowledge articulation efforts take place in the firm 
and support the development process of capabilities.  
Knowledge articulation is the process through which 
experience and implicit knowledge is articulated by 
individuals through collective discussions, 
debriefing sessions, and outcomes evaluation 
processes (Zollo & Winter, 2002).
Investments in physical resources Investments in physical captial resources refer to the 
act of investing in outsourcing, acquiring, or 
developing physical capital resources which include 
the physical technology used in a firm, a firm´s plant 
and equipment, its geographic location, and its 
access to raw materials (Barney, 1991).
Sessions of collective discussions about what 
was learned though operations
Interviews to the key employees involved
Formal evaluation of the strategies 
implemented and their outcomes 
Investments in technological infrastructure
Investments in machinery and equipment
Investments in acces to raw materials
Investments in a new geographical location for 
the firm
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Managerial commitment to knowledge 
codification
Means commitment to learning (McLarney & 
Dastrala, 2001) or to investments in learning (Zollo 
& Winter, 2002) which refers to assuring that 
knowledge codification efforts take place in the firm 
and support the development process of capabilities.  
Knowledge codification takes place when 
individuals codify their understandings of the 
outcome implications of internal processes in written 
tools, such as frameworks, manuals, spreadsheets, 
decision support systems, etc (Zollo & Winter, 
2002).
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Lose the knowledge developed A disaster takes place and affects the firm (fire, 
flood, robbery, computer break down, viruses)
The memory of the people who posses the 
knowledge fails, The people who posses the 
knowledge retire or leave the firm
People forget what they have learned
The people who possess the knowledge retire 
or leave the firm
A disaster takes place and affects the firm (fire, 
flood, robbery, computer break down, viruses)
Creation of written tools such as manuals, 
protocols, frameworks, systems or others to 
support decision making
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Control variables Literature Review Findings in my research Type of variables Measurement scales Coding
(43) Colombia 43
(136) Mexico 136
(62) United States 62
(105) Italy 105
(191) Swizerland 191
(1) Microfirm 1
(2) Small firm 2
(3) Medium firm 3
(4) Large firm 4
Experience in foreign high political 
uncertainty contexts
ratio number of years between 
0-13
0-13
Country scope interval Number of countries 
where firm operates 1-
198
1-198
(1) The firm sustained its 
operations
1
(2) The firm closed its 
operations
2
(3) The firm had no 
operations
3
(1) YES
(2) NO                                                 
1
2
(1) YES                                                                   
(2) NO                                                 
1
2
(1) YES                                                                   
(2) NO                                                 
1
2
(1) YES                                                                   
(2) NO                                                 
1
2
Level of headquarters control interval (1) None                                                                    
(2)                                                                              
(3) Some                                                                      
(4)                                                                         
(5) A lot
1                             
2                                         
3                                     
4                                       
5      
Years
Size
Involvement of counterparts in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua in the decisions of the 
firm regarding how to confront these foreign 
political contexts
The firm closed its operations
The firm had no operations
The firm only owned distribution operations 
(did not owned production operations) in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua
Number of countries
Type of operations in high political 
uncertainty contexts
The firm exported directly to its clients or third 
parties (not to its own distribution) in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua
The firm owned production and distribution 
operations simultaneously in one country in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua
Status of operations in high political 
uncertainty contexts
The firm owned production operations (did not 
owned distribution operations) in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua
The firm sustained its operations nominal
nominal
Dimensions
nominalCountry of origin of the firm List of 198 countries in the world
nominalMicro firm
Small firm
Medium firm
Large firm
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Copyright  2012 Maria Andrea De Villa 
 
All rights are reserved.  No part of this paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, 
including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the author. 
           
 
The development of political strategies for foreign high political uncertainty 
markets 
 
Research overview and consent: 
 
EAFIT University (Colombia) and Cranfield University (United Kingdom) are studying 
how firms in the Colombian processed food sector which have exported, distributed or 
produced their products in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011, have 
managed to sustain their operations in these foreign markets despite their high political 
uncertainty.  High political uncertainty in foreign markets occurs when it is likely that a 
firm’s operations are affected by discriminatory changes in policies by a host 
government, or when the proprietary structure of a firm is threatened by a potential 
expropriation on behalf of a host government. 
 
Your participation in this survey is of great importance since the firm that you work for 
is part of our population of study and it will allow the firm to be part of a contest to win 
an executive education course offered by EAFIT University between 2013-2014.  The 
winner firm will be able to select the executive education course of its preference from 
the portfolio of executive courses of EAFIT University and beneficiate by training one 
employee of its choice. 
 
We ask you to please respond the attached survey which should take less than 15 
minutes.  Your participation is voluntary, you may retire at any time, and your 
responses will be anonymous, confidential and exclusively used for academic purposes.  
By returning this survey you are providing consent to participate.  An executive 
summary of the survey findings will be sent to the interested firms upon completion of 
the study. 
 
If you have any questions you may contact us at the following email: 
mdevilla@eafit.edu.co 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Maria Andrea De Villa    Tazeeb Rajwani, PhD 
Doctoral Researcher     Supervisor 
Universidad EAFIT - Cranfield University  Cranfield University
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SURVEY 
 
SECTION 1. GENERAL INFORMATION: 
1) What is your job title? ____________________________________________________________________________ 
2) How many years have you worked for the firm? ______________________________________________________ 
3) What is the firm’s country of origin? ________________________________________________________________ 
4) Mark with an “X” the classification of the firm according to the Colombian law 905 of 2004 (select only one 
answer that matches the highest classification of the firm by either its employees or assets): 
 Micro firm: No more than 10 employees. Total assets up to 500 current legal minimum monthly salaries in 
Colombian pesos (COP). 
 Small firm: Between 11 and 50 employees. Total assets between 501 and 5.000 current legal minimum monthly 
salaries in COP. 
 Medium firm: Between 51 and 200 employees. Total assets between 5.001 and 30.000 current legal minimum 
monthly salaries in COP. 
 Large firm: More than 200 employees. Total assets more than 30.000 current legal minimum monthly salaries in 
COP. 
 
5) In how many countries, excluding Colombia, are the firm’s products sold regardless of if they are exported to or 
produced in these countries? _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6) Mark with an “X” the approximate number of years between 1999-2011 that the firm had operations in:  
6.1. Venezuela: □0   □1    □2    □3    □4    □5    □6    □7    □8    □9    □10    □11    □12    □13 
6.2. Ecuador:     □0   □1    □2    □3    □4    □5    □6    □7    □8    □9    □10    □11    □12    □13 
6.3. Nicaragua:  □0   □1    □2    □3    □4    □5    □6    □7    □8    □9    □10    □11    □12    □13 
7) Mark with an “X” the statement that best describes the firm’s operations between 1999-2011 in the following 
markets. (The term sustained means the firm maintained operations, no matter if sales decreased.) 
7.1. Venezuela: 
 The firm sustained its operations 
 The firm closed its operations 
 The firm had no operations 
7.2. Ecuador: 
 The firm sustained its operations 
 The firm closed its operations 
 The firm had no operations 
7.3. Nicaragua: 
 The firm sustained its operations 
 The firm closed its operations 
 The firm had no operations 
 
No. 
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SECTION 2. KNOWLEDGE 
 
8) Rate with an “X” to what extent has the firm conducted the following activities to preserve  
the knowledge that it has developed about how to sustain operations in foreign high political uncertainty  
markets through its experience in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011: 
8.1. Sessions of collective discussions about what was learned through operations 1   2   3   4   5      
8.2. Interviews with the key employees involved 1   2   3   4   5      
8.3. Formal evaluation of the strategies implemented and their outcomes 1   2   3   4   5      
8.4. Creation of written tools such as a historical memory, manuals, protocols, frameworks, systems or 
others to support decision making 
1   2   3   4   5      
 
9) Rate with an “X” the possibility of the firm losing the knowledge it has developed about how  
to sustain operations in high political uncertainty market, when the following situations occur: 
9.1. People forget what they have learned 1   2   3   4   5      
9.2. People who possess the knowledge retire or leave the firm 1   2   3   4   5      
9.3. A disaster takes place and affects the firm (e.i. fire, flood, robbery, computer break down, viruses) 1   2   3   4   5      
 
 
SECTION 3. PERCEIVED POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY 
 
 
 
 
10) Rate with an “X” the certainty that the firm  
has had of each of the variables of the political  
context between 1999-2011: 
Variables of the political context  Venezuela Ecuador Nicaragua 
10.1. Ability of the party in power to maintain control 
of the government 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.2. Threat of armed conflict 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.3. Tax policies 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.4. Monetary policy 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.5. Prices controlled by the government 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.6. National laws affecting international business 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.7. Legal regulations affecting the food sector 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.8. Tariffs on imported goods 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.9. Enforcement of existing laws 1     2     3     4      1     2     3     4      1     2     3     4      
10.10. Public service provision (e.i. energy, gas, water, 
transport, communications) 
1     2     3     4      1     2     3     4      1     2     3     4      
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11) Only respond the columns of the markets in which 
the firm has had sales between 1999-2011, by rating  
with an “X” to what extent has the firm used  
each of the following strategies to confront the high  
political uncertainty that it has perceived: 
 Venezuela Ecuador Nicaragua 
11.1. Reconfiguring its organizational structure 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.2. Reconfiguring its organizational processes 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.3. Using the previous experience of its employees 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.4. Using the knowledge of internal employees 
about the context of this specific market 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.5. Using the knowledge of external organizations 
or people about the context of this specific market 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.6. Investing in machinery and equipment to operate 
in this market (i.e. investing in energy plants to 
overcome energy cuts installed by a host 
government) 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.7. Investing in access to raw materials (i.e. 
investing in developing raw materials to offer 
healthier products) 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.8. Investing in technological infrastructure (i.e. 
investing in creating a backup in servers outside of a 
market to enable the access of information about an 
operation despite an expropriation from a host 
government) 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.9. Investing in a new geographical location for the 
firm (i.e. investing in a new geographical location to 
supply a restricted market) 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
 
SECTION 4. OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIES 
 
12a) Mark with an “X” the countries to which the firm exported directly to its clients or third parties (not to its own 
distribution) between 1999-2011: 
 Venezuela 
 Ecuador 
 Nicaragua 
 None of the above (if this is your answer please go to question 13a) 
12b) If the firm exported directly to its clients or third parties (not to its own distribution) in Venezuela,  
Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011, rate with an “X” to what extent it used each of the  
following strategies to confront the high political uncertainty in these markets and sustain its exports: 
12.1. Lobbying the Colombian government (e.i. by communicating opinions or information to policy 
makers through informal meetings, formal settings or social settings to influence the government 
towards the firm’s own interests) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.2. Lobbying the host governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. by communicating 
opinions or information to policy makers through informal meetings, formal settings or social settings to 
influence any of these governments towards the firm’s own interests) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.3. Commissioning research projects and reporting research results to inform and influence the 
governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
12.4. Using position papers or technical reports to influence the governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.5. Paying honoraria to politicians in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua for public speaking 1   2   3   4   5      
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12.6. Offering presentations as an “expert” firm about a given subject to influence the governments of 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.7. Making financial contributions to politicians, political parties or causes in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.8. Paying travel expenses of government officers in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
12.9. Inviting employees, suppliers, and customers to mobilize in favor of a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.10. Hiring relatives of politicians or having a firm member run for office or participate in government 
affairs in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.11. Using public relations in favor of a politician, political party or cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.12. Supporting advertisement of a political cause or message in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
12.13. Offering thought leadership events or press conferences to support a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.14. Leading or participating in political education programmes in favor of a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.15. Diversifying the firm’s markets 1   2   3   4   5      
12.16. Further penetrating the firm’s existing markets 1   2   3   4   5      
12.17. Avoiding influencing the host governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
12.18. Adopting a low profile in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. not being a market leader) 1   2   3   4   5      
12.19. Adopting a neutral political stance 1   2   3   4   5      
12.20. Representing the firm through locals before the host governments and local customers in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.21. Not incurring in acts of corruption 1   2   3   4   5      
12.22. Using human capital with knowledge about the host contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
to understand, anticipate, and react to their political challenges 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.23. Carefully evaluating future investments in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
12.24. Investing in physical resources to overcome political challenges in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua (e.i. investing in energy plants to overcome energy cuts installed by a host government or 
investing in a new geographical location to supply a restricted market) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.25. Sustaining permanent clear internal communications evidencing the firm’s focus on its operations 
and not on a political stance 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.26. Developing tools to assure the firm’s compliance with laws, its adequate management of 
governmental inspections or its maintenance of positive community and labor relations in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. guidelines to guarantee the compliance of laws or to manage inspections) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.27. Adequating the firm’s products to ensure their compliance with the laws of Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua (e.i. changing the content of product labels to match the requirements of a new law) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.28. Modifying the firm’s organizational structure or processes to comply with the laws of Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. modifying financial processes to meet with new accounting and taxing laws) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.29. Modifying the firm’s organizational structure or processes not to comply with the laws of  
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua but to help it sustain its operations competitively in these markets (e.i. 
decreasing the number of employees in an operation to match decreasing sales) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.30. Developing ways to supply the markets of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua despite their 
restrictions (e.i. through new distributors, a new geographical location, among others) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.31. Monitoring the host contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
12.32. Reducing operational costs to overcome increasing operational expenses related to governmental 
policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.33. Revising prices to maintain competitiveness and assure the best possible profit in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.34. Identifying products that can competitively and profitably be supplied in accordance to changing 
policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.35. Anticipating possibilities to comply with potential upcoming policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
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12.36. Investing in initiatives to sustain and improve the competitive position of the firm in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. investing in developing healthier products) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.44. Involving the export counterparts (agents, representatives, distributors) in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua in the decisions of the firm regarding how to confront these foreign political contexts 
1   2   3   4   5      
 
13a) Mark with an “X” the countries in which the firm owned production and distribution operations simultaneously 
in one country between 1999-2011: 
 Venezuela 
 Ecuador 
 Nicaragua 
 None of the above (if this is your answer please go to question 14a) 
13b) If the firm owned production and distribution operations simultaneously in one country in  
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011, rate with an “X” to what extent it used  
each of the following strategies to confront the high political uncertainty in these markets and  
sustain its own production and distribution:  
13.1. Lobbying the Colombian government (e.i. by communicating opinions or information to policy 
makers through informal meetings, formal settings or social settings to influence the government 
towards the firm’s own interests) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.2. Lobbying the host governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. by communicating 
opinions or information to policy makers through informal meetings, formal settings or social settings to 
influence any of these governments towards the firm’s own interests) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.3. Commissioning research projects and reporting research results to inform and influence the 
governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
13.4. Using position papers or technical reports to influence the governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.5. Paying honoraria to politicians in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua for public speaking 1   2   3   4   5      
13.6. Offering presentations as an “expert” firm about a given subject to influence the governments of 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.7. Making financial contributions to politicians, political parties or causes in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.8. Paying travel expenses of government officers in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
13.9. Inviting employees, suppliers, and customers to mobilize in favor of a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.10. Hiring relatives of politicians or having a firm member run for office or participate in government 
affairs in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.11. Using public relations in favor of a politician, political party or cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.12. Supporting advertisement of a political cause or message in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
13.13. Offering thought leadership events or press conferences to support a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.14. Leading or participating in political education programmes in favor of a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.15. Diversifying the firm’s markets 1   2   3   4   5      
13.16. Further penetrating the firm’s existing markets 1   2   3   4   5      
13.17. Avoiding influencing the host governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
13.18. Adopting a low profile in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. not being a market leader) 1   2   3   4   5      
13.19. Adopting a neutral political stance 1   2   3   4   5      
13.20. Representing the firm through locals before the host governments and local customers in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.21. Not incurring in acts of corruption 1   2   3   4   5      
13.22. Using human capital with knowledge about the host contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
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to understand, anticipate, and react to their political challenges 
13.23. Carefully evaluating future investments in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
13.24. Investing in physical resources to overcome political challenges in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua (e.i. investing in energy plants to overcome energy cuts installed by a host government or 
investing in a new geographical location to supply a restricted market) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.25. Sustaining permanent clear internal communications evidencing the firm’s focus on its operations 
and not on a political stance 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.26. Developing tools to assure the firm’s compliance with laws, its adequate management of 
governmental inspections or its maintenance of positive community and labor relations in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. guidelines to guarantee the compliance of laws or to manage inspections) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.27. Adequating the firm’s products to ensure their compliance with the laws of Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua (e.i. changing the content of product labels to match the requirements of a new law) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.28. Modifying the firm’s organizational structure or processes to comply with the laws of Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. modifying financial processes to meet with new accounting and taxing laws) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.29. Modifying the firm’s organizational structure or processes not to comply with the laws of  
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua but to help it sustain its operations competitively in these markets (e.i. 
decreasing the number of employees in an operation to match decreasing sales) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.30. Developing ways to supply the markets of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua despite their 
restrictions (e.i. through new distributors, a new geographical location, among others) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.31. Monitoring the host contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
13.32. Reducing operational costs to overcome increasing operational expenses related to governmental 
policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.33. Revising prices to maintain competitiveness and assure the best possible profit in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.34. Identifying products that can competitively and profitably be supplied in accordance to changing 
policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.35. Anticipating possibilities to comply with potential upcoming policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
13.36. Investing in initiatives to sustain and improve the competitive position of the firm in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. investing in developing healthier products) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.37. Avoiding the media so that statements made by the firm cannot be used or manipulated in favor or 
against a political stance 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.38. Paying just prices to suppliers to appear as a local value-adding firm in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.39. Changing the country of origin in the legal structure of an investment in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua to protect it against a potential expropriation 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.40. Substituting imports by local production to appear as a local value-adding firm in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.41. Provisioning in financial statements the value of the investments that face potential expropriation in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.42. Creating plans to manage a potential expropriation in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
13.43. Mapping and analyzing the potential impact of interest groups on the firm’s operations in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.44. Involving the production and distribution operations in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua in the 
decisions of the firm regarding how to confront these foreign political contexts 
1   2   3   4   5      
 
14a) Mark with an “X” the countries in which the firm only owned distribution operations (did not owned production 
operations) between 1999-2011: 
 Venezuela 
 Ecuador 
 Nicaragua 
 None of the above (if this is your answer please go to question 15a) 
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14b) If the firm only owned distribution operations (did not owned production operations) in Venezuela, Ecuador  
or Nicaragua between 1999-2011, rate with an “X” to what extent it used each of the following  
strategies to confront the high political uncertainty in these markets and sustain its own distribution: 
14.1. Lobbying the Colombian government (e.i. by communicating opinions or information to policy 
makers through informal meetings, formal settings or social settings to influence the government 
towards the firm’s own interests) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.2. Lobbying the host governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. by communicating 
opinions or information to policy makers through informal meetings, formal settings or social settings to 
influence any of these governments towards the firm’s own interests) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.3. Commissioning research projects and reporting research results to inform and influence the 
governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
14.4. Using position papers or technical reports to influence the governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.5. Paying honoraria to politicians in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua for public speaking 1   2   3   4   5      
14.6. Offering presentations as an “expert” firm about a given subject to influence the governments of 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.7. Making financial contributions to politicians, political parties or causes in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.8. Paying travel expenses of government officers in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
14.9. Inviting employees, suppliers, and customers to mobilize in favor of a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.10. Hiring relatives of politicians or having a firm member run for office or participate in government 
affairs in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.11. Using public relations in favor of a politician, political party or cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.12. Supporting advertisement of a political cause or message in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
14.13. Offering thought leadership events or press conferences to support a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.14. Leading or participating in political education programmes in favor of a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.15. Diversifying the firm’s markets 1   2   3   4   5      
14.16. Further penetrating the firm’s existing markets 1   2   3   4   5      
14.17. Avoiding influencing the host governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
14.18. Adopting a low profile in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. not being a market leader) 1   2   3   4   5      
14.19. Adopting a neutral political stance 1   2   3   4   5      
14.20. Representing the firm through locals before the host governments and local customers in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.21. Not incurring in acts of corruption 1   2   3   4   5      
14.22. Using human capital with knowledge about the host contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
to understand, anticipate, and react to their political challenges 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.23. Carefully evaluating future investments in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
14.24. Investing in physical resources to overcome political challenges in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua (e.i. investing in energy plants to overcome energy cuts installed by a host government or 
investing in a new geographical location to supply a restricted market) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.25. Sustaining permanent clear internal communications evidencing the firm’s focus on its operations 
and not on a political stance 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.26. Developing tools to assure the firm’s compliance with laws, its adequate management of 
governmental inspections or its maintenance of positive community and labor relations in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. guidelines to guarantee the compliance of laws or to manage inspections) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.27. Adequating the firm’s products to ensure their compliance with the laws of Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua (e.i. changing the content of product labels to match the requirements of a new law) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.28. Modifying the firm’s organizational structure or processes to comply with the laws of Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. modifying financial processes to meet with new accounting and taxing laws) 
1   2   3   4   5      
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14.29. Modifying the firm’s organizational structure or processes not to comply with the laws of  
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua but to help it sustain its operations competitively in these markets (e.i. 
decreasing the number of employees in an operation to match decreasing sales) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.30. Developing ways to supply the markets of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua despite their 
restrictions (e.i. through new distributors, a new geographical location, among others) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.31. Monitoring the host contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
14.32. Reducing operational costs to overcome increasing operational expenses related to governmental 
policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.33. Revising prices to maintain competitiveness and assure the best possible profit in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.34. Identifying products that can competitively and profitably be supplied in accordance to changing 
policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.35. Anticipating possibilities to comply with potential upcoming policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
14.36. Investing in initiatives to sustain and improve the competitive position of the firm in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. investing in developing healthier products) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.37. Avoiding the media so that statements made by the firm cannot be used or manipulated in favor or 
against a political stance 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.38. Paying just prices to suppliers to appear as a local value-adding firm in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.39. Changing the country of origin in the legal structure of an investment in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua to protect it against a potential expropriation 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.40. Substituting imports by local production to appear as a local value-adding firm in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.41. Provisioning in financial statements the value of the investments that face potential expropriation in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.42. Creating plans to manage a potential expropriation in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
14.43. Mapping and analyzing the potential impact of interest groups on the firm’s operations in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.44. Involving the distribution operation in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua in the decisions of the 
firm regarding how to confront these foreign political contexts 
1   2   3   4   5      
 
15a) Mark with an “X” the countries in which the firm owned production operations (did not owned distribution 
operations) between 1999-2011: 
 Venezuela 
 Ecuador 
 Nicaragua 
 None of the above (if this is your answer please go to question 16) 
15b) If the firm owned production operations (did not owned distribution operations) in Venezuela,  
Ecuador or Nicaragua between 1999-2011, rate with an “X” to what extent it used each of the following  
strategies to confront the high political uncertainty in these markets and sustain its own production: 
15.1. Lobbying the Colombian government (e.i. by communicating opinions or information to policy 
makers through informal meetings, formal settings or social settings to influence the government 
towards the firm’s own interests) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.2. Lobbying the host governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. by communicating 
opinions or information to policy makers through informal meetings, formal settings or social settings to 
influence any of these governments towards the firm’s own interests) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.3. Commissioning research projects and reporting research results to inform and influence the 
governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
15.4. Using position papers or technical reports to influence the governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
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15.5. Paying honoraria to politicians in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua for public speaking 1   2   3   4   5      
15.6. Offering presentations as an “expert” firm about a given subject to influence the governments of 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.7. Making financial contributions to politicians, political parties or causes in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.8. Paying travel expenses of government officers in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
15.9. Inviting employees, suppliers, and customers to mobilize in favor of a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.10. Hiring relatives of politicians or having a firm member run for office or participate in government 
affairs in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.11. Using public relations in favor of a politician, political party or cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.12. Supporting advertisement of a political cause or message in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
15.13. Offering thought leadership events or press conferences to support a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.14. Leading or participating in political education programmes in favor of a politician, political party or 
cause in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.15. Diversifying the firm’s markets 1   2   3   4   5      
15.16. Further penetrating the firm’s existing markets 1   2   3   4   5      
15.17. Avoiding influencing the host governments of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
15.18. Adopting a low profile in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. not being a market leader) 1   2   3   4   5      
15.19. Adopting a neutral political stance 1   2   3   4   5      
15.20. Representing the firm through locals before the host governments and local customers in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.21. Not incurring in acts of corruption 1   2   3   4   5      
15.22. Using human capital with knowledge about the host contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
to understand, anticipate, and react to their political challenges 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.23. Carefully evaluating future investments in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
15.24. Investing in physical resources to overcome political challenges in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua (e.i. investing in energy plants to overcome energy cuts installed by a host government or 
investing in a new geographical location to supply a restricted market) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.25. Sustaining permanent clear internal communications evidencing the firm’s focus on its operations 
and not on a political stance 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.26. Developing tools to assure the firm’s compliance with laws, its adequate management of 
governmental inspections or its maintenance of positive community and labor relations in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. guidelines to guarantee the compliance of laws or to manage inspections) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.27. Adequating the firm’s products to ensure their compliance with the laws of Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua (e.i. changing the content of product labels to match the requirements of a new law) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.28. Modifying the firm’s organizational structure or processes to comply with the laws of Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. modifying financial processes to meet with new accounting and taxing laws) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.29. Modifying the firm’s organizational structure or processes not to comply with the laws of  
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua but to help it sustain its operations competitively in these markets (e.i. 
decreasing the number of employees in an operation to match decreasing sales) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.30. Developing ways to supply the markets of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua despite their 
restrictions (e.i. through new distributors, a new geographical location, among others) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.31. Monitoring the host contexts of Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
15.32. Reducing operational costs to overcome increasing operational expenses related to governmental 
policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.33. Revising prices to maintain competitiveness and assure the best possible profit in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.34. Identifying products that can competitively and profitably be supplied in accordance to changing 
policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.35. Anticipating possibilities to comply with potential upcoming policies in Venezuela, Ecuador or 1   2   3   4   5      
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Nicaragua  
15.36. Investing in initiatives to sustain and improve the competitive position of the firm in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua (e.i. investing in developing healthier products) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.37. Avoiding the media so that statements made by the firm cannot be used or manipulated in favor or 
against a political stance 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.38. Paying just prices to suppliers to appear as a local value-adding firm in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.39. Changing the country of origin in the legal structure of an investment in Venezuela, Ecuador or 
Nicaragua to protect it against a potential expropriation 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.40. Substituting imports by local production to appear as a local value-adding firm in Venezuela, 
Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.41. Provisioning in financial statements the value of the investments that face potential expropriation in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.42. Creating plans to manage a potential expropriation in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
15.43. Mapping and analyzing the potential impact of interest groups on the firm’s operations in 
Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.44. Involving the production operation in Venezuela, Ecuador or Nicaragua in the decisions of the firm 
regarding how to confront these foreign political contexts 
1   2   3   4   5      
 
 
16) Please provide an email through which you can be contacted in case the firm wins the executive extension 
course offered by EAFIT University: __________________________________________________________________ 
 
17) Please tick the box indicating if you wish to receive an executive summary of the survey findings through the 
previous email:                             YES                 NO     
 
18) Please provide the name of the firm to allow us to contact one more employee to complete this survey: 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19) Please suggest the name and/or position of one other employee within the firm who can be contacted to respond 
this survey: 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME! 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
Copyright  2012 Maria Andrea De Villa 
 
Esta encuesta se encuentra protegida por la legislación de derechos de autor. Todos los derechos se encuentran reservados.  Esta 
prohibida su reproducción y/o divulgación en cualquier forma y por cualquier medio sin autorización escrita del autor. 
        
Investigación sobre el desarrollo de estrategias políticas para mercados foráneos  
de alta incertidumbre política 
 
Generalidades de la investigación y consentimiento: 
 
La Universidad EAFIT (Colombia) y Cranfield University (Reino Unido) se encuentran 
investigando como las empresas en el sector de alimentos procesados en Colombia, que 
hayan tenido exportaciones, distribución propia y/o producción propia en Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua entre 1999-2011, lograron sostener sus operaciones en estos 
mercados foráneos a pesar de su alta incertidumbre política.  La alta incertidumbre 
política en mercados foráneos se da cuando es muy probable que las operaciones de una 
empresa sean afectadas por cambios discriminatorios en las políticas de un gobierno 
foráneo, o cuando la estructura de propiedad de una empresa se ve amenazada por una 
potencial expropiación por parte de un gobierno foráneo.  
 
Su participación en esta investigación es muy importante debido a que la empresa para 
la cual usted trabaja hace parte de la población de estudio y le permitirá concursar por 
un diplomado abierto al público ofrecido por la Universidad EAFIT durante el 2013-
2014.  La empresa ganadora podrá seleccionar el diplomado abierto al público de su 
preferencia dentro del portafolio de diplomados de la Universidad EAFIT y se 
beneficiará capacitando a un empleado de su selección. 
 
Le solicitamos el favor de responder la encuesta adjunta, la cual no debe tomarle más de 
15 minutos.  Su participación es voluntaria, puede retirarse en cualquier momento y sus 
respuestas serán anónimas, confidenciales y utilizadas exclusivamente para fines 
académicos.  Al devolver la encuesta usted da su consentimiento para hacer parte de 
esta investigación.  Un resumen ejecutivo de los resultados será enviado a las empresas 
que lo deseen al ser concluido el estudio. 
 
Si tiene alguna pregunta puede contactarnos enviado un email a: mdevilla@eafit.edu.co 
 
Agradecemos su atención, 
 
Maria Andrea De Villa    Tazeeb Rajwani, PhD 
Investigadora Doctoral    Profesor Investigador 
Universidad EAFIT - Cranfield University  Cranfield University
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ENCUESTA 
 
SECCIÓN 1. INFORMACIÓN GENERAL: 
1) ¿Cuál es su cargo en la empresa? ___________________________________________________________________ 
2) ¿Cuántos años ha trabajado en la empresa? __________________________________________________________ 
3) ¿Cual es el país de origen de la empresa? ____________________________________________________________ 
4) Seleccione con una “X” la clasificación de la ley 905 de 2004 que representa a la empresa (seleccione solo una 
respuesta que esté acorde con la clasificación más alta de la empresa, ya sea  a través de sus empleados o activos): 
 Microempresa: Personal no superior a 10 trabajadores. Activos totales hasta 500 salarios mínimos mensuales 
legales vigentes. 
 Pequeña empresa: Personal entre 11 y 50 trabajadores. Activos totales entre 501 y 5.000 salarios mínimos 
mensuales legales vigentes. 
 Mediana empresa: Personal entre 51 y 200 trabajadores. Activos totales entre 5.001 y 30.000 salarios mínimos 
mensuales legales vigentes. 
 Gran empresa: Personal superior a 200 trabajadores. Activos totales superiores a 30.000 salarios mínimos 
mensuales legales vigentes. 
 
5) ¿En cuantos países, excluyendo Colombia, se venden los productos de la empresa sin importar si son exportados 
hacia o producidos en esos países? ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6) Seleccione con una “X” el número aproximado de años entre 1999-2011 durante los cuales la empresa tuvo 
operaciones en: 
6.1. Venezuela: □0   □1    □2    □3    □4    □5    □6    □7    □8    □9    □10    □11    □12    □13 
6.2. Ecuador:     □0   □1    □2    □3    □4    □5    □6    □7    □8    □9    □10    □11    □12    □13 
6.3. Nicaragua:  □0   □1    □2    □3    □4    □5    □6    □7    □8    □9    □10    □11    □12    □13 
7) Seleccione con una “X” el enunciado que mejor describe las operaciones de la empresa entre 1999-2011 en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua.  (El término “sostuvo” significa que la empresa mantuvo sus operaciones, sin 
importar si sus ventas disminuyeron.) 
7.1. Venezuela: 
 La empresa sostuvo sus operaciones 
 La empresa cerró sus operaciones 
 La empresa no tuvo operaciones 
7.2. Ecuador: 
 La empresa sostuvo sus operaciones 
 La empresa cerró sus operaciones 
 La empresa no tuvo operaciones 
7.3. Nicaragua: 
 La empresa sostuvo sus operaciones 
 La empresa cerró sus operaciones 
No. 
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 La empresa no tuvo operaciones 
 
SECCIÓN 2. CONOCIMIENTO   
 
8) Califique con una “X” que tanto la empresa ha realizado las siguientes actividades  
para conservar el conocimiento que ha desarrollado sobre como sostener sus operaciones en entornos  
foráneos de alta incertidumbre política a partir de su experiencia en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
entre 1999-2011: 
8.1. Sesiones de discusiones colectivas sobre lo aprendido a través de las operaciones 1   2   3   4   5      
8.2. Entrevistas al personal clave involucrado 1   2   3   4   5      
8.3. Evaluación formal de las estrategias implementadas y sus resultados 1   2   3   4   5      
8.4. Creación de herramientas escritas como memorias históricas, manuales, protocolos, modelos, o 
sistemas para apoyar la toma de decisiones  
1   2   3   4   5      
 
9) Califique con una “X” la posibilidad que tiene la empresa de perder el conocimiento  
que ha desarrollado sobre como sostener sus operaciones en entornos foráneos de alta incertidumbre  
política, cuando se presenten las siguientes situaciones:  
9.1. Las personas olviden lo que lo aprendieron 1   2   3   4   5      
9.2. Las personas que tienen este conocimiento se jubilen o se marchen de la empresa 1   2   3   4   5      
9.3. Ocurra un siniestro en la empresa (e.j. incendio, inundación, robo, daño de computadores, virus) 1   2   3   4   5      
 
 
SECCIÓN 3. INCERTIDUMRE POLÍTICA PERCIBIDA 
 
 
10) Califique con una “X” que tanta certeza ha tenido 
la empresa sobre cada una de las siguientes variables  
del entorno político entre 1999-2011:  
 
Variables del entorno político Venezuela Ecuador Nicaragua 
10.1. Habilidad del partido en el poder de mantener 
control del gobierno 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.2. Amenaza de un conflicto armado 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.3. Políticas de impuestos 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.4. Política monetaria 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.5. Precios controlados por el gobierno 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.6. Leyes nacionales que afectan a los negocios 
internacionales 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.7. Regulaciones legales que afectan al sector de 
alimentos 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.8. Tarifas a bienes importados 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.9. Aplicación de las leyes existentes 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
10.10. Provisión de servicios públicos (e.j. energía, 
gas, agua, transporte, comunicaciones) 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
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11) Solo para los mercados en los cuales la empresa tuvo  
ventas entre 1999-2011, califique con una “X” 
que tanto la empresa utilizó cada una de las siguientes  
estrategias para confrontar la alta incertidumbre política 
que ha percibido: 
Estrategias Venezuela Ecuador Nicaragua 
11.1. Modificar su estructura organizacional  1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.2. Modificar sus procesos organizacionales 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.3. Utilizar la experiencia previa de sus empleados  1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.4. Utilizar el conocimiento de sus empleados internos 
sobre el contexto de ese mercado específico 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.5. Utilizar el conocimiento de personas u 
organizaciones externas a la empresa sobre el contexto 
de ese mercado específico 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.6. Invertir en maquinaria y equipos para lograr atender 
ese mercado (e.j. invertir en plantas de energía para 
sobreponerse a cortes en la energía instalados por un 
gobierno foráneo) 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.7. Invertir en el acceso a materias primas para lograr 
atender ese mercado (e.j. invertir en el desarrollo de 
materias primas para lograr productos más saludables 
exigidos por la ley) 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.8. Invertir en infraestructura tecnológica (e.j. invertir 
en un back-up en servidores por fuera del mercado para 
poder acceder a la información de un operación en caso 
de una expropiación por parte del gobierno foráneo) 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
11.9. Invertir en la ubicación geográfica de parte de la 
estructura organizacional de la empresa para lograr 
atender ese mercado (e.j. invertir en una nueva 
ubicación geográfica para proveer a un mercado 
restringido) 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5 
 
SECCIÓN 4. OPERACIONES Y ESTRATEGIAS 
 
12a) Seleccione con una “X” los países hacia los cuales la empresa exportó directamente a clientes o terceros (no a su 
distribución propia) entre 1999-2011: 
 Venezuela 
 Ecuador 
 Nicaragua 
 Ninguno de los anteriores (si esta es su respuesta por favor pase la pregunta 13a) 
12b) Si la empresa exportó directamente a clientes o terceros (no a su distribución propia) en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua entre 1999-2011, califique con una “X” que tanto utilizó cada una de las siguientes  
estrategias para confrontar la alta incertidumbre política en cualquiera de estos mercados y lograr  
sostener sus exportaciones: 
12.1. Lobby al gobierno Colombiano (e.j. comunicando opiniones o información a los legisladores a 
través de reuniones informales, escenarios formales o sociales para influenciar al gobierno hacia los 
intereses particulares de la empresa) 
1   2   3   4   5      
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12.2. Lobby a cualquiera de los gobiernos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. comunicando 
opiniones o información a los legisladores a través de reuniones informales, escenarios formales o 
sociales para influenciar a cualquiera de estos gobiernos hacia los intereses particulares de la empresa) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.3. Realizar o apoyar investigaciones para informar sus resultados e influenciar a los gobiernos de 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
12.4. Usar reportes técnicos para influenciar a los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
12.5. Pagar a políticos en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua por su realización de discursos públicos 1   2   3   4   5      
12.6. Elaborar presentaciones como empresa “experta” sobre algún tema para influenciar a los gobiernos 
de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
12.7. Hacer contribuciones financieras a políticos, partidos o causas políticas en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
12.8. Pagar gastos de viaje a funcionarios de los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
12.9. Invitar a empleados, proveedores o clientes a movilizarse a favor de un político, partido o causa 
política en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.10. Contratar a familiares de políticos o lograr que alguien de la empresa postule una candidatura o 
participe en los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
12.11. Usar relaciones públicas a favor de un político, partido o causa política en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
12.12. Apoyar la publicidad de una causa o mensaje político en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
12.13. Realizar eventos sobre pensamientos de liderazgo o conferencias de prensa para apoyar a un 
político, partido o causa política en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.14. Realizar programas de educación política a favor de un político, partido o causa política en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.15. Diversificar los mercados de la empresa 1   2   3   4   5      
12.16. Penetrar los mercados existentes de la empresa 1   2   3   4   5      
12.17. Evitar influenciar a los gobiernos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
12.18. Adoptar un perfil bajo en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. no siendo el líder del mercado) 1   2   3   4   5      
12.19. Adoptar una postura política neutral 1   2   3   4   5      
12.20. Representar a la empresa a través de locales ante los gobiernos foráneos y los clientes locales en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.21. No incurrir en actos de corrupción 1   2   3   4   5      
12.22. Utilizar capital humano con conocimiento sobre los contextos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua para entender, anticiparse y reaccionar ante los retos políticos de estos mercados 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.23. Evaluar cuidadosamente futuras inversiones en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
12.24. Invertir en recursos físicos para enfrentar retos políticos en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. 
invertir en plantas de energía para sobreponerse a cortes en la energía instalados por un gobierno foráneo 
o invertir en una nueva ubicación geográfica para proveer a un mercado restringido) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.25. Sostener permanentemente comunicaciones internas claras evidenciando el enfoque de la empresa 
en sus operaciones y no en una postura política 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.26. Desarrollar herramientas para asegurar el cumplimiento de las leyes, el buen manejo de inspecciones 
gubernamentales o el mantenimiento de buenas relaciones laborales y comunitarias en Venezuela, Ecuador 
o Nicaragua (e.j. guías para garantizar el cumplimiento de las leyes, guías para atender inspecciones) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.27. Adecuar los productos de la empresa para asegurar su cumplimiento con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. cambiar el contenido de las etiquetas de los productos de acuerdo a los 
requerimientos de un nueva ley)  
1   2   3   4   5      
12.28. Modificar la estructura y los procesos de la empresa para cumplir con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. modificar los procesos financieros para cumplir con nuevas leyes contables y 
de impuestos) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.29. Modificar la estructura y los procesos de la empresa no para cumplir con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua sino para mantener sus operaciones de manera competitiva en estos mercados (e.j. 
disminuir el número de empleados en una operación para equipar una disminución en las ventas) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.30. Desarrollar alternativas para proveer a los mercados de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua a pesar de 1   2   3   4   5      
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sus restricciones (e.j. a través de nuevos distribuidores, una nueva ubicación geográfica, entre otros) 
12.31. Monitorear los contextos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
12.32. Reducir costos para sobreponerse a aumentos en gastos operacionales relacionados con políticas 
gubernamentales en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.33. Revisar precios para mantener la competitividad y asegurar el mejor margen posible en Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.34. Identificar productos que puedan proveerse de manera competitiva y rentable de acuerdo a las 
cambiantes políticas en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.35. Anticipar alternativas para cumplir con potenciales políticas a futuro en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.36. Invertir en iniciativas para mantener la posición competitiva de la empresa en Venezuela, Ecuador 
o Nicaragua (e.j. invertir en desarrollar productos más saludables) 
1   2   3   4   5      
12.44. Involucrar a la contraparte del proceso de exportación (agente, representante, distribuidor, etc) en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua en las decisiones de la empresa sobre como confrontar estos contextos 
políticos foráneos 
1   2   3   4   5      
 
13a) Seleccione con una “X” los países en los cuales la empresa tuvo distribución y producción propias 
simultáneamente en un país entre 1999-2011: 
 Venezuela 
 Ecuador 
 Nicaragua 
 Ninguno de los anteriores (si esta es su respuesta por favor pase la pregunta 14a) 
13b) Si la empresa tuvo operaciones de distribución y producción propias simultáneamente en un país en  
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua entre 1999-2011, califique con una “X” que tanto utilizó cada una de las  
siguientes estrategias para confrontar la alta incertidumbre política en cualquiera de estos mercados y  
lograr sostener su distribución y producción propias: 
13.1. Lobby al gobierno Colombiano (e.j. comunicando opiniones o información a los legisladores a 
través de reuniones informales, escenarios formales o sociales para influenciar al gobierno hacia los 
intereses particulares de la empresa) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.2. Lobby a cualquiera de los gobiernos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. comunicando 
opiniones o información a los legisladores a través de reuniones informales, escenarios formales o 
sociales para influenciar a cualquiera de estos gobiernos hacia los intereses particulares de la empresa) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.3. Realizar o apoyar investigaciones para informar sus resultados e influenciar a los gobiernos de 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
13.4. Usar reportes técnicos para influenciar a los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
13.5. Pagar a políticos en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua por su realización de discursos públicos 1   2   3   4   5      
13.6. Elaborar presentaciones como empresa “experta” sobre algún tema para influenciar a los gobiernos 
de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
13.7. Hacer contribuciones financieras a políticos, partidos o causas políticas en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
13.8. Pagar gastos de viaje a funcionarios de los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
13.9. Invitar a empleados, proveedores o clientes a movilizarse a favor de un político, partido o causa 
política en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.10. Contratar a familiares de políticos o lograr que alguien de la empresa postule una candidatura o 
participe en los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
13.11. Usar relaciones públicas a favor de un político, partido o causa política en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
13.12. Apoyar la publicidad de una causa o mensaje político en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
13.13. Realizar eventos sobre pensamientos de liderazgo o conferencias de prensa para apoyar a un 
político, partido o causa política en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
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13.14. Realizar programas de educación política a favor de un político, partido o causa política en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.15. Diversificar los mercados de la empresa 1   2   3   4   5      
13.16. Penetrar los mercados existentes de la empresa 1   2   3   4   5      
13.17. Evitar influenciar a los gobiernos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
13.18. Adoptar un perfil bajo en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. no siendo el líder del mercado) 1   2   3   4   5      
13.19. Adoptar una postura política neutral 1   2   3   4   5      
13.20. Representar a la empresa a través de locales ante los gobiernos foráneos y los clientes locales en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.21. No incurrir en actos de corrupción 1   2   3   4   5      
13.22. Utilizar capital humano con conocimiento sobre los contextos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua para entender, anticiparse y reaccionar ante los retos políticos de estos mercados 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.23. Evaluar cuidadosamente futuras inversiones en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
13.24. Invertir en recursos físicos para enfrentar retos políticos en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. 
invertir en plantas de energía para sobreponerse a cortes en la energía instalados por un gobierno foráneo 
o invertir en una nueva ubicación geográfica para proveer a un mercado restringido) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.25. Sostener permanentemente comunicaciones internas claras evidenciando el enfoque de la empresa 
en sus operaciones y no en una postura política 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.26. Desarrollar herramientas para asegurar el cumplimiento de las leyes, el buen manejo de 
inspecciones gubernamentales o el mantenimiento de buenas relaciones laborales y comunitarias en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. guías para garantizar el cumplimiento de las leyes, guías para 
atender inspecciones) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.27. Adecuar los productos de la empresa para asegurar su cumplimiento con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. cambiar el contenido de las etiquetas de los productos de acuerdo a los 
requerimientos de un nueva ley)  
1   2   3   4   5      
13.28. Modificar la estructura y los procesos de la empresa para cumplir con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. modificar los procesos financieros para cumplir con nuevas leyes contables y 
de impuestos) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.29. Modificar la estructura y los procesos de la empresa no para cumplir con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua sino para mantener sus operaciones de manera competitiva en estos mercados (e.j. 
disminuir el número de empleados en una operación para equipar una disminución en las ventas) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.30. Desarrollar alternativas para proveer a los mercados de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua a pesar de 
sus restricciones (e.j. a través de nuevos distribuidores, una nueva ubicación geográfica, entre otros) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.31. Monitorear los contextos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
13.32. Reducir costos para sobreponerse a aumentos en gastos operacionales relacionados con políticas 
gubernamentales en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.33. Revisar precios para mantener la competitividad y asegurar el mejor margen posible en Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.34. Identificar productos que puedan proveerse de manera competitiva y rentable de acuerdo a las 
cambiantes políticas en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.35. Anticipar alternativas para cumplir con potenciales políticas a futuro en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.36. Invertir en iniciativas para mantener la posición competitiva de la empresa en Venezuela, Ecuador 
o Nicaragua (e.j. invertir en desarrollar productos más saludables) 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.37. Evadir a los medios para que las declaraciones de la empresa no se puedan utilizar o manipular a 
favor o en contra de una postura política 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.38. Pagar precios justos a los proveedores para mostrarse como una empresa generadora de valor local 
en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.39. Modificar el país de origen de la estructura legal de una inversión en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua para protegerla ante una potencial expropiación 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.40. Substituir importaciones por producción local para mostrarse como una empresa generadora de 
valor local en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
 362 
 
13.41. Provisionar en los estados financieros el valor de las inversiones que enfrenten una potencial 
expropiación en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.42. Crear planes para afrontar una potencial expropiación en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
13.43. Identificar y analizar el potencial impacto de grupos de interés en las operaciones  
en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
13.44. Involucrar a las operaciones de producción y distribución en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua en 
las decisiones de la empresa sobre como confrontar estos contextos políticos foráneos 
1   2   3   4   5      
 
14a) Seleccione con una “X” los países en los cuales la empresa tuvo distribución propia (sin producción propia) 
entre 1999-2011: 
 Venezuela 
 Ecuador 
 Nicaragua 
 Ninguno de los anteriores (si esta es su respuesta por favor pase la pregunta 15a) 
14b) Si la empresa tuvo una operación de distribución propia (sin producción propia) en Venezuela,  
Ecuador o Nicaragua entre 1999-2011, califique con una “X” que tanto utilizó cada una de las  
siguientes estrategias para confrontar la alta incertidumbre política en cualquiera de estos mercados  
y lograr sostener su distribución propia:  
14.1. Lobby al gobierno Colombiano (e.j. comunicando opiniones o información a los legisladores a 
través de reuniones informales, escenarios formales o sociales para influenciar al gobierno hacia los 
intereses particulares de la empresa) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.2. Lobby a cualquiera de los gobiernos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. comunicando 
opiniones o información a los legisladores a través de reuniones informales, escenarios formales o 
sociales para influenciar a cualquiera de estos gobiernos hacia los intereses particulares de la empresa) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.3. Realizar o apoyar investigaciones para informar sus resultados e influenciar a los gobiernos de 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
14.4. Usar reportes técnicos para influenciar a los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
14.5. Pagar a políticos en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua por su realización de discursos públicos 1   2   3   4   5      
14.6. Elaborar presentaciones como empresa “experta” sobre algún tema para influenciar a los gobiernos 
de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
14.7. Hacer contribuciones financieras a políticos, partidos o causas políticas en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
14.8. Pagar gastos de viaje a funcionarios de los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
14.9. Invitar a empleados, proveedores o clientes a movilizarse a favor de un político, partido o causa 
política en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.10. Contratar a familiares de políticos o lograr que alguien de la empresa postule una candidatura o 
participe en los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
14.11. Usar relaciones públicas a favor de un político, partido o causa política en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
14.12. Apoyar la publicidad de una causa o mensaje político en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
14.13. Realizar eventos sobre pensamientos de liderazgo o conferencias de prensa para apoyar a un 
político, partido o causa política en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.14. Realizar programas de educación política a favor de un político, partido o causa política en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.15. Diversificar los mercados de la empresa 1   2   3   4   5      
14.16. Penetrar los mercados existentes de la empresa 1   2   3   4   5      
14.17. Evitar influenciar a los gobiernos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
14.18. Adoptar un perfil bajo en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. no siendo el líder del mercado) 1   2   3   4   5      
14.19. Adoptar una postura política neutral 1   2   3   4   5      
14.20. Representar a la empresa a través de locales ante los gobiernos foráneos y los clientes locales en 1   2   3   4   5      
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Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
14.21. No incurrir en actos de corrupción 1   2   3   4   5      
14.22. Utilizar capital humano con conocimiento sobre los contextos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua para entender, anticiparse y reaccionar ante los retos políticos de estos mercados 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.23. Evaluar cuidadosamente futuras inversiones en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
14.24. Invertir en recursos físicos para enfrentar retos políticos en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. 
invertir en plantas de energía para sobreponerse a cortes en la energía instalados por un gobierno foráneo 
o invertir en una nueva ubicación geográfica para proveer a un mercado restringido) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.25. Sostener permanentemente comunicaciones internas claras evidenciando el enfoque de la empresa 
en sus operaciones y no en una postura política 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.26. Desarrollar herramientas para asegurar el cumplimiento de las leyes, el buen manejo de 
inspecciones gubernamentales o el mantenimiento de buenas relaciones laborales y comunitarias en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. guías para garantizar el cumplimiento de las leyes, guías para 
atender inspecciones) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.27. Adecuar los productos de la empresa para asegurar su cumplimiento con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. cambiar el contenido de las etiquetas de los productos de acuerdo a los 
requerimientos de un nueva ley)  
1   2   3   4   5      
14.28. Modificar la estructura y los procesos de la empresa para cumplir con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. modificar los procesos financieros para cumplir con nuevas leyes contables y 
de impuestos) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.29. Modificar la estructura y los procesos de la empresa no para cumplir con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua sino para mantener sus operaciones de manera competitiva en estos mercados (e.j. 
disminuir el número de empleados en una operación para equipar una disminución en las ventas) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.30. Desarrollar alternativas para proveer a los mercados de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua a pesar de 
sus restricciones (e.j. a través de nuevos distribuidores, una nueva ubicación geográfica, entre otros) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.31. Monitorear los contextos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
14.32. Reducir costos para sobreponerse a aumentos en gastos operacionales relacionados con políticas 
gubernamentales en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.33. Revisar precios para mantener la competitividad y asegurar el mejor margen posible en Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.34. Identificar productos que puedan proveerse de manera competitiva y rentable de acuerdo a las 
cambiantes políticas en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.35. Anticipar alternativas para cumplir con potenciales políticas a futuro en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.36. Invertir en iniciativas para mantener la posición competitiva de la empresa en Venezuela, Ecuador 
o Nicaragua (e.j. invertir en desarrollar productos más saludables) 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.37. Evadir a los medios para que las declaraciones de la empresa no se puedan utilizar o manipular a 
favor o en contra de una postura política 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.38. Pagar precios justos a los proveedores para mostrarse como una empresa generadora de valor local 
en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.39. Modificar el país de origen de la estructura legal de una inversión en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua para protegerla ante una potencial expropiación 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.40. Substituir importaciones por producción local para mostrarse como una empresa generadora de 
valor local en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.41. Provisionar en los estados financieros el valor de las inversiones que enfrenten una potencial 
expropiación en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.42. Crear planes para afrontar una potencial expropiación en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
14.43. Identificar y analizar el potencial impacto de grupos de interés en las operaciones  
en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
14.44. Involucrar a la operación de distribución en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua en las decisiones de 
la empresa sobre como confrontar estos contextos políticos foráneos 
1   2   3   4   5      
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15a) Seleccione con una “X” los países en los cuales la empresa tuvo producción propia (sin distribución propia) 
entre 1999-2011: 
 Venezuela 
 Ecuador 
 Nicaragua 
 Ninguno de los anteriores (si esta es su respuesta por favor pase la pregunta 16) 
15b) Si la empresa tuvo una operación de producción propia (sin distribución propia) en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua entre 1999-2011, califique con una “X” que tanto utilizó cada una de las siguientes  
estrategias para confrontar la alta incertidumbre política en cualquiera de estos mercados y lograr  
sostener su producción propia: 
15.1. Lobby al gobierno Colombiano (e.j. comunicando opiniones o información a los legisladores a 
través de reuniones informales, escenarios formales o sociales para influenciar al gobierno hacia los 
intereses particulares de la empresa) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.2. Lobby a cualquiera de los gobiernos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. comunicando 
opiniones o información a los legisladores a través de reuniones informales, escenarios formales o 
sociales para influenciar a cualquiera de estos gobiernos hacia los intereses particulares de la empresa) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.3. Realizar o apoyar investigaciones para informar sus resultados e influenciar a los gobiernos de 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
15.4. Usar reportes técnicos para influenciar a los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
15.5. Pagar a políticos en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua por su realización de discursos públicos 1   2   3   4   5      
15.6. Elaborar presentaciones como empresa “experta” sobre algún tema para influenciar a los gobiernos 
de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
15.7. Hacer contribuciones financieras a políticos, partidos o causas políticas en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
15.8. Pagar gastos de viaje a funcionarios de los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
15.9. Invitar a empleados, proveedores o clientes a movilizarse a favor de un político, partido o causa 
política en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.10. Contratar a familiares de políticos o lograr que alguien de la empresa postule una candidatura o 
participe en los gobiernos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
15.11. Usar relaciones públicas a favor de un político, partido o causa política en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua  
1   2   3   4   5      
15.12. Apoyar la publicidad de una causa o mensaje político en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua  1   2   3   4   5      
15.13. Realizar eventos sobre pensamientos de liderazgo o conferencias de prensa para apoyar a un 
político, partido o causa política en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.14. Realizar programas de educación política a favor de un político, partido o causa política en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.15. Diversificar los mercados de la empresa 1   2   3   4   5      
15.16. Penetrar los mercados existentes de la empresa 1   2   3   4   5      
15.17. Evitar influenciar a los gobiernos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
15.18. Adoptar un perfil bajo en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. no siendo el líder del mercado) 1   2   3   4   5      
15.19. Adoptar una postura política neutral 1   2   3   4   5      
15.20. Representar a la empresa a través de locales ante los gobiernos foráneos y los clientes locales en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.21. No incurrir en actos de corrupción 1   2   3   4   5      
15.22. Utilizar capital humano con conocimiento sobre los contextos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua para entender, anticiparse y reaccionar ante los retos políticos de estos mercados 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.23. Evaluar cuidadosamente futuras inversiones en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
15.24. Invertir en recursos físicos para enfrentar retos políticos en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. 
invertir en plantas de energía para sobreponerse a cortes en la energía instalados por un gobierno foráneo 
1   2   3   4   5      
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o invertir en una nueva ubicación geográfica para proveer a un mercado restringido) 
15.25. Sostener permanentemente comunicaciones internas claras evidenciando el enfoque de la empresa 
en sus operaciones y no en una postura política 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.26. Desarrollar herramientas para asegurar el cumplimiento de las leyes, el buen manejo de 
inspecciones gubernamentales o el mantenimiento de buenas relaciones laborales y comunitarias en 
Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. guías para garantizar el cumplimiento de las leyes, guías para 
atender inspecciones) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.27. Adecuar los productos de la empresa para asegurar su cumplimiento con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. cambiar el contenido de las etiquetas de los productos de acuerdo a los 
requerimientos de un nueva ley)  
1   2   3   4   5      
15.28. Modificar la estructura y los procesos de la empresa para cumplir con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua (e.j. modificar los procesos financieros para cumplir con nuevas leyes contables y 
de impuestos) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.29. Modificar la estructura y los procesos de la empresa no para cumplir con las leyes de Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua sino para mantener sus operaciones de manera competitiva en estos mercados (e.j. 
disminuir el número de empleados en una operación para equipar una disminución en las ventas) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.30. Desarrollar alternativas para proveer a los mercados de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua a pesar de 
sus restricciones (e.j. a través de nuevos distribuidores, una nueva ubicación geográfica, entre otros) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.31. Monitorear los contextos foráneos de Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
15.32. Reducir costos para sobreponerse a aumentos en gastos operacionales relacionados con políticas 
gubernamentales en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.33. Revisar precios para mantener la competitividad y asegurar el mejor margen posible en Venezuela, 
Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.34. Identificar productos que puedan proveerse de manera competitiva y rentable de acuerdo a las 
cambiantes políticas en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.35. Anticipar alternativas para cumplir con potenciales políticas a futuro en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.36. Invertir en iniciativas para mantener la posición competitiva de la empresa en Venezuela, Ecuador 
o Nicaragua (e.j. invertir en desarrollar productos más saludables) 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.37. Evadir a los medios para que las declaraciones de la empresa no se puedan utilizar o manipular a 
favor o en contra de una postura política 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.38. Pagar precios justos a los proveedores para mostrarse como una empresa generadora de valor local 
en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.39. Modificar el país de origen de la estructura legal de una inversión en Venezuela, Ecuador o 
Nicaragua para protegerla ante una potencial expropiación 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.40. Substituir importaciones por producción local para mostrarse como una empresa generadora de 
valor local en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.41. Provisionar en los estados financieros el valor de las inversiones que enfrenten una potencial 
expropiación en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.42. Crear planes para afrontar una potencial expropiación en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 1   2   3   4   5      
15.43. Identificar y analizar el potencial impacto de grupos de interés en las operaciones  
en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua 
1   2   3   4   5      
15.44. Involucrar a la operación de producción en Venezuela, Ecuador o Nicaragua en las decisiones de la 
empresa sobre como confrontar estos contextos políticos foráneos 
1   2   3   4   5      
 
 
16) Por favor escriba un email en el cual pueda ser contactado en el caso de que la empresa resulte ser la ganadora 
del diplomado ofrecido por la Universidad EAFIT: ______________________________________________________ 
 
17) Por favor indique si desea recibir en el email anterior un resumen ejecutivo de los resultados de esta encuesta:     
                    SI        NO  
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18) Por favor indique el nombre de la empresa con el objetivo de poder contactar a solo otro empleado para 
realizarle esta encuesta: 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19) Por favor sugiéranos el nombre y/o cargo de otro empleado dentro de la empresa al cual podamos realizarle la 
encuesta: 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
¡MUCHAS GRACIAS POR SU TIEMPO! 
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APPENDIX 9 
 
Link to digital survey designed in Qualtrics: 
https://cranfieldsom.eu.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_cSa4MJRsFWeijTT 
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 APPENDIX 10  
 
 
 
   
 
CHRONOLOGY ABOUT THE IMPACT OF VENEZUELA’S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ON 
 LATAM’S OPERATIONS (1999 – 2011) 
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A chronology of critical incidents (Miles and Huberman, 1994) is presented below to retrospectively describe the events which have framed the high 
uncertainty political environment in Venezuela that has had an impact on Latam’s operations from 1999 up to 2011.  Although the timeframe of our 
research is set from 1999 to 2011, this timeline starts in 1990 to describe Latam’s initial operations in this market.  Nevertheless, the first political 
events to affect Latam’s operations in Venezuela occurred in 2002.   
 
To develop the following chronology assuring the objective inclusion of the most relevant events, we triangulated the responses of the 60 interviewees 
that were interviewed with documents and media articles.  All of the data presented throughout the timeline about Latam was provided directly by its 
employees during 2011 and 2012. 
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DATE FIRM’s HISTORY POLITICAL EVENTS 
UNCERTAINTIES 
GENERATED FOR THE 
FIRM BY POLITICAL 
EVENTS 
FIRM’s STRATEGIC 
RESPONSES TO 
POLITICAL 
UNCERTAINTIES 
OUTCOMES 
Early 
1990’s 
 
A commercial alliance 
was made by Latam with 
a Venezuelan company in 
order for it to sell its 
products to the 
Venezuelan market. 
 
    
1995 
 
Latam founded a 
distribution platform in  
Venezuela that started its 
operations by distributing 
only products from 
business line 1.  Later on, 
the distribution platform 
in Venezuela incorporated 
products from business 
lines 2 and 3 into its 
portafolio. 
 
    
1996 
 
A production platform for 
business line 4 was 
acquired in Venezuela by 
Latam. It was the first 
foreign acquisition made 
by Latam. 
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This production platform 
was exclusively dedicated 
to the production of 
business line 4 products 
which were only sold 
inside the Venezuelan 
market. This production 
platform did not export, it 
was intended to attend 
local demand only. 
 
1998 
  
Hugo Chavez was elected 
President of Venezuela 
through democratic 
elections. 
 
 
President Hugo Chavez 
 
Source:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/w
orldnews/southamerica/venezuela/3184293/
Venezuelas-murder-rates-surpass-
Colombias-under-Hugo-Chavez.html 
 
   
1999 
  
A new constitution was 
approved in Venezuela that 
modified the presidential 
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term from five to six years 
and allowed the president’s 
immediate and only 
reelection. 
 
2000 
 
The financial capital that 
Latam had invested in 
acquiring the production 
platform for business line 
4 in Venezuela was payed 
off by 2000 (four years 
after its acquisition took 
place). 
 
 
Hugo Chavez was reelected 
President of Venezuela 
under the new constitution. 
 
 
Re-elected President Hugo 
Chavez 
 
Source:http://www.sampsoniaway.org/bi-
monthly/2012/01/23/under-chavez-media-
harassed-with-online-hacking-phone-
tapping-and-censorship/ 
 
   
April 11
th
 
2002 
 
 
 
A 48-hour coup d'état was 
launched against Chavez by 
opposition politicians and 
segments of the military 
from Venezuela. The coup 
d'état was overthrown after 
a popular protest and 
Chavez was reinstated. 
 
 
The left-wing political 
orientation of the Venezuelan 
government preoccupied the 
private sector and investors 
in general, both local and 
foreign. 
 
Latam faced the uncertainty 
of determining to what types 
 
Latam identified its operations 
could be exposed to policy 
changes and potential 
expropriation.  Latam 
considered the risk of 
expropriation had a higher 
impact on its production 
platform than on its 
distribution platform because 
 
Latam established a 
strategic plan through 
which its 
internationalization strategy 
was decided to advance 
from commercial alliances 
to setting up distribution 
platforms owned by Latam 
and deliberately 
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Image of protest 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
10 2010. 
 
of threats its distribution and 
production operations in 
Venezuela would be exposed 
to. 
 
 
its production platform was by 
far a more expensive 
investment. 
 
Latam explored the possibility 
of selling the production 
platform in Venezuela but the 
political environment had 
already deteriorated to an 
extent that no potential 
investors were found. 
 
The possibility of selling the 
distribution platform was 
never explored.  Latam was 
not interested in selling it. 
 
Despite political uncertainties, 
Latam decided to sustain both 
of its operations in the 
Venezuelan market by 
adopting a long term view.  It 
acknowledged Venezuela was 
a traditional, profitable, and 
“natural market” for its 
products.  Consequently, it had 
to concentrate on developing 
ways to sustain its operations 
in this market. 
 
During 2002 the Venezuelan 
market had accounted for 44% 
of the international sales of 
establishing production 
platforms through 
acquisitions in different 
markets all over the world. 
 
A specialized study allowed 
Latam to define target 
markets and strategic 
locations to acquire 
production platforms. 
 
The strategic region 
identified by Latam 
included: Central America 
and the Caribbean, Mexico, 
the U.S., Venezuela, Peru, 
and Ecuador. 
 
This strategic region was 
identified through the 
evaluation of: price 
competitiveness, market 
potential, cultural 
similarity, consumer 
knowledge, manufacturing, 
and distribution 
opportunities. 
 
Although the Venezuelan 
political environment had 
triggered the 
conceptualization and 
initiation of this strategic 
May 2002 
  
Chavez opposed the 
inclusion of the FARC 
guerrilla in the international 
list of terrorist 
organizations. He claimed 
they should be granted the 
belligerent status. 
 
 
President Hugo Chavez 
 
Source:  
http://www.euronews.net/images_old/08/W
300px_1201-mid-venezuela.jpg. Accessed 
August 11 2010. 
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 Latam, under the political left-
wing scene that had 
consolidated in the country, 
Latam obliged itself to sustain 
operations in Venezuela while 
simultaneously planning an 
international strategy that 
could decrease its 
“dependency” on this market 
by further penetrating and 
diversifying markets.  It 
decided to keep a low profile 
in Venezuela and never incur 
in acts of corruption as stated 
in its values. 
 
plan, the political 
environment was not 
assessed as a factor that 
influenced the 
determination of Latam’s 
strategic region.  Latam 
claimed its strategic region 
was defined based on 
“market” factors. 
 
During 2002 the 
Venezuelan market 
accounted for 44% of the 
international sales of 
Latam.  By 2010 it 
accounted for 26% of its 
international sales since due 
to this strategic plan, Latam 
successfully decreased its 
dependency on the 
Venezuelan market by 
further penetrating and 
diversifying its markets. 
 
2004 
  
Chavez survived a recall 
referendum called by its 
opposition in Venezuela. 
 
   
December 
13
th
 2004 
  
Rodrigo Granda was known 
as an international 
spokesman of the FARC 
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guerrilla.  He was captured 
in Venezuela. 
 
Chavez referred to his 
capture as a kidnap and 
violation of Venezuela’s 
sovereignty. 
 
This was the first rupture of 
political relations between 
Colombia and Venezuela 
from 1999-2011.  Its 
solution took place 20 days 
later after an official 
statement from the 
Colombian government and 
Colombian President 
Uribe’s visit to Miraflores 
Palace. This meeting was 
delayed by 15 days because 
Uribe had a temporary 
illness. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
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10 2010. 
 
2006 
  
Chavez was re-elected 
President of Venezuela. 
 
   
2007 
  
Chavez called for a 
referendum on a series of 
sweeping changes to the 
1999 Venezuelan 
Constitution.  He included 
unlimited re-election for the 
presidency. His initiative 
was not approved. 
 
   
August 
31
st
 2007 
  
Uribe designated 
Colombian Senator Piedad 
Cordoba as facilitator and 
Chavez as mediator in the 
process of a potential 
humanitarian agreement 
with the FARC guerrilla.  
The agreement was 
intended to free kidnapped 
civilians and around 500 
members of the FARC 
guerilla that were in prison. 
 
The Colombian 
government established the 
31st of December as the 
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maximum deadline to see 
the results of this 
mediation. This was 
perhaps the most promising 
time during the relation 
between presidents Uribe 
and Chavez. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
10 2010. 
 
November 
22
nd
 2007 
  
Uribe terminated Chavez 
and Cordoba’s mediation 
because of their unofficial 
and unauthorized contact 
with Colombian military 
forces. 
 
Chavez critiqued that he 
was not officially notified 
about this decision and 
threatened to freeze 
bilateral relations by 
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accusing the Colombian 
government of “conspiring 
against him by acting as a 
puppet of the North 
American empire.” 
 
 
 
Source:http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_t-
XoLtQ4nAA/R0YrAEKHnGI/AAAAAAA
ADD0/igwol0LD0uI/s400/uribe.jpg 
Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
November 
25
th
 2007 
  
Chavez announced the 
rupture of relations with 
Colombia. 
 
Uribe asked him to “not set 
the continent on fire” and 
accused Chavez of “leading 
an expansionist project 
which would have no entry 
in Colombia.” 
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Source:http://marcosdiaz.psuv.org.ve/wp-
content/gallery/fotos_gobierno_bolivariano
_de_merida/abn-28-11-2008-
carneiro_vargas_juramenta_chavez_800.jpg
. Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
November 
27
th
 2007 
 
 
 
Chavez called his 
Ambassador in Bogotá 
Pavel Rondon back to 
Venezuela to evaluate 
relations with Colombia.    
He denied being leading 
and expansionist project. 
 
 
Venezuelan Ambassador 
Pavel Rondon. 
 
Source:http://towelto.files.wordpress.com/2
009/04/nelson-bocaranda.jpg. Accessed 
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August 12 2010. 
 
January 
11
th
 2008 
  
Chavez requested the 
international community to 
recognize the guerrillas of 
FARC and ELN as 
belligerents and take them 
out of the international list 
of terrorist groups. 
 
This proposal was rejected 
by Colombia, the U.S., and 
the European Union. 
 
 
 
Source:http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_UNk_6X
hKms4/SLDqJhuqZI/AAAAAAAADjY/djs
bFmuAI3w/s400/CHAVEZ+DESESPERA
DO.jpg. Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 
17
th
 2008 
  
Venezuela’s National 
Assembly approved a 
Project that recognized the 
FARC and ELN guerrillas 
as belligerent groups and 
stated that Uribe’s 
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government was not 
committed to peace. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.venelogia.com/uploads/j
ose/1170257558_0.jpg. Accessed August 
12 2010. 
 
January 
25
th
 2008 
  
Chavez accused Uribe of 
provoking a war and 
assured the U.S. was 
preparing a military 
aggression to Venezuela 
through Colombia. 
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Source:http://alimontoyaopinion.blogia.co
m/upload/20100122182253-hugo-
chavez.jpg. Accessed August 11 2010. 
 
March 1
st
 
2008 
  
Colombia announced the 
death in Ecuadorian 
territory of Raul Reyes the 
“no. 2” leader and 
international spokesman of 
the FARC guerilla. 
 
Chavez stated that a 
military intrusion in 
Venezuela would cause a 
war. 
 
 
Raul Reyes 
 
Source:http://www.reuters.com/resources/r/
?m=02&d=20080301&t=2&i=3358428&w
=300&fh=300&fw=&ll=&pl=&r=2008-03-
01T233112Z_01_N01226245_RTRUKOP_
0_PICTURE0. Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
 
Chavez’s government had 
fueled anti-Colombian 
feelings since 2001 which 
intensified during this 
episode of the killing of 
Reyes in Ecuador. 
 
Anti-Colombian feelings 
became a threat to Latam’s 
operations in Venezuela by 
confronting it with the 
uncertainty of how to avoid 
the interference of these 
feelings in its operations 
since it offered products with 
a Colombian origin and had 
Colombian employees 
involved in operations in 
Venezuela. 
 
Latam was politically neutral 
and adopted a low profile.  It 
did not adopt any political 
stance. 
 
To avoid the interference of 
anti-Colombian feelings in the 
operations of the distribution 
and production platforms in 
Venezuela, all interactions 
with the government and 
customers were led by 
Venezuelans within these 
platforms, not by Colombians. 
 
 
The political neutrality of 
Latam avoided these anti-
Colombian feelings to 
affect its operations in 
Venezuela.  This stance, 
dimished market tension. 
 
Venezuelans were better 
received than Colombians 
in negotiations and these 
ranned smoothly. 
March 2
nd
 
2008 
  
Chavez requested through 
national television a minute 
of silence to honor Raul 
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Reyes to whom he referred 
to as “the great 
revolutionary”. 
 
 
 
Source:http://img.youtube.com/vi/3wo6xn1
yIjE/0.jpg. Accessed August 24 2010. 
 
March 3
rd
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
Chavez ordered the closing 
of the frontier between 
Colombia and Venezuela, 
the closing of the 
Venezuelan embassy in 
Colombia, and the 
immediate expulsion of the 
Colombian Ambassador in 
Caracas. 
He sent 10 military troops 
to settle in the frontier with 
Colombia. 
 
Chavez stated Uribe was a 
criminal and drug dealer 
that was manipulated by the 
North American empire. 
 
 
Due the closure of the 
frontier, Latam faced the 
uncertainty of not knowing 
when it could continue 
exporting products to its 
distribution platform in 
Venezuela. 
 
Latam decided to sustain its 
distribution platform in 
Venezuela despite the closure 
of the fronteir.   
 
Latam also changed the way it 
coordinated logistic operations 
to assure that its products had 
the best chances of arriving to 
their destination once the 
frontier re-opened and despite 
future logistic difficulties due 
to political decisions.  This 
translated into operating at 
new schedules, developing 
various alternatives to transfer 
products from origin to 
destination, improving 
 
Latam adopted a long-term 
view towards the 
Venezuelan market by 
claiming the most adequate 
response was to sustain its 
distribution platform to 
assure the continuity of its 
operations in Venezuela 
once market conditions 
changed.  Latam expected 
the closure to be temporary. 
 
Latam developed ways 
(plan a, b, c, d) to improve 
its logistics to assure the 
supply of products to the 
distribution platform in 
Venezuela despite future 
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Source:http://img.timeinc.net/time/daily/20
08/0803/chavez_colombia_0303.jpg. 
Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
relations with the 
intermediaries in the logistics 
chain, and including security 
measures during product 
movements. 
political tensions.  During 
fronteir closures, all 
product movements were 
definitely frozen but during 
all other times Latam had to 
search for the best ways to 
deliver its products. 
 
March 9
th
 
2008 
  
The political tension 
between Colombia and 
Venezuela decreased 
during the XX Meeting of 
the Group of Rio in 
Dominican Republic.  
 
On the 10
th
 of March, the 
Colombian Ambassador 
returned to Venezuela and 
Venezuela re-opened 
operations in its frontier
 
with Colombia.
 
 
Source:http://josuearbaje.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008/03/uribe-chavez.jpg. 
 
Although the fronteir re-
opened, Latam started to 
experience delays in the 
renovation of its sanitary 
registrations.  It was 
speculated that sanitary 
registrations for products 
with a Colombian origin 
were delayed by the 
Venezuelan government due 
to the political tensions 
between Colombia and 
Venezuela.   
 
Latam faced the uncertainty 
of not knowing when it 
would receive the 
renovations of the sanitary 
registrations of those 
products which at that 
moment were in the process 
of having their registrations 
 
Since products with a 
Colombian origin were 
presenting delays in the 
renovation of their sanitary 
registrations, Latam requested 
sanitary registrations for 
products with a Peruvian 
origin and invested in 
adequating its production plant 
in Peru to produce such 
products.  
 
The production plant of B2 in 
Colombia had been expanded 
to attend the before increasing 
sales of the Venezuelan 
market. As Venezuela 
restricted imports with a  
Colombian origin, Latam had 
to intensify its search for other 
markets that could demand the 
B2’s Colombian production 
 
Latam received the 
approval of the sanitary 
registrations it requested for 
products with a Peruvian 
origin and it started 
exporting these products to 
Venezuela’s distribution 
platform. 
 
Amplifying the origin of 
products by including Peru 
besides Colombia, came to 
be a creative response that 
allowed Latam to sustain its 
supply to the Venezuelan 
market despite political 
tensions between Colombia 
and Venezuela. 
 
Latam intensified its search 
for and negotiations in 
other international markets 
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Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
renewed. 
 
platform’s products. 
 
besides Venezuela. 
 
Other firms in the industry 
which insisted in getting 
renewed their old 
registrations failed to do so. 
 
May 15
th
 
2008 
  
The international press 
published information 
extracted from Raul 
Reyes’s computer 
compromising Chavez 
through evidence that 
demonstrated his economic 
support to the FARC 
guerrilla. 
 
Ronald Kenneth who was 
Director of Interpol assured 
the computer files 
containing this evidence 
were original and had not 
been manipulated. 
 
 
 
 
The deterioration of 
diplomatic relations between 
Colombia and Venezuela 
challenged Latam with the 
uncertainty of how to 
manage its relation with both 
governments.  The option of 
actively lobbying these 
governments was discussed 
by companies in the food 
sector (and other sectors) as a 
possible response to confront 
political uncertainty in 
Venezuela.  Latam had to 
decide whether lobbying 
either one or both 
governments might be an 
adequate response. 
 
Latam decided to manage its 
operations in the Venezuelan 
market without lobbying the 
Venezuelan or Colombian 
governments.  Latam decided 
to become invisible for both 
governments. 
 
Latam deliberately avoided 
lobbying any government or 
entity because this could only 
increase its visibility.  Been 
visible could motivate the 
implementation of hostile 
policies, corruption requests or 
its chances of been 
expropriated. 
 
Latam concentrated on having 
a politically neutral stance and 
complying with the law. It 
presented itself as a food 
company whose role was to 
provide consumers with 
products at the best possible 
 
Latam invested its 
resources in adapting to 
rather than influencing the 
political Venezuelan 
context.   
 
Latam continued operating 
while other firms that 
became visible were 
expropriated like Polar or 
Exito, among others. 
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Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. 
Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
price and in the best possible 
way by making a reasonable 
profit while beign socially 
responsible. 
 
 
May 2008 
 
  
During May of 2008, 
CADIVI stopped working 
efficiently. 
 
Traditionally business lines 
1, 2, and 3 exported to 
Venezuela and the 
distribution platform in 
Venezuela received 
approval for the payment of 
its imports through 
CADIVI (Venezuela’s 
Commission for Currency 
Administration). This 
approval meant that this 
Venezuelan entity would 
pay the business lines in 
dollars the value of their 
exports to Venezuela. 
 
From this date onwards the 
business lines did not 
receive timely payments for 
their exports and the 
distribution platform in 
Venezuela faced increasing 
difficulties to receive 
 
Latam faced the uncertainty 
of how and when it would 
recover its pending payments 
from CADIVI. 
 
The business lines faced the 
uncertainty of when they 
would receive certificates of 
non-production that 
authorized the import of their 
products by the distribution 
platform in Venezuela.  It 
was not possible for Latam to 
estimate how long it would 
take CADIVI to provide 
these certificates of non-
production and what amount 
of products were going to be 
allowed to be imported 
through such certificates. 
 
Latam continued to sell its 
products in Venezuela through 
CADIVI expecting to receive 
its accumulated payments.  It 
constantly monitored the 
developments in CADIVI 
while it sold the amounts of 
products that the certificates of 
non-production authorized. 
 
The distribution platform 
focused on becoming very 
agile in the process of 
requesting the certificates of 
non-production.  It hired one 
person to be in charge of these 
certificates.  For B1, it was 
easier than for the other 
business lines to receive these 
certificates.  For B2, it was 
complicated because an 
important foregin competitor 
which had local production in 
Venezuela sold a lot of 
products in this category.  For 
B3, it was even more  
complicated, some of its 
 
Pending payments for 
Latam started to 
accumulate in CADIVI.  
Latam monitored these 
pending payments. 
 
Overtime, the authorization 
of certificates of non-
production became more 
difficult to obtain, affecting 
the amount of imports by 
the distribution platform in 
Venezuela. 
 
Other firms in the industry 
did not have one person 
fully in charge of the 
process of requesting 
certificates of non-
production; this gave an 
advantage to Latam. 
 
However, Latam 
recognized it should have 
reacted sooner than it did to 
this situation by earlier 
stopping its accumulation 
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certificates of non-
production.   
 
The certificates of non-
production stated that 
Venezuela did not produce 
a specific product and that 
therefore it authorized its 
import.  These certificates 
also indicated the amount 
of each product that was 
authorized to be imported 
by a specific individual 
firm.  The distribution 
platform had to request 
these certificates for all of 
its imports. 
 
certificates took almost a year.  
The differences in the 
difficulties to obtain the 
certificates of non-production 
between the business lines 
were simply based on the 
market conditions of the 
different product categories. 
of pending payments in 
CADIVI.  Some firms from 
the industry decided to 
abort the Venezuelan 
market because of 
CADIVI, however Latam 
continued operating 
searching for alternatives. 
 
 
June 18
th
 
2008 
  
After the announcements of 
the Interpol about the 
content found in Raul 
Reyes’s computer, Chavez 
changed his discourse 
towards the FARC 
guerrilla.  He now stated 
they were an armed 
guerrillian group and asked 
them to liberate the 
kidnapped civilians. 
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Source:http://noticias.biboz.net/imagenes/2
008/07/farc.jpg. Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
July 11
th
 
2008 
  
Chavez and Uribe 
announced a “new stage” in 
the relation of the two 
countries after a meeting in 
Venezuela. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
11 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
  
Chavez presented another 
referendum just on the 
issue of re-election. He won 
and can now stand for the 
 
Overall, the evolution of 
Venezuela’s political context 
increased uncertainty for 
businesses, both local and 
 
Usually decisions about the 
distribution and production 
operations in Venezuela were 
analyzed and taken by 
 
The result of the 
consolidation of this 
committee was that 
decisions about Latam’s 
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presidency as many times 
as he likes. 
 
foreign. 
 
individual committees within 
Latam.  As political 
uncertainty increased in 
Venezuela, Latam integrated 
one committee for both 
operations.  It included the 
VPs of B1, B2, B3, and B4, 
the VP of Centralized 
Services, the local managers, 
the VP of Corporate Finance, 
the General Secretary, and the 
CEO.  This committee met on 
inmediate notice if it was 
necessary or at least one a 
week by video conference or 
telephone.  Its members 
constantly interacted within 
meetings.  This committee also 
used external human capital 
who had contextual knowledge 
about the Venezuelan market 
which included lawyers, 
financial firms, and political 
analysts. 
 
As the political environment 
became more hostile, it was 
advised not to talk over the 
phone or video conferences so 
committee meetings would be 
held face to face in Colombia 
or Venezuela.   
 
operations were made in 
conjunction assuring a 
corporate stance towards its 
operations in Venezuela. 
 
The use of external and 
internal human capital with 
contextual knowledge was 
key to Latam’s 
understanding of the 
Venezuelan context. 
 
Local managers in 
Venezuela had to fly to 
Colombia for committee 
meetings. 
 
Latam controlled the “way” 
it communicated any topic 
regarding the Venezuelan 
market.  Between face to 
face meetings, there always 
had to be communications 
between committee 
members so the “way” 
situations were described or 
referred to, was very 
carefully thought of to 
avoid “against the 
Venezuelan government” 
interpretations. 
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Later, during 2010 it was 
advised that the top 
management team should not 
be sent to Venezuela so 
meetings were held in 
Colombia every month.   
 
January 
2009 
  
Chavez and Uribe 
celebrated in Cartagena the 
recovery of trust in the 
bilateral relations and 
announced actions to 
promote commerce. 
 
Nevertheless, the business 
environment and the media 
had evidenced the 
expropriation of several 
companies and speculated 
that for long foreign and 
local investments in 
Venezuela would be facing 
the uncertainty of 
expropriation by the 
Venezuelan government.  
Colombian companies in 
Venezuela were not exempt 
from expropriation 
uncertainty. 
 
 
Latam faced the uncertainty 
of a potential expropriation 
of its production platform in 
Venezuela.  This investment 
had a Colombian origin 
which only increased the 
possibility of the Venezuelan 
government expropriating the 
operation due to its political 
disputes with Colombia. 
 
The investment in the 
distribution platform also 
faced the uncertainty of a 
potential expropriation but its 
capital investment was much 
less since it only owned the 
inventory it distributed, 
making it a less risky 
operation for Latam in terms 
of a potential loss due to an 
expropriation.  
 
During January of 2009, 
Latam changed the production 
platform’s investment origin 
from Colombian to Costa 
Rican.  The production 
platform’s new Costa Rican 
investment origin protected 
Latam from the potentail 
losses of an expropiation 
because of an existing FDI 
protection agreement between 
Venezuela and Costa Rica.  
This agreement is supervised 
by the World Bank.  Although 
this agreement does not 
prevent an expropriation, it 
does guarantee that the World 
Bank assures that a just price 
is payed back to the investor in 
case of an expropriation. 
 
As a preventive measure, 
Latam also provisioned the 
value of the production 
platform in its financial 
 
The costs of a potential 
expropiation were 
significantly reduced by 
Latam while other firms in 
the industry maintained 
their levels of exposure. 
 
The distribution platform 
focused on adapting to 
policy changes to sustain its 
operations in Venezuela. 
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Source:http://media.miamiherald.com/smed
ia/2010/07/29/11/DV_To_Getty_4019503_
0.embedded.prod_affiliate.56.JPG. 
Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
statements. 
 
Latam kept a politically 
neutral stance and avoided the 
media. 
 
The production platform 
started to develop the READY 
Project which was a 
confidential project to prepare 
Latam to respond to a potential 
expropriation.  It also started 
to buy the materials it 
previously imported from 
Colombia to local suppliers in 
Venezuela.  It made sure it 
payed just prices to its 
suppliers. 
 
March 13
th
 
2009 
  
The new Colombian 
Ambassador in Venezuela, 
María Luisa Chiappe, 
assumed her position while 
Chavez expanded his model 
in Venezuela. 
 
 
 
The production platform 
identified that Chavez was 
growing the influence of his 
socialism model in the local 
community where its plant 
was located.  Latam faced the 
uncertainty of the impact that 
the different interest groups 
could have on its operations. 
 
Latam created a “power map” 
that identified the different 
interest groups that surrounded 
the production platform and 
analyzed their potential impact 
on the firm’s operations.   
 
This allowed Latam to 
design structured plans to 
interact with these interest 
groups to diminish their 
potential impact on 
operations while most 
foreign firms in its industry 
lacked this type of plans. 
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Colombian Ambassador María 
Luisa Chiappe 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. 
Accessed August 11 2010. 
 
May 15
th
 
2009 
  
Gustavo Marquez was 
appointed as the new 
Venezuelan Ambassador in 
Bogotá.  This position was 
vacant since November 
2007. 
 
 
Venezuelan Ambassador 
Gustavo Marquez 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
11 2010. 
 
  
 
 
July 21
st
 
2009 
  
Chavez announced he 
would revise diplomatic 
relations with Colombia 
because of this country’s 
agreement with the U.S. to 
 
Instability in the diplomatic 
relations between Colombia 
and Venezuela generated 
uncertainty among the local 
employees of the distribution 
 
Internal communications 
within Latam became very 
important. Latam focused on 
transmitting a corporate 
message that was clear and 
 
The coherence and 
consistency between 
Latam’s message and 
behavior benefited good 
internal relations. 
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promote cooperation 
through military bases in 
Colombia. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
11 2010. 
 
and production platforms in 
Venezuela. 
 
 
diminished employees’ 
uncertainty about the 
continuity of their jobs and the 
ratified its neutral political 
stance. 
 
Local managers were 
politically neutral in their day 
to day behavior and in the 
messages that were 
transmitted.  The overall 
message sent by the firm was 
that it was politically neutral 
and socially responsible. The 
firm assured it would strive to 
sustain its operations in 
Venezuela and centered its 
attention on finding ways to 
continue doing business. 
 
 
 
The employees of the 
distribution platform 
understood that the 
commercial restrictions 
imposed by the Venezuelan 
government affected Latam 
and that it was working 
hard to keep its operations 
running despite these 
restrictions. 
 
The production platform 
developed a good 
relationship with its 
syndicate and created 
programmes to relate to and 
benefit its surrounding 
community while 
sustaining a low profile.  It 
made sure the conditions at 
the site and its policies 
promoted a healthy 
working environment. 
 
While the rotation of 
employees was high in the 
industry due to uncertainty, 
the clarity of Latam gave a 
sense of tranquility to 
employees making its 
rotation rate much lower 
than that of the industry. 
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July 23
rd
 
2009 
  
The Colombian 
government asked 
neighboring countries to 
respect the principle of 
non-involvement in other 
countries’ internal affairs 
and defended its agreement 
with the U.S. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
11 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 24
th
 
2009 
  
Chavez bought military 
tanks from the Russians 
and stated, “we are buying 
military tanks and other 
weapons to double our 
existing military capacity.  I 
don’t mind what the 
neighbors or the Yankees 
say”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
396 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
11 2010. 
 
July 26
th
 
2009 
  
The Colombian 
government denounced the 
FARC guerrilla was using 
weapons that were sold by 
Sweden to Venezuela. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
11 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 28
th
 
2009 
  
The Swedish government 
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confirmed the weapons 
they produced and sold to 
Venezuela during the late 
1980s were the ones found 
in hands of FARC guerrilla. 
 
 
 
Source:http://manual.americasarmy.com/im
ages/b/ba/At4-400.jpg 
Accessed August 11 2010. 
 
  
Despite the declarations of 
the Swedish government, 
Venezuelan government 
officials described as a 
“media show” the news 
published about the FARC 
guerilla using weapons that 
belonged to their military. 
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Venezuelan Chancellor 
Nicolas Maduro 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. 
Accessed August 11 2010. 
 
July 29
th
 
2009 
  
Chavez requested the 
retirement of his 
Ambassador in Colombia, 
Gustavo Marquez, and 
broke commercial and 
diplomatic relations with 
Colombia. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
11 2010. 
 
  
 
 
July 31
st
 
2009 
  
Commerce at the frontier 
between Colombia and 
Venezuela was 
“semiparalized” due to the 
incrementing controls that 
the Venezuelan authorities 
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imposed upon the goods 
and people traveling from 
Colombia to Venezuela. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
11 2010. 
 
September 
15
th
 2009 
  
The Venezuelan 
government denounced 
Colombia was not 
transparent by not sharing 
the text of their agreement 
with the U.S.  Venezuelan 
government officials 
sustained the threat they 
considered this agreement 
was for the region.  
Political tensions increased 
hostility measures in the 
business environment in 
Venezuela. 
 
 
The production platform in 
Venezuela faced an 
increasingly hostile political 
environment.  The 
production platform faced 
the uncertainty of how to 
manage the different themes 
that could potentially affect 
its operations.  These were 
compliance with laws, 
governmental inspections, 
and community and labor 
relations. 
 
The production platform 
created an analytical risks 
matrix that was revised on an 
annual basis through which it 
identified and evaluated these 
main themes which could 
potentially affect its 
operations. 
 
The production platform also 
developed a protocols system 
which instructed employees on 
how to manage governmental 
inspections that could take 
place at the plant or at any of 
the distribution agencies in 
Venezuela. 
 
These matrixes supported 
the development of tasks 
and indicators that allowed 
the production platform to 
sustain its operations in 
compliance with the law 
and through good 
community and labor 
relations. 
 
The protocols system 
allowed the production 
platform to be prepared to 
receive governmental 
inspections in a strucutred 
way that improved its 
possibilities of not 
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Colombian Chancellor Jaime 
Bermudez 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
11 2010. 
 
receiving any type of 
sanctions or suffering a 
potential expropriation. 
  
The Spanish President Jose 
Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 
offered to mediate to 
resolve the conflict between 
Colombia and Venezuela 
due to the agreement of 
Colombia with the U.S. 
 
 
Spanish President Jose Luis 
Rodriguez Zapatero 
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Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx 
Accessed August 11 2010. 
 
November 
7
th
 2009 
  
President Lula da Silva 
offered to mediate between 
Uribe and Chavez. 
 
 
Brazilian President Lula da 
Silva 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. 
Accessed August 11 2010. 
 
 
 
  
November 
9
th
 2009 
  
Chavez ordered the military 
to be prepared for a military 
confrontation with 
Colombia.  He highlighted 
that the United States could 
try to provoke a war 
between the neighboring 
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countries. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. 
Accessed August 11 2010. 
 
November 
13
th
 2009 
  
Colombia submitted to the 
OAS (Organization of 
American States) an official 
protest regarding 
Venezuela’s constant war 
threats. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.hondudiario.com/l/sites/
default/files/imagecache/Portada/alvaro_uri
be.jpg. Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November      
403 
 
18
th
 2009 The U.S. Ambassador in 
Caracas Patrick Duddy 
certified that the military 
agreement subscribed 
between Colombia and the 
U.S. had no “aggressive” 
objective and confirmed 
that the U.S. was willing to 
support a dialogue between 
both countries in order to 
overcome the crisis. 
 
The Venezuelan Chancellor 
stated that the purpose of 
the offered mediation had 
the intention of deviating 
the responsibility of the 
U.S. in the crisis. 
 
 
U.S. Ambassador in Caracas 
Patrick Duddy 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
11 2010. 
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November 
19
th
 2009 
  
Jaime Bermudez the 
Colombian Chancellor was 
referred to as disgraceful by 
Chavez because he asked 
UNASUR (Union of the 
Nations of the South) to 
please pronounce itself 
against the war threats 
launched by Chavez. 
 
 
 
Source:http://mises.org/Community/cfs-
filesystemfile.ashx/__key/CommunityServe
r.Components.ImageFileViewer/Communit
yServer.Blogs.Components.WeblogFiles.ro
drigodiaz/6708.Foto-
Chavez.jpg_2D00_150x150.jpg. Accessed 
August 12 2010. 
 
 
 
 
  
November 
20
th
 2009 
  
Colombia alerted militaries 
to be prepared to block any 
potential aggression. 
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Colombian Minister of 
Defense Gabriel Silva Lujan 
 
Source:http://www.radiosantafe.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/11/mindefensasilva.jp
g. Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
2009 
  
Since 2008 CADIVI had 
started to present delays.  
 
During 2009 it stopped its 
payments.   
 
The firm had accumulated 
19 million USD in pending 
payments. 
 
Latam faced the uncertainty 
of how to continue 
operations in the Venezuelan 
market despite the 
suspension of payments from 
CADIVI and faced the 
uncertainty of when these 
would be payed. 
 
 
 
Latam decided to sell in the 
Venezuelan market only what 
could be collected inmediately 
due to the suspension of 
payments from CADIVI. 
 
To do so, Latam started buying 
dollars in the free market to 
pay for the exports of its 
business lines to the 
distribution platform in 
Venezuela.  Dollars in the free 
market were more expensive 
and exchange rates changed 
frequently. 
 
To define this “new” approach, 
 
The modification of the 
financial processes allowed 
Latam to stop accumulating 
pending payments in 
CADIVI and to receive 
much faster the dollars 
corresponding to its exports 
to Venezuela while other 
firms in the industry just 
stopped selling in this 
market.  Necessarily, the 
costs of operations in the 
Venezuelan market raised 
as the exchange rate for 
free market dollars was 
more expensive. 
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Latam modified its financial 
processes by determining that 
to export products to 
Venezuela, first, it had to buy 
dollars in the free market and 
then, after having assured their 
availability to pay the business 
lines, the business lines could 
proceed to export their 
products been aware of the 
exchange rate at which the 
dollars were bought by Latam. 
 
Latam also modified its 
marketing processes.  Latam 
had to change its marketing 
activities from traditional 
promotion activities to what 
one Marketing Director 
referred to “as not doing 
traditional marketing”.   
Instead, Latam’s marketing 
processes focused on 
identifying what were the most 
profitable and strategic 
products to sustain in 
Venezuela.  This involved 
leaving aside traditional 
marketing activities and 
analyzing exclusively the 
profitability and brand 
positioning of products.   
 
The change from CADIVI 
to free market dollars 
started to affect sales. 
 
The modification of 
marketing activites allowed 
Latam to focus its efforts 
on selling in Venezuela the 
most competitive and well 
positioned products of its 
portfolio (being its origin 
either Colombian or 
Peruvian).  
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November 
25
th
 2009 
  
Venezuela submitted to 
Jose Miguel Insulza, 
General Secretary of OAS, 
an official document that 
classified the military 
agreement between the U.S. 
and Colombia as a “war 
threat”, insisting on 
provoking a war with 
Colombia. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.radiosantafe.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/10/consejo-de-
seguridad-de-la-onu.jpg Accessed August 
12 2010. 
 
  
 
 
December 
2
nd
 2009 
  
Uribe denounced the illegal 
embargo Venezuela had 
installed towards Colombia. 
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Source http://www.7medios.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/12/alvaro-uribe-
590x442.jpg. Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
January 
12
th
 2010 
  
Chavez announced local 
energy cuts as a saving plan 
to assure energy availability 
before the rainy season 
started. 
  
 
The production platform in 
Venezuela faced the 
uncertainty of disruptions in 
the energy supply required to 
support its operations. 
 
The production platform 
invested resources in acquiring 
two energy plants that 
provided the site with energy 
during the cuts installed by the 
government. 
 
 
The production platform 
managed to overcome the 
disruption of its operations 
while other firms that 
lacked these plants could 
not produce at cuts. 
February 
21
st
 2010 
 
 
 
Chavez and Uribe had a 
strong discussion at the 
Meeting of the Rio Group 
in Cancun when Uribe 
talked about the 
commercial embargo of 
Venezuela towards 
Colombia and Chavez 
answered by stating that 
Colombia sent the 
paramilitary to kill him and 
threatened to leave the 
meeting. 
 
On the face of reiterative 
political tensions between 
Colombia and Venezuela 
Latam had the uncertainty of 
not knowing if it would be 
able to access information 
about its operations in 
Venezuela if the Venezuelan 
government decided to take 
over its sites.  
 
Latam implemented a replica 
of information of its operations 
in Venezuela in an external 
country from Venezuela, 
creating a necessary back up.   
 
This involved a considerable 
investment in physical capital 
to assure that the replica of 
information was activated and 
continued working overtime. 
 
 
 
Latam counted with a 
secure back up information 
system that allowed it to 
access information about its 
operations in Venezuela 
despite any interventions of 
the Venezuelan 
government. 
 
This allowed Latam to 
access its information 
without restrictions even if 
expropriated while many 
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Diplomatic sources stated 
that Uribe claimed, “these 
topics are to be discussed in 
these meetings.  Chavez is 
brave to talk about them in 
the distance but a coward to 
do so face to face.” 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/noticias-
nacion/cronologia-crisis-entre-colombia-
venezuela/131583.aspx. Accessed August 
11 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
firms that had been 
expropriated had lost access 
to their operations’ 
information. 
March 
2010 
  
The Venezuelan 
government published a 
law in the defense of the 
people for their access to 
goods and services. 
 
This law no 39.658 was 
accessed on April 13 2012 
at: 
http://www.indepabis.gob.v
e/publico/leyes/leydepabis.
pdf 
 
This law obliged the 
distribution and production 
platforms in Venezuela to 
face the uncertainty of new 
policy changes.  
 
Latam analyzed the law and 
understood that the 
Venezuelan government had 
made official a number of 
conditions which the firm had 
to comply with in other to 
assure that it respected the 
individual and collective rights 
of people in the way its 
products were designed, 
manufactured, and sold. 
 
 
The distribution and 
production platforms spent 
significant resources 
making sure they complied 
with all of the different 
requirements of this law.   
 
Latam complied with this 
law while other firms 
throughout various 
industries were sanctioned. 
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 The distribution and 
production platforms decided 
to adequate their activities to 
assure their compliance with 
the requirements of this new 
law.  In synthesis, the 
platforms adequated their 
labels, ellaborated their 
publicity in Venezuela making 
sure that the information 
transmitted was very clear and 
explicit, their promotions were 
revised and authorized by 
governmental authorities, they 
kept low inventories that 
corresponded to no more than 
one month of required 
products so that they could not 
be accused of speculating, 
their prices were always kept 
below that of the leaders in 
their different product 
categories by being price 
followers, and they received 
all governmental or 
community visits that were 
interested in revising the 
compliance of their operations. 
 
April 12
th
 
2010 
  
Brazil signed a military 
agreement with the U.S. 
and no Latin American 
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country protested.  Quite 
different from the case of 
Colombia… 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.eltie 
po.com/mundo/euycanada/ARTICULO-
WEB-PLANTILLA_NOTA_INTERIOR-
7570627.html.  Accessed August 24 2010. 
 
April 25
th
 
2010 
  
Chavez stated that if Santos 
was to be elected as 
President of Colombia this 
could “lead to a war” in the 
region. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.universia.net.co/images/
stories/articulos_especiales/vigia_articulos/
2010_01/2010_04_20_chavez_santos.png. 
Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
412 
 
 
April 26
th
 
2010 
  
Colombia denounced as 
“inacceptable” Venezuela’s 
intervention in the 
country’s electoral 
campaign. 
 
 
 
Source:http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_PkNU42h
VjI4/Szoj9Zve7TI/AAAAAAAAAHA/2H
CKdwt304g/s320/Uribe.bmp. Accessed 
August 12 2010. 
 
  
 
 
May 17
th
 
2010  
  
The Venezuelan 
government prohibited the 
selling of dollars in the free 
market by closing the free 
market through law no. 
5.975. 
 
This law was accessed on 
April 10 2012 at: 
http://microjuris.com.ve/20
10/05/20/ley-contra-los-
ilicitos-cambiarios/ 
 
 
Latam faced the uncertainty 
of how to access dollars to 
sustain its operations in 
Venezuela. 
 
Latam monitored the context 
to identify opportunities that 
would allow it to have access 
to dollars in Venezuela. 
. 
 
 
Latam continued 
supporting its distribution 
platform in Venezuela. 
 
Latam started to work on 
rapidly identifying 
alternatives to access 
dollars while other firms in 
its industry could not view 
other alternatives. 
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June 4
th
 
2010 
 
  
The Venezuelan 
government created the 
SITME (System of 
Transactions of Foreign 
Exchange Titles) through 
law no. 39.439.  Through 
SITME the firm could only 
access at the most 350,000 
dollars per month to 
finance its imports.  SITME 
was directly controlled by 
the Venezuelan Central 
Bank. 
 
This law was accessed on 
April 10 2012 at: 
https://docs.google.com/vie
wer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=
ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpb
nxnYWJlcHJ6fGd4OjJkM
TI4YzE1NDVlMTc0ZWI 
 
 
This measure confronted 
Latam with the uncertainty of 
sustaining operations in 
Venezuela since it now had 
restricted access to 350,000 
USD per month for its 
distribution operations.  
 
Latam decided to start using 
SITME and learned the 
process of requesting dollars 
through this new system.   
 
It also learned about and 
participated in the emision of 
bonds through which it could 
acquire additional dollars to 
amplify its sales in Venezuela.  
 
However, the free market 
dollars and SITME had limited 
Latam’s accesss to dollars and 
decreased its sales.  As a 
consequence of its sales 
reduction, Latam had to reduce 
the size of its distribution 
structure in Venezulea.   
 
The distribution platform 
gradually contracted to adapt 
its costs to decreasing sales in 
order to continue been 
sustainable.  In the process, the 
distribution platform changed 
from having its entire staff 
contracted as direct employees 
who attended all types of 
clients to having less staff that 
only attended directly retail 
chains and contracting external 
 
Latam had access to the 
monthly 350.000 USD 
granted by Venezuela’s 
Central Bank.  Some 
months it received less 
dollars because the bank 
reduced the amount of 
available dollars it had to 
distribute among its clients. 
 
Latam managed to buy 
some bonds and amplified 
this way its available 
dollars to pay for exports to 
Venezuela’s distribution 
platform.  Other firms in its 
industry did not catch sight 
of the alternative of buying 
bonds to increase their 
available dollars. 
 
Latam reduced the structure 
of its distribution platform 
while it searched for 
distributors to sell its 
products in Venezuela.  The 
difficulty was that these 
distributors had to similarly 
request dollars to 
Venezuela’s Central Bank 
and they did not receive 
any for a long time.  Only 
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distributors that attended 
wholesalers and stores.  All 
logistic operations were also 
outsourced.   
 
This process was done through 
2010 and 2011 with a lot of 
clarity and respect.  As a 
result, the distribution platform 
was not zued by any employee 
since Latam always sustained 
clear internal communications 
about the state of its 
operations.  Employees knew 
Latam reduced its size because 
of commercial restrictions 
rather than “poor” 
management. 
 
Consequently, the approach 
towards human capital within 
the distribution platform 
changed to encouraging 
teamwork rather than pushing 
for sales. 
 
The table below shows the 
evolution of the number of 
employees and sales in USD 
millions from 2009-2012. 
 
until March 2012, Latam 
managed to sell to two of 
its distributors in Venezuela 
a total of 287,000 USD, 
amplifying it sales in the 
Venezuelan market. 
 
 
The team of the distribution 
platform in Venezuela 
visited Latam’s central site 
as a recognition for their 
hard work in the 
Venezuelan market. 
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Year N° Employees Sales USD Millions
2009 205 79,7
2010 150 32,2
2011 116 22,1
2012 4
 
As the SITME imposed a 
restriction of 350,000 USD per 
month per importer, Latam 
searched for other importers 
that could sell its products in 
Venezuela to potentially 
recover its sales. 
 
June 20
th
 
2010 
  
Santos was elected 
President of Colombia.  He 
obtained the highest 
number of votes in the 
electoral Colombian 
history. 
 
 
 
Source:http://infolatam.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/santos-discurso-
de-ganador-Colombia2.jpg. Accessed 
 
Since Chavez had manifested 
a few months ago that if 
Santos became president of 
Colombia, he could 
eventually initiate a war, 
although the production 
platform had changed the 
legal origin of its investment 
from Colombian to Costa 
Rican, it still faced the 
uncertainty of confronting a 
potential expropriation.  
 
The production platform 
started to develop the READY 
Project which was a 
confidential project to prepare 
Latam to respond to a potential 
expropriation. 
 
The production operation 
started to buy the materials it 
previously imported from 
Colombia to local suppliers in 
Venezuela.  It made sure it 
payed just prices to its 
suppliers. 
 
 
 
Latam was better prepared 
for a potential expropriation 
on behalf of the 
Venezuelan government. 
 
The production operation 
changed the origin of its 
raw materials and payed 
just prices to suppliers to 
evidence that it was a local 
company that created local 
value. 
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August 11 2010. 
 
June 21
st
 
2010 
  
The elected president 
invited the governments of 
Ecuador and Venezuela to 
“open roads to future 
cooperation”.  The 
Venezuelan government 
congratulated President 
Santos for his election. 
 
 
 
Source:http://static.eluniversal.com/2010/0
6/06/g_3-col02_colombia-election-
santos_0601_11.jpg.550.0.thumb. Accessed 
August 12 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 16
th
 
2010 
  
Venezuela called its 
Ambassador in Colombia 
back to the country while 
Colombia asked the OAS to 
call upon the Permanent 
Council for an 
extraordinary session to 
evaluate the presence of 
Colombian terrorists in 
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Venezuela’s territory. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.7medios.com/index.php
/tag/presencia/. Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
 
 
 
July 19
th
 
2010 
  
The General Secretary of 
the UN, Ban Ki-moon, 
reminded Colombia and 
Venezuela that the best tool 
to address any difference 
between neighbors was 
through dialogue.  He 
offered all the technical 
support the UN could offer 
to resolve the bilateral 
crisis. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.7medios.com/wp-
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content/uploads/2010/02/ban-ki-moon-
590x443.jpg. Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
July 22
nd
 
2010 
  
In an extraordinary session 
of the OAS’s Permanent 
Council, Colombia 
denounced the 
“consolidated, active, and 
growing” presence of the 
guerilla in Venezuela.  
Colombia requested 
Venezuela to act upon this 
presence.  The creation of 
an international 
commission that verified 
during the next 30 days the 
existence of military camps 
from FARC in Venezuela 
was requested on behalf of 
Colombia. 
 
As a response Chavez 
announced a rupture of 
diplomatic relations with 
Colombia and ordered 
“maximum alert” at the 
frontier due to the “severity 
of the events” that took 
place in the session at the 
OAS due to Colombia’s 
request. 
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Source:http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_hwK956
COkC0/TEm88odVvMI/AAAAAAAAO3
Y/YXRAedOpi5U/s1600/ARCHIVO-
7461950-0.jpg. Accessed August 12 2010. 
 
July 2010 
  
The Venezuelan 
government conducted 
inspection visits to firms to 
demonstrate governmental 
control over the economy. 
 
These governmental visits 
intended to identify the 
non-compliance of any law 
or requirements by firms. 
 
Governmental visits 
generated overall 
uncertainty for firms 
because any non-
compliance identified by 
the government could be 
sanctioned by a fee, a 
temporary closure, the 
imposition of a 
 
Uncertainty was generated 
by the installation of these 
governmental visits because 
the regulatory framework 
was not very clear and it was 
hard for firms to make sure 
they complied with all 
requirements. 
 
The distribution platform in 
Venezuela received a 
governmental visit which 
identified that its accounting 
books were in the production 
platform’s site.  This led to a 
non-compliance since 
according to the law the 
accounting books had to be 
in the site of the distribution 
platform.  Because of this 
 
The manager of the 
distribution platform created 
several tools to make sure that 
Latam complied with all of the 
requirements that were 
identified and managed 
governmental inspections in 
the best possible way. 
 
These tools were: 
 
1. Strategic checklist 
Identified strategic topics, the 
people responsible for each 
topic, and the actions that 
have, are or will be 
implemented regarding these 
strategic topics. 
 
The strategic topics included:  
 
These tools helped the 
manager of the distribution 
platform and his team, 
make sure they took the 
necessary measures to 
prevent future sanctions or 
the disruption of 
operations.  The manager 
was responsible of updating 
these tools by incorporating 
any new requirements that 
had to be met or any new 
theme that had to be 
monitored or considered.  
These tools were unique to 
Latam improving its ability 
to comply with Venezuelan 
laws. 
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governmental co-
administration of the firm 
or expropriation. 
 
non-compliance the 
distribution platform was 
sanctioned with a temporary 
3 days closure. 
 
Latam faced the uncertainty 
of finding a way to assure its 
distribution operations would 
not be again disrupted due to 
sanctions arising from 
governmental inspections. 
 
property structure, protection 
of IT systems and information, 
protection of brands, relations 
with associations, 
communications, monitoring 
of legal affairs, corporate 
social responsibility initiatives, 
human resources, and 
expatriates. 
 
2. Operative checklist 
Identified by area all of the 
operative activities or reports 
that had to be up dated to 
assure that governmental 
inspections were passed.  The 
people responsible and the 
dates or periodicities of each 
report or activity were 
specified. It also included the 
requirements that the logistics 
operator had to meet and their 
periodicity. 
 
The areas responsible for the 
operative activities or reports 
were:  general management, 
administrative direction, 
accounting, taxing, treasury, 
human resources, regional 
sales, and logistics. 
 
3. Directory of legal 
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advice services in 
Venezuela 
Provided a directory listed by 
topic or process that indicated 
which company or companies 
in Venezuela could provide 
specialized legal advice to 
Latam. 
 
4. Corporate support 
Indicated who was responsible 
within Latam of what process 
and who supported this 
process within the corporate 
services centre.  It also 
included comments about how 
each process was being 
improved. 
 
5. Calendar for payment 
of taxes 
Detailed what taxes had to be 
payed, who within Latam was 
responsible, and the dates in 
which they had to be payed. 
 
6. Legal status of brands 
and sanitary registries 
Identified the brands directed 
to the Venezuelan market 
along with an explanation of 
their current legal status. 
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Identified the products directed 
to the Venezuelan market 
along with the status of their 
sanitary registries. 
 
7. Protocol to manage 
governmental 
inspections 
Instructed employees within 
Latam on how to manage any 
type of governmental 
inspection that could take 
place at any distribution site in 
Venezuela. 
 
August 
10
th
 2010 
  
Santos and Chavez met in 
Cartagena and announced 
the reestablishment of 
relations between both 
countries. 
 
The payment of the 
Venezuelan debt of 
CADIVI to Colombian 
firms that corresponded to 
exports which added up to 
800 million USD was 
promised to be payed.  This 
debt was caused by the 
governmental blockade of 
official currency 
transactions to Colombia. 
 
Latam faced the uncertainty 
of which markets would help 
the recovery of the sales it 
lost in Venezuela.  In 2010, 
Latam’s sales in Venezuela 
decreased.  
 
In 2010, Latam acquired a 
U.S. production platform for 
B1 in order to compensate the 
sales lost in the Venezuelan 
market. 
 
Although the top management 
team stated this acquisition 
should have been done years 
ago, it only came true as a 
response to overcome the lost 
sales in Venezuela. 
 
Other new markets where 
Latam was able to create sales 
through distributors were 
Africa, the Middle East, and 
 
Latam had effectively 
expanded its 
internationalization strategy 
and kept working on 
developing other markets. 
 
The international sales of 
Latam grew from 2002 to 
2010 by 330% well above 
industry average growth. 
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However, firms face the 
uncertainty of how to 
recover their lost sales in 
Venezuela due to currency 
restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.canalrcnmsn.com/notici
as. Accessed August 10 2010. 
 
Southeast Asia. 
 
April 22
nd
 
2011 
  
Venezuela was officially no 
longer part of the CAN 
(Andean Community of 
Nations) since it 
unilaterally decided to 
retire from this community.  
This meant that the trade 
agreements that benefited 
the firm’s exports to 
Venezuela from other 
Andean countries would 
eventually expire, 
modifying trade conditions. 
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July 14
th
 
2011 
  
The government published 
law no. 8.331about just 
costs and prices. 
 
This law was accessed on 
April 10 2012 at:  
http://www.ciudadccs.info/
wp-
content/uploads/ley_de_cos
tos_y_precios_justos20110
719-0118.pdf 
  
 
This law gave power to the 
Venezuelan government to 
determine the profit margins 
of firms and sanction those 
that did not follow such 
margins. 
 
Latam confronted the 
uncertainty of not knowing if 
their operations would be 
affected by this law. 
 
Latam investigated which 
firms or products had to follow 
this law.  It found that only 19 
products had been affected by 
the determination of specific 
profit margins.  The firm 
recognized it had to keep on 
monitoring the possible 
extension of this law to other 
products. 
 
Latam continued to monitor 
this law while other firms 
were sanctioned for not 
complying with the prices 
and margins that were 
stated for specific products. 
August 
22
nd 
 2011 
  
The Venezuelan National 
Assembly published law 
no. 39.741 about sports, 
physical activity, and 
education through which it 
obliged companies to 
annually pay 1% of their 
net utilities for the 
promotion of sports, 
physical activity, and 
education. 
 
This law was accessed on 
April 10 2012 at: 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/fi
cheros-
2011/08/25/Im_1_3_31372
2386_in1_archivo_2.pdf?A
WSAccessKeyId=1V02D0
 
Latam faced the uncertainty 
of been able to sustain its 
distribution operations in 
Venezuela with increasing 
operational costs. 
 
Latam decided to pay this 
annual tax and to continue 
monitoring its operational 
costs in order to determine 
improvement opportunities. 
 
Latam continued 
distribution operations in 
Venezuela. 
 
Paying this tax was the 
correct response to continue 
complying with 
governmental policies, 
firms that didn’t were 
sanctioned. 
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W3KSR4KHZ90B82&Exp
ires=1335388004&Signatur
e=KchNWEPPOklWeZhgZ
c2yUiCl0hI%3D 
 
2011 
  
Diplomatic relations 
between Colombia and 
Venezuela have improved. 
 
Latam confronted the 
uncertainty of whether or not 
to invest more resources in 
its already existing 
operations in Venezuela. 
 
Latam decided not to grow its 
infraestructure since although 
diplomatic relations had 
improved, this could be 
temporary. 
 
The decision was not to grow 
but to preserve current 
operations. 
 
 
Latam kept its investments 
at the same level, other 
firms in its industry left 
Venezuela, while none 
invested further in the 
country. 
 
After experiencing political 
uncertainties especially in 
Venezuela, and in Ecuador 
and Nicaragua, Latam 
declared to be more aware 
of the potential impact of 
the political environment in 
its operations. 
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APPENDIX 11 
 
 
 
   
 
CHRONOLOGY ABOUT THE IMPACT OF ECUADOR’S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ON  
LATAM’S OPERATIONS (1999 – 2011) 
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A chronology of critical incidents (Miles and Huberman, 1994) is presented below to retrospectively describe the events which have framed the high 
uncertainty political environment in Ecuador that has had an impact on Latam’s operations from 1999 up to 2011.  Although the timeframe of our 
research is set from 1999 to 2011, this chronology starts in 1992 to describe the governmental instability that since then was visible in Ecuador.  
Nevertheless, the first political event to affect Latam’s operations in Ecuador occurred in 1999.   
 
To develop the following chronology assuring the objective inclusion of the most relevant events, we triangulated the responses of the 60 interviewees 
that were interviewed with documents and media articles.  All of the data presented throughout the chronology about Latam was provided directly by its 
employees during 2011 and 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
429 
 
DATE 
FIRM’s 
HISTORY 
POLITICAL EVENTS 
UNCERTAINTIES 
GENERATED FOR THE 
FIRM BY POLITICAL 
EVENTS 
FIRM’s STRATEGIC 
RESPONSES TO 
POLITICAL 
UNCERTAINTIES 
OUTCOMES 
August 
10
th
 
1992 
 
  
Sixto Durán Ballén was 
elected President of 
Ecuador.  His government 
lasted until the 10
th
 of 
August of 1996 which 
was the expected 
presidential period. 
 
 
President Sixto Durán 
Ballén 
 
Source:http://www.enciclopediadelecuad
or.com/temasOpt.php?Ind=724&Let=. 
Accessed February 2012. 
 
   
February 
1995 
 
Latam founded a 
distribution 
platform in 
Ecuador during 
February of 1995 
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that later started 
operations during 
the following 
month of June.  
This distribution 
platform was 
created through 
an alliance with 
an Ecuadorian 
company that 
lasted until 1998. 
 
Latam’s 
distribution 
platform in 
Ecuador started 
by importing 
products from 
business lines 1 
and 2 during June 
(1995) and later 
during September 
(1995) it also 
started importing 
products from 
business line 3, all 
from Colombia. 
 
August 
10
th
 
1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abdalá Bucaram became 
President of Ecuador.  His 
government lasted until 
the 6
th
 of February of 
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1997 when a social revolt 
requested his resignation.  
The Ecuadorian Congress 
responded by dismissing 
him from the position of 
Ecuadorian President 
arguing that he was 
“mentally incapable of 
governing”. 
 
 
President Abdalá Bucaram 
 
Source:http://guayaquilcultura.com/muse
odeguayaquil.com/index.php?option=co
m_phocagallery&view=detail&catid=2:p
residentes-del-ecuador&id=43:ab-abdala-
bucaram-
ortiz&tmpl=component&Itemid=317. 
Accessed February 2012. 
 
February 
11
th
 
1997 
  
After Bucaram was 
dismissed from his 
position as President of 
Ecuador, the Ecuadorian 
Congress named Fabián 
Alarcón President of 
Ecuador.  His government 
began on the 11
th
 of 
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February of 1997 and 
lasted until the 10th of 
August of 1998. 
 
 
President Fabián Alarcón 
 
Source:http://guayaquilcultura.com/muse
odeguayaquil.com/index.php?option=co
m_phocagallery&view=detail&catid=2:p
residentes-del-ecuador&id=44:dr-fabian-
alarcon-
rivera&tmpl=component&Itemid=317. 
Accessed February 2012. 
 
August 
10
th
 
1998 
  
On the 10
th
 of August of 
1998, Jamil Mahaud was 
elected President of 
Ecuador. 
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President Jamil Mahaud 
 
Source:http://proyectolatinoamerica.wiki
spaces.com/Ecuador-La+historia. 
Accessed February 2012. 
 
March 
11
th
 
1999 
  
Ecuadorian President 
Jamil Mahuad declared a 
“bank holiday” and froze 
the financial sector.  The 
government argued this 
was a necessary measure 
since specialists estimated 
an annual inflation of 
1000% that was not 
sustainable. 
 
 
As a result of the “bank 
holiday” the distribution 
platform in Ecuador had its 
bank account “frozen”.   
 
Consequently, in exchange for 
the 300,000 USD that were in 
the account, the distribution 
platform received some bank 
certificates with which it could 
pay taxes. 
 
Latam confronted the 
uncertainty of cash flow 
availability to continue its 
operations due to 
governmental policies. 
 
Latam kept a team working 
together to make decisions 
about the Ecuadorian market 
and permanently used the 
knowledge of human capital 
about the Ecuadorian context 
to understand, anticipate, and 
react. 
 
The distribution platform in 
Ecuador had more money 
represented in these bank 
certificates than it actually 
required to pay taxes.  
Therefore, after paying taxes, 
it sold the rest of these bank 
certificates through the stock 
 
The distribution platform’s timely 
and successful negotiation of bank 
certificates allowed it to avoid the 
loss of approximately USD 
120,000. 
 
 
Latam made cash available from 
Colombia to Ecuador as a way to 
increase the distribution 
platform’s cash flow in Ecuador. 
Latam also increased its capital 
investment in the distribution 
platform.  This illustrates how the 
distribution platform in Ecuador 
counted with the support of Latam 
to pay its obligations and salaries 
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exchange and received 
dollars that were used to pay 
its other obligations at an 
exchange rate of 17,300 
sucres per dollar.  Fifteen 
days later, the exchange rate 
changed to 29,000 sucres per 
dollar. 
 
To overcome the distribution 
platform’s absence of cash, 
Latam made cash available to 
the distribution platform in 
Ecuador from Colombia so 
that the distribution platform 
could pay its obligations and 
salaries in Ecuador. 
 
Latam also decided to 
increase the distribution 
platform’s capital investment 
from 1,050,000 million USD 
to 1,725,440 million USD.  
This decision had two 
objectives.  The first was 
providing the distribution 
platform in Ecuador with 
additional cash flow for 
regular transactions.   The 
second, was improving its 
investment capital so that the 
distribution platform in 
Ecuador would not incur into 
whilst it suffered the effects of the 
“bank holiday”.  Several firms in 
the industry had to delay many of 
their operations while Latam 
managed to continue operating. 
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a state where it would have 
to be dissolved according to 
the law (when losses reach 
more than 50% of capital). 
 
January 
9
th
 2000 
  
Ecuadorian President 
Jamil Mahuad announced 
his decision to dollarize 
the economy. USD 1 = 
ECS 25,000 (Ecuadorian 
Sucres) 
 
President Jamil Mahuad 
 
Source:http://www.cidob.org/var/plain/st
orage/images/documentacion/biografias_
lideres_politicos/america_del_sur/ecuado
r/jamil_mahuad_witt/18206-6-esl-
ES/jamil_mahuad_witt_ficha_biografia.j
pg. Accessed February 2012. 
 
 
The uncertainty experienced 
during 1999 and 2000 was 
generated by the fast 
devaluation of the sucre and 
then by the dollarization of the 
Ecuadorian economy.  
 
The dollarization of the 
Ecuadorian economy seriously 
threatened the distribution 
platform’s sales in Ecuador. 
Due to the dollarization of the 
economy, the accounts 
receivable had to be changed 
from sucres to dollars and this 
involved a loss for the 
distribution platform in 
Ecuador.   
 
The dollarization and 
devaluation exposed Latam to 
the uncertainty of fast-
changing prices for 
negotiations and accounts 
receivables to be collected. 
 
 
 
Due to the dollarization 
process, the exchange rate 
between sucres and dollars 
was very volatile. As a 
consequence, the distribution 
platform in Ecuador changed 
its price lists every week and 
then every day during 
January of 2000.  Therefore, 
the dollarization implied a 
day to day revision of the 
competitiveness of all of the 
products sold by the 
distribution platform in 
Ecuador.  Especially, of the 
products sold by fractions of 
coins.  These products had to 
be permanently monitored 
since they were the most 
sensitive to price changes. 
 
The distribution platform in 
Ecuador converted its 
accounts receivable from 
sucres to dollars in order to 
comply with the law.  It also 
followed a governmental 
 
Due to the uncertainty generated 
by the dollarization, the 
distribution platform’s sales 
decreased by 6% from 1999 to 
2000. The products that were 
found to be more competitive 
after the dollarization were the 
products in which Latam offered a 
higher aggregate value because 
these were not as price sensitive.  
Latam concentrated on selling 
more of this type of products than 
before. 
 
The distribution platform in 
Ecuador amortized from 2000 to 
2005 approximately 101,000 USD 
every year as a loss generated by 
the differential of the currency 
exchange. 
 
Ecuador’s dollarization brought 
stability to prices and to the 
national economy.  The interest 
rate changed from 70% annual 
effective rate (when sucres were 
the official currency) to 14.5% 
436 
 
resolution that allowed firms 
to amortize for the following 
5 years (since 2000) the 
losses generated by the 
diferrential of the currency 
exchange. 
 
 
 
 
annual effective rate when the 
dollarization took place.  Inflation 
also decreased to averages below 
5%.  Therefore, although the 
dollarization had negative short 
term effects for firms with 
operations in Ecuador, it was a 
positive decision in the long term 
that enhanced the Ecuadorian 
economic stability and 
consequently benefited the 
economic environment for the 
operations of the distribution 
platform. 
 
January 
21
st
 2000 
  
Military troops led by 
Lucio Gutierrez and 
indigenous groups 
demanded the resignation 
of Ecuadorian President 
Jamil Mahuad. There was 
a coup d'état. 
 
New military and indigenous 
board in power 
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Source:http://presidentespamela.blogspot
.com/2010/04/jamil-mahuad-witt.html. 
Accessed February 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 
22
nd
  
2000 
  
Gustavo Noboa became 
the President of Ecuador 
after the collapse of 
Mahuad’s government by 
receiving the power to 
rule from the military 
board.  His government 
lasted up to 2002. 
 
 
President Gustavo Noboa 
 
Source:http://www.noboafrenteaunainfa
mia.com/modules/contenido/su_curriculu
m.php. Accessed February 2012. 
 
Novemb
er 24
th
 
2002 
  
During free elections in 
2002, Lucio Gutierrez 
(who led President 
Mahuad’s coup d'état) 
was elected as President 
of Ecuador. 
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President Lucio Gutierrez 
 
Source:http://www.geneall.net/H/per_pa
ge.php?id=534851. Accessed February 
2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 
20
th
 
2005 
  
Many middle class 
Ecuadorians came 
together since the 13
th
 of 
April of 2005, with the 
support of different 
sectors, to protest against 
the government of 
President Lucio Gutierrez 
and search for the 
instalation of a new 
government.  These 
protests were known as 
the "rebelión de los 
forajidos". 
In response to this protest, 
on the 20
th
 of April of 
2005, the Ecuadorian 
Congress decided to 
dismiss Lucio Gutierrez 
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as President of Ecuador 
on the basis of the 
constitutional law that 
allowed the Congress to 
dismiss the Ecuadorian 
President on the charge of 
“abandonment of duty”. 
Lucio Gutierrez facing 
protestors 
Source:http://presidentespamela.blogspot
.com. Accessed February 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As it is evidenced, Ecuadorian 
Presidents changed frequently 
during the last decade and this 
instability generated overall 
political uncertainty in 
Ecuador.  Political instability 
translated into political 
uncertainty that mainly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latam adopted a long term 
perspective that enabled it to 
decide to sustain operations 
in Ecuador despite the 
instability of its governments 
during the last decade.  
 
Although there was political 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latam sustained its operations in 
Ecuador. 
April 
20
th
 
2005 
  
Vice president Alfredo 
Palacio became the 
President of Ecuador.  
Alfredo Palacio was the 
eight Ecuadorian 
President in less than a 
decade.  His government 
lasted up to the 15
th
 of 
January of 2007. 
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President Alfredo Palacio 
 
Source:http://www.geneall.net/H/per_pa
ge.php?id=533446. Accessed February 
2012. 
 
involved policy uncertainty for 
businesses. 
 
 
instability, the operations of 
Latam had not been directly 
affected by the frequent 
changes in government.  
Differently, the distribution 
platform’s operations had 
been affected by policy 
decisions such as the bank 
holiday and the dollarization 
of the Ecuadorian economy. 
 
 
 
January 
15
th
 
2007 
  
On the 15
th
 of January of 
2007, Rafael Correa 
became President of 
Ecuador. 
 
 
President Rafael Correa 
 
Source:http://fotos-rafael-
correa.seebyseeing.net/. Accessed 
February 2012. 
 
   
2007 
 
Latam acquired a 
   
This acquisition allowed 
 
Through its new production 
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production 
platform for 
business line 2 in 
Peru.  
 
Latam to develop exports 
from its production platform 
in Peru to its distribution 
platform in Ecuador. 
platform in Peru Latam could 
provide products from business 
line 2 to the distribution platform 
in Ecuador despite political 
tensions between Colombia and 
Ecuador. 
 
Decemb
er of 
2007 
  
The Constitutional 
Mandate no. 8 was 
released announcing the 
elimination and 
prohibition of 
outsourcing. 
 
This Constitutional 
Mandate was accessed on 
February 20 2012 at: 
http://www.captur.com/D
ocs/Mandato_Constituyen
te8.pdf 
 
The arguments supporting 
the announcement of 
Constitutional Mandate 
no. 8 were that 
Ecuadorian labor 
legislation allowed direct 
employees to participate 
in the distribution of 15% 
of the profit of the firm 
they worked for, 
according to the number 
 
The distribution platform in 
Ecuador had 150 employees 
contracted through outsourcing  
and according to the 
Constitutional Mandate no. 8 it 
could no longer outsource the 
recuitment of these employees. 
 
The distribution platform in 
Ecuador faced the uncertainty 
of been able to sustain 
operations with the higher 
costs that involved the direct 
recruitment of additional 
employees that were before 
contracted through 
outsourcing.  Until this date, 
outsourcing had translated into  
lower laboral costs and 
flexibility for the distribution 
platform in Ecuador. 
 
The distribution platform in 
Ecuador had to directly hire 
150 employees (before 
outsourced empoloyees) in 
order to comply with the 
Consittutional Mandate no. 
8. 
 
The distribution platform’s 
number of employees increased 
dramatically augmenting 
operational costs by 1%.  To 
compensate the increase of 
operational costs, the distribution 
platform in Ecuador introduced an 
austerity plan for its expenses and 
worked on increasing sales. 
 
Due to Consittutional Mandate 
no. 8, unemployment increased in 
Ecuador. Firms had to lay off 
many outsourced employees since 
they could not afford increments 
in the number of their direct 
employees.  Overall, 
unemployment in Ecuador rose 
from 7.3% in 2008 to 8.6% in 
2009 (comparing the first 
trimesters). 
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of members of their direct 
family.  Direct employees 
also received 
compensations when their 
contracts finished.  
Differently, employees 
that were contracted 
through outsourcing were 
not allowed any 
participation in the profit 
of the firm they worked 
for and could be laid off 
without compensation.   
 
Consequently, through 
Mandate no. 8 the 
government claimed that 
equal labor conditions 
would be granted to all 
employees since it 
eliminated outsourcing 
obligating firms to 
directly hire all of their 
employees. 
 
March 
1
st
 of 
2008 
  
The Colombian military 
pursued a mission in 
Angostura, Ecuador 
where they killed Reyes 
(leader of the Colombian 
FARC guerilla) without 
previously requesting 
 
Correa’s government fueled 
anti-Colombian feelings after 
the killing of Reyes in 
Ecuador. 
 
Anti-Colombian feelings 
became a threat to Latam’s 
 
Latam was politically 
neutral.  It did not adopt any 
stance. 
 
To avoid the interference of 
anti-Colombian feelings in 
the operations of the 
 
The political neutrality of Latam 
avoided anti-Colombian feelings 
to affect its operations in Ecuador.  
This stance, dimished market 
tensions. 
 
Ecuadorians were better received 
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authorization to the 
Ecuadorian government. 
 
This event was considered 
an attack to the 
sovereignty of Ecuador by 
President Rafael Correa. 
 
 
 
Ex-leader of FARC guerilla 
Rafael Reyes 
 
Source:http://nuestraeconomiaudea.blogs
pot.com/2008/04/el-conflicto-de-
colombia-con-los-paises.html. Accessed 
February 2012. 
 
operations in Ecuador by 
confronting it with the 
uncertainty of how to avoid the 
interference of these feelings 
in its operations since it 
offered products with a 
Colombian origin and had 
Colombian employees 
involved in operations in 
Ecuador. 
distribution platform in 
Ecuador, all negotiations 
with retail chains were led by 
Ecuadorians within the 
distribution platform in 
Ecuador, not by Colombians. 
than Colombians in negotiations 
and these ranned smoothly. 
March 
3
rd
 2008 
  
As a consequence, of the 
Colombian military 
operation in Ecuador, 
President Rafael Correa 
broke diplomatic relations 
with Colombia. 
 
The Colombian 
 
Latam experienced the 
uncertainty of expecting the 
frontier to be closed or 
restricting measures to be 
imposed on imports.   
 
Although there were several 
unrests at the frontier a 
 
Latam continued operations 
in Ecuador.  Taking into 
account that the frontier 
could be closed at any point 
in time, the distribution 
platform in Ecuador 
increased its inventory stock 
from 25 to 45 days.  This 
 
Although diplomatic relations 
broke, commercial relations kept 
trade developing. 
444 
 
Ambassador in Ecuador 
was expelled and the 
Ecuadorian Ambassador 
in Colombia was called to 
return to Ecuador. 
 
Ecuadorian troops were 
sent to the border with 
Colombia but no 
confrontation took place. 
 
 
President Rafael Correa 
 
Source:http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2011
/11/08/poderes/80041. Accessed 
February 2012. 
 
military confrontation did not 
take place.  
measure was a preventive 
response that intended to 
guarantee the availability of 
products in case of a frontier 
closure due to any political 
conflict. 
April 
26
th
 of 
2009 
  
On the 26
th
 of April of 
2009, Correa was 
reelected as President. 
 
 
 
Latam confronted the 
uncertainty of not knowing if 
Correa could be willing to 
increase taxes.  Analysts stated 
Correa would do so. 
 
 
 
As a result of these 
expectations, the distribution 
platform in Ecuador 
permanently monitored the 
development of tax 
legislation.   
 
These expectations also 
 
The distribution platform’s 
awareness about possible changes 
in tax regulations allowed it to 
quickly assess the impact of any 
new taxes or changes on current 
tax legislation. 
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Reelected President Rafael 
Correa 
 
Source:http://nuevageopolitica.blogspot.c
om/2009_08_05_archive.html. Accessed 
February 2012. 
 
made Latam evaluate if 
sustaining a distribution 
platform was more profitable 
and less risky than initiating 
production operations. 
July 10
th
  
2009 
  
The COMEXI 
(International Commerce 
and Investment Council) 
resolution no. 494 was 
published on the 10th of 
July of 2009 stating: 
“Safeguards will be 
applied during one year to 
correct the alteration of 
the normal conditions of 
competition to imports 
from Colombia.  They 
will apply to products 
shipped since the 13
th
 of 
July of 2009.” 
 
These safeguards include 
quotas and additional 
tariffs. 
 
Quotas were imposed to 
Colombian imports in 
Ecuador. 
 
Latam confronted the 
uncertainty of determining 
how these quotas threatened its 
exports to Ecuador. 
 
Latam studied which 
products were affected by the 
imposition of quotas in order 
to be able to comply with this 
safeguard. 
 
Latam found that the quotas 
imposed affected the product 
lines of barquillos and 
wafers. 
 
Latam decided to adopt a 
long term perspective and 
kept exports to Ecuador.  Its 
decision was to sell what was 
allowed by the quotas. 
 
 
Latam did not export barquillos to 
Ecuador so it was not impacted by 
the imposition of quotas to 
barquillos. 
 
The quotas that were imposed to 
wafers were initially thought to 
affect this product line but in 
practice these quotas had no effect 
on wafers.  Instead, what affected 
wafers was the tariff that was 
imposed to this product.  Because 
of the tariff, wafers changed their 
price from one fraction of a coin 
to another more expensive 
fraction of a coin.  This change in 
price decreased the quantity of 
wafers sold and this quantity of 
wafers did not reach the quota 
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This measure will affect 
Colombian exports since 
Ecuador is one its most 
important export 
destinations 
 
Source:http://www.semana.com/economi
a/ecuador-restringe-importaciones-
colombianas/126187-3.aspx. Accessed 
February 2012. 
restrictions. 
 
 
Additional tariffs on 
Colombian imports going into 
Ecuador reached up to 50%. 
 
Latam confronted the 
uncertainty of determining 
how these tariffs threatened its 
exports to Ecuador. 
 
Latam identified which 
tariffs would be imposed on 
its products. 
 
Latam along with the 
distribution platform in 
Ecuador decided to sell the 
products which could 
maintain the best possible 
competitive positions despite 
the increase in prices due to 
the tariffs. 
 
The distribution platform in 
Ecuador continued operating.  
Business line 2 products 
originating from Peru were 
not imposed any safeguards 
and played an important role 
during this point in time in 
Ecuador.   
 
There was no visible 
expropriation risk. 
 
 
 
Due to the imposition of tariffs 
prices increased, products became 
less competitive and sales 
decreased deteriorating market 
participation.  Nestle which was a 
foregin investment that had a 
local production platform in 
Ecuador, gained market share.  
Also, La Universal an Ecuadorian 
firm, increased its market share.  
Overall, Ecuadorian food firms 
gained market share whilst Latam 
lost market share. 
 
The tariffs mainly affected the 
products sold by fractions of 
coins.  For example, Latam 
offered a product that was sold for 
15 cents (USD) and saw an 
increase to 17 cents (USD), 
consequently it had to then be 
sold at 20 cents.  At the price of 
20 cents (USD), the consumer 
could choose from a different 
portfolio of products.  This 
affected Latam because it lost the 
market for its business line 2 
products during the time that the 
tariffs were present. Its 
participation in the category of 
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business line 2 dropped from 68% 
in 2007 to 6.8% in 2011. 
Similarly, in business line 1, 
Latam sold a product that was 5 
cents (USD) and that then had to 
be sold at 10 cents (USD).  As a 
result, this product went from 
selling 8,000 boxes to 1,000 
boxes per month. 
 
The following table shows how 
the sales of the most impacted 
products decreased due to the 
imposition of tariffs: 
 
 
 
As sales decreased, there was less 
money to invest in marketing. 
 
Latam learned that it could not 
depend on products that were sold 
at low fractions of coins.  It 
2007 2008 2009 2010
PRODUCT B1 1.097.885 1.319.930 571.500 318.542
GROWTH % 20% -57% -44%
PRODUCT B2 1.383.352 802.520 388.985 172.586
GROWTH % -42% -52% -56%
PRODUCT B2 546.365 634.536 359,88 288.886
GROWTH % 16% -43% -20%
PRODUCT B3 826.860 976.727 737.337 1.009.246
GROWTH % 18% -25% 37%
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should rely on higher profit 
margin products with higher 
aggregate value.  The reason is 
that the prices for these type of 
products are not as sensible as 
those of fractions of coins.  
Therefore, many of the products 
that are being launched in 
Ecuador are those with more 
aggregate value which are not as 
sensitive to price changes. 
 
August 
8
th
 2009 
  
The CAN (Andean 
Community of Nations) 
determined during August 
8
th
 of 2009 through the 
resolution no. 1250 that 
the devaluation of the 
Colombian peso (COP) 
against the US dollar 
between June of 2008 and 
June of 2009, translated 
into the loss of 
competitiveness of 
Ecuadorian products in 
the face of Colombian 
products.  The alteration 
of competitive conditions, 
allowed Ecuador to adopt 
safeguards against 
Colombian imports. 
 
 
Latam understood safeguards 
were going to be present for 
some time with the support of 
this resolution published by 
the CAN.  Latam faced the 
uncertainty of been able to 
sustain operations overtime 
despite these safeguards. 
 
Latam also confronted the 
challenge of employees 
doubting the continuity of 
operations in Ecuador and 
having low enthusiasm. 
 
Latam trasmited a clear 
message of political 
neutrality and assured 
employees the continuity of 
operations. 
 
The clarity that characterized the 
communication with employees 
allowed these to understand that 
their special effort was required to 
sustain sales that could assure the 
continuity of operations.  The 
perspective of Latam was to 
maintain operations as long as 
possible in Ecuador.  Employees 
felt that if Latam had as a long 
term objective sustaining their 
operations in Ecuador, hopefully 
they would be able to sustain 
operations through the imposition 
of safeguards if they worked on 
reducing costs whilst maintaining 
sales. 
449 
 
 
Logo of CAN 
 
Source:http://www.comunidadandina.org
/prensa/noticias/10-8-09.htm. Accessed 
February 2012. 
 
February 
3
rd
 2010 
  
Ecuador informs the CAN  
about the COMEXI 
(International Commerce 
and Investment Council) 
resolutions it adopts on 
the 3
rd
 of February of 
2010. 
Resolution no. 548 states: 
“the application of 
safeguards to imports 
with a Colombian origin 
is terminated.”   
 
Resolution no. 549 states: 
“a schedule for the 
termination of the 
safeguards is as follows:   
 
10% since January of 
2010 
30% from the 23
rd
 of 
March of 2010  
 
 
 
The termination of 
safeguards allowed the 
distribution platform in 
Ecuador to recover sales and 
market participation. 
 
Latam recalculated prices 
without safeguards.  Prices 
became more competitive. 
 
Sales and market participation 
started to improve. 
450 
 
30% from the 23
rd
 of May 
of 2010 
30% from the 23
rd
 of July 
of 2010.” 
A total of 1.346 products 
had suffered the 
imposition of safeguards 
since July of 2009. 
The communication of the 
termination of safeguards 
finalized a difficult period 
for Colombian exports to 
Ecuador. 
 
 
 
Source:http://portalgamarra.blogspot.co
m/2010/01/ecuador-desmontara-
gradualmente.html. Accessed February 
2012. 
 
April 
14
th
 
2010 
  
The Ecuadorian 
government published the 
 
This new legislation 
confronted Latam with the 
 
During 2011 Latam is 
revising its portfolio and raw 
 
During 2011 the distribution 
platform in Ecuador keeps selling 
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intra-ministries agreement 
no. 001-10 regarding 
school bars. Through this 
agreement the 
government regulated the 
amounts of fat, saturated 
fat, sugar, and salt that 
can be sold in food 
products to under age 
students. 
 
The intra-ministries 
agreement was accessed 
on the 20th of February 
2012 in: 
http://issuu.com/poderesip
/docs/acuerdo_interminist
erial_reglamento_bares_e
scolares 
 
 
Ecuadorian students 
 
Source:http://www.elnuevoempresario.co
m/noticias_22640_socializaran-en-todo-
el-ecuador-reglamento-que-regula-el-
funcionamiento-de-bares-escolares.php. 
Accessed February 2012. 
 
uncertainty of how to respond 
to these new requirements.  
This challenge implies an 
important decision: if Latam 
wants to sustain its sales in 
Ecuador, it will probably have 
to substantially change its 
products since currently 
(December 2011) none of 
them comply with this law. 
 
Latam found that this law 
imposed sanctions to the 
owners of the school bars but 
not to their suppliers.  Until 
December 2011, the owners of 
school bars were found to still 
not be following the law 
because massive inspections 
had not been conducted.  The 
owners of the school bars did 
follow some other points 
included in the law regarding 
hygiene and the physical 
layout of the bars but they 
were still regularly buying 
products from Latam which 
did not comply with this law. 
 
 
materials.  Serious research 
is advancing through 
Vidarium regarding how can 
products improve their 
nutrition value and reduce 
their contribution to obesity 
and other health issues. 
 
Although Ecuador is 
becoming very strict in 
nutrition, Latam is not only 
revising its portfolio of 
products for this country but 
in general for all markets.  
This seems to be  a 
generalized future market 
trend. 
 
 
to school bars but it is working on 
modifying its products worldwide 
to improve their nutrition value.  
This initiative involves important 
investments. 
 
Complying with these 
requirements is important for 
Latam not only because these 
have become a global market 
trend but because nutrition 
requirements can also become a 
trade restriction in the case that 
any government decides to ban 
the imports of products that do not 
comply. 
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Novemb
er 26
th
  
2010 
  
Colombian President Juan 
Manuel Santos and 
Ecuadorian President 
Rafael Correa met during 
UNASUR (Union of the 
Nations of the South) in 
Georgetown, Guyana. 
The Colombian and 
Ecuadorian governments 
announced the 
reestablishment of 
diplomatic relations. 
 
 
Ecuadorian President Rafael 
Correa and Colombian 
President Juan Manuel 
Santos at Unasur 
 
Source:http://www.elespectador.com/noti
cias/politica/articulo-237170-correa-dice-
el-presidente-santos-tiene-gran-espiritu-
integracionis. Accessed February 2012. 
 
   
January 
& 
February 
2011 
  
Ambassadors came back 
to their offices. 
 
 
Diplomatic relations improved 
and trade was fluent.  Latam 
did not face threatening 
 
Although Latam did not face 
threats stemming from 
political events or decisions 
 
Latam claims that the decision to 
sustain operations in Ecuador 
through uncertain years was the 
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On the 14
th
 of January the 
Ecuadorian Ambassador 
Raúl Vallejo initiated his 
work in Colombia. 
 
On the 3
rd
 of February 
Colombian Ambassador 
Fernando Arboleda Ripoll 
started his work in 
Ecuador.  
 
political uncertainties at this 
point in time. 
it became more aware of the 
influecence the political 
environment may have on its 
operations. 
right one as the political 
environment becomes less of a 
threat to imports from Colombia. 
Novemb
er 24
th
 
2011 
  
The Ecuadorian 
government increased the 
tax to currency exit 
(Impuesto a la salida de 
divisas – ISD) from 2% to 
5%. 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.americaeconomia.co
m/economia-
mercados/comercio/ecuador-anuncio-de-
impuesto-la-salida-de-divisas-provoco-
caida-de-la-inve. Accessed February 
2012. 
 
 
The increase of up to 5% of 
the tax to currency exit 
(Impuesto a la salida de divisas 
– ISD) increased the costs of 
Latam’s operations in 
Ecuador.  Latam confronted 
the uncertainty of how to 
respond to this governmental 
policy. 
 
The distribution platform in 
Ecuador reduced its 
operational costs by 2% and 
started a savings plan of 1%. 
Additionally, it revised the 
prices of its products in order 
to increase profit to partially 
cover this tax without losing 
competitiveness. 
 
 
 
The imposition of the tax was 
overcome through these responses 
and operations continue with a 
close monitoring of costs, prices, 
sales, and market participation. 
February 
7
th
 2012 
  
The reporters Juan Carlos 
Calderon and Christian 
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Zurita were sentenced to 
pay 2 million USD to 
President Rafael Correa 
for the moral damages 
that he assured to suffer 
due to their book about 
the polemic contracts his 
brother sustained with the 
government. 
 
Source:http://www.amazon.com/HERM
ANO-OFICIO-CONTAR-Spanish-
ebook/dp/B0055PONTE. Accessed 
February 2012. 
 
February 
16
th
 
2012 
  
President Rafael Correa 
won a lawsuit against the 
newspaper El Universo. 
The Ecuadorian 
maximum court 
condemned the three top 
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executives and one ex 
editor of the newspaper El 
Universo to three years in 
jail and the payment of 40 
million USD.  These 
executives requested 
political asylum in 
Panama. 
The dispute began in 
March of 2011 when 
Correa requested 80 
million USD after editor 
Emilio Palacio published 
an article titled “No to 
lies” which addressed that 
during the 30
th
 of 
September of 2010 Correa 
left the police hospital 
where he was retained 
during a revolt. A bloody 
military fight took place 
leaving behind several 
victims. 
The editorial warned “that 
in the future, perhaps a 
new president that may be 
an enemy of Correa could 
take him into trial for 
ordering fire in a hospital 
without previous notice 
and where innocent 
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people were present.” 
Correa stated this was a 
great precedent against 
the private media which 
he declared as corrupt. 
President Rafael Correa 
speaking to media after the 
court’s announcement 
Source:http://www.elpais.cr/frontend/not
icia_detalle/2/62548. Accessed February 
2012. 
 
 
 
February 
2012 
  
The Ecuadorian 
government is currently 
(February 2012) debating 
the approval of a 
communication law. The 
final debate is estimated 
for 2012. 
 
This law will address the 
following points: 
 
Children may not appear 
 
This new communication law 
threatens to affect Latam’s 
marketing strategy because 
most of its products are 
directed to children and 
involve children in 
commercials.  If this law is 
approved, marketing costs will 
also be increased since a 
“special” commercial will 
probably have to be created 
and produced in Ecuador to 
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in commercials. 
 
Statements that cannot be 
proved cannot be 
included.  Example:  
“Chocolisto makes you 
grow”. 
 
TV commercials must be 
produced mainly in 
Ecuador. 
 
comply with this law.  Latam 
confronts the uncertainty of 
not knowing if the law will be 
approved and if approved how 
it should best respond to its 
requirements. 
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APPENDIX 12 
 
 
 
   
 
CHRONOLOGY ABOUT THE IMPACT OF NICARAGUA’S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ON  
LATAM’S OPERATIONS (1999 – 2011) 
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A chronology of critical incidents (Miles and Huberman, 1994) is presented below to retrospectively describe the events which have framed the high 
uncertainty political environment in Nicaragua that has had an impact on Latam’s operations from 1999 up to 2011.   
 
To develop the following chronology assuring the objective inclusion of the most relevant events, we triangulated the responses of the 60 interviewees 
that were interviewed with documents and media articles.  All of the data presented throughout the timeline about Latam was provided directly by its 
employees during 2011 and 2012. 
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DATE FIRM’s HISTORY POLITICAL EVENTS 
UNCERTAINTIES 
GENERATED FOR THE 
FIRM BY POLITICAL 
EVENTS 
FIRM’s STRATEGIC 
RESPONSES TO POLITICAL 
UNCERTAINTIES 
OUTCOMES 
 
Decem
ber 7
th
  
1999 
  
Colombia and Nicaragua 
have a territorial dispute 
over San Andres, 
Providencia, Santa 
Catalina, and other 
territories. 
Since 1803, Spain 
declared these islands as 
Colombian territory.  
Later, during the 24
th
 of 
March of 1928, the 
Esguerra – Barcenas 
treaty was signed between 
Colombia and Nicaragua. 
This treaty recognized 
that San Andres, 
Providencia, Santa 
Catalina, and other 
territories were 
Colombian. The meridian 
82 was determined as the 
limit between both 
countries.  
During 2001, Nicaragua 
declared the Esguerra – 
Barcenas as “null” and 
presented a lawsuit 
 
The territorial dispute 
between Colombia and 
Nicaragua had not 
interfered with the 
business environment 
until the 7
th
 of December 
of 1999 when the 
National Assembly of 
Nicaragua announced 
through law no. 325 the 
installment of a tax of 
35% to imports of 
products with a 
Colombian or Honduran 
origin.   
 
The government 
announced that the funds 
collected through this tax 
were required to cover the 
expenses generated by the 
legal procedures that 
originated because of the 
territorial dispute between 
Nicaragua and Colombia. 
 
This law was accessed on 
the 28
th
 of February of 
2012 at:  
 
Latam knew that while the 
sovereignty tax to 
Colombian imports existed, 
it would not be able to 
compete in the Nicaraguan 
market with products 
produced in Colombian 
production platforms. 
 
Consequently, Latam 
started to analyze where it 
could effectively acquire 
production platforms that 
could efficiently supply 
Nicaragua and other 
Central American markets 
with competitive products. 
 
Latam decided to aim for 
acquisitions in Costa Rica 
which offered a strategic 
position to supply Nicaragua 
and other Central American 
markets. 
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against Colombia in the 
International Court of 
Justice claiming as 
Nicaraguan the territories 
to the east of the 82 
meridian. 
During the 13
th
 of 
December of 2007, the 
International Court of 
Justice recognized the 
sovereignty of Colombia 
over San Andres, 
Providencia, and Santa 
Catalina.  But it left open 
the consideration of 
border limits by the 82 
meridian and the 
sovereignty of some small 
islands like Serranilla, 
Quitasueño, Serrana, 
Roncador, and Bajo 
Nuevos. 
This dispute has not yet 
been settled at the start of 
2012. 
http://www.mific.gob.ni/L
inkClick.aspx?fileticket=
G1LZWNr9WkI%3D&ta
bid=232&language=en-
US 
 
Products with a Honduran 
origin also suffered the 
imposition of the 
sovereignty tax because 
Honduras had signed a 
treaty with Colombia 
during 1986 in which the 
maritime limits between 
both countries were 
established.   
 
Although this treaty had 
been signed since 1986, it 
was just until the 20
th
 of 
December of 1999 that 
both countries exchanged 
ratifications of the treaty.   
 
This treaty was accessed 
on the 21
st
 of May of 
2012 at: 
http://www.sogeocol.edu.
co/documentos/trat_col_h
onduras.pdf 
 
Since the 7
th
 of December 
of 1999, imports with a 
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Source:http://campuscomunicativo.com/?
p=471. Accessed February 2012. 
 
Colombian origin were 
obliged to pay this tax in 
Nicaragua. This tax was 
named “impuesto por la 
soberania” or sovereignty 
tax.   
 
The sovereignty tax 
caused imports with a 
Colombian origin to lose 
their competitiveness in 
the Nicaraguan market. 
Latam faced the 
uncertainty of how could 
it compete in the 
Nicaraguan market having 
its products produced in 
production platforms 
located in Colombia. 
 
March 
11
th
 
2003 
  
The Nicaraguan 
government published law 
no.449 to announce that 
the sovereignty tax 
imposed on imports with 
a Honduran origin was 
terminated. 
 
This law was accessed on 
the 21
th
 of March of 2012 
at:   
http://legislacion.asamble
 
The sovereignty tax 
imposed to imports with a 
Colombian origin 
continued.  This sustained 
a restrictive condition for 
Latam’s products 
produced in production 
platforms located in 
Colombia. 
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a.gob.ni/Normaweb.nsf/%
28$All%29/44C19B3A67
5BC60C0625720D0057F
EFD?OpenDocument 
 
Nicaragua argued that the 
decision to terminate the 
sovereignty tax imposed 
on imports with a 
Honduran origin was 
based on the intention of 
promoting Central 
America’s economic 
integration. 
 
2004 
 
Latam acquired two 
production 
platforms in Costa 
Rica: a production 
platform for 
business line 1 and 
a production 
platform for 
business line 2. 
 
These production 
platforms allowed 
Latam to supply 
products from these 
two business lines 
to the Nicaraguan 
market and other 
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Central American 
markets. 
 
2004 
 
During 2004, 
Latam also founded 
a distribution 
platform in 
Nicaragua that 
started to supply 
this market. 
 
The distribution 
platform in 
Nicaragua 
distributed products 
from the two 
business lines 
which were 
imported from the 
production 
platforms located in 
Costa Rica. 
 
   
Latam organized a team to 
evaluate potential 
acquisitions in the Central 
American region.  
Eventually, it acquired two 
production platforms and 
founded a distribution 
platfom.  Through the 
acquisition of the two 
production platforms in 
Costa Rica, the distribution 
platform that was founded 
in Nicaragua was in a 
competitive position to 
import products from 
business lines 1 and 2 from 
Costa Rica since these 
products were not charged 
with a soveregnity tax. 
 
Latam used the knowledge 
of human capital about the 
Costa Rican and 
Nicaraguan contexts to 
understand, anticipate, and 
react. 
 
There was no visible 
expropriation risk. 
 
The distribution platform in 
Nicaragua was able to offer 
competitive products from 
business lines 1 and 2 in the 
Nicaraguan market. 
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2006 
 
Latam acquired a 
second production 
platform for 
business line 1 in 
Costa Rica. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
March 
2007 
 
This second 
production platform 
(for business line 1) 
acquired in Costa 
Rica already owned 
a distribution 
platform located in 
Nicaragua.   
 
This distribution 
platform was found 
to be more efficient 
in costs and 
operations than the 
distribution 
platform that Latam 
had already 
founded during 
2004. 
 
Consequently, it 
was decided that 
the distribution 
platform (originally 
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founded by the firm 
during 2004) was 
absorbed by the 
second distribution 
platform (owned by 
the second 
production platform 
for business line 1 
acquired during 
2006) to become 
Latam’s only 
distribution 
platform in 
Nicaragua. 
 
This decision was 
based on the fact 
that running two 
distribution 
platforms in the 
same country was 
not efficient.   
 
Logically, the 
absorption decision 
focused on that the 
most efficient 
distribution 
platform absorbed 
the less efficient 
one. 
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2008 
 
In Costa Rica, the 
first production 
platform for 
business line 1 
acquired during 
2004 was also 
absorbed by the 
second production 
platform for 
business line 1 
acquired in 2006. 
 
This absorption 
took place due to 
the high brand 
recognition that the 
second production 
platform for 
business line 1 
enjoyed of in 
Central America.   
 
Both production 
platforms were 
integrated into one 
increasing 
productiveness and 
competitiveness. 
 
The administrative 
and commercial 
structures of the 
production and 
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distribution 
platforms were 
integrated obtaining 
more effectiveness 
and coverage. The 
brands gained more 
“value” and sales 
increased.   
 
2011 
 
 
 
The sovereignty tax still 
applies to imports with a 
Colombian origin in 
Nicaragua. 
 
The sovereignty tax 
imposed to Colombian 
imports in Nicaragua 
signifies that the 
distribution platform in 
Nicaragua cannot yet 
competitively offer 
products with a 
Colombian origin to the 
Nicaraguan market.  
 
 
During 2011, the 
distribution platform in 
Nicaragua is studying the 
possibility of also  
importing products from a 
production platform of 
business line 2 that Latam 
acquired in Mexico in order 
to amplify its product 
portfolio. 
 
 
Latam manages to sustain 
operations in Nicaragua. 
 
  Although it is a small market 
it is strategically important and 
presents future growth 
possibilities, especially if the 
sovereignty tax comes to an 
end. 
 
Latam was able to design a 
way to offer products in the 
Nicaraguan market while 
competitors were still 
investigating how to do so. 
 
 
